PRESS RELEASE
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Vartan Oskanian talks about the recent developments around the
Armenia-Trukey protocols and more to the Yerevan based 168 Zham newspaper.
It’s already out of our hands
< terviews/363-its-already-out-of-our-hands.html>
Thursday, 28 January 2010
168 ZHAM
-Mr. Oskanian, how do you assess the fact that in Sochi, the sides agreed
on the preamble to the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement documents? Is this in
sync with the initial principle guiding these discussions that `nothing is
agreed until everything is agreed?’
-That principle exists precisely for such complicated issues as Karabakh;
every sentence of every relevant document is interrelated and every word is
consequential. For this very reason, in agreeing on any public declaration,
utmost caution must be exercised since not everything in the negotiating
document is agreed to. In that regard, the declaration you cite, is at least
cause for worry, since as a result of similar earlier `agreements,’ whether
the Meindorf or Athens declarations, Azerbaijan received plenty to use to
its advantage.
-After the meeting, we learned that the sides were given two weeks during
which to present proposals on disputed matters. Doesn’t that mean that
they’re pressuring the sides to settle quickly, or has the process already
entered its final stage? Especially considering that the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly Special Rapporteur for Karabakh, Goran Lennmarker, expressed hope
that it would be possible to get the sides to arrive at an agreement by
spring?
-Pressure only counts if you submit to it. It’s possible to place deadlines,
but only if within those timeframes, documents and decisions are not adopted
that go against our interests. Taking into account recent experience when in
the framework of the Armenia-Turkey process, under deadlines, documents were
created which do in fact go counter to our interests, then deadlines are
indeed cause for concern.
-Overall, how do you evaluate the latest developments in the
Nagorno-Karabakh settlement process?
-The thing that worries me most is Turkey’s active involvement and the fact
that the Armenia-Turkey process has further complicated the Karabakh
settlement. Now, all our energy must be aimed at separating these two
processes, and at the same time, finding a way to address the increasingly
more complicated challenge of defending our rights during the negotiations.
-In comparison to the increased activity surrounding the NK negotiations,
one would think the Armenia-Turkey reconciliation process was on hold.
Doesn’t this mean that before moving to ratify the protocols Turkey is
indeed waiting for progress on the Karabakh question, as so many Turkish
high officials have frequently stated? In your opinion, is the settlement
process in fact progressing based on that condition?
-In principle, continuing to try to predict when and whether Turkey will
ratify the protocols, and under what conditions, is already irrelevant. From
the beginning, it was clear where this process would end up. Turkey has
already received the minimum to which it aspired both in regard to the
content of the documents, and in exploiting the entire process for its own
ends. Now it’s trying to gain the maximum by achieving a speedy conclusion
to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem.
-During the last OSCE ministerial council, member states’ foreign ministers
accepted a document that said that Nagorno-Karabakh conflict must be
resolved according to three principles of the Helsinki Final Act — the
principles of non-use of force, territorial integrity, and the right of
peoples to self-determination, while in the Madrid principles, the issue of
Karabakh’s status will follow the return of territory and refugees. Isn’t
there the danger that in the case of the Madrid principles, the principle of
national self-determination in regards Nagorno-Karabakh will not be
decisive?
-The problem is not in the sequence of the principles; documents which
confirm that the solution of the NK conflict must be based on the two
principles — territorial integrity and self-determination — must be
avoided so long as Azerbaijan has not publicly acknowledged that the people
of NK have the right to adopt any manifestation of their right to
self-determination, and so long as the details of the application of that
right to self-determination have not yet been clarified.
-How do you assess the constitutional court decision and Turkey’s uproar in
response? Would it be right that the parliament ratifies the protocols with
reservations, as the Dashnaksutyun proposes?
-We should call a spade a spade. This is not the time to be evenhanded, and
play both sides of the fence. This simply further complicates the situation,
as I believe, everyone’s had ample time to comprehend. From the beginning,
these documents could not have served as the foundation on which our two
countries could build a stable relationship. There was no need to waste a
year to try to persuade each other, lose time, and to divert attention from
more significant problems.
-How do you assess the news that there are already steps being taken
towards arriving at the participation of Nagorno-Karabakh in the
negotiations? After determining the principles of the settlement, will
Karabakh’s participation not be merely a formal step, to keep up
appearances?
-It seems there hasn’t been official confirmation of this. But that without
Nagorno-Karabakh’s agreement, there can be no resolution to this issue
–
this must be an irrevocable and undeniable principle of the Armenian side.
As to whether their participation at that time will be more formal, than
significant, will depend on the degree and extent to which Karabakh’s
authorities have been involved and engaged in the development and acceptance
of those principles.
-Of the co-chair countries, is it the Russian Federation’s desires that
are
the determining ones? Is the Russian Federation not using the Karabakh
conflict to resolve its own economic, territorial and geopolitical issues
–
that is, taking into account recent events, such as their arrangement with
Azerbaijan to buy a large quantity of gas, and the mutually beneficial
agreements arrived at during Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to Moscow?
-I am convinced that Russia does seek a settlement, in fact, exactly for the
reasons stated here. With the Karabakh problem settled, Russia will be freer
to deepen its relationship with Armenia for its own strategic interests, and
with Azerbaijan for geopolitical and energy reasons. This means that it
would be short-sighted to make plans or calculations based on the belief
that regardless of how things develop, Armenia would receive Russia’s
unconditional support.
-With the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or the Armenia-Turkey reconciliation
processes, what role or interest does or can Iran have? This question was
raised following Robert Kocharian’s visit to Iran. Does his visit in fact
have any connection to this question?
-The question about the second president’s trip perhaps you should direct
towards him. As for Iran, in contrast, for example with Turkey, although it
isn’t directly involved, its balanced position has had a positive effect
on
the Karabakh settlement process. Of course, Iran, too has interests. We
talked about Russia’s interests already. Other countries, too, have
interests in our region. Each state moves based on its own interest. But
that shouldn’t be perceived fatalistically. Armenia’s task is to clearly
picture, articulate and defend our own interests, and not just to go with
the flow.