TURKEY’S INITIATIVE: PROSPECTS FOR ARMENIA
Vardan Grigoryan
Hayots Ashkhar Daily
26 Sep 2008
Armenia
The Armenian, Azeri and Turkish Foreign Ministers’ trilateral meeting
that’s going to take place today in the frameworks of the 63rd session
of the UN General Assembly arouses interest both in the diplomatic
circles of different countries and among the politicians and political
scientists of Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Over the recent days, the Azerbaijani mass media have been sparing no
effort for persuading their own society that Turkey’s mediation will
push Armenia to concession and may very soon break the unyieldingness
of the Armenian side.
The assessments made in our reality in this connection may be
conventionally divided into two groups: internal political and expert.
The first group of assessments has been mainly expressed by the
representatives of the radical opposition who, assuming the airs of
wise people, have finally "revealed" that Turkey cannot be a mediator
in the Karabakh settlement talks.
The second group of assessments deriving from serious expert circles
views the fact of the trilateral meeting in the context of the
concrete current situation in the region and distinguishes it from
the settlement of the Karabakh conflict.
At present, the Karabakh settlement format proposed by the OSCE Minsk
Group is not only maintained but also applied. So, the Armenian20
President has already managed to meet with the Co-Chairs in the
frameworks of his current visit to New York. Furthermore, the latter
haven’t expressed any objection to the prospect of the meeting of
the Armenian, Azeri and Turkish Foreign Ministers, since they do
not absolutely consider it to be a serious alternative to the OSCE
Minsk Group.
Hence, the main issue does not consist in either Azerbaijan’s dream to
see Turkey in the role of a full mediator or the absence of Armenia’s
will. Our country has already expressed its standpoint in a clear
manner and agrees to the idea of proceeding with the talks by the
mediation of the Minsk Group.
The heart of the problem lies behind the Armenian-Turkish dialogues
and negotiations initiated by the real forces leading a battle against
one another in the region. Turkey desires to expand its role in the
South Caucasus by way of normalizing its relations with Armenia. It
has no other way since Georgia and Azerbaijan have already given the
country whatever it needed.
Quite different is the nature of the present and past of the
Armenian-Turkish relations as their regulation acquires a strategic
importance for Turkey in the present-day conditions. In this context,
Ankara has become faced with a hard choice which, in some sense,
is a kind of test for it.
With the purpose of moving forward with its recent initiative in the
South Caucasus,=2 0Turkey has to prove to the other participants of the
regional maneuvers that it can renounce its traditional preferences
in the relations between Baku and Yerevan and act as a more or less
impartial "broker", at least outwardly.
That’s why, Baku’s recent statements that Turkey may mitigate Armenia’s
attitude towards the Karabakh issue were followed by the clear-cut
and tough answer of the Armenian Foreign Minister: Ankara obviously
has much greater potentials and levers for influencing Baku rather
than Yerevan with which it doesn’t even have diplomatic ties.
Turkey’s initiative of organizing a trilateral meeting with the
participation of the Armenian and Azeri Foreign Ministers do not,
as a matter of fact, imply a change in the negotiation format. The
countries acting as mediators in the frameworks of the OSCE Minsk
Group will never lose their holdfast of such a serious lever. Ankara
has to make a choice between the prospects of becoming either the
‘elder brother’ of Azerbaijan or a regional superpower. And the
seeming "green light" that opens on it way towards the settlement of
the Karabakh conflict is the "litmus test" with the help of which all
the centers of the power interested in the South Caucasus should draw
relevant conclusions in the near future.
The Western strategists believe Turkey has to sacrifice its traditional
role of being Az erbaijan’s protector and become the regional power
which is capable of persuading Baku to accept the Karabakh settlement
conditions elaborated by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs. If the
mediator countries are now unable to overcome Baku’s persistence,
it is for the sole reason that the latter has the "strong support" of
Ankara behind its back. So, the meeting of the three countries’ Foreign
Ministers is an opportunity of "driving out one nail with another".
In such conditions, Armenia could not have deprived either the
Co-Chairs or Turkey of such "pleasure" because it loses nothing as a
result of such complex maneuvers. But as regards Turkey, it may lose
a lot.
A question arises as to whether Turkey will assume the expected role
or it will continue convincing Armenia that it has been keeping the
Armenian-Turkish border closed since 1993 solely "because of the
Armenian aggression in Azerbaijan". We believe that at the current
stage of the negotiations, Turkey will avoid making attempts to
influence any of the parties in order not to scare Armenia off and
at the same time not to offend Azerbaijan. Ankara still hopes to
do away with the trap standing on its path, playing on the "field"
of the Russian-American discords, i.e. showing each of the parties
that the "game" it is playing in the South Caucasus is the one which
is adv antageous to it.
Therefore, the ongoing negotiations in New York will, on the one hand,
ensure a certain "propaganda effect" for Turkey, and, on the other
hand, establish an "additional platform" for the OSCE Minsk Group
Co-Chairs, enabling them to test their proposals.