Bad things happen when empires fall apart

Bad things happen when empires fall apart
Harking back to Armenia in 1915 will only drive modern Turkey into China’s arms
Norman Stone

The Times/UK
March 8, 2010

The best thing said about the Armenian tragedy was a sermon delivered
in the main church in Constantinople in 1894, more than 20 years
before it happened. Patriarch Ashikyan had this to say: `We have lived
with the Turks for a thousand years, have greatly flourished, are
nowhere in this empire in a majority of the population. If the
nationalists go on like this [they had started a terrorist campaign]
they will ruin the nation.’

That Patriarch was quite right, and the nationalists shot him (and
many other notables who were saying the same thing).

Now a US Congressional committee has had its say, by voting to
recognise as `genocide’ the mass killing of Armenians by Turkish
forces that began in 1915, during the First World War.

Is the committee right? When the First World War broke out there were
Armenian uprisings and the Patriarch’s fears were realised. The
population in much of the territory of today’s Turkey was deported in
cruel circumstances that led to much murder and pillage.

But genocide? No, if by that you mean the sort of thing Hitler did.
The Armenian leader was offered a job in the government in October
1914 to sort things out (he refused on the ground that his Turkish was
not up to it). The Turks themselves put 1,600 men on trial for what
had happened and executed a governor. The British had the run of the
Turkish archives for four years after 1918 and failed to find
incriminating documents. Armenians in the main cities were not
touched. Documents did indeed turn up in 1920, but they turned out to
be preposterous forgeries, written on the stationery of a French
school.

You cannot really describe this as genocide. Horrors, of course,
happened but these same horrors were visited upon millions of Muslims
(and Jews) as the Ottoman Empire receded in the Caucasus and the
Balkans. Half of its urban population came from those regions and, in
many cases, the disasters of their families occurred at Armenian
hands.

Diasporas jump up and down in the politics of the United States – as
an American friend says of them, when they cross the Atlantic, they do
not change country, they change planet.

Braveheart is, for the Scottish me, a dreadful embarrassment. I have
to explain to Kurdish taxi drivers that the whole film is wicked tosh
that just causes idiots in Edinburgh to paint their faces and to hate
the English, whereas there cannot be a single family in Scotland that
does not have cousins in England.

But what will be the effect of the resolution in Turkey? The answer is
that it will be entirely counterproductive. Yes, the end of the
Ottoman Empire was a terrible time, as the end of empires generally
are: take the Punjab in 1947, for instance.

Disease, starvation and massacre carried off a third of the population
of eastern Turkey, regardless of their origin. But of all the states
that succeeded the Ottoman Empire, Turkey is by far the most
successful; you just have to look at its vital statistics to see as
much, starting with male life expectancy which not so long ago was a
decade longer than Russia’s.

Turkey is in the unusual position of doing rather well. She has
survived the financial mess, her banks having had a drubbing some
years before, and exports are humming. The Turks are not quite used to
this, and this shows with the present Government, which (as the Prime
Minister’s unfortunate anti-Israeli outburst at Davos a year ago
showed) can on occasion be triumphalist.

This Government has been remarkably successful, not least in getting
rid of the preposterous currency inflation that made tourists laugh,
but it should not be allowed to forget the bases of Turkey’s
emergence: the strength of the Western connection, the link with the
IMF, the presence in the West of tens of thousands of Turkish
students, many of them very able.

However, every Turk knows that, during the First World War, horrible
things happened, and for Congress to single out the Armenians is
regarded in Turkey simply as an insult.

The Turkish media is full of tales about the resolution, and there has
been a great deal of dark muttering about it. There are Turks who
agree that the killings amounted to genocide, and there has been an
uncomfortable book, Fuat Dundar’s The Code of Modern Turkey, as some
of the government at the time did indeed think of ethnic homogeneity
(though not the killing of children).

But the dominant tone is more or less of contempt: who are these
people, to orate about events a century ago in a country that most of
them could not find on the map? It all joins with resentment at US
doings in Iraq, and in the popular mind gets confused with the Swiss
vote against minarets or Europe’s ridiculous admission of Greek Cyprus
to their Union.

In practice the Turks are being alienated, and will be encouraged to
think that the West is doing another version of the Crusades, that
`the only friend of the Turk is the Turk’, and other nationalist
nonsense of a similar sort. Nowadays Turkey does not need the Western
link as before: trade and investment have been switching towards
Russia and Central Asia; the Chinese are quite active in Ankara. Is
that what we want to achieve, in a country that is otherwise the best
advertisement for the West that anyone could have imagined back in
1950?

Norman Stone is Professor Emeritus of Modern History at the University
of Oxford and head of the Russian-Turkish Institute at Bilkent
University, Ankara

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