DAVUTOGLU ERA IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
Today’s Zaman
30 June 2009, Tuesday
ABSTRACT – Ahmet Davutoglu was appointed Foreign Minister of Turkey
on May 1, 2009. Chief advisor to the Prime Minister since 2002,
Davutoglu is known as the intellectual architect of Turkish foreign
policy under the AK Party.
He articulated a novel foreign policy vision and succeeded, to
a considerable extent, in changing the rhetoric and practice of
Turkish foreign policy. Turkey’s new dynamic and multidimensional
foreign policy line is visible on the ground, most notably to date
in the country’s numerous and significant efforts to address chronic
problems in the neighboring regions. Davutoglu’s duty will now shift
from the intellectual design of policies to greater actual involvement
in foreign policy, as he undertakes his new responsibilities as
Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Davutoglu era in Turkish foreign
policy will deepen Turkey’s involvement in regional politics,
international organizations, and world politics.
DAVUTOGLU ERA IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY by Bulent Aras* Prime Minister
Tayyip Erdogan appointed Ahmet Davutoglu as Turkey’s new Foreign
Minister on May 1, 2009. Davutoglu has been a close associate of
Erdogan, and his chief advisor on foreign policy since 2003. Davutoglu
is known as the intellectual architect of the AK Party’s foreign
policy and has been influential in a number of major foreign policy
developments. There is a consensus that it was Davutoglu who largely
changed the rhetoric and practice of Turkish foreign policy, bringing
to it a dynamic and multi-dimensional orientation. He set the vision
and the style of the new foreign policy line and provided a framework
for pursuing it. At first, Davutoglu’s new vision and style were
subject to much discussion and critism; many wondered whether it
would be suitable for Turkish foreign policy. After seven years,
the discussion has mainly shifted to whether his policy would be
sustainable without the AK Party and himself in the advisor’s chair.
Davutoglu vision has proven successful on the ground and his
policy line has gained legitimacy in the suspicious eyes of
critics in Turkey and abroad, although his approach continues to
raise criticism. Davutoglu’s influence is mainly due to former
Foreign Minister and current President Abdullah Gul and Prime
Minister Erdogan’s willingness to appropriate his vision in the
implementation of foreign policy. He is a well perceived person
in Turkey’s neighborhood, and in the eyes of major players in
the international system, as was witnessed during French President
Sarkozy’s request that Turkey lend a hand to French diplomacy during
the Gaza crisis. Davutoglu’s appointment to Foreign Minister will
have implications beyond Turkey, both in the neighboring regions and
among the international organizations in which Turkey takes active
part. The major media outlets in the US, Europe and the Middle East
covered his appointment extensively, and future close interest in
Davutoglu’s moves as Foreign Minister of Turkey seems likely.
Davutoglu Vision in Foreign Policy Davutoglu’s foreign policy
vision has Turkey’s domestic transformation in the background,
specifically the consolidation of political and economic stability
in the country. Turkey’s domestic reform and growing economic
capabilities have enabled the country to emerge as a peace-promoter
in neighboring regions. Prior to Davutoglu’s rise to prominence,
security in Turkey had been treated, to a considerable extent, as an
internal problem. Foreign policies were seen as extensions of domestic
considerations, and this attitude was traditionally accompanied by
a visible tendency to externalize domestic problems and search for
foreign enemies as the root causes of security problems. In some
cases, there may indeed have been external causes for the problems,
but political elites tended to exaggerate and manipulate them
to preserve their hold on power. Davutoglu developed his foreign
policy on the basis of a novel geographic imagination which put
an end to what he calls the "alienation of Turkey’s neighboring
countries. One essential component of Davutoglu’s vision is to make
negative images and prejudices, particularly those pertaining to the
Middle East, a matter of the past. This shift has enabled Turkey to
completely emancipate foreign policy from the chains of the domestic
considerations.[1] Davutoglu’s vision paved the way for the emergence
of a new imagination, one which places different assumptions about
regional countries in the minds of policymakers. The crux of the
question lies within the aforementioned transformation, which reshaped
foreign policy choices. In this sense, the new foreign policy took
form under the impact of Davutoglu’s re-definition of Turkey’s
role in the neighboring regions and in international politics,
namely its "strategic depth," with frontiers that have expanded
beyond the homeland in the cognitive map of policymaker’s minds. The
territorial limits to Turkish involvement in neighboring countries has
disappeared in this new mindset. The relationship between ‘bordering
and othering'[2] gained a new meaning after removing the strains of
domestic threat perceptions in regional policy.
Davutoglu’s vision is likely to have a widespread impact on the
culture of national security and the culture of geopolitics, which
means widening the horizons of policymakers and the emergence of
certain new attitudes in foreign policy. The change can be best
understood in a multilateral framework that includes changes in the
domestic landscape and the bilateral interaction of each component
of the political, economic, and cultural transformation in relation
to the emerging foreign policy line. For example, a more secure
domestic atmosphere enters into a bilateral formative interaction
with a confident foreign policy line. This process reconfigures the
formulation of national security and integrates new factors into the
foreign policymaking process. As Kiriþci notes, according to Turkish
policymakers, "the political development, economic capabilities,
dynamic social forces, and ability to reconcile Islam and democracy
at home are the qualities that offer Turkey the possibili!
ty to develop and implement"[3] active and influential policies in the
neighboring regions and in distant geographies like Africa and Asia.
Davutolu points out that Turkey promises to contribute to security,
stability and prosperity in a wide range of territories that go beyond
Turkey’s immediate neighborhood. He commented on Turkey’s projected
activism in Africa as follows: "A country that undermines Africa can
not have an international standing."[4] Turkey’s newfound interest
in these regions is the result of putting its home affairs in order,
gaining self-confidence in international relations, developing a
universal vision of foreign policy, and seeking a leadership role
in world politics. As Ahmet Davutoglu himself argues: In terms of
geography, Turkey occupies a unique space. As a large country in the
midst of Afro-Eurasia’s vast landmass, it may be defined as a central
country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to
one unified character. Like Russia, Germany, Iran, and Egypt, Turkey
cannot be explained geographically or culturally by associating it with
one single region. Turkey’s diverse regional composition lends it the
capability of maneuvering in several regions simultaneously; in this
sense, it controls an area of influence in its immediate environs.[5]
Namely, although the distance between Turkey and other countries
remains same, as Davutoglu argues in his seminal book, Strategic
Depth,[6] a new recognition of Turkey’s historical and cultural
roots in the neighboring regions is changing perceptions of these
geographies under the premises of a new geographic imagination. The
physical distance and prior difficulties of getting involved in these
geographies no longer make sense in policy circles and among the
public. What has emerged is a process of discovery of the ‘closeness’
of these geographies and their ‘availability’ for Turkey’s involvement
through the instruments of remembering past relations, unfolding
cultural and civilizational affinities, and exploring opportunities
for engagement. Turkey’s new neighborhood policy appropriated a vision
of minimizing the problems in its neighboring regions, which has
been called zero problem policy by Davutoglu himself, while avoiding
involvement in international confrontations.[7] The changing meanings
of Asia or Africa in the new rhetoric of foreign policymakers exemplify
the dynamic interaction between power and geography. There emerges a
process of re-positioning, which places Turkey in a wider geographical
landscape or makes it part of new regions. Turkey’s new foreign policy
places Turkey within various regions in such a way that it occupies not
only an important geo-political position but is also able to emerge as
a meaningful player in political and economic settings. Davutoglu’s
vision has been appropriated by Turkey’s foreign and security elite,
and by the politicians in power. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan
exemplified Davutoglu’s rhetoric of strategic depth when he said,
"Istanbul is not only a center combining the continents but also
a central symbol combining and synthesizing the civilizations."[8]
Erdoðan place Istanbul in the center of a vast landscape, wherein
Turkey’s geography and cultural heritage gain meaning in a wider terr!
itorial context. As Davutoglu further argues: Turkey’s engagements from
Chile to Indonesia, from Africa to Central Asia, and from the EU to
the OIC will be part of a holistic approach to foreign policy. These
initiatives will make Turkey a global actor as we approach 2023,
the one hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish
Republic.[9] In this mindset, Turkey emerges as an influential player
in a geography extending from Africa to the Far East and beyond.
Critics tend to present Davutoglu’s vision as neo-Ottomanism,
emphasizing that most of Turkey’s foreign policy activism occurs in
former Ottoman territories. In fact, Davutoglu’s policies represent a
continuity with Turkey’s gradually developing activism during the era
of former President Turgut Ozal, as well as the radical steps towards
EU membership taken by the coalition government that preceded the
AK Party. Taking these trends further, Davutoglu formulated a more
comprehensive foreign policy vision and developed policy mechanisms
to tackle the challenges of globalization in a post-nation state
age. Davutoglu’s approach of making boundaries de facto meaningless
while respecting national sovereignty creates geo-political imperatives
to return to the backyard of the former Ottoman Empire. As Ibrahim
Kalýn argues: "Turkey’s post-modernity seems to be embedded in
its Ottoman past."[10] Neither ignoring Turkey’s Ottoman past nor
seeking to merely recapitulate it as such, Davutoglu’s reference
to historico-cultural affinities provides an advantage to Turkey in
its involvement in neighboring regions. For example, his argument in
Strategic Depth regarding the conflict over Jerusalem, namely that "no
political problem in the region can be resolved without [utilizing]
Ottoman archives,"[11] aims to bring the Ottoman past into play to
provide a position for Turkey in the Middle East peace process. As a
further note on the realistic account of Davutoglu vision, Kiriþci
underlines one priority of the new foreign policy as the emphasis
placed on the rising importance of economic interdependence.[12]
In this respect, it would be misleading to consider neo-Ottomanism
as the primary motive behind Davutoglu’s geo-political imagination.
Turkish foreign policy in neighboring regions does not assume a
hegemonic role for Turkey but targets an inclusive approach for
building peace and security based on the dynamics within these
regions. Following this line of thought, Turkish foreign policymakers
have gained a new self-confidence and political will to pursue peace
attempts in the neighboring regions. Turkey now hosts Middle Eastern,
Eurasian, and African leaders as well as high-level politicians and
officials from Western countries, and facilitates platforms for the
solution of conflicts in various geographies. Turkish policymakers
try to overcome differences between countries in conflict through
confidence-building measures and by acting as a mediator and
facilitator to find solutions to chronic regional problems. Turkish
policymakers’ approach has enabled Turkey to emerge in the role of
peace-maker in the periphery of the international system. As the
driving force behind these developments, Davutoglu’s vision!
aims to prepare the ground for a new peace consciousness in a wide
geography extending from the Middle East to the steppes of Eurasia.
New Foreign Policy Instruments Davutoglu offers a number of mechanisms
to realize the foreign policy objectives set forth in his new
vision. The first is an integrated foreign policy approach.[13]
According to Davutoglu, Turkey was a country of priorities in its
foreign policy orientation during the Cold War era. At that time,
there was a certain hierarchy of priorities in the minds of foreign
policymakers, and they pursued foreign policy in association with these
static priorities. However, in Davutoglu’s view, this hierarchy is no
longer valid in the current era. Instead, Turkey needs to develop a
new policy of integrating foreign policy issues within a single policy
formulation framework. Turkey does not have the luxury to turn its back
on or avoid certain areas as it once did. Turkey has multiple regional
identities and thus has the capability to follow an integrated foreign
policy to bring a variety of issues into the same picture, from the
Middle East peace process to Caucasian stability, giving priority to
immediate issues without ignoring other foreign policy concerns.
According to this line of logic, foreign policy is a process and it
should be considered from a longer perspective than had previously
obtained. For example, contention surrounding the EU and Cyprus was
on the agenda in the first half of 2004, and foreign policy focused
on Iraq throughout the rest of 2004. The Gaza tragedy came onto
the agenda in late 2008. As Davutoglu argues, it would be wrong to
artificially maintain a priority in any certain area; rather Turkish
involvement should remain rooted in the principles of strategic
depth, yet fluid and resilient enough to respond appropriately to the
changes that occur in any given time period.[14] Also related to this
discussion, Davutoglu opposes the notion that Turkey is guilty of a
shift of axis in foreign policy.[15] For example, one may consider
Turkey Cyprus-oriented if one looks at its 2004 activism, or Middle
East-oriented if one looks at Turkey’s intense diplomatic activities
during Gaza crisis. Such categorizations would represent the mistake of
evaluating Turkey’s foreign policy at a certain short-term conjuncture,
falling short of understanding it as a process. Turkey follows an
integrated policy which collects all foreign policy areas and issues
into a singe picture of policy formulation. Rejecting the idea that
Turkey has made a shift from the West to a Middle Eastern axis,
Davutoglu underlines that Turkey occupies a non-permanent seat in UN
Security Council and is an active member of the G-20. Turkey also
preserves its utmost commitment to the EU membership process.[16]
These continuing commitments to involvement with the West, while
deepening connections with the East, are the hallmarks of Davutoglu’s
integrated foreign policy approach.
The second mechanism Davutoglu offers to realize his foreign policy
vision is a pro-active foreign policy line supported by rhythmic
diplomacy. Davutoglu criticized in his book the low level of
diplomatic engagement in the OIC, attributing to it Turkey’s lost
opportunity to place a Turkish candidate in the seat of secretary
general at the OIC in 2000.[17] Davutoglu guided foreign policy into
a high degree of involvement with the OIC’s election of a secretary
general in 2004 when he was chief advisor to the Prime Minister. The
result was the election of Turkish Professor Ekmeleddin Ýhsanoðlu to
the position of general secretary by democratic vote, for the first
time in the history of the OIC.[18] Moreover, Turkey’s neighboring
areas have seen more Turkish foreign policy elites and politicians
in the past several years than they had in previous decades in their
capitals. This proactive diplomacy targeted to achieve "zero problem"
with Turkey’s neighbors and stepped to the next!
stage, which has been named as "maximum cooperation" by Davutoglu
in his first press conference as Foreign Minister. Turkey hosts
major summits of international organizations ranging from the
Water Forum and the Least Developed Countries to the Caribbean
Community. Turkey also hosts direct and indirect talks between the
sides of disputes from the Middle East to the Eurasian steppes. Recent
examples include the indirect talks between Israel and Syria and the
direct negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Turkey also has
acquired a non-permanent seat in UN Security Council, and an observer
status in the African Union, the Arab League, the Association of
Caribbean States (ACS) and the Organization of the American States
(OAS). Turkey’s development assistance exceeded 700 million USD in
2008 and Turkey is emerging as a donor country in the United Nations.
Third is presence on the ground, in particular during times of
crisis.[19] As Davutoglu put forward, Turkey needs to be on the ground
whether it be in the European Union, the Middle East or the Caucasus,
with a Turkish perspective. This mechanism has been exemplified in
several cases, most recently during the Russia-Georgia crisis and the
Gaza Crisis. Prime Minister Erdogan visited Georgia, Azerbaijan and
Russia before any other leader in the region and in Europe. Turkey
offered a stability platform and carefully managed a potential
NATO-Russia crisis in the Black Sea. Second, Erdogan visited four
influential Arab countries in the immediate aftermath of Israel’s
Gaza offensive, and a Turkish team led by Davutoglu himself pursued
shuttle diplomacy between Damascus and Cairo during the crisis.
Fourth is Davutoglu’s all-inclusive, equidistance policy. According
to Davutoglu, Turkish policy should aim to include all related
actors, forming a broad coalition to solve problems and develop
initiatives. In this sense, Turkey pursues its diplomacy carefully and
modestly. Turkish policymakers keep an equal distance from all actors
and avoid taking part in any regional alliances or groupings. Turkey’s
all-inclusive policy and equidistance policy satisfy the concerns
of regional actors and assure them of the constructive nature of
Turkish policies.
Fifth is total performance in foreign policy, which means considering
NGOs, business communities and other civil organizations as part of
the new foreign policy vision and mobilizing their support behind the
new dynamic foreign policy line.[20] As a result of the facilitating
impact of the new foreign policy understanding, various social
groups increased their role in the making of foreign policy. Business
organizations, civil society, intellectuals, think-tanks, and other
actors now provide input into the foreign policymaking process. The new
role of these institutions is part of this idea of total performance,
in contrast to a past when regional policy and international relations
were imagined in such a way that there was no room for these actors
in the foreign policymaking process.
Davutoglu’s Foreign Policy Style Davutoglu sparked a number of
foreign policy initiatives in his capacity as chief advisor to the
prime minister. Among these initiatives, Turkey’s invitation to, and
ongoing engagement policy with HAMAS has drawn more attention than any
other, and has been the center of criticism against Davutoglu. HAMAS’
victories in the local elections of 2005 and in the Parliamentary
Legislative Elections in 2006 opened a new era in the Palestinian
question. HAMAS’ refusal to recognize Israel was presented as the
main concern of the international community, and the US and the EU
started to discuss possible measures to force HAMAS to recognize
Israel. Turkey’s ruling party, the AK Party, under Davutoglu’s
guidance, interpreted the HAMAS victory in a different way and favored
diplomatic engagement with HAMAS to preempt possible problems. The
Turkish position, as expressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is
that all related parties should respect the result of democratically
conducted el!
ections and that it would be against democratic principles if outside
actors attempted to weaken the newly elected order by imposing
economic measures against the Palestinian administration.[21]
According to Turkish policymakers, HAMAS was in search of allies in
the Middle East to put an end to the economic and political blockade
it was facing from the international system. In such an environment,
without Turkey’s intervention, the only possible entry for HAMAS was
the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis.[22] Turkey’s position is to include
HAMAS in the political process; Davutoglu’s expectation was to
persuade HAMAS to return to a truce in exchange for Israel’s lifting
of the blockade of Gaza. Turkish policymakers asked HAMAS to declare a
ceasefire and work for the political accommodation of different groups
within Palestinian politics.[23] Davutoglu met twice in Syria with
Khaled Mashal, HAMAS’s leader-in-exile. Davutoglu’s second visit came
as a result of French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s request for help
from Erdogan. In this sense, Turkey has started a mediation process
between HAMAS and international actors while maintaining regular
contacts with Fateh, the Palestinian Authority and Abbas. Ankara’s
contribution at this point has been to motivate HAMAS to take pragmatic
steps and ensure a rapprochement among the Palestinian factions.
Professor Richard Falk, the UN’s special reporter on the occupied
Palestinian territories, underlined the importance of Turkey’s HAMAS
engagement with a specific reference to HAMAS invitation in 2006 as
follows: "It is tragic that this effort failed, and was at the time
criticized. In retrospect, both the wellbeing of the Gazan civilian
population and the security of Israel would have been greatly benefited
by taking advantage of the Turkish initiative, and moving to implement
the readiness of HAMAS to establish a long-term truce."[24] Davutoglu
participated in Sarkozy’s meeting with Syrian President Basher Asad,
Javier Solana and the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign
and Security, in Damascus in January 2009. During the joint press
conference of Sarkozy and Asad, Sarkozy expressed his appreciation
for Davutoglu’s active contribution to the process.[25] A number of
Western and Middle Eastern media joined Sarkozy in this exclusive
acknowledgement of Davutoglu’s role with a further notice of his role
in the truce between HAMAS and Israel.
Davutoglu’s foreign policy activism is not limited to the Middle
East. The past seven years have witnessed similar activism in policies
toward the EU, Cyprus and the Caucasus. Turkey’s new dynamic foreign
policy line toward the Caucasus on the eve of the Russia-Georgia
crisis is a landmark example of Davutoglu’s policies in practice
and on the ground. As a product of Turkey’s new regional policy,
in the wake of the Georgia-Russia crisis, Ankara streamlined
a multilateral diplomatic initiative, the Caucasian Stability
and Cooperation Platform, which will consist of Russia, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. This platform aims to develop a
shared regional perspective, along with policy instruments to deal
with issues like regional peace and security, energy security, and
economic cooperation. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan pointed
out that this Platform should appropriate the principles and norms
of the OSCE and further argued that: "The failure of the Minsk grou!
p to produce any results is a fact that makes us think… The Caucasian
Cooperation and Stability Platform will contribute to the efforts
for the establishment of peace and stability in the region."[26]
Turkey’s position indicates Ankara’s preference for an inclusive
approach to the situation. Armenia, the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan,
and Georgia have responded positively to the offer, and have praised
the proposed project as a constructive attempt.[27] Turkey’s fresh
approach of including both Azerbaijan and Armenia in regional peace
efforts is targeted at ending the hegemony of Cold War-style binary
oppositions. The Armenian administration too recognizes the need to
put an end to the inimical patterns that create cycles of violence
in the region.[28] Officials from the five countries met in Helsinki
to discuss the aims, principles, and mechanisms of the Stability
Platform after the OSCE meeting in Helsinki in December 2008.[29]
Ankara tries to avoid taking sides in any !
"Russia versus the West" struggles while developing its own
relations with Moscow. Turkey pursued this policy actively during
the Russia-Georgia crisis in August of 2008. Turkish policymakers
acted carefully in order to minimize tension during the crisis
and put forward the idea of a regional platform to settle regional
problems. During the crisis, Prime Minister Erdogan pointed out the
importance of relations with Russia in the following way: "America is
our ally and the Russian Federation is an important neighbor. Russia is
our number one trade partner. We are obtaining two-thirds of our energy
from Russia. We act in accordance to our national interests. […] We
cannot ignore Russia."[30] The armed conflict and escalation of
tension between Russia and Georgia gave Turkey a tougher burden in
the region. Trying to mediate among different parties in the area,
Turkey faced a critical test of its neutral stance when US warships
passed through the Turkish straits to deliver aid to Georgia. As a
member of NATO, and also a neighbor, Turkey has supported Georgia
both economically and politically since the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Turkish policymakers aim to limit the Russian-Georgian crisis
to the Caucasus region and prevent its expansion to the wider Black
Sea region. At present, there is a clear tendency to seek support
from outside actors and wider regional alliances for providing
security in the region. Azerbaijan and Georgia rely on NATO and
the Western powers and seek regional alliances with the Ukraine,
Moldova, and Turkey. Armenia relies on Russia, while Russia calls on
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to support the Russian
cause in the Caucas!
us.[31] In response, Turkey suggested a Caucasian Stability Platform
to configure a dialogue between the three Caucasian states, Russia,
and Turkey in order to contain any crises in the region. Turkish
policymakers stress the need to create a confidence and trust-building
mechanism to foster a regional understanding of security. The EU gave
the green light to this initiative, and the EU progress report on
Turkey’s accession negotiations positively mentioned the project.[32]
NATO supported the platform as a constructive step for security in the
wider Black Sea region with reference to Turkey’s constructive policy
line during the crisis.[33] As a third example, under the strong
influence of Turkey’s new regional profile, Turkish policymakers
present Turkey as the only country that can pursue constructive
relations with all Iraqi actors and Iraqi neighbors. Erdogan noted that
his government pursues continuous and equal relations with all ethnic
groups to motivate them for Iraq’s unity and welfare.[34] In order to
contribute to political stability in Iraq, Turkey has followed four
complementary paths of diplomatic relations, exemplifying Davutoglu’s
multidimensional foreign policy line and rhythmic diplomacy: through
the UN Security Council, the Organization of the Islamic Conference,
Iraq’s neighbours, and ethnic and religious groups in Iraq. Among
these initiatives, the Platform for Iraqi Neighbors has arguably been
the most important. The platform met for the first time in Istanbul
on January 23, 2003 to find a peaceful solution and continued its
activities after the beginning of the Iraq war.
As part of this platform, the foreign ministers of related countries
have met formally eleven times and informally three times in different
locations such as Istanbul, Baghdad and Tehran. Through the platform,
Iraq’s neighbors all agreed on the territorial integrity and political
unity of Iraq. Some of the meetings were attended by representatives
from the European Commission and the United Nations as well as
the Secretaries General of the Arab League and the Organization of
Islamic Conference. The UN Security Council has taken these meetings
seriously and has requested further regional cooperation on the
Iraqi question. Inspired by this initiative, the UN Secretary General
established a consultation group involving the platform members.
Turkey also plays an active role in making the Arab League and the
OIC more sensitive to the ongoing issue of Iraq. Turkey engaged in
backstage diplomacy by bringing together the Americans and the Sunnis
on several occasions. During one such meeting before the elections
in Iraq, the Sunnis agreed to end Sunni attacks while the Americans
agreed to provide the conditions for a fair election.[35] In addition,
Ankara brought major Sunni opposition figures and US envoys together
to ensure Sunni participation in Iraq’s national elections on 30 June
2005. Tariq-al Hashimi, a prominent Sunni leader and Vice-president of
Iraq, has met former US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad in Istanbul in another
initiative aimed at involving all groups in the political process.[36]
In order to contribute to the democratic process in Iraq, Turkey also
organized training programs for 350 Iraqi politicians from various
political parties.[37] As these efforts demonstrate, Turkey’s ruling
elite now enjoy a newl!
y developed self-confidence that Turkey can play a constructive role
in the Middle East, including Iraq. Turkey’s Iraqi policy has been
an asset in Turkish-American relations and a serious motive behind
President Barrack Obama’s projected "model partnership" on a number
of issues ranging from the future of Iraq to Afghanistan’s stability.
Concluding Remarks It is not an overstatement to claim that the
position of Foreign Minister is a challenging duty in Turkey even for
Davutoglu, who has long been chief foreign policy advisor to Prime
Minister Erdogan. More than an advisor, Davutoglu is the intellectual
architect of Turkey’s new foreign policy. This dual role brings both
advantages and disadvantages. Statements against and in favor of
Turkey’s proactive regional policy and growing international relations
are usually targeted at Davutoglu himself.
Although such statements underestimate the role of institutional
background and ignore other agents of Turkish foreign policy, there
is a general consensus that Davutoglu has played an influential role
in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy since 2002. There are
a number of challenges and difficulties ahead for Davutoglu in his
new position. The following notes may help to delineate the problems
ahead; the recommendations may help partially to overcome some of them.
1. Davutoglu has a strong academic background in philosophy, political
science and international relations. He is very talented in building
sophisticated foreign policy rhetoric vis-a-vis the problems on
the ground. As minister of Foreign Affairs, the burden will shift
more from rhetoric to practice. There will be more expectations of
seeing actual results. Davutoglu thus assumes a challenging duty
since his vision promises a central role for Turkey in a wide range
of geography from Africa to Asia, an area encompassing almost all of
the major challenges to international security.
2. Davutoglu’s idea of integral foreign policy is persuasive in terms
of identifying Turkey’s foreign policy agenda. However, the validity
of this idea is dependent on the size of the receptive audience. There
is need to keep the EU membership and reform process on the agenda in a
way that facilitates the maintenance of a wide, receptive audience for
integral foreign policy perspectives both inside and outside of Turkey.
3. Davutoglu should consider Turkey’s democracy as the main source
of its soft power. The challenging task is to manage Turkish foreign
policy in such a way to limit the securitizing impact of a number
of issues–like the Cyprus issue and Northern Iraq-in domestic
politics. Another dimension of this challenge is the need for
public diplomacy in Turkey’s actively involved regions and to
create communication channels with Turkish public opinion. For
example, the attempts for normalization with Armenia triggered a
nationalist Azeri response and this response found support in Turkey
in a form of allegation that the Turkish government is selling out
Azerbaijan. Preventing this kind of negative input should be on the
agenda in relation to Turkey’s increasing activism in regional policy.
4. Davutoglu will be in charge of Turkish foreign policy and will
manage the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the new era. He will not
have the luxury of opening a certain file and proceeding with it:
he will have all the files of foreign policy at his table. He will
probably not have the chance to be personally involved in all issues
and problems. He will be working together with or delegating to
the ministry cadres. As Temel Ýskit pointed out, he may encounter
serious internal problems and obstacles while trying to reconcile his
vision with the bureaucratic mechanisms of Turkish foreign policy.[38]
Populist pressure from both the government and the opposition parties
will continue to complicate the situation as external obstacles.
5. In addition to its commitment to democracy, Turkey’s soft power
emerges from its on-the-ground influence in the Middle East and
the Caucasus, coupled with its political, cultural and economic
abilities. Turkey has gained its status in the neighboring regions by
experimenting with its foreign policy and demonstrating achievements
on the ground. The challenge for Davutoglu is to consolidate
Turkey’s strategic-political achievements with economic and cultural
engagements. The task is to create a feasible and sustainable trading
state in close cooperation and coordination with the business community
and state institutions.
6. US President Obama’s visit contributed to Turkey’s soft power
image on the international stage. There is a need to constitute
a solid base for Obama’s notion of model partnership in order to
secure long-term support and cooperation on the ground from the US
administration. The challenge is to utilize converging regional and
international interests between Turkey and the US in the current era
in order to create a win-win situation for all sides.