Month: November 2009

ON ISLAM: A REPLY TO RICK BROOKHISER
Andrew Bostom

The National Review
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Nov 11 2009

Responding to an e-mail query I posed to him about a Corner post on
October 26, Rick Brookhiser (on November 3) claimed: "My correspondent
[Bostom] and the Islamists say that Islam is unchanging, because the
Koran says so."

First, let me point out that Mr. Brookhiser has equated me with the
wrong "Islamists." Through at least the mid-1950s, dedicated students
of Islamic doctrine and history — such as myself — were still
referred to as "Islamists." This "Islamism" helped me to understand, in
detail, the other "Islamists" somewhat better than Mr. Brookhiser does.

In 19th-century parlance, "Islamism" and "Islam" were synonymous,
and meant to be equivalent to "Catholicism," "Protestantism," and
"Judaism" — not to "radical" or "fundamentalist" sects of any of
these religions. Sir Henry Layard, the British archeologist, writer,
and diplomat, described an abhorrent spectacle of such "Islamism"
(i.e., Islam) that he witnessed in the heart of Istanbul, during the
autumn of 1843:

An Armenian who had embraced Islamism [i.e., Islam] had returned to his
former faith. For his apostasy he was condemned to death according
to the Mohammedan law. His execution took place, accompanied by
details of studied insult and indignity directed against Christianity
and Europeans in general. The corpse was exposed in one of the most
public and frequented places in Stamboul, and the head, which had been
severed from the body, was placed upon it, covered by a European hat.

[Early Adventures in Persia, Susiana, and Babylonia, London, 1887, pp.

454-55.]

Mr. Brookhiser’s glib November 3 post replying to my e-mail omitted
mention of a published essay I had included that covers the historic
nature of punishment for blasphemy under Islamic Law. This detailed
piece debunks his assumption that the desire to impose Islamic
blasphemy law is somehow limited to a present-era "radical" version of
Islam. According to Brookhiser, "the practice of Islam changed during
the twentieth century, and even in her [i.e., Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s]
lifetime, thanks to the evangelizing of the Muslim Brotherhood, and
the agendas of Saudi Arabia and post-Shah Iran." Here, from my February
2008 essay, is an explanation of how much, sadly, has not changed:

Even in that purely mythical paragon of Islamic ecumenism, Andalusia,
Charles Emmanuel Dufourcq, a pre-eminent scholar of Muslim Spain,
observed that the myriad religious and legal discriminations suffered
by non-Muslim dhimmis (i.e., the non-Muslim Iberian populations
vanquished by jihad, and governed by Islamic law, Shari’a), included
lethal punishments for "blaspheming" the Muslim prophet, or the Koran:
"[For] having insulted the Prophet or blasphemed against the Word of
God (i.e., The Koran)-dhimmis were executed."

At present, these views are not held merely by small groups of
sectarians; they are mainstream Islamic understandings today, most
evident in the contemporary application of blasphemy law in Pakistan.

Citing al-Qayrawani’s 10th-century treatise on Islamic Law (the
Risala), which was applied in Muslim Spain, Pakistan’s Sharia court
has accepted the argument of a modern champion of Islamic blasphemy
law, the esteemed Pakistani scholar Muhammad Asrar, that anyone who
defames Muhammad — Muslim or non-Muslim — must be put to death. Dr.

Patrick Sookhdeo has documented how this orthodox Islamic doctrine —
incorporated into the Pakistani legal code (Section 295-C, "defiling
the name of Muhammad") — has wreaked havoc, particularly among
Pakistan’s small Christian minority community:

The blasphemy law is felt to be a sword of Damocles and has developed
a huge symbolic significance which contributes substantially to the
atmosphere of intimidation of Christians. The detrimental effect of the
law . . . is most dramatically illustrated by the incident at Shanti
Nagar in February 1997 in which tens of thousands of rioting Muslims
destroyed hundreds of Christian homes, and other Christian property,
following an accusation of blasphemy. Furthermore the blasphemy
has engendered a wave of private violence. Equating blasphemy with
apostasy and influenced by the tradition of direct violent action
and self-help which goes back to the earliest times of Islam, some
Muslims feel they are entitled to enforce the death penalty themselves.

Thus the doctrinal and historical context for modern Islamic attitudes
towards the Danish cartoons — including the recent lethal threats
to Kurt Westergaard and Flemming Rose by Chicago-based Muslims —
far transcends what Brookhiser terms "Islamism." Perhaps Brookhiser
designates as "Islamists" the entire religious and political leadership
of the Organization of the Islamic Conference — fierce contemporary
advocates of Islamic blasphemy law (as chronicled for over two decades
by historian David Littman), and representative of over a billion
Muslims from 57 nations identified as "Islamic." Or where else will
Brookhiser’s Diogenes-like search for moderate Islam take him?

— Andrew G. Bostom is a professor of medicine at Brown University
and author of The Legacy of Jihad.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ARMENIA-TURKEY RAPPROCHEMENT PUTS IDEOLOGIES TO THE TEST
by Muriel Mirak-Weissbach

Center for Research on Globalization
Nov 11 2009
Canada

When Armenian and Turkish Foreign Ministers Nalbandian and Davutoglu
signed the protocols on reestablishing diplomatic relations on October
10 in Zurich, one would have thought that that event would mark the
beginning of a new era in the troubled, if not tormented, history
of the two countries. Instead, the protocols became the hottest new
potato being tossed back and forth in the arena of politics in the
Caucasus. Opinions, editorials, and in some cases, just plain gripes
vied for attention in the pages of the Armenian and Turkish press,
not only at home but especially in the Armenian Diaspora.

Notwithstanding the tendentious and — not infrequently — hysterical
tone of some commentaries, the issues that they raised do merit
serious discussion, discussion which should be conducted rationally
and by cool heads: Because what is at stake is not the "position"
and related public profile of one or another political faction,
but fundamental principles of justice. On the practical plane, the
outcome of the ongoing rapprochement process will affect life or death
questions facing the people living in Armenia, Turkey, Azerbaijan,
and the neighboring countries, including Iran.

The protocols were contested by communities on both sides. Inside
Turkey, the government was accused of making a rotten compromise,
perhaps even relinquishing longstanding demands that the Armenians
give up their international campaign for recognition of the 1915
genocide. The Azeris were upset by the suggestion that Ankara might
have made unacceptable concessions on the status of Nagorno Karabagh
and Armenian-occupied Azeri territories. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip
Erdogan had indicated in Baku last spring that Ankara considered
Armenian military withdrawal a condition for talks, but that seemed
to have disappeared from the new agenda.

On the Armenian side, the rejectionist front was far more populous
and more vocal. President Serge Sargsyan embarked on what he dubbed a
"listening tour" to hear what Diaspora Armenians in Paris, Los Angeles,
New York, Beirut, and beyond, had to say. And he got an earful. In
Paris on Oct. 2, he was greeted by angry protestors who shouted
"Traitor!" and "Votch! Votch!" ["No! No!"]. Demonstrators in New York
a day later carried pickets saying "Turkey is Guilty! Turkey Must
Pay!" referring to the 1915 genocide. Following his address to leaders
of the Armenian groups assembled there, a hefty question-and-answer
session went on for hours, only on condition it be kept off the
record. On Oct. 4, over 12,000 Armenian Americans turned out in Los
Angeles, where he met with organization representatives.

They carried signs saying "Don’t Betray the Armenian people!" and
"Stop Turkish-Armenian protocols." In Beirut it was the same story.

The Diaspora Armenians were enraged by two points; first, that
the protocols suggested that long-standing Armenian demands for
recognition of the 1915 genocide might be diluted or withdrawn;
and, secondly, that the agreement to open "existing borders’ would
be tantamount to recognition of borders whose historical legitimacy
is hotly disputed. As Raffi Hovannisian, the first foreign minister
of independent Armenia, wrote in www. ArmeniaNow.com on Sept. 25,
the only border agreed to by a sovereign Armenia and Turkey was
the one sanctioned under Woodrow Wilson at the close of World War
I. That border was redefined (in the Treaty of Kars and Moscow Treaty)
following the invasions of Armenia by the Kemalists and Bolsheviks, who
divided up Armenian territory, but those treaties have no legal status.

In an attempt to quell the protest, President Sargsyan
issued a statement to all Armenians on October 10,
( thenews/naxagh_eng_pdf)
and addressed the concerns raised by the Diaspora regarding borders.

He said he insisted that "The issue of the existing border between
Armenia and Turkey is to be resolved through prevailing norms of the
international law. The Protocols do not go beyond that." Furthermore,
that "These relations cannot and do not relate to the resolution of
the Nagorno Karabagh conflict, which is an independent and separate
process…." He ended by saying Armenia was undertaking no unilateral
commitments in signing the Protocols.

As for the genocide, one leading condition posed by Diaspora Armenians
was that the Turks had to first recognize the 1915 events before any
agreement on redefining relations could be considered. Instead, the
protocols foresee a "dialogue on the historical dimension … including
an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and
archives…" as well as the constitution of an "intergovernmental
bilateral commission" to implement this task.

This clause on the "historical dimension" was rightly perceived as
an outrageous insult to all those historians, Armenian and not, who
have documented the events over the intervening decades. The Zoryan
Institute, the foremost center for genocide studies, correctly argued
that any such commission "in effect dismisses all of the extensive
research that has already been conducted for decades and implies
that none of it was impartial or scientific." The Zoryan Institute
stressed that particularly non-Armenian scholars felt offended,
and thought their work was being politicized. (1)

In his October 10 statement, President Sargsyan attempted to address
these concerns, by stating: "No relations with Turkey can question
the reality of the patricide and the genocide perpetrated against
the Armenian nation. It is a known fact and it should be recognized
and condemned by the whole progressive humanity." He added" "The
relevant sub-commission to be established under the intergovernmental
commission, is not a commission of historians."

Now, this latter specification that it would not be a "commission of
historians" was most unsettling, since it is only competent historians
who can set the record straight. Reports floated in the press later
to the effect that, from the Armenian side, only national historians
would participate in the commission, to the exclusion of those in
the Diaspora, should be further cause for concern: if the work of
the Diaspora historians were to be excluded, there could be no hope
for impartial conclusions. (After all, one should not forget, that
there would be no Diaspora, had there not been a genocide.)

The fact of the Armenian genocide has been established, not only by
meticulously documented historical research by (Diaspora Armenian)
scholars like Dr. Vahakn N. Dadrian and Richard G. Hovannissian, as
well as Christopher J. Walker and Taner Ackam, — to name but a few
— but also through the first-hand accounts rendered by victims and
survivors of the genocide, ordinary people, like my mother and father,
who were both orphaned by the massacres in Arabkir. Massive further
eye-witness documentation is provided by non-Armenian sources, like
the valiant Dr. Johannes Lepsius, a German doctor and humanitarian
who, in response to the Hamidian massacres of the 1890s, travelled
to Turkey and set up his Deutsch-Orient Mission. Lepsius reported
on his face-to-face encounter with War Minister Enver Pasha in 1915,
who told him point blank that the Young Turks’ policy was to eliminate
the Armenians. (2) Jakob Keunzler, a Swiss doctor and humanitarian,
joined Lepsius after the 1915 massacres, and set down his eye-witness
accounts of the deportations and murders from Urfa. The American
Ambassador to the Sublime Porte at the time, Henry Morgenthau,
recounted in his book, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story, not only what
he witnessed as atrocities, but what he was told personally by Young
Turk leaders regarding their anti-Armenian policy.

In addition, as the Zoryan Institute notes, there is "incontestable
documentation" of the genocide in the national archives of the
U.S., Great Britain, and France, as well as Turkey and Germany and
Austria, who were allies in the war. On the latter, Prof. Dadrian’s
"Documentation of the Armenian Genocide in German and Austrian Sources"
is exhaustive.(3)

So there is no lack of historical material to establish that genocide
occurred and that it occurred as a consequence of a conscious policy
on the part of a specific political force, namely, the Young Turk
government of Enver Pasha, Djemel Pasha, and Talaat Pasha, which
took power in the Ottoman Empire in 1908 and ruled as a "triumvirate"
from 1914 until their defeat in the First World War. Most important
in confirming responsibility of that Young Turk government for the
genocide was a trial held in Ottoman Turkey in 1919, which put all
the Young Turk leadership on the bench (in absentia) and found them
all guilty of war crimes, specifically of plotting to annihilate the
Armenian people. The Zoryan Institute, citing these historical records
as yet further proof, emphasizes that the documents, the prosecutors,
the judges, and most witnesses were all Turks. Dr. Dadrian’s own
detailed examination of the Turkish court records shows that those
charged and indicted included the "top echelons of the Ottoman
government," cabinet ministers, Young Turk party leaders, central
committee members, and the Special Operations, the hit squads that
carried out the deportations and murders. Dr. Dadrian highlights two
aspects: that they were tried under Turkish law, the Ottoman penal
code, not international law; and, that the evidentiary material proved
incontrovertibly both "genocidal intent" and "genocidal outcome."(4)

There can be no doubt what the historical record is. The problem – the
political problem – is that the Turks refuse to acknowledge this. And
to demand, as many Armenians in the Diaspora do, that Turkey first
recognize the genocide is to engage in a fruitless Catch-22 mechanism.

It is not going to happen.

Why?

The Zoryan Institute is one of the few voices to address the crux of
this issue, to wit, that if Turkey were to acknowledge the genocide
against the Armenians, it would be violating its own sovereign law. In
fact, according to Article 301 of the Turkish penal code (TPC), any
criticism of "Turkishness" is punishable. Point 1 states: "A person who
publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand National
Assembly of Turkey, shall be sentenced a penalty of imprisonment for
a term of six months to three years."(5) Under this clause numerous
journalists and writers have been hauled into court and condemned,
among them illustrious names such as Orhan Pamuk and the unforgettable
Hrant Dink. In 2008, under pressure from the European Union, which
Turkey seeks to join, the wording was altered, and in place of
"Turkishness," the phrase "Turkish nation" was introduced; instead of
"the Republic," "the State of the Turkish Republic" was inserted. That
notwithstanding, no substantial change occurred; in the case of Hrant
Dink, the Turkish Supreme Court of Appeals argued that "Turkishness"
and the "Turkish nation" were virtually interchangeable.(6)

In face of this dilemma, the Zoryan Institute document suggests that,
if any progress on the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation agenda is
to be achieved, either the protocols must be revised regarding the
"historical dimension," or Article 301 in the TPC must be modified.

Formally speaking, that would appear to deal with the problem. But
it is not only a formal point: It is not only that legal constraints
would appear to prevent any Turkish government from acknowledging
the historical record. The matter implicitly addressed here goes
much deeper. The question is: what is the concept of "Turkishness"
all about?

Turkishness, Turkism, and Pan-Turkism

Here, I realize I am treading on a political and psychological
minefield, one which could blow up in my face if I make one false
step — all the more reason to walk gingerly and with caution.

"Turkishness" is the stuff of which "Turkism" and "Pan-Turkism" were
made. These are concepts that go back to the early years of the 20th
century, in the works of one Ziya Goekalp (1876-1924), the ideologue
of the fiercely nationalistic movement of the Young Turks. Goekalp’s
ideas, in turn, had their origin in the geopolitical fantasies of a
Hungarian Jew named Armínius (Hermann) Vámbéry, who worked closely
with the British Foreign Office from 1899-1911. Vámbéry believed that
the Turkish people, all those speaking a Turkic language, constituted
a Turkish "race." More broadly, Vámbéry conceived of "Pan-Turanism,"
comprising all those peoples inhabiting the region stretching from
Persia and Turkey to the borders of China, a vast expanse he designated
as "Turkestan." Vámbéry distinguished very clearly between the true
"Turanians," who were Turks, and the "pseudo-Turanians" or "Osmanians,"
members of the Ottoman Empire. The latter were "a mongrel people par
excellence," in his view, because they included Slavs, Armenians,
Greeks, and the like.(7)

Goekalp was a member of the Young Turks’ Central Committee until
1918 and later supported Ataturk. He shaped Vámbéry’s vision into
a political program, calling for the "Turkification" of the Ottoman
Empire, and the constitution of "Turan," a geopolitical entity with
a 100 million population. "All the Turks are one army" was one of
his many famous slogans. (8). Goekalp posited "Turkism" as the means
to solve the problem he saw in the contradictory co-existence among
Turks of a religious culture (uemmet) and the Westernized culture
(Tanzimat). Arguing that both ignored what he called the national
culture, he hailed "Turkism" as the way out, the "method of right
feeling and right thinking for the Turks."(9) Foremost in this task
of reviving the national culture was the purification of the Turkish
language, which, for Goekalp, must be purged of Arabic and Persian
words. Instead of Ottoman Turkish, the national language should be
based on "the Turkish which is the basis of the folk literature" and
must "accept the pronunciation of the people–especially of the women
of Istanbul."(10) Alongside purification of the language, morality
also had to be revived: patriotic morality, professional, family,
civic, and personal morality, all infused with fervent nationalism.

It was this ultra-nationalistic, chauvinistic ideology of "Turkism"
and "Pan-Turkism" that fuelled the wartime Young Turk government’s
anti-Armenian policy. Some years after the 1919 trials, which indicted
and condemned the Young Turk leadership for war crimes against the
Armenians, the issue of "Turkism" and" Turkishness" returned to center
stage. This was following Mustafa Kemal’s successful struggle to
salvage Turkey as a nation. Goekalp wrote: "Under the leadership and
direction of our great Mustafa Kemal, the Society for the Protection
of Rights, from which the People’s Party was later born, delivered our
country from invasion and, at the same time, called our state, nation,
and language by their real names and delivered our political life from
the last traces of absolutism and cosmopolitanism"(11). Article 301 of
the penal code evolved as a logical consequence of this process. It
first appeared as Article 159 in 1926, and went through several
revisions and amendments, in 1936, 1938, 1946, 1961, 2002, then, as
Article 301, in 2005 and 2008. (12) Despite the linguistic changes,
the substance has remained; thus any mention of the Armenian genocide
(or any criticism of Ataturk) is forbidden by law.

This is not a matter of legal niceties or formulations. There is
something fundamentally problematic with the concept of "Turkishness,"
and this takes us to the heart of the matter.

"Turkishness" should not be confused with a healthy patriotic Turkish
identity, founded on the historical cultural achievements of those
belonging to the Turkic language culture, over hundreds of years,
through the Ottoman Empire into the era of modern Turkey. This is
a rich culture, with achievements in architecture, science, music,
painting, and a 700-year-old literary tradition, reaching back to
Yunus Emre in the 13th century, and continuing through the works of
Sueleyman Celebi, Barden, Nejati, Pir Sultan Abdal, Baki, and others,
up to today’s authors like novelist Orhan Pamuk, or the hundreds
of other modern writers who presented their works in 2008 at the
Frankfurt Book Fair, where Turkey was the guest of honor. Modern
Turkey is a key industrial nation in the region, whose ambitious
infrastructure projects, especially in the crucial area of water
management, have transformed the economic landscape. Politically,
it has emerged over recent years as a major regional factor, oriented
toward mediation of regional crises, whether involving Iraq and Syria,
Iran, or Palestinian factions.

But "Turkism" or "Turkishness" implies something quite different:
it implies the existence of a special quality, almost a mystical
essence, which only those calling themselves Turks may possess. In
the fantasies of Vámbéry and Goekalp, it implied the right to
establish a virtual empire ("Turkestan") composed of all those lands
with any Turkic language tradition. As in all such imperial notions,
the implication is that this "ism" is not only different and separate
from all other "isms," but also in conflict with them. As Turkish
scholars have documented, the notion of "Turkishness," whether in
the Pan-Turkist or the Kemalist versions, "scrutinized very similar
racist and nationalist references in their imaginations of Turkish
identity as racially superior."(13).

Addressing this issue today is of special importance, first,
because of its direct relevance to sincere efforts to overcome the
Turkish-Armenian adversary relationship. The question that should
be raised in the context of the ban on recognition of the Armenian
genocide, as codified in Article 301, is the following: Was it the
"Turkish nation" which was responsible for the 1915 genocide? If so,
then the principle of "collective guilt," an odious and ahistorical
concept, should be applied in all comparable cases, including the
Nazi holocaust against the Jews or the 1948 Zionists’ expulsion of
the Palestinians. Or, was it, as the legal records of the Turks
themselves document in the 1919 trials, a discreet, identifiable
collection of political forces, individuals and groups — albeit with
their international backers — who were responsible? If so, their
condemnation should be reaffirmed in full acknowledgement of their
crimes. The aberrant ideology of "Turkishness" or "Turkism" was, to be
sure, the ideological glue that held the murderous elements together.

But can or should that ideology be misconstrued today as the raison
d’etre of the modern nation of Turkey?

Turkey’s National Identity

This is a leading item on the agenda of political and intellectual
leaders in Turkey today. It deserves serious consideration – and not
because the European Union demands this or that preferred formulation
in a legal code, but because it is a fundamental issue of identity
for the nation and its people. A broad-based debate has been rife
for years in Turkey as to the nation’s essential identity: is it
a European country, as the pro-EU faction argues? Or, is it rather
oriented to Eurasia? Is it the bridge between Europe and Asia? If so,
what are the implications for its economic, cultural, and foreign
policy? In a certain sense, the answer to all three questions is
"yes." And that should provide an impetus to creative thinking about
Turkey’s potential contributions.

Recent developments in the region especially since the 2008
Russian-Georgian conflict, have redefined the roles of certain nations,
among them Armenia, which, though small, occupies a key geopolitical
position. It offers itself automatically as an alternative to Georgia
as a transit land for pipelines from the Caspian Sea region westward
to Europe. Raffi Hovannisian is not the only one to complain that,
indeed, part of Ankara’s strategic calculations regarding rapprochement
with Armenia may include pipeline plans; both the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan
and the Nabucco pipeline projects cross this territory. Should such
projects be therefore condemned as part of an assumed Turkish bid
for regional hegemony? Should they be characterized as "the fruits
of genocide" whose benefits Armenia will never enjoy? Or would it be
conceivable for Armenia, after having reestablished normal relations
with its neighbors, Turkey and Azerbaijan, on the basis of fair
negotiations, to enter into meaningful economic, infrastructure,
and trade agreements that will only benefit all involved? One of the
most promising ideas in the protocols deals precisely with the need to
expand, improve, and maximize the use of transport, communications,
and energy infrastructure between Turkey and Armenia – implicitly
also with other neighbors. Anyone who has had a glimpse of the dire
economic-social reality of Armenia today could only rejoice at the
prospect of opening borders and reintegrating the country into the
regional context.

The Zoryan Institute is right in suggesting that practical, pragmatic
steps be taken, to reopen borders, reestablish diplomatic relations,
and so forth, in order to alleviate the unquestioned duress of the
Armenian population at home – and that, without preconditions. Then,
in the meantime, preparations might be made to expand examination
of the so-called "historical dimension." Since the case has already
been settled by competent historians that the genocide did occur,
would it hurt if unpublished documents in the Ottoman and other
archives were made available to scholarly examination? Fears on the
part of some Armenian intellectuals, that such new documentation
would undermine their position, might be vastly exaggerated. Given
the massive documentation on the public record, there is nothing in
any archive anywhere in the world which could nullify the charge of
genocide. No one should have any fear of the truth.

Once the incontrovertible fact of the genocide is finally established
and acknowledged by all sides — and it must be, even after all the
material is placed on the table — then other political considerations
will beg for attention. From the Diaspora Armenians, the cry has been
raised – a cry that President Sargsyan heard in the U.S. — that Turkey
was guilty and Turkey must pay. But pay what? Some say, citing the
arrangements made between Israel and post-war Germany, that financial
reparations must be made for confiscated territories, loss of life,
and livelihood. More extremist voices demand territorial concessions,
essentially, that Turkey cede large areas in the east to Armenia. (14)

Aside from such material considerations, there is a moral question:
if Turkey were to acknowledge that, yes, a specific Turkish political
formation in power at the time had been responsible for the genocide,
what should the Armenian reaction be? With all due respect for those
who lost everything (among them my parents), I can only plead for
a response on the highest moral plane. Armenians are rightly proud
of the fact that their nation was the first to officially adopt
Christianity as its state religion. That awesome heritage brings
with it a tremendous responsibility. The historic revolution which
Christianity brought to humanity was the message of love, which
supercede the notion of retributive justice; Christianity introduced
a higher notion of forgiveness. In the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia,
which ended centuries of religious strife in Europe, the word was to
"forgive and forget": acknowledge all atrocities on whatever side, then
forgive their perpetrators, and forget the events, in the interest of
forging a new order of peace in which each side would seek to promote
the interest of the other.

Viewed from this moral high ground, the notion that "Turkey is guilty"
and "Turkey must pay" somehow rings false. While visiting Yerevan last
year, as part of a visiting delegation, I had the opportunity to hear
His Holiness Catholicos Karekin II respond to questions from Diaspora
Armenians. Asked about the importance of achieving recognition of
the genocide, he said he deemed it crucial, as a way of to rendering
justice to the victims, not only of that genocide but of all other
mass murders. He added," We do not preach hatred or bitterness,
only justice."

That is the issue: justice. Whatever practical accommodations may be
negotiated – and that is a matter for the governments in question to
deal with –, there can be no hope for a new relationship between the
former adversaries to come into being, unless a fundamental moral and
emotional shift occurs in the minds and hearts of individual Armenians
and Turks. As I argue in my new book dealing with this adversary
relationship, that is the challenge that the process initiated by
the signing of the protocols has put on the table.(15)

Notes

1. , letter to President Serge Sargsyan,
September 30, 2009.

2. The account of this meeting by Lepsius was incorporated in the
novel by Jewish Austrian writer Franz Werfel, in his famous Forty
Days of Musa Dagh.

3. Vahakn N. Dadrian, "Documentation of the Armenian Genocide in
German and Austrian Sources," H.F. Guggenheim Foundation Research
Project, Reprinted from The Widening Circle of Genocide, Genocide:
A Critical Biographic Review, Volume 3, New Brunswick, Transaction
Publishers, 1994.

4. Vahakn N. Dadrian, "A Textual Analysis of the Key Indictment of
the Turkish MilitaryTribunal Investigating the Armenian Genocide,"
Armenian Review, Spring 1991, pp. 1-36.

5. Buelent Algan, "The Brand New Version of Article 301 of
Turkish Penal Code and the Future of Freedem of Expression
Cases in Turkey,"German Law Journal, Vol. 09, No. 12,
=1066.

6. Ibid., p. 2243.

7. Vámbéry, Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert: Eine
culturgeschichtliche Studie vom Hermann Vámbéry, F.A. Brockhaus,
Leipzig, 1875, p. 18 ff..

8. Jacob B. Landau, Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation,
Indiana University Press, Bloomigndale and Indianapolis, 1995,
p. 30, 37.

9. Goekalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected
Essays of Ziya Goekalp, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London,1959, p.

287.

10. Ibid., pp. 290-298.

11. Ibid., pp. 305-306.

12. Algan, op. cit., pp. 2238 ff.

13. Gueldeniz Kibris, Creating Turkishness: An Examination of Turkish
Nationalism Through Goek-Boerue, Mssters thesis, Sabanci University,
2005, p. 5.

14. If that demand were ever to be met, as one Armenian intellectual
explained to me, it would be no solution, but the creation of new
problems. If Armenia were to receive areas of eastern Anatolia from
Turkey, it would find itself in a situation similar to that facing the
Israelis who have occupied Palestinian territories in the West Bank:
they have their settlements and all, but are a minority in what they
would like to consider their own country.

15. "Through the Wall of Fire – Armenia – Iraq – Palestine: From
Wrath to Reconciliation," edition fischer, ISBN 978-3-89950-498-9,
September 2009

Muriel Mirak-Weissbach is a frequent contributor to Global Research.

Global Research Articles by Muriel Mirak-Weissbach

x.php?context=va&aid=16026

IRAN HALTS GAS DELIVERY TO ARMENIA

APA
Nov 11 2009
Azerbaijan

Baku – APA-ECONOMICS. Iran has halted natural gas supply to Armenia
on Wednesday, said Valialla Dini, representative of the Iranian gas
transport company.

According to him, the delivery was suspended after the Armenian side
reported "technical failures" in receiving natural gas.

Iran will resume gas delivery to Armenia just after the problems are
solved, he added.

He also noted that Iran has to date pumped 2 million cubic meters of
gas a day to Armenia through a 110 km pipeline.

TURKISH DAILY ON ARMENIAN VACATIONERS

news.am
Nov 11 2009
Armenia

Armenian travel agents offer tours to Georgia, Greece, Bulgaria, Italy
and Jordan among other countries, but 70 percent of Armenians that
fly out of their country seem to prefer Turkey, especially Antalya,
writes the Turkish Today’s Zaman.

"Armenians coming to Turkey may be a sign of normalization and
accepting facts of life like swimming in the Mediterranean Sea. Any
citizen of a landlocked country would feel the same — living in
Ankara and dreaming of the Mediterranean all year long. This longing
is evident in the posters of Antalya’s attractive sun-drenched beaches
hanging on the walls of buildings in Yerevan," the source writes.

"While it is a dream destination for some, it is a provocation
for others… It did not take too long for a youth group from the
nationalist Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Dashnaktsutyun, to
rally for the removal of those posters. They went to the Yerevan
mayor’s office and demanded that the Antalya posters be brought down
and not hung up again. The mayor’s office has not yet acted on the
request. If the borders are opened soon, they will never be brought
down," the source writes.

"The nationalists’ logic against traveling and vacationing in Turkey
in general and in Antalya in particular is just like the Turkish
leftists’ logic: Every penny that goes to the ‘enemy’ will return
to us as arms and aggression or exploitation. This must be the
universal language of all nationalists and chauvinists… Another
slogan shared by the nationalists on both sides of the border says:
‘Turkey shouldn’t have won us over.’ Turkish nationalists said the
same thing when nearly three dozen militants belonging to the notorious
terrorist organization, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), came from
Iraq and surrendered to Turkish authorities. As promised, they were
interrogated but due to a lack of criminal records they were released.

They returned to their hometowns with joy and were greeted with
public demonstrations. This was enough to forget why they came back:
to surrender and end hostilities. The government was accused of
giving the impression that the mighty Turkish army was defeated by
the terrorists and all that nonsense," Today’s Zaman writes.

"Government employees are not officially warned against vacationing
in Turkey…The Armenian Ministry of the Economy is encouraging
competitive domestic tours to destinations like Lake Sevan, the
mountain resort of Tsakhkadzor, the mineral water spa of Jermuk and
the historical Nagorno-Karabakh region. Presently vacation packages
to these sights start at about $700 while Antalya offers a week of
good service, sea and sun for only $450," writes the newspaper.

"Well, you may be a patriot, but there is nothing better than a good
warm vacation after a whole year’s hard work, especially when your
old foe is serving you with a friendly smile," the source writes.

IN DECEMBER AZERBAIJANI AND ARMENIAN MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO GO ON CONFLICT TALKS

Azerbaijan Business Center
Nov 11 2009

Following an upcoming meeting between Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders
their countries’ ministries of foreign affairs will continue Garabagh
conflict consultations.

Azerbaijani FM Elmar Mammadyarov says that after the both presidents’
meeting at the end of November the relevant discussion will go on in
Athens on 1-2 December within the OSCE foreign ministers’ meeting.

Mammadyarov says that definition of negotiations is stage-by-stage
process.

"First of all it is necessary to agree about withdrawal of Armenian
troops from occupied lands with following process of demining and.

Then it is needed to restore infrastructure and return all refugees to
their native lands with solution of all socio-economic problems. And
only after that it will become possible to talks of status for Nagorno
Garabagh. In parallel the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities of
Nagorno Garabagh will discuss jointly the matter of future status
of Nagorno Garabagh. The status issue can be solved only within the
frames of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. Examples of settlement
of similar issues can be brought in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and
many other countries of the world, including Europe. The Armenian
party wants to solve the matter immediately with status, but I don’t
believe that today we can approach to the last stage. First of all,
there should be released occupied territories, and without that it
is impossible to talk of any economic co-operation," the minister said.

5% POVERTY RATE INCREASE EXPECTED IN ARMENIA: IMF

news.am
Nov 11 2009
Armenia

Poverty rate in Armenia might increase by 5% and make 25% as a result
of global crisis, IMF resident representative Nienke Oomes said while
presenting a "Prospects of regional economy development in Caucasian
and Central Asian countries" report to Yerevan State University
students, Nov. 10.

Income per capita rise and poverty reduction is expected in countries
like Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, however
poverty rate growth will be registered in Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan
and Kyrgyzstan. According to IMF forecasts, the population incomes
will decrease by 5%, as private transfers from abroad reduced. "The
recession of demand in labor market may entail the unemployment rate
increase," Oomes said.

According to "Armenia’s social arrears and poverty" report, the
poverty rate in Armenia last year reduced for 1.5% making 23.5%.

Recently a breakthrough in consumer goods was registered, that will
boom when gas and electricity prices go up in April 2010.

BAKU LOOKS DOWN ON KREMLIN TOWER?
By Armen Gevorgyan

news.am
Nov 11 2009
Armenia

"The GUAM and Baltic states have common goals and interests, and we do
not rule out closer cooperation with this organization," President of
the Baltic Assembly (BA) Mantas Adomenas stated in Tbilisi, Georgia,
yesterday.

We would remind you that the GUAM Parliamentary Assembly finished its
4th session in Tbilisi yesterday. Baltic Assembly representatives took
part in the forum for the first time. GUAM and BA adopted a communiqué
on political, economic, energy and security cooperation. Mr. Adomenas
believes bilateral cooperation is important for cooperation in Europe.

Referring to Azeri mass media, NEWS.am reported that a document on the
Nagorno-Karabakh problem was adopted at the session. The essence of
the document remains unclear. It is also unclear what such a country
as Estonia has to do with the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. The weight
of the document on Nagorno-Karabakh is tantamount to the political
weight of GUAM and its member-states.

Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, which are going through a severe domestic
political crisis (in the last case the Parliament has not been able
to elect the President for several months), as well as Azerbaijan,
which joined the organization with its domestic political problems,
are an instance of complete lack of coordination, like the heroes of
a fable by Russian fabulist Ivan Krylov: "Upward strains the swan,
the crab keeps stepping back, the pike is for the pond". The Baltic
Assembly members, especially Poland, are apparently supposed to
"set the tone" for GUAM’s further actions.

What "common goals and interests" can Azerbaijan and Poland have?

After various energy projects aimed to "leave Russia holding a bag"
failed, only the political agenda has remained. The aims of the Baltic
States and Poland have well been studied and described by experts.

Will Ilham Aliyev, as GUM member, succeed in telling the Kremlin the
same old story about Russian Azerbaijani strategic partnership?

Obviously not! Rather Azerbaijan might as well become Moscow’s partner
as the other GUAM members – Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova (the last with
its new pro-Romanian Government), as well as the Washington-appointed
partners, Poland and the Baltic states. Of course, it is all the
same for Azerbaijan where to raise the Nagorno-Karabakh problem —
even UNICEF is a "suitable arena."

Azerbaijani politicians should realize, however, that by signing
documents on GUAM’s integration with the Baltic Assembly they actually
put their signatures to their new partners’ priorities – ousting
Russia from certain regions, projecting bypass transport corridors,
revising history in favor of nationalist fascism, etc..

As a member of the GUAM-BA alliance, Azerbaijan cannot rely on
Russia’s confidence.

AZERBAIJAN DISMISSES ARMENIAN PLAN FOR AIRPORT IN KARABAKH

news.az
Nov 11 2009
Azerbaijan

Arif Mammadov International organizations will not recognize the
airport that Armenians are planning to build in Shusha, Arif Mammadov,
head of Azerbaijan’s State Civil Aviation Administration, has said.

Shusha lies in the occupied Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.

"If any aircraft lands in that airport, the Azerbaijani side will
take appropriate legal action against the airline. I don’t think
this airport will be recognized by international airlines either,"
Mammadov said.

He said that there is a similar situation in Cyprus, where
international organizations and airlines do not recognize the airport
in Northern Cyprus as an international airport.

Mammadov said that the State Civil Aviation Administration and
Ministry of Defence regularly bring to the attention of international
organizations the fact that Armenia violates international conventions
and rules in using Azerbaijani airspace.

HYKE BABUKHANYAN: ARMENIA’S OBJECTIVE IS TO RE-JOIN

Aysor
Nov 11 2009
Armenia

"We propose to establish a National Re-Unity Day" said at today’s
press-conference chairman of Party of Union of the Constitutional
Rights, Hyke Babukhanyan. He mentioned that he has already spoken to
Presidents of Armenia and Karabakh and proposed to celebrate the 20
anniversary of re-join of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.

"December 1 marks the 20th anniversary of the decision that provided
opportunities for Armenian people to regain rights in relation with
Karabakh," he said adding if a National Re-Unity Day celebrates in
Armenia, then an idea of a single state can be promoted.

"We have just raised the question of re-joining as one nation
must have one state. When a nation divides it will bring a
misunderstanding. Armenian people said agreed with independence of
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic; however, it doesn’t mean we abandon the
idea of a single state.’

Hyke Babukhanyan pointed that Azerbaijan has a wrong idea that
Armenia’s only purpose is the sovereignty of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
while Armenia demanded and demands on re-joining.

RA NA PRESIDENT RECEIVES AMBASSADOR OF GERMANY TO ARMENIA

National Assembly
Nov 11 2009
Armenia

On November 11 President of the National Assembly Mr. Hovik Abrahamyan
received the newly appointed Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Ambassador of Germany to Armenia Mr. Hans-Jochen Schmidt.

Welcoming the guest RA NA President congratulated him on the occasion
of assuming that post and expressed hope that Ambassador Mr. Schmidt
would do his best in developing the Armenian-German cooperation. Mr.

Abrahamyan noted that the bilateral relations have already been on
firm bases and highly assessed the existing trade-economic, political
and cultural contacts, as well as the projects being implemented in
Armenia by German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) enterprise.

During the meeting the interlocutors agreed that it was necessary
to more develop the inter-parliamentary cooperation and use all the
opportunities given by parliamentary diplomacy. Ambassador Mr. Schmidt
conveyed the greetings of Bundestag President to RA NA President.

Sending his greetings to his German counterpart Mr. Abrahamyan noted
that the Armenian side was ready to host on an official visit in
Yerevan the President of the German Parliament.

During the talk the sides also discussed the procedure of normalizing
the Armenian-Turkish relations without preconditions, paying special
attention to the role of the parliaments of two neigbouring countries.