Month: August 2008

Sunday’s Zaman, Turkey
Aug 17, 2008

`A Chemical Prison’ by Barbara Nadel

I can remember rushing home from high school to watch "Quincy, M.D."
on television, one of the first television series to highlight the
work of a forensic pathologist.

It was a great crime series — where the pathologist found something
suspicious on, or in, the body and then proceeded to make up for the
incompetence of the police by solving the case himself.

I was later to learn that life for a real forensic pathologist was
very different. One pathologist interviewed on the Web said, "In
contrast to the popular image of the television show ‘Quincy,’ we
usually do not run around the city solving murder mysteries, although
it would be interesting!" However shows such as "CSI" (which you can
watch on at least two channels on Digitürk every night of the
week) have given us a glamorized image of the forensic pathologist’s
work.

"Quincy, M.D." ran for 186 episodes between 1976 and 1983, a sure sign
of its popularity. It spawned a whole genre of forensic crime shows,
on both sides of the Atlantic. In each show a key feature of the plot
line is the relationship between the chief forensic investigator and
the chief police investigator.

In "Crossing Jordan" (also on Digitürk) the police officer
Woody harbors romantic feelings for Jordan, who resists, preferring
friendship because she believes it to be safer.

In the original "CSI" (Las Vegas) policeman Brass is a captain in the
homicide division and works closely with the grave shift CSI team. He
is a close friend of CSI Gil Grissom (whom he granted with his power
of attorney). The show has been heavily criticized almost since its
debut by police and district attorneys, who feel that "CSI" portrays
an inaccurate perception of how police solve crimes.

More realistic, perhaps, is "Waking the Dead," a British television
crime drama series featuring a team of police officers, led by DS
Peter Boyd. His multi-disciplinary team includes a psychological
profiler and a forensic scientist. The latter does not hesitate to
stand up to Boyd, when necessary.

Maybe in a desire to bring the pathologist to the fore, the BBC also
created "Silent Witness." Again, the series is often criticized for
apparently showing the pathologist (Sam Ryan) actively investigating
the crime. The police hardly feature! This characteristic of
pathologist as urban hero follows on earlier American series.

When Rob Chapman, one of the few UK government accredited forensic
pathologists was asked who is best: Sam Ryan of "Silent Witness" or
"Quincy, M.D.," he replied: "Well my job is nothing like theirs
[thankfully]. I suppose the pathology is similar, but I definitely
would not want to be chasing suspects and interviewing witnesses in
the way they do on television. I think that Sam Ryan is a bit too
dour. Quincy is much more entertaining."

Perhaps my favorite police officer-pathologist relationship is that
between Chief Inspector Morse of the Oxford police, and the
pathologist Max. (The books by Colin Dexter can be seen dramatized on
Hallmark Channel in Turkey.) Often called to a crime scene from an
official dinner, Max would arrive in his dinner jacket, and within 20
seconds the gruff police inspector would expect time of death and
cause of death to have been identified. Smart witticisms would always
follow.

Following in such a great tradition, it would be surprising if Barbara
Nadel’s crime novels set in Ä°stanbul failed to give us a
wonderful relationship between a police officer and his pathologist
colleague. Inspector Ã?etin Ä°kmen and Arto Sarkissian
have been friends since boyhood. "As children the two of them had
shared their play and their thoughts in equal measure. As adults that
state of affairs had not really changed except for their respective
professions."

As can be guessed from their names, theirs is a friendship that
crosses racial and religious divides. Ä°kmen is a shabbily
dressed Turk (he always brings images of Peter Falk as Columbo to my
mind!) and Sarkissian is "a round and jolly little Armenian."

Nadel cleverly uses their friendship, and the fact that the victim may
or may not be Armenian — and the only thing known in the neighborhood
about the man who appears to have kept him prisoner is that he is
Armenian — to delicately examine the relationship between the
majority and this minority.

Without side-stepping the very real issues, she has a character
conclude that "Whether we are Turks, whatever they are, Greeks,
Armenians, Venetians, all of us who live in this city are bound by the
irrefutable fact that we are Ä°stanbulites."

But "A Chemical Prison" is about much more than just the Turk-Armenian
relationship. Nadel cleverly weaves into the plot the story of the
Ottoman cage. The victim seems to have been a prisoner in a gilded
cage, in an old house called the Sacking House, which backs on to
Topkapı Palace.

Although at first sight a barbaric practice, the cage replaced the
previous custom that when a new sultan ascended to the throne, his
first act would be to order his brothers killed, to avoid attempts to
overthrow him. Royal fratricide was the standard of the day — and not
just those who had been born, pregnant concubines would also be thrown
into the Bosporus in sacks (that had been sewn in the Sacking House)
to avoid the birth of other potential contenders to the throne.

All of this changed in 1590 when the compassionate Ahmet ascended the
throne. Instead of murdering his brother Mustafa, he ordered him to
live with his grandmother in a single room of the harem known as the
Golden Cage. A special room, it had windows only on the second floor,
and a slot for delivering food. Though it was beautifully decorated on
the inside, it was merely an exquisite prison cell. The sultans that
followed, followed suit. Sadly, this meant that when those who had
spent their whole life in the Golden Cage were released at the death
of the sultan, they were often mad.

Ä°kmen and Sarkissian become embroiled in a case that has all
the hallmarks of a 20th century Ottoman cage. Nadel uses the facts of
the case as they emerge to cleverly question some practices used to
contain mental patients (the title "A Chemical Prison" refers to the
use of drugs to sedate a sane boy). Is this a novel that reconciles
Ä°stanbul’s present with the shadows of its past? Or is it
purely a good, fast-paced detective novel that keeps you guessing?
Maybe, it is a study in the issues of jailing and freedom — depicted
by what Ä°kmen calls "the old Turkish custom of paying to
release caged pigeons and thereby obtaining a blessing for setting
something free."

"A Chemical Prison" by Barbara Nadel, published by Headline, 6.99
pounds in paperback, ISBN: 978-074726218-3

17 August 2008, Sunday

MARION JAMES Ä°STANBUL

Panorama.am

15:25 16/08/2008

THE US ENCOURAGES TO REJECT THE OLYMPIC GAMES IN SOCHI

The US Congress plans to call on the International Olympic Committee
to review the resolution concerning the conduction of Winter Olympic
Games in Sochi 2014.

According to `Interfax’, the reason for this step is obvious: the
Congress is displeased with `Russian invasion in Georgia’.

Senator Alison Svartz, who is to present the resolution plan to the
IOC, has declared that `The US is going to support Georgia as its ally
and friendly country; therefore, we will urge the Committee to change
the place of the Olympic Games in 2014.’

Source: Panorama.am

Panorama.am

13:57 16/08/2008

NATO divided on American call to punish Moscow

Russia’s military walkover in Georgia has deepened NATO divisions as
it prepares to find a new way next week of handling the resurgent
former superpower.

The British `Times’ reports, that Washington has called a meeting on
Tuesday of NATO foreign ministers, essentially to punish Moscow for
what the United States, Britain and, especially, East European
countries see as a brutal invasion that reverted to Cold War methods.

The trouble is that several big European states ‘ notably France,
Germany and Italy ‘ do not see the Russian offensive that way. They
partly blame Georgia, a would-be NATO member and a
protégé of the United States. As Bernard Kouchner, the
French Foreign Minister, told The Times: `Russia is a great
nation. Look how we have been treating it.’ NATO, like its sister
organization, the EU, papered over divisions this week, condemning
Russia for `excessive, disproportionate use of force’ in Georgia and
restating that Nato membership would one day be offered to Tbilisi.
The presidents of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined President
Yushenko of Ukraine in a symbolic trip to Tbilisi this week to push
NATO to `stand up against the spread of imperialist and revisionist
policy’ by Russia.

NATO has few options for putting pressure on the Kremlin beyond
advancing Georgian and Ukrainian membership or ending the partnership
with Moscow. Leverage is more likely to come from other fronts, such
as suspending Russia’s much-desired membership application for the
World Trade Organization or freezing its participation in G8 meetings.

Source: Panorama.am

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey

Discontinuity of Russia’s Policy: Kosovo and South Ossetia
Mirzet Mujezinovic

Saturday , 16 August 2008

Even if they do not have anything in common, Kosovo and South Ossetia
became closer in last two weeks that they were ever before. Kosovo
declared independence from Serbia in February 2008 that is recognized
by about 45 world countries. Russia, backing Serbia in this issue,
strongly opposes this independence arguing that such act creates
precedence for every separatist region all around the world,
especially mentioning those in Georgia; Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Almost half a year after the Kosovo’s declaration of independence,
Georgia Army Forces suddenly attacked South Ossetia trying to
reestablish control over the breaking province. South Ossetia declared
independence from Georgia within collapse of Soviet Union, which was
not recognized by any state, including Russia. From that time until
present South Ossetia (together with Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh)
represent a so-called `frozen conflict’.

What was the real reason of suddenly Georgian military operation and
did Mikheil Saakashvili had Western (namely the US) support is not
very important, since small countries were and will always be an
element in the foreign policies of big ones. What is important is that
Saakashvili made a terrible political and strategic mistake by using a
military option for resolving a political problem. Russian reaction
against prospective NATO member presents her standpoint regarding
NATO’s further enlargement toward Russia.

Russia’s respond against Georgian military operation was incredible
fast and brutal. Bombing all Georgian military assets around whole
country forced Georgian Army to withdraw. First military operation
outside the Russian Federation completed with totally success. As
every winner, Russia dictates peace criteria. The most interesting
statement made by Russian officials was statement of Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev, who said that Russia supports the position of
Georgia’s separatist South Ossetia (and Abkhazia) region in talks on
their future status. Vladimir Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister also
argued that no document or agreement that includes words as
`territorial integrity of Georgia’ will be accepted by his
country. All this means that Russia strongly supports secession of
Georgia’s breakaway provinces which is in serious contradiction with
Russian stand regarding Kosovo.

Such Russian standpoint puts Serbia in a difficult position, since
Serbia still counts on Russian support in UN Security Council. So, if
Russia raises her voice for South Ossetia’s independence from Georgia,
Serbia will lose her most important ally and stay absolutely alone in
her fight against Kosovo’s independence. On the other hand, Russian
encouraging of the independence declaration of the Georgian provinces
and their recognition will verify widely accepted opinion that Russian
support to Serbia on Kosovo issue was just a continuation of Putin’s
`confrontation policy’. Mirzet Mujezinovic USAK/ISRO Balkan Studies
Desk

Sunday Business Post, Ireland

Comment: Further hardship on battered people as old battle resumes
17 August 2008

There were just 70,000 people in South Ossetia when the conflict
started, fewer than the 90,000 at the opening of the Olympic
Games. Yet many saw conflict as inevitable, writes Timothy Phillips.

Very few people in the West had heard of South Ossetia before the
events of the last fortnight; fewer still empathized with its people’s
desire for sovereignty.

Perhaps surprisingly, our ignorance was mirrored by a lack of interest
closer to the region, among the enclave’s neighbours, including most
ordinary Georgians and Russians. The catalysts for the current
bloodshed lie elsewhere.

I first visited the town of Gori ten years ago. I went because it was
the birthplace of Josef Stalin and one of the few places in the world
that still had a statue of the dictator in its main square. Friends
elsewhere in Georgia warned me to be polite about Stalin while I was
there.

The local population still held him in high regard as a man who ruled
all of Russia, defeated Germany, and carved the world up with
Roosevelt and Churchill. During the past week, there must be some in
Gori who wished for a strong deliverer once more.

Like the rest of Georgia, the town feels bewildered and
frightened. South Ossetia, whose war has been this summer’s grim
televisual alternative to the Olympic Games, is only a 20-minute drive
away.

The Georgian president invaded the place on August 7, re-establishing
control for the first time in 18 years. It was taken back off him by
the Russian armed forces three days later, on August 10.For Georgians,
the first event was more surprising than the second.

The citizens of Gori watched wide-eyed as their compatriots drove
north, and gaped open-mouthed as they retreated under air bombardment
and heavy artillery fire, giving way to a Russian occupation of the
town that, at the time of writing, is still ongoing.

On my visits to Gori, people often told me how close we were to South
Ossetia. I remember passing a turnoff to a road which was said to be
too dangerous to drive along. There was regret among my hosts that
Georgia had had to surrender control of the Ossetian region, but not
much venom.

Poverty and crumbling infrastructure were making it hard enough for
the rest of the country to get along. A dangerously xenophobic
nationalist government in the early 1990s was generally understood to
have harmed its own citizens through poorly-picked and even more
poorly executed fights with Georgia’s ethnic minorities, including the
South Ossetians.

People had no desire to do that again in a hurry. Russia’s moral
support for the South Ossetian cause, though irritating, was one
powerful reason for this reticence. Better that the Georgians have
independence from Moscow for the first time in 200 years than that the
Kremlin have any excuse to reinvade.

Years later, I found myself in Beslan in the south of Russia, staring
at one of the only other public statues of Stalin to survive. It was
here, in 2004, that more than 300 children, parents and teachers were
killed after being held hostage in their local school.

The town is located in North Ossetia, which, though across an
international border, is South Ossetia’s sister state. The people of
Beslan felt sympathy with the South Ossetians, their ethnic brothers,
but were also concerned about how any further moves towards
independence might rebound on them.

During the first phase of the conflict in 1991, tens of thousands of
refugees flooded across the border into North Ossetia, already one of
Russia’s poorest regions. They brought with them the baggage that
accompanies all displaced peoples: pressure on local jobs, housing and
services, and allegations of crime.

Far from being a priority, the creation of an Ossetian nation, within
the Russian Federation and straddling the massive Caucasus mountain
range, was not even an ambition for most people in Beslan. More keenly
felt by North Ossetians was the threat from their compatriots in the
neighbouring Russian regions of Chechnya and Ingushetia.

They wanted Vladimir Putin, the then Russian president, to liquidate
the Islamic extremism on their doorstep much more than they wanted him
to unite all Ossetians.

Stalin’s policies as the Commissar for Nationalities led directly to
the current conflict. The decision to give South Ossetia
semi-autonomous status in 1922 was his. It had nothing to do with
protecting the rights of a small ethnic group and was all about
weakening Georgia’s ability to exist outside the Soviet Union.

Similar fixes were made in Abkhazia – also formally part of Georgia
and now involved in the current dispute – Azerbaijan
(Nagorno-Karabakh) and Moldova (Transdniestria).

In all cases, the expectations of local populations were raised
unfairly, creating constant ethnic squabbling, which in Soviet times
could only be overcome through intercession with Moscow.

The fall of the USSR made the status of these places untenable. The
new countries they were now part of tended to distrust the people
there intrinsically: for instance, an ultra-nationalist Georgian
government unforgivably cancelled South Ossetia’s autonomy in 1990.

Brief wars ended inconclusively, as new governments, including
Georgia’s, reluctantly realised that victory would be difficult to
achieve and bring few tangible benefits. The South Ossetians were left
genuinely frightened of the Georgians.

They were finally convinced that nothing less than total secession
from the country would be enough, but this is the one solution that
will be impossible to achieve through negotiation alone. The stalemate
that replaced the conflict after 1992 has been terrible for the people
who live in this corrupt and embittered enclave, but crucially has not
had too many ill-effects on others close by.

According to some commentators, a renewal of violence over South
Ossetia was inevitable at some point: the war had only been
interrupted, never actually won or lost. But this need not have been
so. When Georgian troops marched into Tskhinvali, there were only
70,000 people left in the separatist region. At the very same moment,
90,000 were in a stadium watching the opening ceremony of the Olympic
Games.

Even in the Balkans, states don’t usually go to war for fewer than a
million people – Bosnia has four million, Kosovo a population of at
least two million. What changed in 2008 to make this war inevitable?
Could it be that two men’s patience wore thin and then finally snapped
altogether?

Putin, now prime minister of Russia, had already grown tired of
Georgia’s endless courting of the US and its goal of Nato membership,
which he sees as politically damaging for the Kremlin, but also
intrinsically distasteful.

But the key event – the one that Putin could not let pass unnoticed
and that made him set his sights on South Ossetia – happened in
February, when Kosovo declared independence.

Moscow protested that the territorial integrity of a sovereign state,
Serbia, had been infringed, in contravention of international law.

In Russia’s eyes, this had been allowed to happen because of a global
conspiracy to enfeeble the Slavs. The Russian foreign ministry issued
a statement saying that “the declaration of sovereignty by Kosovo and
its recognition will undoubtedly be taken into account in Russia’s
relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia”.

>From then on, Putin offered more explicit support to the separatists
than at any time in the past: public statements of support for the
South Ossetian world view increased. Russian passports had already
been handed out to most of the population.

This year, Russian jets began flying low over Georgian airspace with
increased frequency. (Georgia says that sometimes they dropped bombs.)
Unable to stop Kosovan independence, Putin decided to use it to his
advantage.

Through his actions, he dared the western world to condemn him and,
thereby, convict themselves of a double standard – why were the South
Ossetians less deserving of the right to self-determination than the
Kosovars?

The other man whose patience wore thin was the Georgian president,
Mikheil Saakashvili. He had promised to bring all the country’s
rebellious regions back under central control in his manifesto in
2003.

He says he decided to bomb Tskhinvali now to put a stop to the
mafia-friendly regime that ran South Ossetia. But, in reality, he
reached the end of his tether with the clever Putin.

In Soviet times, Russia often described itself as the older brother of
the other 14 states of the USSR. And so it has been in recent months,
with Moscow’s taunting often resembling that of an older sibling:
sufficiently subtle to go unnoticed by parents in the international
community, it has had an infuriating impact on the younger brother.

Eventually, the government in Tbilisi cracked and lashed out. Even
Saakashvili’s supporters around the world were perplexed by the
suddenness of his onslaught. Georgia’s bombardment of South Ossetia
was an overreaction, giving the Kremlin the excuse it needed to rush
to Tskhinvali’s defence.

That Russian forces make unlikely peacekeepers is obvious and has been
underlined by the manner and extent of their incursions into
Georgia. But, here too, Putin would point to Serbia for a defence:
specifically to Nato’s aerial destruction of parts of Belgrade in
1999.

This war, whether short or long, is unlikely to serve the interests of
ordinary people in the region. Today, South Ossetia is empty of
Ossetians; all have fled to Beslan and other towns in the north.

They will probably get to go home in a few weeks’ time, but to what
sort of destruction and destitution? Russia’s barely accountable
regime is brimming with confidence and the hawks have answered all
remaining questions about the relative importance of Putin and Dmitry
Medvedev, the Russian president.

Saddest of all are the ordinary Georgians who, time after time, appear
to be shocked by the actions of their president, while remaining
reluctantly but understandably supportive of him as the Russians, the
old enemy, close in and circle overhead.

On Monday, I received a text message from a friend who lives in
Tbilisi. His words described the contradictions most Georgians are
feeling.

“They’ve been bombing the country from the air, and they’re still
bombing now. Not just Gori, but Poti, Zugdidi and the Kodori Gorge as
well. This morning, they bombed the outskirts of Tbilisi. I was woken
up by the horrifying sound of the explosion.

“Thankfully, there have been relatively few casualties amongst the
civilian population so far, but there have been some. Dozens of
people, rather than hundreds. My family and I are alright, but how can
you live a normal life in a place like this, when your friends are
being gathered up and sent to fight in a danger zone like South
Ossetia.

“I thought we had chosen a different path. For me, this was something
totally unexpected. But they will not break us. Russia is now removing
its mask, so all the world can see what it is really like.’

As in chess, it is sometimes better to settle for a stalemate than to
risk all in pursuit of an unlikely victory.

Timothy Phillips is the author of Beslan: The Tragedy of School No. 1,
published by Granta Books

Atlantic Forfaitierungs AG to increase credit line to Armeconombank

2008-08-15 21:43:00

ArmInfo. Armeconombank is waiting for growing of the credit line on the
programme of commerce financing of Swiss company Atlantic
Forfaitierungs AG. As deputy chairman of Armeconombank Board Hayk
Lazarian told ArmInfo correspondent, $1.75 mln were not enough because
of raising of demand of borrowers. Armeconombank has been also taking
part in the programme on commerce financing of European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development since 2002.

According to ArmInfo data, the share of the credits within the frames
of international programmes is about 21% in the credit portfolio of
Armeconombank, which exceeds 26 bln drams ($86.7 mln).Lazarian
predicts that the credit portfolio of the bank will be increased up to
29 bln drams by the end of the current year. The assets of the bank
have increased by 15 bln drams if compared with the end of March of the
current year and were more than 57 bln drams as of 11 August 2008.
According to Ranking of commercial banks prepared by ArmInfo, as of 1
July 2008 Armeconombank entered the ten of the leading banks by the
size of credit portfolio, total capital and investments in state
government securities.

In late Sept 2008 Armeconombank will learn when it will receive the
second syndicated loan

2008-08-15 21:41:00

ArmInfo. In late Sept 2008 Armeconombank will learn when it will
receive the second syndicated loan, the vice chairman of the Board of
Armeconombank Hayk Lazarian has told ArmInfo.

Earlier the chairman of the Board of the bank David Sukiassyan said
that the size of the loan would range within $15mln-20mln.

To remind, in Dec 2007 Armeconombank signed an agreement with EBRD for
receiving a syndicated loan worth $15mln. The loan was provided by EBRD
and six big banks: Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG and Bank
Austria Creditanstalt AG (Austria), State Bank of India, Land Bank of
Taiwan and FBN bank Limited (UK). EBRD lent $5mln for 36 months, the
other banks – $10mln ($5mln for 18 months, $5mln for 12 months – in
both cases the period of repayment can be prolonged). The money is to
be spent on support of small and medium-sized business.

Saakashvili’s rescue operation

23:08 | 15/ 08/ 2008

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Andrei Fedyashin) – It took
the United States a week to understand the damage Mikheil Saakashvili’s
"Ossetian blitzkrieg" has caused him, and its fosterling, the Rose
Democracy.

Now Washington has launched an operation to rescue Saakasvili in real
earnest. At the same time, a diplomatic battle is unfolding around the
Caucasian knot. Regrettably, this struggle will be harder for Russia to
win than any armed conflict. On August 14, U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice arrived in Paris to meet President Nicolas Sarkozy,
and immediately left for Tbilisi to talk with Saakashvili. At the same
time, President George W. Bush sanctioned humanitarian relief to
Georgia. The first S-17 cargo planes have already delivered medicines
and food there. Several U.S. warships are moving to Georgian shores
from the Persian Gulf to prevent Russia from blocking relief aid.

The Pentagon’s humanitarian relief effort has little to do with
Georgia’s real requirements. But this is the first action in support of
Saakashvili. He did not receive such support in the first days after
the attack, and even began to complain that Washington’s initial
criticisms of Moscow’s role in the conflict were too mild. This was not
what he expected from those who had pushed him to attack South Ossetia.

Now Bush has accused Russia of "not behaving like the kind of
international partner that it has said it wants to be." The fact that
Washington has only lashed out at Moscow a week after the event is
telling. Usually, the Americans provide thorough propaganda support for
their political or military actions in any part of the globe (the
invasions of Grenada, Panama, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq are all
good examples), and do this preemptively. The flow of inspired leaks
and revelations from anonymous high-rankers usually mounts for weeks
before the decisive blow.

But it did not happen with Georgia. In fact, the U.S. press carried
post factum "confidential" reports that during her visit to Tbilisi
over a month ago Rice warned Saakashvili against military action. But
he either did not get it, or lost his temper, and decided to act at his
own risk. Sometimes pocket rulers get out of hand.

Yet it is hard to believe that a stateswoman as formidable as "Teflon
Condi" could not make it clear to Saakashvili what the White House
wants or does not want him to do. And he is not an Angela Merkel or
Silvio Berlusconi, who can easily afford not to listen to the U.S.
secretary of state.

The White House’s recent moves suggest it has overcome the initial
shock and has embarked on what it calls "damage control" by using the
only remaining option – aggressive diplomacy. These moves also point to
its blunder in anticipating Moscow’s reaction to Saakashvili’s action.
Washington clearly did not expect such a prompt and forceful response
from Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, still less so on the first day
of the Olympics.

The Olympics are also a key to understanding what happened. After the
boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics (after the introduction of Soviet
troops into Afghanistan), U.S. leaders became confident that all Soviet
leaders were obsessed with the Olympic Games (which was true), and that
it was easier for them to arrest several hundred dissidents than be
subjected to a denigrating boycott. It is no accident that one of the
possible responses being floated by Western diplomats is a boycott of
the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, a measure designed to cut "the
aggressive Russia" down to size.

That would certainly be unpleasant, but it is not very likely. Too much
may change in the next six years. The Bush administration will be gone,
for one thing. Incidentally, despite all his outspoken criticism of
Russia’s "invasion of Georgia," Republican presidential nominee John
McCain said on August 14 that as president he "would not send American
military forces into a conflict in Georgia."

Like Washington, London never misses a chance to step on the Kremlin’s
toes. Together they want to give a tough response to Moscow, and choose
those sanctions that would "hit hardest at its prestige," as The Times
put it. Apart from the Olympic boycott, Washington has suggested a
whole package of measures against Russia, including blocking its entry
to the WTO, denying it admission to the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), excluding it from the G8, stopping
the talks on a new strategic partnership agreement with the EU, and
curtailing its Partnership for Peace with NATO.

NATO is to adopt a common position next week, when its foreign
ministers will gather for an urgent meeting in Brussels at Bush’s
request. The meeting will take place on Monday or Tuesday (August 18 or
August 19). The worst-case scenario for Russia is that Washington may
persuade the Europeans to welcome Tbilisi and Kiev to the Membership
Action Plan without delay, a proposal France, Italy and Germany
rejected at NATO’s April summit in Bucharest. The Kremlin will be
hoping they will choose to disagree again.

As for the new partnership agreement with the EU, Moscow has no reason
to rush it. Russia is quite content with its current status, and Europe
needs the agreement more than we do. Western business is much more
interested in Russia’s WTO entry, because it wants to establish itself
firmly here. The OECD is more of a club of economic projects of its 30
members, and we are not rushing there, either. NATO-Russia partnership
has long become a fiction.

Ousting Russia from the G8 looks like a tough measure, but it is not
really. The G8 long ago lost its original essence, and has turned into
little more than an expensive talking shop. If it is to regain its
relevance its format must be changed. It is strange that Canada is a
member of this club, but such huge economies as China, India, or Brazil
are not. Nor does it include a single African nation. It has been clear
since the end of the past century that this is inadequate. If Russia
leaves this club, it will simply cease to exist.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

NKR FAM message

armradio.am
16.08.2008 17:11

The Foreign Affairs Ministry of NKR made an announcement about the
tragic events in the South Ossetia and sympathized with the relatives
of the innocent victims. `People of Karabakh understand the tragedy of
people who felt the horror of the last events as NKR felt itself ethnic
decanting, the pain and bitterness of war. We are convicting strictly
usage of any military action for solving the counteractions’, was
written in the message of NKR FAM.

The participants of demonstration were arrested in Beijing

armradio.am
16.08.2008 17:54

Five activists of `Students for Tibet’s liberty’ organization have been
arrested in Beijing for organizing a demonstration. Two of them `
British and Canadian, climbed the building of TV-centre in Beijing and
pasted wallpapers `Freedom to Tibet’ written in English and Chinese.

The representative of Great Britain’s Embassy in China informed that
the British diplomats were in connections with the authorities of China
connected those events. It was noted that the British demonstrator will
be deported from China.