THE RUDE AWAKENING: EU LEADERS BELIEVED RUSSIA’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WOULD MAKE IT MORE EUROPEAN. NOT ANYMORE.
By Stefan Theil
Newsweek
September 15, 2008
International Edition
The criticism of the European Union’s weakly worded resolution on
the Russian-Georgian conflict–warning Russia to withdraw its troops
from Georgia without naming specific consequences should Moscow fail
to comply–was as predictable as it was seething. "Europe can keep
sucking our oil and gas," mocked the Moscow tabloid Tvoi Dyen. Western
commentators likened Europe’s message to Robin Williams’s spoof of
unarmed British cops: "Stop! Or we’ll say ‘stop’ again!"
Once again, the limitations of Europe acting as one on foreign policy
were painfully obvious. The one measure the 27 leaders could agree on
at their emergency summit in Brussels was to suspend talks on a planned
EU-Russia agreement regulating such things as trade and visas–a
largely symbolic act considering the talks have been stalled for more
than a year. But the more interesting news was how closely aligned EU
members were compared to the last emergency summit in 2003, when the
continent’s split over the Iraq War led to the worst foreign-policy
crisis in the EU’s history. This time, they unanimously agreed that
there had been a red line, and that Russia had crossed it by invading
Georgia and unilaterally declaring two of its provinces independent.
What’s more, the lack of tough action was more a reflection of
coolheaded realism than of disunity. "Europe’s short-term options
are close to zero," says Jan Techau, an analyst at the German
Council on Foreign Relations. Fighting a nuclear-armed Russia over
Georgia? Forget it. Trade sanctions would hit Europe with a painful
backlash–its citizens depend on Russian deliveries for 25 percent of
their oil and gas consumption, and its companies are heavily invested
in Russia. Given Russia’s phobias about Western conspiracies and
encirclement, threats would likely harden Russian policies. Even
if it wanted to take a tougher line, says Techau, the EU hasn’t
even begun to develop strategic options for a more bellicose Russia,
instead choosing to live comfortably with the narrative that Russia’s
economic integration would align it with a soft-power, multilateral,
postconflict Europe.
The Russian-Georgian war has shot down this illusion. "Georgia shows
that a military conflict in Europe is not as unlikely as it seemed
just a short time ago," says Klaus Reinhardt, a retired Bundeswehr
general and former NATO commander. The real test of Europe’s resolve
is how it intends to deal with these threats in the future. That would
start with uncomfortable questions of how the bloc would react if
one of its members were threatened. Several EU countries (including
Estonia and Latvia) have sizable Russian minorities, which Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev said two weeks ago Moscow has the right to
"protect." It would include turning rhetoric into action on cutting
Europe’s growing energy dependence on Russia–finding new suppliers,
building new pipelines, boosting alternative energy and nuclear
power–and getting serious about a European energy market that would
make it harder for Russia to play off one country against another. And
it would include finally getting serious about resolving exploitable
frozen conflicts from Moldova to Armenia.
That assumes that the EU can find the will. The weakest link may
be Germany, despite Chancellor Angela Merkel’s shuttle diplomacy
that kept the bloc unified last week. Germany has traditionally
nurtured a special relationship with Russia, and there is a strong
undercurrent in public opinion blaming the United States (and its
Trojan-horse allies like Georgia and Poland) for any trouble with
Russia. In recent weeks, Russian diplomats and lobbyists, including
former chancellor Gerhard Schrider, seem to have been on a propaganda
offensive to boost public opposition to any robust EU reaction. The
emerging divide between the pro-Russian Social Democrats and Merkel’s
more hawkish Christian Democrats also threatens to draw Russia policy
into next year’s national-election campaign.
So far, though, the biggest effect on Europe of Russia’s actions is
a tenuous unity. Europe’s leaders seem desperate to avoid the fracas
that divided them over Iraq–or, for that matter, over the former
Yugoslavia in the 1990s, another conflict that battered Europe’s
illusion of itself as a soft-power superpower. Now there seems to be
growing agreement that Russia will be a more uncomfortable neighbor
in the future. Whether that is the catalyst for the EU to develop a
common strategy and effective foreign policy remains to be seen.