Month: May 2008

PAIN WITH SPAIN
Michael Soltys

Buenos Aires Herald, Argentina
al/editorial_english.jsp?idContent=490343
April 30 2008

A seminar on "Women in the Alliance of Civilizations" sounds supremely
abstract but somehow the Monday event contrived to become the focus
of a cluster of problems with Spain, coinciding with the Spanish
courts’ refusal to extradite ex-president María Estela "Isabel"
Martínez de Perón on the same day. The event itself suffered from
various absences, including an extremely weak presence on the part
of the Turkish co-sponsors of the "Alliance of Civilizations" series
(perhaps hypersensitive over the Cristina Fernández de Kirchner
administration’s love of the term "genocide" in general and its
application to the Armenian massacres of 1915-23 in certain Argentine
official resolutions in particular) and the absence of Spanish deputy
premier María Teresa Fernández de la Vega (despite sharing both
the gender and surname of her presidential host). Instead the reasons
for the latter’s absence became the issue and was used by President
Cristina Kirchner to continue her domestic feud with the press in
contempt of the international occasion — the Spanish socialist was
quoted as being affronted by the alleged misreporting of Clarín
in giving as the reason for her suspension of the trip her presumed
ire over the Argentine government’s pressures to "Argentinize" the
Spanish-owned Aerolíneas Argentinas.

Yet this denial is belied by the concern over these pressures
explicitly transmitted by Spanish Ambassador Rafael Estrella to
Transport Secretary Ricardo Jaime and in any case Aerolíneas has
some very serious problems quite irrespective of attendance at the
"Women in the Alliance of Civilizations" seminar. With only half of
its fleet in the air and interminable union problems, Aerolíneas
is rapidly sliding back to its parlous state of 2002 when it was
the object of what can only be called a privatization in reverse —
i.e. the Argentine state paid the Spanish tourism company 700 million
dollars to take charge of the airline after selling 90 percent of
the shares for a single dollar. The current "Argentinization" (this
clumsy term must be used because the government is not attempting any
direct nationalization of the airline but rather an acquisition by
crony capitalist interests) is flying in the face of world trends —
do the Kirchners really want to take a leaf out of Silvio Berlusconi’s
book with his anachronistic bid to keep Alitalia national?

Even if Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos dutifully
painted the brightest picture of bilateral relations, Spanish
concern extends not only to Aerolíneas but to all Spanish-owned
utilities and their artificially low rates. And then there is the
refusal to extradite Isabel Perón — the Spanish courts not only
seem unconvinced of the evidence of her direct links with the Triple
A far right terrorist organization but also whether the Triple A
qualified for state terrorism and hence crimes against humanity. The
refusal to extradite Isabel Perón is less hostile than it seems and
possibly even a favour to ex-president Néstor Kirchner since the
return and trial of his predecessor would undoubtedly create rifts
in the Peronist movement he is set to chair. The problems with Spain
certainly should not be exaggerated but neither can they be ignored.

–Boundary_(ID_a7VvALxom1N2DPyR94iNYg)–

THAWING OUT
By Sergei Markedonov

Russia Profile, Russia
rnational&articleid=a1209552191
April 30 2008

How Will the New President Handle Frozen Conflicts?

One of the most important and pointed questions facing Dmitry Medvedev
in terms of Russia’s foreign policy is the country’s relations with
de-facto states in the post-Soviet space. There are few other foreign
policy problems that are as closely tied to security inside Russia,
while the ethno-political situations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia
directly influence the situation in Russia’s North Caucasus.

The confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh
resulted in a significant movement of Armenian immigrants to Russia’s
Krasnodar and Stavropol regions. The number of Armenians in Kuban
increased by 42.5 percent from 1989 to 2001. As a result, the "Armenian
issue" became one of the most important social and political factors
in the Krasnodar region, and anti-Armenian rhetoric became a method
of political legitimization for the region’s elite. Another example
of interrelated ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus is the problem of
Ossetia. The Georgian-Ossetian conflict became the first interethnic
conflict in post-Soviet Georgia, and developed into a large-scale armed
confrontation from January 1991 to July 1992. This struggle exerted
significant influence on the course of the first interethnic conflict
on Russian territory–the Ossetian-Ingush conflict. The military
phase of this conflict occurred in October and November of 1992.

As a result of the escalation of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, around
43,000 refugees from South Ossetia and the inner regions of Georgia
arrived in North Ossetia in the early 1990s. The refugees facilitated
a radicalization of ethno-nationalist sentiments in North Ossetian
society; they became mass supporters of North Ossetian radicals, who
demanded the preservation of their republic’s territorial integrity
in the dispute with Ingushetia over the Prigorodny district.

In much the same way, Georgia’s problems with Abkhazia contributed
to the consolidation of Adyg ethno-nationalist movements in
Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, and Adygea, as well as
to the activation of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the
Caucasus, which played a significant role in the Georgian-Abkhazian
conflict of 1992-1993. These ethno-nationalist groups remain important
participants, although often undeclared and unrecognized, in the
Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.

The meltdown

It is important to remember that Medvedev will be acting in much more
complicated circumstances than his predecessor. The fragmentation of
ethnic groups within the CIS only began during Vladimir Putin’s time
in office; moreover, there is now an active thawing of conflicts that
were considered frozen during the Putin years.

Before 2008, the attempts to change the status quo in the conflict
zones were not part of a systematic strategy, but this changed when
the international community began recognizing the independence
of Kosovo. And even though the official position of Washington
and Brussels is that Kosovo’s self-determination is "unique,"
in the capitals of the de-facto states, Kosovo is seen as a legal
precedent. For Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, Kosovo is not a legal
precedent, but a political one, seen as an important step toward the
eventual loss of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and the
self-proclaimed Transdnestr republic.

This year has already seen other important developments. The largest
armed confrontations in Nagorno-Karabakh since the end of military
action in May 1994 occurred in March. Additionally, on March 21,
the Russian State Duma approved an appeal to the federal government
and the president to examine the possibility of legal recognition
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And a day before that, the outgoing
Armenian president Robert Kocharyan declared that it might be possible
to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh if Azerbaijan withdraws from the OSCE
Minsk group.

The world is watching

Putin’s successor must carefully examine the background of the de-facto
states. In the first years of the 21st century, the political role of
these states has grown noticeably. Before, they were seen as nothing
more than a consequence of ethno-political conflicts in the post-Soviet
space. As British researcher Laurence Browers pointed out, "Instead
of seeing these formations as an independent political environment,
de-facto states are only seen in the context of their relationship
with external players and world processes." This attitude explains
the terms "breakaway republics" and "separatist states," adopted by
Western political scientists to refer to these areas. These terms gave
rise to the supposition that "breakaway" republics could potentially
"return," and such a return would be considered a "resolution of
the ethno-political conflict" and the restoration of the territorial
integrity of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova was equated with the
resolution of these conflicts. As a result of such an approach, the
domestic political processes in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdnestr
and Nagorno-Karabakh were viewed as temporary phenomena that would
be eliminated as soon as the existing status quo was broken and their
status determined.

In the 1990s, Russian politicians and diplomats shared this
approach. As long as levers of influence on the political authorities
of Georgia and Moldova were preserved, Moscow was not eager to
intensify the dialogue with Tiraspol, Sukhumi, and Tskhinvali. In
Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia initially consented to international
conflict regulation under the auspices of the OSCE. In the case of
Transdnestr, Moscow, along with Kiev, became a guarantor of the peace
process. Moscow’s main achievement in the 1990s was not allowing the
conflicts to thaw. Moscow’s position regarding the de-facto states
that share a common border with Russia — South Ossetia and Abkhazia
— was much more active. In 1998, Moscow prevented an escalation of
the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict in the Gal region of eastern Abkhazia.

The year 2003 became a kind of Rubicon for Russian political
attitudes toward the frozen conflict zones. The failure of Dmitry
Kozak’s plan to create a united federated Moldovan state that would
include Transdnestr, and the "Rose Revolution" in Georgia, definitively
eliminated Moldova and Georgia from Moscow’s orbit. From this point on,
the Kremlin began to consider the de-facto formations as independent
entities that have their own significance.

The increase of the geopolitical role of these regions occurred
in large part due to formally external causes–the ethno-political
self-determination in the Balkans. As a result, in 2006 the independent
Republic of Montenegro appeared on the world map for the first
time since 1918. In 2008, 33 states recognized the independence of
Kosovo. And even though Montenegro, unlike Kosovo, never existed as an
unrecognized state, the possibility of a violation of the principle of
territorial integrity and ethno-political self-determination aroused
a heightened interest in the country by the leaders of de-facto states.

The response of the leaders of these de-facto states to the events
in the Balkans forced Russia’s political leaders to take a more
drastic position on the unrecognized post-Soviet republics. Russian
representatives, beginning with Vladimir Putin, announced a "universal"
approach to the Kosovo problem, saying that if Kosovo can be granted
full independence, it should not be denied to Abkhazia or South
Ossetia. "I do not want to say that Russia will also immediately
recognize Abkhazia or South Ossetia as independent and sovereign
states," Putin said, "but such precedents exist in international
politics. In order to be fair, in the interest of all the people
living in certain territories, we need commonly recognized universal
principles for the resolution of such problems." Yet Putin’s
"universal" approach is hardly universal. He does not extend the
Kosovo precedent to Nagorno-Karabakh, limiting its precedent-setting
to Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdnestr. This attitude can be
explained by the fact that Moscow has had a much more constructive
relationship with Azerbaijan than with Moldova and Georgia, and is
trying once again to not aggravate its relations with Baku.

Putin’s approach also found support among experts in the United States
and Europe, who stopped viewing the situation as a case of Russia
meddling in the domestic affairs of Georgia and Moldova. For the first
time since the 1990s, Western political scientists began mentioning the
de-facto states as not simply the consequences of unresolved "frozen"
conflicts, but as formations that have their own internal dynamics and
are capable of transformations. In the words of British expert Thomas
de Vaal, "Many external observers mistakenly consider Abkhazia as
simply a Russian puppet state. Of course, Russia uses its undetermined
status for its own purposes, but Sergey Bagapsh, the acting president,
was elected despite Moscow’s wishes, and many Abkhazians are not
happy with creeping annexation by Moscow." De Vaal also asks:
"How long can we go on denying their right to independence? This
is not a simple matter. But the alternative–keeping the conflicts
frozen and keeping whole territories as the world’s ‘orphans’–is
also unacceptable." Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman have also urged
American and European politicians to be realistic, and doubt that
the West will risk confrontation with Russia solely for the sake of
Georgia preserving its jurisdiction over South Ossetia.

Cooperation goes a long way

The countries that host the frozen conflict zones have also changed
their behavior. In 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili started demonstratively
violating the Dagomys Treaty that set the rules and format for
conflict regulation in 1992. "If the Dagomys Treaty does not permit
raising a Georgian flag on the territory of the Tskhinvali district
[the official name of South Ossetia in Georgia], I am ready to leave
this treaty." Then, in spring 2006, Moldova and Ukraine decided to
use economic instruments to change their customs policies to break
the Transdnestr "separatists." With this action, Kiev changed its
role from a guarantor of the peace process into an ally of one of
the conflict sides. Late that summer, Georgia seized the Kodor Gorge
in a military operation, violating the Moscow Treaty of 1994, which
regulated the peacemaking operation in Abkhazia, and attempted to
change the status quo in the conflict.

Russia’s policy with regard to the de-facto states has been based,
first of all, on maintaining the status quo not as an end in
itself, but as a mechanism of counteraction to the "thawing" of the
conflicts. But this status quo is changing. Additionally, no official
representative of Moscow has ever expressed prejudice against the
territorial integrity of Moldova, Georgia or Azerbaijan. However,
Moscow’s political patronage allows the de-facto states to work
toward final self-determination and in 2006, there was a parade of
referendums in these states. These referendums were more legitimate
than those held in the conditions of open conflict in the early 1990s
and demonstrated that Transdnestr, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh all
have their own working legislative systems.

These referendums are another step toward final self-determination,
but the success of this project depends in many respects on Russia’s
actions. Russia must convince the international community that
it wants to continue to play a stabilizing role in Transdnestr,
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Additionally, only Russia can shepherd
the development of democratization and modernization in these
regions, which will benefit them in the long run, whether or not
they become independent states. And finally, political recognition
of these regions is much more important for Russia than legal
recognition. After all, the United States works with Taiwan and
finances social projects in Nagorno-Karabakh without any declarations
recognizing these states. Israel has an active working relationship
with Somaliland without announcing official support for the former
British protectorate. Naturally, the UK itself "works" with the
subjects of the former empire and the fact of legal recognition is not
crucial here either. The most important thing is political cooperation
and cooperation in the field of security, and the expectation of a
favorable political situation. Russia should not force an acceleration
of the process of official recognition for the de-facto states. Right
now it is much more important to bring them out of the shadows,
to provide them with political support and to appeal to political
realism. After all, Russia is the only country that can explain that
the disintegration of the Soviet Union will only be complete after
the post-Soviet reality is taken into account.

Sergey Markedonov, is the Head of the Interethnic Relations Department
at Moscow’s Institute of Political and Military Analysis.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

PRESS FREEDOM IN TURKEY

EuropeNews, Denmark

April 30 2008

With heightened polarization regarding issues of secularism,
nationalism, and separatism, reform efforts toward enhanced freedom of
expression stalled in 2007. The restrictive measures of the new Turkish
penal code, which came into force in June 2005, continued to overshadow
and undermine positive reforms achieved in the country’s effort to meet
European Union (EU) membership requirements, including a new Press Law
in 2004 that replaced prison sentences with fines. The EU accession
process and perceptions that the ruling Justice and Development Party
intends to undermine the country’s secular traditions have prompted
a nationalist movement that is driving a legalistic crackdown on free
expression by journalists and writers.

Status: Partly Free

Legal Environment: 20

Political Environment: 20

Economic Environment: 11

Total Score: 51

Constitutional provisions for freedom of the press and of expression
exist but are matched with provisions that restrict it and, in
practice, are only partially upheld. According to Bianet, a Turkish
press freedom organization, the number of prosecuted journalists,
publishers, and activists dropped to 254 in 2007 from 293 in 2006
(after a dramatic jump from 157 in 2005).

Yet the same organization reports that 55 individuals were tried over
the year under the penal code’s especially controversial Article 301
alone. This provision allows for prison terms of six months to three
years for "the denigration of Turkishness" and has been used to charge
journalists for crimes such as stating that genocide was committed
against the Armenians in 1915, discussing the division of Cyprus,
or writing critically on the security forces.

Book publishers, translators, and intellectuals have also faced
prosecution for "insulting Turkish identity." In January, Hrant
Dink–editor-in-chief of the Armenian weekly Agos, who was prosecuted
for a second time under Article 301 in July 2006 for confirming his
recognition of Armenian genocide allegations–was the victim of a
carefully plotted assassination carried out by a 17 year old. Charges
against Dink under Article 301 were subsequently dropped, but both
his son and the owner of Agos were convicted on the same charges for
the same case in October.

In November, two policemen were charged with knowing about plans
to kill Dink and failing to report it; the trials of all 19 people
charged in connection with the murder were ongoing at year’s end.

Article 277 of the penal code was invoked in 2007 to charge 14 people
with "attempting to influence court decisions." Article 216 penalizes
"inflaming hatred and hostility among peoples" and is most frequently
used against journalists who write about the Kurdish population or
are perceived to degrade the armed forces.

23 people were charged on this count in 2007 and, in May 2007, a court
of appeal overturned the prior acquittal of two professors charged
under this article in 2005 for a report in which they discussed the
term "citizenship of Turkey" as it relates to minorities, a concept
being debated in preparation for a new "civil" constitution. The
court ruled that the discussion constituted a "social danger" and more
specifically, "… a danger to the unitary state and the indivisibility
of the nation." Nationalist lawyers groups, such as the Great Lawyers’
Union, credited by many human rights groups for leading the push for
prosecutions, continued to bring insult suits over the year.

Despite a September 2006 declaration of commitment by Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan to revise Article 301 and heightened pressure
from international press freedom watchdog groups to abolish it
following Dink’s murder, no progress was made by year’s end; many
believe the government dropped the issue in the context of election
concerns. Erdogan himself continued to launch a number of defamation
suits against members of the media; in October, newly elected President
Abdullah Gul promised changes in the period ahead.

Convictions against journalists are made much less frequently than
are prosecutions, but trials are time-consuming and expensive. A
total of six convictions were made for charges under Article 301 in
2007 (nine were acquitted). In a positive development, the Supreme
Court of Appeals confirmed a lower court’s prior decision to drop
the Article 301 case against Turkish writer Orhan Pamuk in August.

While Bianet also reports that the number of threats and attacks on the
press increased in 2007, threats and harassment remain significantly
more prevalent than acts of violence. The Dink assassination marked
the culmination of a deliberate plot believed to be developed by
nationalist forces, or the "deep state"–a vague network involving
members of the state bureaucracy, military and intelligence apparatus.

It was not a popular or commonplace crime, and journalists’ work is
not regularly compromised by fears of violence. Instability in the
southeastern part of the country does infringe upon journalists’
freedom to work, however.

In April, three employees of a Christian publishing house in the
Malatya province of southeastern Turkey were brutally murdered and
a newspaper owner was killed in the southeastern province of Van
in September, though no evidence proved the murder to be related to
freedom of the press. The issue of police violence against journalists
was raised by the abduction, assault, and death threats against
journalist Sinan Tekpetek by police in Istanbul in late July.

June 2006 amendments to the Antiterror Law allow for imprisoning
journalists for up to three years for the dissemination of statements
and propaganda by terrorist organizations. The new legislation raises
concerns that the broad definition of terrorism could allow for
arbitrary prosecutions, particularly for members of the pro-Kurdish
press who are sometimes charged with collaborating with the Kurdish
Workers Party (PKK). According to Bianet, 83 people were charged in
cases of "terrorism" over the year.

The Supreme Council of Radio and Television, whose members are elected
by the Parliament, has the authority to sanction broadcasters if they
are not in compliance with the law or its expansive broadcasting
principles. It is frequently subject to political pressure. Some
editors and journalists practice self-censorship out of fear of
violating legal restrictions, and Turkish press freedom advocates
contend that self-censorship has become more prevalent as a result
of the onslaught of prosecutions under the new penal code.

Owner of the weekly Nokta magazine stopped its publication in April
after the magazine’s investigative articles on the military prompted
a police raid on its offices. Charged with spreading PKK propaganda
under the Anti-Terrorism Law, the Gundem newspaper was suspended for
15-30 day periods four times over the year. Broadcasting bans were
reportedly issued against a few stations during the pre-election
period, and the government censored coverage of PKK attacks in
southeastern Turkey in October.

Media are highly concentrated in four major conglomerates, which
subtly pressure their editors and journalists to refrain from reporting
that will harm their business interests. This could include avoiding
criticism of the government or potential advertisers, both of which
could have contracts with other arms of the companies.

Turkey’s broadcast media are well developed, with hundreds of
private television channels, including cable and satellite as well
as commercial radio stations.

State television and radio provide limited broadcasting in minority
languages, now including four local radio and television stations in
Kurdish. This marks a major step forward for freedom of expression,
although critics say that the broadcasts are too restricted and quality
is poor. The quality of Turkish media is low with a greater prevalence
of columns and opinion articles than pure news, but independent
domestic and foreign print media are able to provide diverse views,
including criticism of the government and its policies. An estimated
22.5 percent of the Turkish population accessed the internet in 2007.

The video-sharing web site, YouTube was blocked in March and again in
September for airing videos perceived to insult government leaders and
founder of the Turkish republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. [Editors note:
Turkey also blocked WordPress.]

ADRIAN SEVERIN: "SELF-DETERMINATION PRINCIPLE COVERS PEOPLES, BUT NOT ETHNIC MINORITIES"

Azeri Press Agency, Azerbaijan
April 30 2008

Baku. Lachin Sultanova -APA. Foreign minister of Azerbaijan Elmar
Mammadyarov met with Romanian member of the European Parliament Adrian
Severin on Wednesday.

Press-service of the foreign ministry told APA, the guest said
Azerbaijan was not only oil and gas producer, it was an important
country for the European Union for its geopolitical location,
dynamic economic development and as a possible contributor for
the EU-Central Asian cooperation. Mammadyarov has agreed with that
and said first report on Azerbaijan fulfilling the Action Plan for
European Neighborhood Policy has been already prepared and integration
process into Europe caused positive progress in a number of fields in
the country. He urged to research opportunities for the establishing
of GUAM friendship group in the European parliament. Then the sides
exchanged opinions on the Nagorno Karabakh problem and condemned
occupation of Azerbaijani lands and said that veiling of Armenian
ethnic cleansing policy with the principle of self-determination was
unacceptable. Romanian parliamentarian said that self-determination
principle covered the peoples, but not the ethnic minorities and
Armenian people are self-determined within Armenia. It was emphasized
at the meeting to increase knowledge of members of the European
Parliament about Azerbaijan, to organize their visits to Azerbaijan
and to provide Lobbyist activity.

NO FORCES IN AZERBAIJAN CAPABLE OF UPSETTING STABILITY

Interfax News Agency, Russia
April 29 2008

Azeri presidential chief of staff Ramiz Mekhtiyev has said he is upbeat
about the current socio-political situation in the country."Stability
ranks today among the most important issues for Azerbaijan. Stability
is leading Azerbaijan towards development. If anyone attempts to upset
stability, the entire nation must offer resistance," Mekhtiyev told
journalists on Tuesday.

"The future of Azerbaijan strongly depends on stability. Although there
are no forces in the country capable of destabilizing the situation,
individual people are there," he said.

Commenting on the situation in Armenia after the elections and on
whether similar events could be repeated in Azerbaijan, Mekhtiyev said,
there are no forces in the country capable of organizing such events.

"I do not know who has what plans, but no one will allow similar events
to unfold in Azerbaijan. And no one will be strong enough to venture
unrest similar to that in Armenia," the presidential chief staff said.

Again, absolute stability reigns in Azerbaijan. The future presidential
elections will be open and democratic. There are no doubts today that
the people and President Ilham Aliyev are one and that he will again
be elected president with a large margin, Mekhtiyev said.

The upcoming presidential elections will be model elections, he
also said.

The elections will be observed by international organizations. We
will not hide anything from anyone. Again, we will hold open elections.

The current socio-political situation shows that really good, model
elections will be held in Azerbaijan, he said.

BAKU CLAIMS IT HOLDS ARMENIAN SPECIAL FORCES’ OFFICERS, YEREVAN OFFERS DIFFERENT VERSION

Interfax News Agency, Russia
April 29 2008

Azerbaijan law enforcement authorities have foiled a provocation
attempt in Azerbaijan by the Armenian Armed Force’s special unit,
Azeri ANS television channel said.

"As a result of a counter-operation all four Armenian Armed Force’s
special unit officers have been detained," the television channel
said on Monday.

Azerbaijan’s National Security and Interior Ministry was not
immediately available for comment.

For his part, Armenian Defense Minister Seiran Shakhsuvarian offered
another version of what happened.

"In fact, these are four Armenian nationals, Vanik Nikolayevich
Zmboyan, Artyom Andranikovich Zograbian, Karen Dzhivanovich Torosian,
Agasi Atomovich Yenokyan, who were on their way to a military town
near the village of Khachik to meet their colleague and friend. On
their way back they got lost and apparently, they found themselves
in the Nakhichevan area," Shakhsuvarian said

Currently, these men are being held by Azeri security forces, he
said. Their health condition is normal.

Armenia asked the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
office to arrange for the return of the Armenians through the Azeri
ICRC office, Shakhsuvarian said.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

OVER 60 PEOPLE REMAIN IN POLICE CUSTODY OVER YEREVAN RIOTS

Interfax News Agency, Russia
April 29 2008

Sixty-six people who were arrested over the March 1 riots in Yerevan
remain in police custody, and 27 people have been asked to give their
written undertaking not to leave their residence area, a spokesman
for the Armenian Prosecutor General’s Office told Interfax.

Thirty-one criminal cases have been sent to court as of April 28.

The March 1 riots followed the February 19 presidential elections
in Armenia and were led by former president Levon Ter-Petrosyan,
who had lost the elections. His supporters have still not recognized
the outcome of the elections. Ten people were killed in the riots.

The National Movement Center led by Ter-Petrosyan intends to file
a lawsuit with the European Court of Human Rights to contest the
electoral violations they believe occurred during the February 19
elections. A working group composed of Armenian and foreign experts
has already been created to prepare the suit.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ARMENIAN OFFICERS HELD IN AZERBAIJAN MAKING CONFESSIONS – BAKU

Interfax News Agency, Russia
April 29 2008

Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry has confirmed the information about
a foiled attempt by a group of Armenian special forces’ officers to
stage a provocation act in Azerbaijan.

"A group of Armenian military officers who attempted to stage a
provocation in Azerbaijan’s territory, were detained by military
servicemen from the country’s Defense Ministry," chief spokesman for
Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry Eldar Sabiroglu told Interfax-Azerbaijan.

The neutralized group consisted of four officers from the Armenian
Army’s special forces, he said.

The investigation into the incident has begun, and "the detained
persons have already made several confessions," Sabiroglu said.

REP. VAN HOLLEN ISSUES STATEMENT COMMEMORATING 93RD ANNIVERSARY OF ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

US Fed News
April 29, 2008 Tuesday 8:14 AM EST

Rep. Chris Van Hollen, D-Md. (8th CD), issued the following statement:

United States Representative Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) today released
the following statement commemorating the 93rd anniversary of the
Armenian genocide:

"I rise today to commemorate the 93rd anniversary of the Armenian
Genocide, in which 1.5 million Armenian men, women, and children were
killed by Ottoman authorities during World War I.

"On April 24, 1915, the Ottoman government began its genocidal plan by
arresting and murdering over 250 Armenian intellectuals and political
figures in Istanbul. In the interior of the Ottoman Empire, where the
bulk of the Armenian population lived, the government then arrested
and killed village leaders. Meanwhile, most able-bodied Armenian men,
who had been conscripted into the Ottoman army, were separated into
labor battalions and subsequently murdered. Next, in various provinces,
gendarmes and the army massacred Armenian villagers outright, while in
other provinces the remaining Armenian population of women, children
and the elderly were forcibly deported over the mountains and into the
scorching deserts of Syria, without food and water. Many of the female
deportees were raped and killed en route, while other deportees died
of starvation and dehydration. By the end of 1915, the centuries-old
Armenian civilization of eastern Anatolia no longer existed.

"U.S. diplomats who were stationed in Anatolia at the time were
some of the main eye-witnesses and chroniclers of that horrific
period. U.S. Consul Leslie Davis, stationed in Harput in eastern
Anatolia, wrote the following in a cable to U.S. Ambassador Henry
Morgenthau, dated July 24, 1915: "It has been no secret that the
plan was to destroy the Armenian race as a race, but the methods
used have been more cold-blooded and barbarous, if not effective,
than I had first supposed." He also wrote in this same cable: "I
do not believe there has ever been a massacre in the history of the
world so general and thorough as that which is now being perpetrated
in this region or that a more fiendish, diabolical scheme has been
conceived in the mind of man."

"This cable, and many others of a similar nature, is housed in the
U.S. National Archives only a few blocks from the U.S. Capitol and
the White House. They provide unambiguous, documentary evidence
of what occurred. Yet there are those who still refuse to properly
characterize what happened to the Armenian people during World War I
as genocide. Although the word "genocide" was not invented in 1915,
what these diplomats described was indeed genocide of a people.

"I am deeply disappointed that many of our current officials avoid
characterizing what occurred as "genocide." The avoidance does a
disservice to the memory of the victims and their descendants and
hurts our moral standing in the world. I hope that one day soon, this
legislative body and the U.S. Administration will properly characterize
what happened to the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire.

"Many of the survivors of the Armenian Genocide settled in the
United States. Bearing painful physical and emotional scares,
they nonetheless re-established their lives here, worked hard,
and became proud American citizens, thankful for the opportunity to
live in freedom. Many of their descendants have become leaders in the
fields of science, business, academia, and the arts, and have served
their country bravely in military uniform. They have also created a
vibrant community. Yet they also bear the pain of what their parents
and grandparents went through and are actively engaged in the effort
to seek proper recognition of what happened to the Armenian people in
1915. Today, as we recall the events of the Armenian Genocide and pay
homage to the victims, we also honor the Armenian-American community
for its unwavering commitment to this human rights struggle."

STATEMENT FROM SENATOR BARACK OBAMA IN REMEMBRANCE OF ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

States News Service
April 29, 2008 Tuesday

The following information was released by Illinois Senator Barack
Obama:

U.S. Senator Barack Obama today released the following statement in
remembrance of the Armenian Genocide:

"Last week we paused in remembrance of the Armenian Genocide, which
was carried out by the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923. Nearly 2
million Armenians were deported, and approximately 1.5 million of
those deported were killed.

"It is imperative that we recognize the horrific acts carried out
against the Armenian people as genocide and I will continue to stand
with the Armenian American community in calling for the government
of Turkey to acknowledge it as such. The occurrence of the Armenian
genocide is a widely documented fact supported by an overwhelming
collection of historical evidence.

"I was deeply disturbed two years ago when the U.S. Ambassador to
Armenia was fired after he used the term "genocide" to describe
the mass slaughter of Armenians. I called for Secretary Rice to
closely examine what I believe is an untenable position taken by the
U.S. government.

"I will continue to push for the acknowledgement of the Armenian
Genocide and I offer the Armenian people my condolences."