IS THE EU AFRAID OF ANKARA?
Jean-Paul Marthoz
PressEurop
March 25 2010
Following recent declarations by the Turkish Prime Minister on the
deportation of Armenian immigrants, Europe’s silence is testimony to
the EU’s ambiguous attitude towards the aspiring member state. Seen
as not sufficiently European for immediate inclusion, Turkey is at
the same time too important and powerful to be ignored.
Imagine if Angela Merkel threatened to deport undocumented Turks,
because she did not appreciate a declation in Ankara on the subject of
the Holocaust. Such a reaction on the part of the German Chancellor
would prompt a huge outcry, because everyone expects Germany to
take full responsibility for the darkest chapter in its history
and to comply with international law, which unequivocally forbids
collective punishments. However, there was no strong condemnation from
any European country when, last week, the Turkish Prime Minister,
irritated by the international reprimands on the subject of the
Armenian genocide, threatened to deport "100,000 natives of the
Republic of Armenia who are living without residence permits in
Turkey." The silence that followed Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s sally was
more than surprising. And the European Union has continued to hold
its peace on the matter in official statements.
Why has there been no response? You might be tempted to think that
European authorities are resigned to considering Turkey, which is
nonetheless a candidate for enlargement, as a country apart that does
not have to be judged with regard to the standards and values that the
Union claims to promote. No, they are behaving as if they were afraid
of "losing Turkey," the world’s 17th-ranked industrial power, a key
link in Europe’s energy supply chain, a "strategic pawn of the West"
and a "bridge between the Judeo-Christian and Muslim civilizations."
Shoe-horning Turkey into the Union
In private, the same European leaders acknowledge that, notwithstanding
the real progress that has been made, Turkey does not meet essential
criteria for a European democracy. Its constitution (which a bill
presented to the national parliament on 22 March now proposes to
revise) and its penal code contain articles that are incompatible with
European legal models. And although its dominance may be a thing of
the past, the army remains all too powerful, while the issue of the
Kurdish minority remains a major stumbling block.
Recognition of the Armenian genocide is still a taboo subject, in
spite of the thousands of signatures collected by the "I apologise"
petition launched by a group of progressive Turkish intellectuals. And
even if the conservative Muslim democratic AKP, which is currently in
power, styles itself as a political moderate, its reign has coincided
with an increasing albeit slow-moving Islamisation of Turkish society
and institutions.
Confronted by their own doubts, European partisans of Turkish
enlargement are wondering how the country can be shoe-horned into the
Union, in view of limited public support for the plan to make Ankara
a new European capital. But they are also worried by a more immediate
concern: Turkish exasperation with European equivocation on the issue
is now palpable. Although Turkish leaders continue to insist that
they want their country anchored in Europe, they are beginning to
allude to possible alternatives and the fact that Turkey may choose
to go its own way.
Conscious of its demographic, economic, cultural, geopolitical, and
lay-religious advantages, Turkey no longer sees itself as a state
on the borders of Europe with a mission to defend Western interests
in one of the world’s most tormented regions. It views itself as a
country that can play "a central role," with the capacity to define
its own vision and interests — and this is already evident in its
independent positions on Iraq, Israel and Iran, which are clearly
distinct from those adopted by Europe and the United States. Having
acquiesced to some of "Brussel’s demands," Turkey now appears less
willing to make concessions. In the negotiation process, it discovered
the real implications of inclusion in the EU — notably a loss of
sovereignty that would undermine fundamental aspects of the Turkey’s
state system and political culture.
Turkish question in conflict with European project
In other words, if Turkey became a member of the European Union and at
the same time maintained what a significant proportion of its leaders
and Turkish public opinion consider to be non-negotiable elements
in any deal with Europe (uncompromised nationalism, the primacy of
Sunni Islam, Turkism etc.), its accession would effectively modify the
nature of the European democratic model. The "Turkish question" cannot
be resolved by the granting of British or Danish style exemptions and
opt-outs, because it is clearly in conflict with the post-nationalist
and pluralist political model that underlies the European project. The
Turkish public has yet to fully understand this model, which has only
been fully accepted by a "lay-liberal" and Islamic Modernist elite
that may be growing but still remains a minority.
Turkey and the European Union are now embroiled in a deadlock where
both parties are being forced to define the values that they believe
to be non-negotiable. This is not a matter of business and development
strategy. The issues have fundamental implications for the future
planning and destiny of both European and Turkish society. And at
this existential moment, it is clear that Turkey is not alone in
having to cope with a difficult political position.
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