US State Department and Javakhk: The WikiLeaks Cables Part I
asbarez
Friday, September 9th, 2011
Javakhk
With the publication of all WikiLeaks cables from the US State
Department and its diplomatic missions worldwide, interesting
information has become available regarding many issues of concern to
Armenia and Armenians. One of these issues is the situation in
Javakhk, the Samtskhe-Javakheti administrative region in southern
Georgia, bordering the Republic of Armenia.
WikiLeaks published around 100 cables with references to Javakhk, from
US missions in Tbilisi, Yerevan, Moscow, Ankara and Baku, as well as
the State Department.
The cables from the Ankara and Baku embassies are mainly regarding the
Kars-Akhalkalak-Baku railroad construction. There are references to
this railroad in cables from the US diplomatic missions in Yerevan and
Tbilisi.
The following is a chronological presentation of what the US
diplomatic cables contain about Javakhk.
The list starts with a cable from the US Embassy in Yerevan, dated 12
February 2004 (Identifier: 04YEREVAN347), about the official openning
ceremony in Yerevan of the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation-Dashnaktsutyun 29th World Congress. In the cable US
Ambassador Ordway writes: `Dashnak Party Chairman Hrand Margarayan’s
February 6 comments on relations with Turkey, N-K, and Georgia’s
Armenian population sparked renewed controversy among Armenia’s
political elite. Margaryan declared during his address to the Armenian
Revolutionary Federation (ARF or `Dashnaksutyun’) 29th World Congress
that the GOAM should not entertain closer relations with Turkey,
endorsed permanent independent status for all geographic regions
involved in the N-K conflict and called for autonomy for the Armenian
enclaves in Georgia’s Javakheti region. FM Vartan Oskanian, who
himself addressed the meeting before Margaryan’s speech, was quick to
distance himself and the GOAM from these statements during press
opportunities this week.’ Amb. Ordway goes on: `The most unexpected
part of Margaryan’s speech was a call for autonomy for Armenians
living in Georgia’s Javakheti region. He declared that Javakh (sic)
was `now a part of the Armenian agenda’ and accused successive
Georgian regimes of discrimination and exploitation of the country’s
Armenian population. He fell short of calling for an independent state
and clarified that an autonomous Armenian region should exist within
the Georgian state. Margaryan claimed that the Armenian Diaspora was
increasingly supportive of the ARF’s approach to Javakheti.’ According
to the Ambassador, the `Speech creates headaches for the GOAM.’ `FM
Vartan Oskanian, who himself addressed the meeting before Margaryan’s
speech, was quick to distance himself and the GOAM from these
statements during press opportunities this week. Oskanian did not
criticize Margaryan’s comments, but went to great lengths to
categorize them as ARF opinions that `do not reflect Government of
Armenia policy.’ MFA spokesman Hamlet Gasparian responded aggressively
to the speech by reciting constitutional passages giving the president
authority to create foreign policy. Local news outlets carried his
closing statement that, `[Foreign Policy] issues are a constitutional
prerogative of the President,’ not of the Dashnaks,’ concludes the
cable.
The second published US diplomatic cable with reference to Javakhk, is
dated 30 August 2005 (Identifier: 05YEREVAN1576), on the
`Kocharian-Saakashvili `Unofficial Meetings’.’ The confidential cable
by Ambassador Evans reads in part: `On August 21, Armenian President
Robert Kocharian hosted Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili at his
summer residence on Lake Sevan for what Armenian press characterized
as an `informal’ visit. Armenian Defense Minister Serzh Sarkisian and
his Georgian counterpart Irakly Okruashvili also attended. The two
presidents met for similar `unofficial’ discussions at a Georgian ski
resort in April 2005.’ Armenian `Presidential spokesman Viktor
Soghomonian, who traveled with Kocharian to Sevan, declined to discuss
specifics but told us `press reports are accurate.’ Previous meetings
between the two leaders, Soghomonian said, usually focus on economic
cooperation – particularly transit of Armenia’s imports and exports
through Georgia – and Georgia’s largely ethnic Armenian Javakheti
region.’ The cable includes the statement posted on Kocharian’s
official website: `Begin text of statement as published (original in
English): On August 21-22, President of Georgia Michael Saakashvili
made an unofficial visit to Armenia. Michael Saakashvili and Robert
Kocharian discussed issues related to the Armenian-Georgian relations
and current socio-economic situation in Javakhk at the summer
residence of the President of Armenia on the Sevan Lakeshore. At the
briefing with journalists President of Armenia said that leaders of
the neighboring states should meet more than once during the year.
Those meetings can be official or unofficial. The very fact that we
are conducting not only official but also friendly contacts with
Georgia is a very good sign. `I think that relations of the Presidents
will have their impact on the relations of common people. Relations
between the people of the two states can be established through
contacts, reciprocal visits, tourism, business and common interest –
all this should be reestablished. It is not possible to do it in one
or two days, however it is possible to ruin it in one or two days. We
must preserve and cherish the relations that have been built through
the generations and do our best to develop them further,’ concludes
the Armenian presidential statement quoted in Ambassador Evans’ cable.
A 20 September 2005 (Identifier: 05ANKARA5444) cable from the US
Embassy in Ankara reports on the Turkish press summary. It includes a
headline about `Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan Railroad Project’, according
to which `Turkey will host a meeting on September 19 to discuss the
developments regarding the Kars-Javakheti-Tbilisi-Baku Railway
Project, weekend papers report. The Turkish and Azerbaijani ministers
of transportation and the Georgian infrastructure minister will
participate in the meeting to discuss the project, which aims to
establish a direct railway between Turkey and Georgia and between
Turkey and Azerbaijan via Georgia. The three countries signed a
memorandum of understanding in December last year to put the project
into force. The project will further develop the Eurasia-Caucasus-Asia
transportation corridor, and contribute to efforts to revive the
historic Silk Road, say reports.’
Next is a confidential report from the US Embassy in Yerevan, dated 27
January 2006 (Identifier: 06YEREVAN119), reporting on the Russian
Defense Minister’s visit to Armenia. Amb. Evans writes that the
`Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov arrived in Armenia January 26
for meetings with Armenian President Robert Kocharian, Defense
Minister Serzh Sargsyan, and Chief of General Staff General Mikhael
Harutiunyan. Speaking at Yerevan’s Zvartnots Airport (extreme weather
conditions postponed Ivanov’s flight from Baku) reporters quoted
Ivanov saying he planned to discuss `the entire complex of bilateral
issues.’ Armenian Defense Minister Serzh Sargsyan touted
`Russian-Armenian military cooperation’ as `steadily developing.’
Ivanov inspected Russia’s 102nd military base in Gyumri, and announced
Russian plans to transfer additional materiel from Georgia.’ Amb.
Evans goes on: `The Russian base is a component of Armenia’s national
security and we still need that base,’ Sargsyan told reporters. During
his visit, Ivanov inspected the 102nd military base, and announced to
press that he observed no problems with base storage depots. According
to press reports, Russian General Aleksander Baranov, commander of
Russia’s North Caucasian Military District, told Ivanov that 102nd
depots have reached 60 percent capacity (following transfers of
materiel from the Russian base in Akhalkalaki), with additional
storage for additional transfers of materiel from Georgia.’
In a 31 January 2006 confidential cable (Identifier: 06YEREVAN130)
from the Embassy in Yerevan, Amb. Evans writes `Coupled with the
country’s major source of electricity (the Armenian Nuclear Power
Plant), the Hrazdan units will produce enough electricity to cover
Armenia’s demand as well as generate a surplus to export to Georgia.
While Armenian officials wait for the Hrazdan thermal power plant
boilers to heat, Armenia has begun energizing two power lines (a
process which can take several hours) to Georgia (one through Alaverdi
to Tbilisi and one through Ninots Minda (sic) (Georgia) to Georgia’s
ethnic Armenian-populated region of Javakheti).’
Amb. Evans’ next WikiLeaks published cable is dated 5 April 2006
(Identifier: 06YEREVAN489). The Ambassador reports about his visit to
`Armenia’s northwest Shirak province;’ `During our March 21 visit to
Gyumri (Shirak’s capital), Ashotsk (near Armenia’s borders with
Georgia and Turkey), and Bavra (on the Armenia-Georgia border), we met
with local community leaders and political party officials […]. The
potential economic impact of unrest in Georgia’s Samstkhe-Javakheti
region (ref B), they said, was a significant issue for Shirak.’
`Shirak Governor’s Chief of Staff and Ramkavar Party official Norik
Grigoryan added, as did many of the local community leaders and party
officials with whom we met, that unrest in Georgia’s
Samstkhe-Javakheti region had the potential to destabilize the entire
region by closing transit and trade routes. Along those lines,
Grigoryan said, proposals to build an alternate railway skirting
Armenia would be `disaster’ for Shirak.’ `Villagers in Bavra and
Ashotsk alleged that, since the March 10 protests triggered by the
murder of an ethnic Armenian in Tsalka (ref B), border guards had
selectively barred Armenians from crossing through the Bavra border
checkpoint. According to Grigoryan, officials in the region had been
ordered to steer clear of even the perception that the GOAM was
contributing to the escalation of tensions in Georgia, which `could
include’ government orders to prevent `criminal elements’ from
entering Georgia and further stirring ethnic tensions.’
In a cable classified as confidential from the US EMbassy in Moscow,
dated 15 June 2006 (Identifier: 06MOSCOW6358), Ambassador Burns
reports that `DAS Kramer accompanied by the DCM called on Russian MFA
Fourth CIS Department Director (DAS equivalent) Andrey Kelin June 13
to discuss Caucasus issues. (Kramer met subsequently one-on-one with
DFM Karasin on other regional agenda items.) […] Kelin was more frank
than most Russians about games Russia is playing to irritate Georgia,
putatively in response to Georgian `nastiness.’ His hints about the
Armenians of Samtskhe-Javakheti and the Azeris of Kvemo Kartli echo
calls by Moscow’s chattering class to `activate’ those communities
against Georgia (something both Armenia and Azerbaijan have always
tried to discourage).’
Another `Media Reaction Report’ from the US Embassy in Ankara, a cable
dated 20 June 2006 (Identifier: 06ANKARA3641) writes that `Radikal
reports that, while in Baku, FM Gul was received by President Ilham
Aliyev of Azerbaijan. The meeting focused on Kars-Tbilisi-Javakheti
(Ahilkelek)-Baku railway project. Gul stressed that Turkey, Azerbaijan
and Georgia should come together to overcome several difficulties
about the project.’
In a 28 September 2006 cable (Identifier: 06TBILISI2590) from the US
Embassy in Tbilisi, Ambassador Tefft reports that `The Georgian
government announced the arrests of four Russians and eleven Georgians
on September 27, in connection with an alleged espionage ring. […] The
Russian MFA issued a statement claiming that the four arrested
Russians were in charge of the withdrawal of Russian forces from the
Akhalkalaki and Batumi bases.’
The next day, in a confidential cable from the US Embassy in Moscow
(Identifier: 06MOSCOW11029) Ambassador Burns reports that Russian `MFA
Fourth CIS (Caucasus) Deputy Director Dmitriy Tarabrin reviewed the
diplomatic steps that Russia had or was about to take today in
response to the arrests. They are: […] – drawdown of staff and
dependents from the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi and Russian military
facilities in Tbilisi, Batumi and Akhalkalaki.’
The Kars-Akhlkalaki-Baku railroad project is discussed in a
confidential cable (dated 20 October 2006, Identifier: 06YEREVAN1476)
from the Embassy in Yerevan, about the meeting EUR DAS Bryza had with
Armenian Prime Minister Andranik Margaaryan on October 4, `to
encourage Armenia to work towards free and fair elections in 2007 and
2008 and to discuss energy security and other regional issues.’ DCM
Godfrey reports that `The Prime Minister was concerned that Armenia
was excluded from certain regional projects; he mentioned both the BTC
pipeline and the proposed railroad connecting Azerbaijan, Georgia and
Turkey (ref. C) which he said would `blockade’ Armenia. He said that
Georgia was being cautious about the proposal, but was under pressure
from Turkey and Azerbaijan. Markarian called for more international
involvement on this issue suggesting that the EU could pressure Turkey
to give up the proposal as part of accession negotiations. Bryza said
that the U.S. did not support the Kars-Akhalkalaki railroad. He said
we saw a difference between the pipeline and the railroad and, while
we supported the BTC because of the need to have multiple sources of
energy for Europe, we favored a railroad that would link the entire
region, including Armenia. Bryza added that while it might be possible
to engage on the issue in the EU, it appeared that Azerbaijan was
willing to finance the project on its own and was working hard to move
it forward.’
Amb. Burns reports in a 15 November 2006 confidential cable
(Identifier: 06MOSCOW12457)[viii] from the US embassy in Moscow that
Russian `Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov has
made himself more available to the media and the general public in
recent weeks.’ Ivanov has announced that `All Russian troops will
depart the Tbilisi garrison by the end of December 2006. Withdrawal
from the base in Akhalkalaki will be completed in 2007 and from the
base in Batumi in 2008.’
In a 22 November 2006 cable (Identifier: 06TBILISI3069) classified as
confidential, Amb. Tefft gives high marks to Saakashvili’s
administration. `In place of a nearly-failed state, the GOG has built
a cohesive nation with maturing democratic institutions […]. The GOG
successfully re-integrated the Adjara region in 2004. Russian bases
that have existed in Georgia for over 200 years are being withdrawn
and NATO, citing reform progress has given Georgia Intensified
Dialogue (ID).’ `On May 30, 2005, the Russian and Georgian Foreign
Ministers signed a Joint Statement agreeing to a timeline for the
withdrawal of Russian military forces from its bases in Batumi and
Akhalkalaki by October 1, 2007. Russia fulfilled the 2005 provision of
the Joint Statement calling for the removal of 40 armored vehicles,
including 20 tanks, by the end of October 2005 (slightly behind
schedule because of weather delays). Russia fulfilled its 2006
withdrawal requirements ahead of schedule, removing all remaining
heavy equipment from Akhalkalaki, as well as equipment and ammunition
from Batumi, by mid-September 2006. All remaining Russian military
forces and equipment in Akhalkalaki and Batumi are on schedule to be
removed from Georgia by October 1, 2007.’
Following the closure of the Russian military base in Akhlkalak, the
US starts to show a closer interest with the problems of Javakhk. In a
confidential cable dated 27 November 2006 (Identifier: 06YEREVAN1645),
US Embassy in Yerevan CDA Godfrey reports: `Georgia’s predominantly
Armenian Samstkhe-Javakheti (S-J) region periodically makes news in
Armenia, colored by the local perception here that Georgians treat
their Armenian minority shabbily. Armenian government officials have
not generally complained on this theme, but others, including the
governing-coalition Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF)
`Dashnaktsutyun’ party, bemoan what they view as Georgian neglect of
the impoverished and isolated community. Working together, Yerevan and
Tbilisi poloffs recently interviewed the ARF, an Armenian-based
Javakheti advocacy group, and local analysts to assess the issue from
a Yerevan perspective’. `RUN-OF-THE-MILL POVERTY OR POLITICAL NEGLECT?
Though our interlocutors assigned varying degrees of blame to the
Georgian government for the socio-economic problems that plague S-J,
none let the GOG completely off the hook. Giro Manoyan, a member of
the nationalist ARF’s party secretariat (or `Buro’) said that while
the Armenian community’s situation has improved under President
Saakashvili, conditions in S-J remain worse than that of other poor,
but ethnically Georgian, regions. He stopped short of accusing the
Georgians of politically motivated neglect, and noted that the GOG is
beginning to pay attention to the roads out of S-J, thanks to
Georgia’s Millennium Challenge Account. Manoyan said he believed the
road would jump-start the region’s revitalization, and that he hoped
the next such project would be a joint Armenian-Georgian venture. Up
until now, the roads’ poor condition prevented S-J residents from
selling goods in Tbilisi, a situation that exacerbated regional
poverty in an area without industry, guaranteed electricity or viable
infrastructure. […] Shirak Torosian, the S-J-born chairman of the
Javakh (sic) Union of Compatriots and a member of the Armenian
pro-government Powerful Fatherland party, was less measured in his
criticism of the GOG. `Nobody wants to help,’ Torosian said. `It’s
political that infrastructure is not guaranteed for Javakheti.’
Torosian went further than Manoyan on the issue of autonomy, too. At
first he said that he and his organization did not advocate autonomy
for the region, but then noted that the oft-touted
`self-determination’ for S-J was really the same thing as autonomy. He
said he avoided the word `autonomy’ in public because it tended to
raise Georgian and Western ire. […] Anna Mnatsakanian from the
Armenian Relief Society, a Dashnaktsutyun-affiliated social welfare
organization that works in S-J, said she did not think the region’s
problems were worse than those of similarly poor areas elsewhere in
Georgia. She thought the Saakashvili administration did pay attention
to the region, but noted that infrastructure problems were severe. She
said that in the winter of 2005, three children died of the flu
because there was no ambulance service in their S-J village. S-J.
SHOULD SAMSTKHE-JAVAKHETI RESIDENTS STAY IN GEORGIA? […] Both Torosian
and Manoyan were adamant that it is in Armenia’s interest for S-J
residents to stay put, if only to prevent others from moving in. Both
raised the specter of Turkish atrocities past, and fretted over the
idea that Meshkhetian Turks or ethnic Azeris might expand into the
region if ethnic Armenians migrated south, which would put unfriendly
faces at one of Armenia’s two remaining friendly borders. […] Torosian
said ethnically Armenian S-J residents are tied to Georgia only by
virtue of employment. He said they consider themselves Armenian, and
consider where they live to be somehow part of Armenia, but look to
Tbilisi for opportunities to earn a living. That said, Torosian said
their ties to Armenia are stronger and more compelling. For example,
although the proposed Baku-Akhalkalaki-Kars railroad will help S-J
economically, Torosian said the ethnic Armenians there did not support
the project because it bypassed Armenia. (COMMENT: It,s also possible
that this is just what Yerevantsi prefer to believe their kindred up
north think. END COMMENT.) He said that although he would like the
Armenians to stay in S-J, the Georgians were trying to force them out
by refusing to help solve their problems. […] Manoyan said he
encouraged reluctant S-J residents to learn Georgian so they could
obtain an education and participate in politics. `I’m not sure they
want to learn Georgian,’ Manoyan said, adding that the residents
feared losing their Armenian identity because they knew the GOG tended
to try to assimilate national minorities, rather than integrate them.
He said the GOG should be understanding of the complexities of
introducing Georgian as a state language in such an isolated and
underdeveloped region. GOAM STAYS OUT OF IT […] Though NGOs and
individual political parties are concerned with the region’s problems,
the Armenian government is staying out of it. Vartan Hakobian, head of
the MFA’s CIS desk, told us that the government views S-J as a
strictly domestic Georgian concern, not a bilateral issue. […] Earlier
in the summer, a working group of NGOs and others met to discuss
Armenia-Georgia issues, focusing in large part on S-J. After the
meetings, Hranush Kharatian, head of the GOAM’s national minorities
department, told reporters at a press conference, `The result of
discussion of problems accumulated in Javahk (sic) at the state level
would be higher than at the level of experts and NGOs, but we have
problems and they need to be discussed.’ BUT THE PRESS DOES NOT […]
Javakheti schools were a hot topic in the Armenian press this summer,
and continue to make news into the fall. Newspapers have complained
that ethnic Armenians have less chance of gaining admission to the
Akhalkalaki branch of Tbilisi State University, because of their
Georgian language deficiencies. Javakheti activist Torosian was
featured in one article published in the Russian-language Regnum news
service in June regarding the language battle. Torosian railed against
the Georgian requirement that all classes, save Armenian language and
Armenian history, be taught in Georgian. The author of the article
succinctly described the Javakheti dilemma, writing, `Of course, he
who does not want to sell potatoes in Javakh should learn Georgian to
be able to integrate into Georgian society and to work in Georgian
governmental structures. COMMENT […] Barring any sudden crisis,
Samstkhe-Javakheti seems unlikely to become a major political issue
for the GOAM any time soon because the problem is not pressing, and
boxed-in Armenia knows it must maintain working relations with its
northern neighbor (and closest outlet to the sea). Though Armenian
NGOs and political parties are concerned about the welfare of their
compatriots in Georgia, their level of involvement in the region does
not get far beyond a lot of talk, and a little welfare assistance.
However, the S-J situation is among other, more pressing factors –
such as Georgia’s friendly relations with Azerbaijan, and the fallout
of its fracas with Russia – that contribute to Armenians, general
dissatisfaction with Georgia. It likely would not take all that much
to arouse Armenian indignation on the subject should events turn
sour.’
In a `Media Reaction Report’ from the US Embassy in Ankara, dated 20
December 2006 (Identifier: 06ANKARA6709), it is reported the `Visiting
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili said he considered `the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas
pipeline a guarantee of energy safety and stability in the region,’
adding Georgia was also ready to help the construction of
Kars-Javakheti (Ahilkelek)-Tbilisi-Baku railway.’
The U.S. stance on the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku Railroad is part
of a cable dated 29 January 2007 (Identifier: 07YEREVAN93) from the
Embassy in Yerevan.
Ambassador Tefft, in a confidential cable dated 9 February 2007
(Identifier: 07TBILISI263), reports that in a February 8 meeting with
[Tbilisi Embassy] DCM Mark X. Perry, Valeri Chechelashvili, Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia expressed strong disappointment
that the February 7 meeting of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan,
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Georgian President Saakashvili,
along with meetings of Energy and Trade Ministers of the three
countries, did not produce better results in terms of securing gas
supplies for Georgia.’ `During the meeting, Saakashvili, Erdogan and
Aliyev signed an agreement confirming construction of the
Kars-Akhalkalaki-Baku railway (reftel). Chechelashvili said the
project was signed by Georgia despite the GOG’s concerns about the
impacts on Georgia’s Black Sea ports. The project is important to
Georgia’s number one and two trade partners, Turkey and Azerbaijan,
and so it will go forward, he said. Georgia is well aware of Armenia’s
opposition to the project, and before the deal was signed, Minister of
Foreign Affairs Bezhuashvili talked to the Armenian Foreign Minister
to allay his fears. President Saakashvili publicly mentioned Georgia’s
interest in good relations with Armenia in the presence of both
Erdogan and Aliyev, Chechelashvili said. Saakashvili was quoted in
reports of the event as saying Georgia does not want any country of
the region to be isolated from regional cooperation. Chechelashvili
said that Georgia wants to do what it can to help Armenia have
transport capacity. For the past year, Georgia has allowed Armenian
trucks to use its roads free of transit fees, although this gesture
lost importance when the Russians closed the only legal border
crossing into Russia in mid-2006. Armenia has reciprocated for
Georgian truckers but free transit through Armenia is not especially
useful to Georgia, Chechelashvili said. The GOG hopes the project will
have positive impact on the impoverished region of Samskhe-Javakheti,
where many Armenian people live. The exchange facility from European
to CIS gauge railroad track is located in the region and will create
jobs. Improved electricity connections to Turkey are expected to help
the area as well. Chechelashvili mentioned the $200 million, 25 year,
1% interest loan with no state guarantee required that Azerbaijan is
providing to Georgia to fund the railroad project.’
In the `Georgia Bi-Weekly Update April 20, [2007]’ (unclassified cable
dated 20 April 2007, Identifier: 07TBILISI894) Amb. Tefft reports:
`Protesters in Akhalkalaki, an area with a large ethnic Armenian
population, called April 14 for the Armenian language to receive the
status of administrative language of the Samtskhe-Javakheti region,
which would permit all official business to be conducted in Armenian.
The protest was reportedly organized by local nationalist parties
Javakhk and Virk. At the same time, several candidates in May’s
Armenian parliamentary elections visited Akhalkalaki to underline
their family roots in the area and to promote their candidacies among
locals with relatives in Armenia.’
In the confidential cable dated 30 April 2007 (Identifier:
07TBILISI996), Amb. Tefft reports: `Russia appears ready to complete
its withdrawal from its military base in Akhalkalaki and to finish
removing all heavy equipment from its base in Batumi in 2007. On April
13, the first of five convoys of Russian arms and equipment left the
Russian military base in Akhalkalaki for the Russian 102nd military
base in Gyumri, Armenia. According to George Zakarashvili, Director of
the Russia Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russians
are withdrawing their personnel and equipment ahead of schedule, and
are on target to close the Akhalkalaki base by July 1, 2007.’
`Zakarashvili told Poloff on April 26 that Russia was ahead of
schedule in its base withdrawal activities. Akhalkalaki will be closed
by July 1, he said, which is far ahead of the stated deadline of
October 1. Three vehicle convoys of equipment have already left
Akhalkalaki and two remain.’
In a confidential cable dated 13 June 2007 (Identifier: 07ANKARA1505)
from the US Embassy in Ankara, Ambassador WIlson reports: `Turkish MFA
Deputy Undersecretary Unal Cevikoz (a former Ambassador to Baku)
visits Washington from June 18-20 for consultations on South Caucasus
and Central Asia. Cevikoz is likely to identify the strengthening
relationship between Turkey and Georgia as a major component of
Turkey’s strategy to promote regional integration and economic
development in the South Caucasus […]. REPATRIATION OF THE MESKHETI
TURKS […] The repatriation of the Meskheti, or Ahiska, Turks to
Georgia from Russia and Central Asia, where they were exiled during
Soviet times, is a high priority issue for the GOT. Gul raised the
issue with Saakashvili at their May 26 meeting. Despite Turkey’s
frustration with Georgia’s inability to pass legislation allowing
resettlement, MFA is sensitive to Georgian concerns. MFA officials
assert there are approximately 200,000 Meskheti Turks, but it is
unclear how many would return. The Turks acknowledge returning to
their homeland in the Javakheti region would upset the demographic
balance of that ethnic Armenian-majority region. A bill currently in
the Georgian parliament aims to resettle the Meskheti Turks throughout
Georgia.’
The Meskhetian Turks’ issue in Georgia is reported in the unclassified
`Georgia Bi-Weekly Update’ cable dated 15 June 2007 (Identifier:
07TBILISI1446). Amb. Tefft reports that `On June 13, the [Georgian]
parliamentary foreign affairs committee held a hearing of a draft law
on repatriation of the Meskhetian Turks, deported from Georgia by
Stalin in 1944. Georgia has an outstanding commitment to the Council
of Europe, made in 1999, to complete repatriation by 2011. The
Meskhetian Turks, who are now living in Russia and Central Asia, have
long pushed to return to their homeland in Georgia, but this prospect
has caused fear among ethnic Armenians in Georgia over potential land
and property disputes, demographic shifts, and the emergence of a
`Turkish’ presence in their territory. Many ethnic Georgians are also
resistant to repatriation. On June 13, parliamentary discussion of the
issue grew into a noisy clash between majority and opposition MPs,
with the latter arguing that resettlement in Georgia would distort the
country’s demographic balance and exacerbate social and ethnic
problems (Note: The majority ethnic-Armenian population of Javakheti,
origin of the Meskhetian Turks, does not want them to be repatriated
here. End note).’
In a 26 June 2007 confidential cable (Identifier: 07TBILISI1528) Amb.
Tefft reports that `On June 14, MCC President John Danilovich,
accompanied by Ambassador Tefft, MCC Country Director Colin Buckley
and Millennium Challenge Georgia Director Lasha Shanidze, traveled to
the ethnic minority region of Samtskhe-Javakheti to meet members of
local government and civil society. This isolated and impoverished
region of Georgia will benefit from MCC’s planned construction of a
new road which will link its main city, Akalkalaki, to Tbilisi and
thereby provide a way in which farmers can transport highly-valued
local agricultural products, including cheese and potatoes, to larger
markets in the capital. Danilovich explained that the MCC program is
structured not as an American program to solve Georgian problems but
as a Georgian program that allows Georgians to identify and solve
their own problems. […] Citing high unemployment as the region’s
greatest challenge, all residents expressed concern over whether the
road contractor would hire local workers. They argued that
unemployment levels were exacerbated this year by the Russian bans
which suspended visa issuance and cut transportation links, resulting
in 8-9,000 more unemployed from seasonal workers who were unable to
travel to Russia. Hamlet Mousesian, the Parliamentarian representing
the region argued that the region contained skilled workers and said
that he had met with Minister of Education Lomaia to arrange for any
professional courses that local workers might need to increase or
improve those skills. He noted also that local workers would be
cheaper than those from outside Georgia and expressed concern about
the political implications in an ethnic Armenian region of bringing
ethnic Turks (as the contractor is expected to be) to work on the
road. Other questions were about the start date of construction and
potential benefits of the road. […] Buckley responded that although
the U.S. cannot require contractors to employ locals, contractors make
rational decisions based on skill and cost. He noted that the
arguments made by the Council represented good reasons to hire locally
and added that other projects funded by MCC, employed locals for those
reasons. Buckley also outlined MCC’s view of benefits of the road. In
the short term, the contractor would need local assistance including
housing, food and other services in addition to the possible benefit
of local employment. MCC believes that the long-term benefits of the
road will be profound as it will make it easier to transport goods to
markets in Tbilisi and the region. Although he could not put a start
date on construction, he noted that the road would be complete by the
end of the MCC compact in 2011. Shanidze said that bids are now being
considered and estimated that MCG would know the start date of
construction following the conclusion of the tendering process at the
end of July. […] Other issues from residents included requests to
improve local roads as well as open dairy farms, cheese processing
plants and sugar mills which could both take advantage of the regions
highly-valued agricultural products and provide employment for the
population. Danilovich responded that the region had been awarded two
MCC Agricultural Development Assistance grants for such purposes and
encouraged individuals to submit applications for funding of specific
projects to MCC. Shanidze said that MCG is planning to place a liaison
in Akalkalaki and Ninotsminda, in addition to its office in
Akhaltsikhe, in order to answer questions and help individuals fill
out applications. Buckley encouraged resident also to consider MCG’s
public outreach office in Tbilisi as an informational resource. […]
COMMENT: The visit of Danilovich and the Ambassador was warmly
welcomed by the local community, which continues to suffer high
unemployment as a result of the closure of the Russian base this year.
This is the biggest issue on their agenda. Interestingly, neither in
the town hall meeting nor in the follow-on lunch did anyone raise any
concerns related to the minority population and its relationship to
Tbilisi. One of the most difficult challenges to overcome, however, a
lack of initiative and innovation which is a Soviet legacy in this
region. What the population would prefer is for the Government to
build factories in which the residents could work. To overcome this
passivity, a significant amount of education – including especially
from people from the community itself – is needed to encourage people
to take advantage of the resources that are available. MCG is working
on this and we will continue to as well.’
In a confidential cable dated 27 June 2007 (Identifier: 07TBILISI1542)
Ambassador Tefft reports that Samskhe-Javakheti is one of `only six
areas [which] have not yet reported an outbreak,’
In a 29 June 2007 unclassified cable (Identifier: 07TBILISI1566) Amb.
Tefft reports: `On June 27 Russia officially handed over its military
base in Akhalkalaki to Georgia, several days ahead of schedule.
Georgian First Deputy Defense Minister Levan Nikoleishvili and Russian
Commander of the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus Andrei
Popov attended the handover ceremony and signed the Act of Handover
and Acceptance. The closure and transfer of the base, which was built
by Russia in 1910 and occupied by Russian and Soviet forces since that
time, began in 2006, following a March 31 agreement between Georgia
and Russia on the withdrawal of the remaining Russian forces stationed
in Georgia. (Comment: The Georgian Ministry of Defense has not yet
made clear its plans for the base, though it is unlikely that they
will station troops there.).’
In the 13 July 2007 `Georgia Bi-weekly Update’ (Identifier:
07TBILISI1675) Amb. Tefft reports that `The Georgian Government has
announced a 10-year energy program, which envisages the construction
of a number of new hydropower generation facilities in Georgia. […]
The GoG has also signed a memorandum with a Turkish Company, Urban, to
build the 78 MW Paravani hydro plant in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region
in southern Georgia. Total cost of investment in this project is
estimated at USD 100-120 million.’
In the 20 July 2007 confidential cable (Identifier: 07TBILISI1732)
Amb. Tefft reports about `Support for Minority Extremists: […]
Georgian officials in Tbilisi and Akhalkalaki, as well as local
community leaders and political activists, have confirmed that the
Russian government has funded radical ethnic-Armenian nationalists in
Samtskhe-Javakheti in a bid to destabilize this mutli-ethnic,
politically fragile region. Tensions peaked during spring 2006 when
scattered violent demonstrations occurred in Akhalkalaki in March (ref
K), following the murder of an ethnic Armenian in the city of Tsalka,
and on May 2 (ref J), when protesters briefly halted the first stage
of Russian base withdrawal. As the withdrawal moved ahead,
disturbances in Akhalkalaki dropped off precipitously, lending
credence to Georgian allegations that the tensions were being stoked
by elements operating from within the Russian base.’
Yerevan Embassy CDA Perina. in a confidential cable dated 7 August
2007 (Identifier: 07YEREVAN1000) reports: `DRAWING ARMENIA AND GEORGIA
CLOSER […] FM Oskanian said he had become convinced during his recent
trip through Georgia that `Armenia and Georgia need to do more
together.’ While the FM was not specific, he said Armenia and Georgia
should work to `take down fences’ and `build a common space.’ Oskanian
was thrilled that Armenia and Georgia had finally demarcated their
border along Georgia’s Samtskhe-Javakheti region. As a key next step,
Oskanian urged that Georgia, Armenia, and the U.S. work together to
rebuild the 24 kilometers of road from Armenia to the Georgian
transportation hub of Akhalkalaki, which would then tie Armenia into
the road being built between Akhalkalaki and Tbilisi under Georgia’s
Millennium Challenge program. Bryza recalled that he had been working
in past years with the Armenian-American community to develop such a
road project with Diaspora support. Oskanian agreed to pursue this
option.’
A cable dated 17 August 2007 (Identifier: 07TBILISI2074) Tbilisi
Embassy DCM Perry reports that `on July 19, the USAID-funded National
Integration and Tolerance in Georgia (NITG) program implemented by the
UN Association of Georgia (UNAG) () presented
the results of a survey of national minorities in Georgia. The survey
revealed that the overwhelming majority of ethnic Azeri and Armenian
minorities consider Georgia their homeland sharing a strong sense of
identification with Georgia among ethnic minorities. However, a lack
of Georgian language skills among ethnic minorities was identified as
an ongoing challenge to integration. […] The survey was based on
interviews with 2,400 people throughout the country, monthly media
monitoring, desk research, and focus group meetings. The purpose of
the survey was to inform the Government of Georgia (GoG) as it
prepares to draft a strategy and action plan for national integration
and tolerance in Georgia. The research will also constitute a baseline
for measuring the impact of the NITG program and the government’s
integration policies. The research results highlighted attitudes on
ethnic diversity and integration issues among minority groups in
Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli, as well across the Georgian
population nationwide. Freedom House – Europe assisted UNAG to develop
the research methodology and contributed to the survey report. […] The
NITG survey results revealed that the overwhelming majority of
national or ethnic minorities in southern Georgia consider the country
to be their homeland. In the predominantly ethnic Azeri region of
Kvemo Kartli, 98% of non-ethnic Georgian respondents considered
Georgia to be their homeland. In the predominantly ethnic Armenian
region of Samtskhe-Javakheti, 80% of non-ethnic Georgian respondents
considered Georgia to be their homeland. Given the long history of
political, economic, and social isolation of these regions from the
rest of Georgia, the results show a reassuringly strong sense of
identification with Georgia among ethnic minorities. […] The survey
also explored voter participation in the October 2006 Local Government
Elections and revealed that ethnic minority respondents registered
high levels of voter participation in the elections. In Kvemo Kartli,
76% of respondents said they voted in the elections. In
Samtskhe-Javakheti, 81% of respondents said they voted in the
elections. These figures imply a high level of confidence in
democratic processes in these regions. Attitudes toward ethnic
minorities among Georgian citizens in general were also shown to be
positive. When asked whether minority rights should be protected in
Georgia, 91% of respondents nationwide responded positively. […]
Considerable Challenges Remain: While clarifying positive attitudes,
the survey data also revealed numerous ongoing challenges facing
ethnic minorities in Georgia, including geographic isolation, low
levels of Georgian language proficiency, limited language accessible
media availability, and poor levels of political representation by
minorities. The USG and GOG are actively working to eliminate the
physical isolation of ethnic Azeri and Armenian communities. The
Millennium Challenge Corporation program in Georgia includes a project
to construct a road from Tbilisi to a major city in the minority
ethnic Armenian region of Samtskhe-Javakheti, and the GOG is investing
considerable sums in road infrastructure improvement projects in both
the ethnically Azeri Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti regions. […]
The low levels of Georgian language skills among ethnic minorities
were highlighted in the survey results. Among non-Georgian residents
in Kvemo Kartli, 83% of respondents did not speak Georgian. Among
non-Georgian residents in Samtskhe-Javakheti, 75% of respondents did
not speak Georgian. As Georgian is the official language, the low
level of proficiency in Georgian among ethnic minorities is a clear
challenge to integration into Georgian society which acts as a
disincentive to travel and commerce. […] The survey also revealed
numerous other challenges, including access to local media, with over
40% of respondents in both Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti viewing
Azeri and Armenian TV; unemployment; and low levels of political
representation of minorities’ communities in Tbilisi. (Note: Recently
passed legislation requires politicians to be able to speak Georgian
to hold office. End note.) […] Conclusion: The NITG survey shows that
Georgia is making progress toward greater integration of its ethnic
minorities. Ethnic Azeris and Armenians, two of Georgia’s
traditionally most isolated ethnic minority groups, overwhelmingly
identify with Georgia as their homeland. Furthermore, the USG and GOG
are taking dramatic steps to advance the physical integration of these
regions through large scale road infrastructure projects. That said,
the survey results also show that challenges remain, including low
levels of Georgian language skills, poor access to local media,
unemployment, and under-representation in the government.’
In a `Sensitive but unclassified. Not for public Interest’ cable dated
7 September 2007 (Identifier: 07TBILISI2272) Amb. Tefft reports:
`Following a series of scandals involving the misuse of public funds
by newly elected local officials, the Georgian Parliament recently
passed two laws that strengthen the powers of regional Governors, who
are appointed by the President, to exercise `state supervision’ and
ensure compliance of local self-government bodies with the `interests,
goals and policy’ of the state. Increasing the authority of the
Governors may help with the formulation and subsequent implementation
of economic development of Georgia’s undeveloped regions. However,
this will need to be done carefully as some may claim that these new
powers are counter to the goal of decentralizing power from federal to
local structures. This cable contains a brief summary of the current
regional Governors of Georgia, whose personalities – some of which
tend toward that of a local prince, rather than an institutional
manager of local self-governance – may prove decisive in the
development of Georgia’s regions. […] Giorgi Khachidze – Samtskhe-
Javakheti: Samtskhe-Javakheti borders Turkey and Armenia and comprises
the largest portion of Georgia’s ethnic Armenians. The region has a
strong potential for meat and dairy-products development. It consists
of six districts with the total population of approximately 207,598.
Giorgi Khachidze was appointed governor of Samtskhe-Javakheti in March
2005. Khachidze was born on February 9, 1974. In 1997, Khachidze
graduated from the Tbilisi State University, majoring in biology and
journalism. Between 1994 and 2000, he worked for state-run Channels I
and II on Georgian Television, as well as for the television companies
`Ibervizia’, `Rustavi-2′, `202′. During this time, Khachidze also
worked in the press-service of the Ministry of Defense, as well as for
radio station `105′, radio `Rezonansi’, and newspaper `Rezonansi’. In
November 2002, he founded the Khashuri office of the `United
Democrats’ party. From November 2003 to March 2004, he was the Deputy
Gamgebeli of Khashuri rayon. From March to October, 2004, he was a
Member of Georgian Parliament, elected through National Movement party
lists. From October, 2004 to March, 2005 he was appointed Governor in
Mtskheta-Mtianeti region. Khachidze was also a relatively popular
pop-singer and managed to transfer his personable qualities to his
managerial work as well. Khachidze is quite liked by the local NGO
community, which stresses his regular work with civil society
organizations and his focus on concrete achievements. Khachidze’s
strongest asset is said to be his ability to work with people, despite
their religion or ethnicity.’
The 1 October 2007 confidential cable (Identifier: 07TBILISI2450)
reports `that there were plans to open new prisons in Javakheti and
Adjara.’
The next WikiLeaked US diplomatic cable which mentions Javakhk is
dated 16 October 2007 (Identifier: 07YEREVAN1247) by Perina, the CDA
at the Embassy in Yerevan. `President Kocharian made clear to CDA his
profound disbelief in Turkey’s sincerity on rapprochement, but
grudgingly agreed to hear out any Turkish proposal. […] Kocharian
conveyed profound skepticism of Turkey’s good faith. […] Kocharian
said `You think this is the last opportunity for a generation. I
believe there is no opportunity at all for at least a generation.
Turkey is not ready, even at the level of society, to reach out to
Armenia.’ The proof of this, Kocharian said, is that Turkey is
spending so much money to build the railroad to Azerbaijan via
Akhalkalaki, bypassing Armenia. There would be no point if Turkey were
serious about opening the border with Armenia, which it could do any
time it wished.’