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THE GOOD SAILOR POLICY
by Khatchik DerGhougassian

Harvard International Review
icle&id=1817
Jan 9 2009
MA

The Return of the US Fourth Fleet and the South American Reaction

Khatchik DerGhougassian is a Professor of International Relations at
the Universidad de San AndrÃ©s in Argentina, a Visiting Professor at
the American University of Armenia (Yerevan, Republic of Armenia),
and an advisor at the Ministry of Defense of Argentina. He holds an MA
degree in International Relations from FLACSO/Argentina and did his
PhD studies at the University of Miami in International Studies. His
research projects have included arms transfer, gun control policies,
terrorism, organized crime and international conflict.

Venezuela’s Hugo ChÃ¡vez, along with Cuba’s Castra and Bolivia’s Evo
Morales, denounced the "imperialist" and "interventionist" character
of the re-deployment. Photo courtesy Â¡Que comunismo!/flickr.comAfter
58 years of absence, the US Fourth Fleet went back to business on
July 1, 2008 in the southern West Hemisphere. If the event had
occurred in 1990s, the Argentine government would probably have
welcomed the initiative and even anticipated further enhancing the
"special relationship" that the Carlos S. Menem administration had
with the United States. But times have changed. Since the so-called
"left turn" in Latin America after the 2001-2003 social and economic
crises and the subsequent political turmoil in Argentina, Venezuela,
Bolivia, Ecuador, and other countries, almost every US move in the
region has been received with skepticism, concern, and criticism. Such
has been the case with the return of the US Fourth Fleet.

The decision of re-deployment was made public on April 24, and although
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead made an announcement
assuring Latin America that the move does not imply new military
assets in the region, the leaders of South American countries were
not convinced, with the exception of Colombia. Cuba’s Fidel Castro,
Venezuela’s Hugo ChÃ¡vez, and Bolivia’s Evo Morales denounced the
"imperialist" and "interventionist" character of the re-deployment,
whereas Brazil’s Defense Minister, Nelson Jobim, declared that his
country would not allow the fleet to operate in Brazilian waters
without authorization. Jobim’s Argentine colleague, Nilda GarrÃ©–whom
Admiral James Stavridis, the head of the Southern Command (SouthCom),
visited on May 7 during his South American tour to personally explain
Washington’s decision–was also not convinced. Brazil and Argentina
did not take any immediate steps against the US decision, but the
issue of the Fourth Fleet is on their defense and foreign policy
agendas and is being widely discussed and debated in both official
and unofficial circles. In the South American press, an uncritical
perspective towards the US military move is rare.

Same Concern, Different Reactions On July 1, 2008, the day of the
Fourth Fleet’s arrival, the leaders of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay,
and Paraguay–the four founding members of the Southern Common Market
(Mercado ComÃºn del Sur -MERCOSUR)–as well as Venezuela, Bolivia,
and Chile, met for a summit in the city of San Miguel de TucumÃ¡n
in Argentina. Although the two main issues on the agenda were the
world food crisis and the European immigration policy, Venezuela’s
ChÃ¡vez referred to the re-deployment of the Fourth Fleet and proposed
that his colleagues ask Washington for an official explanation of the
move. Brazil and Argentina were the first countries to take action. The
Brazilian Senate debated the issue while Lula rushed his Foreign and
Defense Ministers, Celso Amorin and Nelson Jobim, to Washington to
meet separately with their American counterparts. At the same time,
Argentina’s Crisitina FernÃ¡ndez de Kirchner demanded explanations
from the US Undersecretary of State for Hemispheric Affairs, Thomas
Shannon, during his visit to the country on July 10. Even Chile,
which has signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States,
raised the issue at a bilateral meeting.

None of the explanations that the representatives of the Pentagon, the
State Department, or the commanding officers of SouthCom and the Fourth
Fleet have provided officially have satisfied South Americans. Yet,
neither Brazil nor Argentina went beyond an official demand for
explanation. Moreover, during his visit to Argentina in the second
week of September, Brazil’s newly appointed Minister of Strategic
Affairs, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, denied any relation between the
re-deployment of the Fourth Fleet and his country’s ambitious decision
to raise the defense budget from 1.5 to 2.7 percent of the GDP. "We
do not work based on enemies or threats; only on capacities we need,"
he said. During the VIII Conference of the Defense Ministers of the
Americas with US Defense Secretary Robert Gates in Banff, Canada,
Nilda GarrÃ© maintained that bilateral cooperation between Argentina
and the United States would continue despite her concern about the
reactivation of the Fourth Fleet, which she described as "a military
move for which we do not see any convincing explanation."

Argentina and Brazil’s rather prudent reaction can be explained
first by a realist approach to the issue; historical experience has
shown that confrontation with the United States never has a positive
outcome. Second, there is at least one country in South America,
Colombia, that is aligned with the United States, and Brazil, the
leading country in the process of the regional integration, does
not want to alienate any member of the Union of the South American
Nations (UNASUR). Third, there is a widespread conviction in Brazil and
Argentina that the defense and exercise of sovereignty are basically
a function of strengthening national and regional institutions to face
any direct or indirect attempt of foreign intervention in the region.

Venezuela, however, did not hesitate to go further and raise the
stakes with the United States. Barely a month after the Fourth Fleet
became operative in the waters of the South Atlantic, President Chavez
seized on the opportunity of renewed Russian-American tension in the
aftermath of the Georgia crisis and announced that Venezuela and Russia
would hold joint naval exercises in the Caribbean. On September 8,
Moscow confirmed the visit of the nuclear warship Piotr Veliki. Later
that same week, ChÃ¡vez expelled the US Ambassador in Caracas as
a gesture of solidarity with Bolivia’s Evo Morales’ decision to
expel the US Ambassador in La Paz. At the heart of Venezuela’s and
Bolivia’s hawkish position lies not only an ideological factor but
also the conviction that the United States is indeed intervening
in their internal affairs. Moreover, both ChÃ¡vez and Morales have
experienced direct hostility from Washington: in April 2002, the former
US Undersecretary of State Otto Reich rushed to legitimize the failed
military coup against ChÃ¡vez; in Bolivia the US Ambassador publicly
repudiated Evo Morales while he was still a leader of the coca-growing
peasants and a candidate for the presidential elections. Both leaders
came into power with an agenda of radical reforms violently opposed by
entrenched minority sectors, which after historically holding power are
now facing threats and have been displaced and marginalized. ChÃ¡vez
and Morales have accused Washington of maintaining ties with the
opposition, providing its leaders with financial aid, and even arming
them. Hence, an emerging Russia is seen as a potential ally to balance
the US hegemonic drive in the region.

Unconvincing Explanations As soon as news of the redeployment of the
Fourth Fleet was made public, the leading figures of the US SouthCom
started an active public campaign to explain the reasons behind the
decision. Through meetings with South American leaders and several
press conferences, the following arguments were crystallized as
the official US rationale: (a) the redeployment of the Fourth Fleet
has to do with operational reasons, and is not directed against the
sovereignty of any Latin American nation; (b) there is no hostile
intention toward any country, including Venezuela; (c) the decision
has no relation to the discovery of large offshore oil reserves
in Brazilian waters; (d) more broadly, it does not aim at future
appropriation or threatening of South America’s abundant natural
resources, including oil, natural gas, water, and agricultural land;
(e) its mission is to fight drug trafficking and terrorism; (f) this
mission also includes providing humanitarian assistance in times of
natural disasters or epidemics.

Most of these strategic arguments have already been formulated in
several US military documents that are public, particularly in the
October 2007 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century and Admiral
James Stavridis’ U.S. Southern Command 2008 Statement. The first
document, for instance, concludes that the US sea strategy "focuses on
opportunities -not threats; on optimism -not fear; and on confidence
-not doubt." More precisely, Stavridis’ address before the 110th
Congress mentions poverty and inequality, drugs, violence and crime,
and terrorism as some of the "challenges" that the US SouthCom faces.

Reasons for Concern in the South Yet, none of these arguments seem
to convince South Americans. For Argentina, involving the military in
humanitarian assistance could raise the issue of confusing the roles of
the military and the civilians. After the bloody dictatorship of the
military government in 1976-1983, the return of the democracy brought
about a strict separation of internal and external security, as well
as civil and military roles. Argentine law forbids any military
interference in internal affairs, and Argentines are therefore
suspicious of any move that could weaken civilian rule.

More broadly, South Americans do not accept "challenges" such as
drug trafficking, violent crime, and even terrorism as issues that
reserve any role for the military. This does not necessarily mean
that some countries have not militarized these issues. Colombia
is engaged in the US "war on drugs;" Bolivia’s military annually
receives US$30 million dollars in US assistance to fight the same
war in Bolivia; violent crime in Rio de Janeiro has led to increasing
public support for the use of the military against organized gangs;
and even ChÃ¡vez’s Bolivarian Revolution ideal has a strong military
component. Generally, however, while countries south of the Panama
Canal look for an authentic means of regional integration, Central
America and the Caribbean are becoming further integrated in the North
American process. Whereas in Central America and Mexico militaries are
increasing their involvement in fighting the so-called "new threats,"
South American countries are moving toward a regional and global
strategic repositioning that reserves a more traditional role for
the military.

There are two basic reasons why Central American nations and Mexico
are inclined to give a greater role to their military in dealing with
the "new threats."

The first reason is related to the greater integration of these
countries within the North American process, which has decreased their
autonomy in executing their defense and security agendas. Despite
the participation of several Central American nations in the 2003
US-led intervention in Iraq, Washington does not plan to include any
Latin American military in its global projections. In other words,
no Latin American country is foreseen as a partner in a NATO-style
alliance. During the Cold War, especially in the 1980s, Central
American militaries were useful in fighting leftist insurgencies
or regimes. The process of pacification in the early 1990s left
these militaries with no specific mission. Unwilling to include
them in its post-Cold War strategic designs, Washington pushed for
yet another domestic function for these militaries through their
involvement in the so-called "new threats." For Washington, such a
role would decrease the risks of arms proliferation in its "backyard"
(i.e. Noriega). For the Central American militaries, the redefinition
of their role by Washington has perhaps become essential to their
institutional survival.

The second reason is the historically unprecedented level of crime
and delinquency in Central America and the impotency of the internal
security agencies to deal with the problem. The military is seen as
the only efficient way to fight crime, gang violence and organized
crime, despite the high risk such a move involves. In Mexico, for
example, it is clearly the cartelization of drug trafficking and
the high levels of violence that have increased the militarization
of internal security, a move that Washington hailed within the logic
of the "war against drugs."

For South America, by contrast, autonomy from the United States has
become a virtue, particularly since the failure of the southern
hemisphere’s ill-fated attempts at integration in the 1990s. The
consistent exception is Colombia, which has sought cozier relations
with the United States. In general, though, South Americans are all
too suspicious of Washington’s rhetoric about the "war on terror"
and "preemption," perhaps due to tragic memories of Cold War US
interventions that were based on similar national security doctrines.

This strategic repositioning of South America, in turn, is closely
related to the renewed importance of natural resources in the global
economy. Oil in Venezuela and Brazil, natural gas in Bolivia, copper
in Chile, the world’s largest water resources, cultivable land areas,
and the rich resources of the Amazon are gaining new importance in the
global free market system. With the price of the oil barrel hitting
historic records, water reserves becoming a strategic asset, and in a
world facing food crises, South American nations see an opportunity to
escape cycles of sudden growth and brutal collapse. It is, therefore,
hard for them not to suspect an interest in natural resources behind
the redeployment of the Fourth Fleet, notwithstanding the verbal
assurance they receive from the United States. This is not to say, as
some suggest, that the United States would appropriate these natural
resources through military force; but any power projection could be a
prelude of a direct or indirect interference in South American economic
policies. After having paid their entire debt to the International
Monetary Fund, and amidst strong rejection of advice from international
financial institutions, South American nations have recovered a level
of sovereignty that includes the protection and management of their
resource-rich lands–without any foreign interference.

The Ghosts of the Cold War With the exception of Colombia and perhaps
Peru, the broad concern that all South American nations share about
the redeployment of the US Fourth Fleet has to do with two factors:
(1) the failure of the early 1990s attempt to institutionalize a
hemispheric defense and security regime, and, (2) the apparently
enduring phenomenon of the "left turn" and its social, economic,
and political expressions. Neither of these two factors should be
understood in absolute terms. Quite the opposite, they are both so
diverse and complex that the possibility of reversals in the future
cannot be ignored. In other words, US hegemonic push in the Western
Hemisphere has not come to an end, and the electoral comeback of
rightist forces is not impossible. But, both the 1990s failure to
institutionalize a hemispheric defense and security regime and the
"left turn" in South America are tangible proof that the post-Cold
War order has created serious limitations in terms of expectations.

Nevertheless, the disenchantment of the 1990s has brought back some
of the Cold War ghosts, and especially the suspicion of renewed US
involvement in South American internal affairs and a widespread
hostility to American imperialism. The recent US-Russian tension
has sparked fears of a "new" Cold War in the Western Hemisphere, as
Venezuela seems to consider the emerging Russia as a counter-balancing
factor to the perceived US power play to the South. Regardless of
the real intentions of Russia, Caracas has opened the possibility
for Russian battleships to navigate where the US Fourth Fleet now
is present.

Conclusion: The Rationale of a Regional "Shield" In all, even if the
US Fourth Fleet’s novel mission of "humanitarian assistance" during
natural disasters is a serious initiative aimed at reassuring South
Americans of the United States’ good intentions, it still is a move
within Washington’s logic of a global power projection. This global
projection of power has already defined and confirmed a policy of
primacy in the world, the aim of which is to prevent the emergence of
any regional power. In Latin America, however, the United States has
historically looked for a hegemonic presence, and the long series of
direct intervention and support for military takeovers is still more
relevant to Latin Americans than any explanation the US SouthCom can
put forth.

ChÃ¡vez and Morales perceive US hegemony as a threat. Venezuela’s
leader, therefore, sees in the emergence of Russia the opportunity
to forge an anti-US military alliance as a guarantee for Venezuela’s
national security. At the same time however, ChÃ¡vez did not hide
his interest to start a dialogue with the Obama administration.

Despite their concerns regarding the redeployment of the US
Fourth Fleet, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and other South American
countries do not wish to risk the regionalization of another global
tension. Since the return of democracy in the 1980s, formerly rival,
if not enemy, South American countries have defined their relations
as a "security community," and are eager to secure the region as a
"zone of peace." This "zone of peace" however is sometimes shaken
by the internal crisis of a country, which can have a "spill-over"
effect on the rest. The most recent examples are the Colombia-Ecuador
tensions in March that followed the assassination of the FARC guerrilla
leader by Colombia on Ecuadorian territory, and the separatist threat
in Bolivia that in September escalated to deadly clashes between
the government and the opposition. In both cases, South American
countries showed a clear political will to deal with the challenges
and avoid any extra-regional interference. Any revival of the Cold
War, in its classical or "new" forms of power projection, can simply
become a potential invitation for intervention by the US Fourth Fleet,
which few desire.

This has not been the panorama that Brazil, the emerging power in
the region, had in mind when the Lula government decided to launch
a historically unprecedented and ambitious plan to reorganize its
defense sector, which foresees a drastic increase of the defense
budget from 1.5 percent to 2.7 percent of the GDP and includes the
construction of a nuclear submarine. The plan is conceived as a
common regional "shield" of defense, as well as a broad development
project, as Minister Mangabeira Unger characterizes it. Indeed, Brazil
simultaneously proposed the creation of the South American Defense
Council (CSD), which was approved at a meeting of the UNASUR countries
in Santiago, Chile in September 2008. If it overcomes tremendous
political and technical obstacles, the CSD could strengthen the idea
of a regional "shield."

Concerning the re-deployment of the Fourth Fleet, the rationale
of the regional "shield" does not specifically aim at countering
the US move. It aims at strengthening South America’s defense and
security to prevent foreign interference targeting the region. With
the prospect of a global financial collapse and the advent of a
deeply turbulent context in world politics, protectionist policies
are gaining importance. Overall, therefore, the redeployment of the
US Fourth Fleet has strengthened the protectionist instinct in South
America, as no country is willing to give any credibility to alleged
good intentions in a move that is by essence a power projection.

–Boundary_(ID_brM/ztrgMUPjrUEAOBpe9A)- –
From: Baghdasarian

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