The Cold War Between Turkey And Iran – Analysis

The Cold War Between Turkey And Iran – Analysis

By: Published by the Foreign Policy Research

June 21, 2012
By Can Kasapoglu

With American clout in the Middle East on the decline, the historic power
struggle between Turkey and Iran has intensified, each attempting to fill
the vacuum in the region by expanding its influence. Syria and Iraq have
become the battlefields between Turkey and Iran. In Syria, a proxy war is
underway, with Iran supplying weapons to its Alawite client and Turkey
actively arming the opposition. In Iraq, Turkey and Iran vie for political
influence along Sunni-Shiite fault lines. In neither arena is Turkey seen
as the regional leader it aspires to be.
[image: Iran – Turkey Relations]

Iran – Turkey Relations

The US withdrawal from Iraq, and its corresponding decline in regional
influence, has left a power vacuum in the Middle East. Two historic rivals,
Turkey and Iran, have stepped into the fray; each hoping to extend its
influence at the expense of the other. With Syria and Iraq serving as the
battlefields, the lines of battle have been drawn mostly along Sunni-Shiite
sectarian divisions.
In Syria, where the Sunni majority is struggling to overthrow the Alawite
Assad regime, Turkish-Iranian differences can have dire consequences for
Arab lives. A proxy war has effectively developed, with the Iranians
supplying weapons to their Alawite clients and Turkey actively arming the

The victims of the recent massacre in Houla, who numbered more than 100,
half of whom were children, served as pawns in the regional game between
the ancient rivals. Tehran sided with the Assad regime in claiming that the
murders were perpetrated by terrorists and foreign forces. Whereas Ankara
demanded that Syria withdraw its diplomats from Turkey within 72 hours. The
Turkish foreign ministry also threatened to take further `measures’ if
crimes against humanity continued in Syria.

In contrast with the Syrian scenes of carnage, the Turkish-Iranian showdown
in Iraq includes less bloodshed and more political maneuvering. Ankara and
Tehran each has its favored political groups and personalities. The pro-
Iran Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and the pro-Turkish Sunni Vice
President Tarek Hashimi each serves as a respective `man in Baghdad.’

Under pressure from the Iran-aligned Maliki, an arrest warrant was issued
for Hashimi on charges of running death squads against Iraqi Shiites.
Interpol subsequently issued its own arrest warrant for Hashimi. However,
the erstwhile vice prime minister has found refuge in Turkey, and Ankara
has made clear that it is not about to hand over its man in Baghdad.

Clearly, a Cold War has developed between Turkey and Iran in the Middle
East. While so far tensions have remained relatively stable, there is a
real possibility of things heating up.

In Syria, the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad is coming under increasing
pressure from an expanding insurgency. Ankara has offered sanction and
armed and moral support to the opposition.

Turkey’s Hatay province has become the headquarters of the Free Syrian
Army, while the Friends of Syria, which is critical of Assad held a meeting
in Istanbul on April 1, 2012.

Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, has told the Turkish Parliament
that Damascus has the blood of innocents on its hands, and that Turkey
`would not offer its hand to such a regime unless it cleans itself up.’

In contrast, Iran continues to support the Baathist regime politically and
militarily. Iran even acknowledges that its Quds Forces, the arm of the
Revolutionary Guards tasked with overseas operations, has conducted
operations in Syria. Ismail Gha’ani, the deputy head of the Quds force, has
`Before our presence in Syria, too many people were killed by the
opposition but with the physical and non- physical presence of the Islamic
republic, big massacres in Syria were prevented.’

There is also reason to believe that Iran’s Lebanese ally, Hezbollah, has
played a supportive role in the bloody crackdown.
Syria has become the test field of Ankara’s and Tehran’s proxy war
capabilities. Iran is much more experienced in waging proxy wars in a wide
array of areas, ranging from Afghanistan to Lebanese Hezbollah and
Palestinian radical Muslims. However, as atrocities similar to the Houla
massacre continue to mount, there is increasing risk that the low intensity
conflict could provoke a military intervention.

The scenario of an intervention would be a game changer. Currently, Iran
can leverage its superior experience in proxy warfare. However, Turkey
holds the advantage with regard to conventional warfare capacity. Thus,
Iran can have the upper hand as long as the Syrian crisis does not force a
military intervention by the West and/or Turkey.

Ever since the American departure from Iraq, Turkey and Iran have each
tried to use their weight to affect the political makeup of the country and
extend their influence. The competition first surfaced in the parliamentary
elections of 2010 when Ankara supported the relatively secular and Sunni
dominated Iraqiya party, which included Hashimi’s Renewal List. Tehran on
the other hand, stood behind the State of Law Coalition, which included
Maliki’s Islamic Da’awa Party, and other Shiite Islamist groups which
gathered under the National Iraqi Alliance bloc.

Although the Sunni Iraqiya garnered two seats more than the State of Law
Coalition in the elections, Maliki managed to keep his position as prime
minister by consolidating his power with the more radical, pro-Iran Shiite
groups of the National Iraqi Alliance, including the Sadrists and Supreme
Iraqi Islamic Council. Maliki has gradually seized greater personal control
over the country by simultaneously retaining multiple critical posts, such
as acting interior minister, defense minister and national security affairs

It was under these circumstances that the pro-Ankara Vice President Hashimi
was forced to flee the country. Hashimi first took refuge with the regional
government of Northern Iraq, and then travelled to the Sunni Gulf states
before settling in Turkey.
In Iraq, the regional Sunni-Shiite fault lines are clearly visible. Baghdad
has aligned itself with Iran in support of the Alawite regime in Syria. It
has blocked an attempt by the Arab League to adopt a harsh resolution
against Assad’s crackdown.

The formation of a Shiite bloc has corresponded with a Turkish-Iraqi
divergence, which peaked in April 2012, when Maliki labeled Turkey `a
hostile state.’ This statement was made in response to Prime Minister
Erdogan’s accusation against the Maliki administration of fomenting
sectarian tensions in Iraq.

Ankara responded to the Shiite bloc by deepening its ties with Sunnis and
with Kurds in northern Iraq, in addition to hosting Tarek Hashimi in

Turkish-Iraqi, and sectarian, tensions have simmered to the point that they
have been manifest on the street. On May 19 there were anti-Turkey
demonstrations and a burning of the Turkish flag in Basra, a Shiite
province. These acts infuriated the Turkish public.

Adherents of the Turkish foreign policy doctrine, the so-called Davutoglu
Doctrine, wish to see Turkey as the rising star of the region; as the
leader of a regional `spring.’ Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu has
declared that, `Turkey will lead the change in the Middle East as its
master and servant.’

However, in Syria and Iraq the `Arab Spring’ has turned into the sectarian
winter of the Islamic world, with Turkey as a problematic protagonist, not
a leader. Early on, Davutoglu promoted a ‘zero problems with neighbors’
foreign policy, which aimed to enhance Turkey’s power in the historical
Ottoman territories and promote integration for making national borders
meaningless -all in an attempt to restore Turkish (Ottoman) regional
hegemony. Yet Turkey’s involvement in Shiite-Sunni conflicts renders this
doctrine an unattainable utopia. None of the local players see Turkey as
the regional leader it aspires to be.

Can Kasapoglu, who holds a Ph.D. from the Strategic Research Institute at
the Turkish War College, is a visiting post-doctoral researcher at the
Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. This essay is reprinted with
permission from BESA Perspectives, No. 172, June 11, 2012, published by The
Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.
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Published by the Foreign Policy Research