Published on openDemocracy ()
Democracy contested: Armenia’s fifth presidential elections
By Armine Ishkanian,
Created 2008-03-04 15:52
Armenia’s presidential election of 19 February 2008 appeared to deliver a
clear victory to the candidate who had led in most opinion polls throughout
the campaign, Serzh Sarkisian. Sarkisian, Armenia’s current prime minister
and close ally of President Robert Kocharian, was declared the victor on 24
February with (according to official results) 52% of the vote. But as so
often in the region [1] – and in a pattern increasingly familiar around the
world – the official results were bitterly disputed. The supporters of the
leading defeated candidate (and former president) Levon Ter-Petrossian
responded to the declared outcome by organising a continuous mass protests
in the centre of the capital, Yerevan. In confrontations [2] between
demonstrators and security forces, eight people have been killed.
Armine Ishkanian [3] is a lecturer at the Centre for Civil Society, London
School of Economics. She is the author of Democracy-building and Civil
Society in post-Soviet Armenia [4] (Routledge, 2008)
The election crisis has thus become one of public order and governance [5].
But what is it "really" about, and where does it fit the pattern of
Armenia’s democratic development in the years since independence from the
Soviet Union in September 1991?
Since achieving independence, Armenia has held five presidential elections
(1991, 1996, 1998, 2003, and 2008). Of these only the 1991 election is
considered to have been free and fair. All the others, the most recent one
included, have followed a pattern that has unfortunately become all too
familiar: a flawed process followed by boisterous protests by the
opposition.
In the aftermath of the 19 February 2008 elections [6], demonstrations were
convened in Yerevan’s Liberty Square. The atmosphere at the tented
encampment was celebratory rather than threatening, typified by protestors’
singing and dancing around bonfires. Behind the display of public defiance,
political manoeuvring also continued, as Serzh Sarkisian began reaching out
to other opposition candidates (apart, that is, from his chief rival [7]
Levon Ter-Petrossian) to seek collaborative deals. In quick succession,
Artashes Geghamian [8] and Artur Baghdasarian [9] agreed to cooperate.
The post-election standoff remained tense [10]; across the ten days until 29
February there were a number of arrests and detentions of individual
opposition party members, activists, and some state officials who had
defected to the opposition camp. But few expected what happened in the early
morning of Saturday 1 March, when interior-ministry security forces moved in
and forcibly dispersed [11] the demonstration in the square using tear-gas,
truncheons, and electric-shock equipment. In circumstances as disputed as
the election itself, eight people lost their lives; it appears that
excessive force was used against the demonstrators. The deaths have
intensified the sense of emergency [12] in Armenia, adding urgency to
efforts to resolve the crisis yet embittering an already difficult
[13]situation still further.
The context
The irreconcilable positions of Serzh Sarkisian and Levon Ter-Petrossian
[14] are rooted in Armenia’s post-independence politics. Ter-Petrossian came
to prominence in the late 1980s as the leader of the Karabakh Committee,
which championed the interests and rights of the ethnic-Armenian majority in
Nagorno-Karabakh [15] (an enclave inside Armenia’s neighbour Azerbaijan). He
was elected Armenia’s president in 1991 and was re-elected in 1996, but
resigned from office in February 1998 as a result of a coup that brought
Robert Kocharian [16] to power. Ter-Petrossian then withdrew from public
life and effectively entered voluntary internal exile. It was only in
September 2007 that he re-entered politics with a vitriolic attack on what
he saw as the corruption [17] of his successor and of Armenia’s system more
generally; soon after, he announced his candidacy in the February 2008
elections (see Vicken Cheterian, "Armenia’s election: the waiting game [17]"
(19 February 2008).
After his electoral effort [18] resulted in defeat (with the official
results awarding him 21.4% of the vote), Ter-Petrossian said that massive
voting irregularities and violations had made the declared outcome invalid.
His next step was to appeal to the Constitutional Court to schedule new
elections (another disappointed candidate, Tigran Karapetyan, has said he
also intends to take this route). But after the break-up of the protests,
there are reports that Ter-Petrossian has been placed under house-arrest.
A number of neutral local observers, and international organisations such as
Human Rights Watch, has highlighted voting irregularities and intimidation
at polling-stations across Armenia [19]. But the authorities insist the vote
was fair and that Sarkisian was legitimately elected, and thus characterise
the protests as part of an attempt to seize power by illegal means.
The Armenian government and Sarkisian’s camp defend their stance by pointing
out that a number of significant countries (including France, Russia, and
Turkey) has recognised his victory, and that the finding of the
International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) is that the vote met the
required standards. The IEOM preliminary report [20]indeed declares that the
election was "administered mostly in line with OSCE and Council of Europe
commitments and standards"; but it also says that further improvements are
needed to address remaining problems, including "the absence of a clear
separation between state and party functions, the lack of public confidence
in the electoral process and ensuring equal treatment of election
contestants". The report states: "The conduct of the count did not
contribute to reducing an existing suspicion amongst election stakeholders".
Several Armenian NGOs have criticised [21] the IEOM report as being too
cautious. They released a joint statement [22] arguing that "the apparent
discrepancy between the actual findings of the assessment with the formative
first two sentences of the report resulted in the government only referring
to this paragraph in the international observers’ assessment in order to
legitimise the results of the election". Some demonstrators picketed near
the OSCE offices in Yerevan, shouting "Shame!" to indicate their
disappointment with the observers’ report [23]and what they consider its
lending credibility to a flawed electoral process.
The radically different interpretations of the election result have
dominated political debate inside Armenia (as well as among the large
Armenian diaspora). On 26 February, two days after Sarkisian’s victory was
announced, a rally by his supporters – ostensibly to "thank the voters" was
organised in Yerevan’s Republic Square. People were bussed into Yerevan from
around the country, but many proceeded to abandon the Sarkisian rally and
march up Northern Avenue to join the demonstrators in Liberty Square – to be
met with chants of "Unity!"
The differences
I have observed and written about three of the four past Armenian
presidential elections (1996, 1998, 2003). With this experience in mind, I
find the 2008 elections and the post-election developments to be
significantly different from previous ones – in three ways.
First, several officials, civil servants and diplomats have resigned or been
sacked from their posts for expressing their support for (or for actively
joining) the camp of Levon Ter-Petrossian. They include the deputy
prosecutor-general Gagik Jahangirian (who along with his brother Vahan was
arrested [24] on charges of illegal arms possession and assault on "state
officials performing their duties"); a number of officials from the foreign
ministry (including deputy foreign minister Armen Bayburtian, chief
foreign-ministry spokesman Vladimir Karapetian, ambassadors Ruben Shugarian
and Levon Khachatrian); and civil servants from the trade and
economic-development ministries.
Several army generals have also backed Ter-Petrossian, including Manvel
Grigorian (who heads theYerkrapah [25] [Defenders of the Country] faction)
and Gagik Melkonian; neither has been stripped of his post. Such an open
breach [26] by senior figures was not a feature in past elections; then,
individuals would switch sides only once the final outcome had been
declared – and when they did so, they would move towards the ruling party
rather than (as at present) the opposition.
Second, there has been a flourishing of new forms of media, communication,
and information-sharing. During the election campaign and in the
post-election standoff, Armenian television coverage was greatly skewed in
favour of Serzh Sarkisian; opposition candidates were either ignored or (in
the case of Ter-Petrossian) negatively portrayed.
The absence of independent television channels and the strict loyalty to the
regime of the channels that survive – a situation that has lasted since the
closure of the independent [27]television channel A1+ in 2002 – has meant
that the reporting of the opposition protests has been scarce to
non-existent. The broadcasts have not reflected the reality of what is
happening in the streets and squares. This has led civil-society activists
to send an open letter criticising the H1 public-television channel’s biased
presentation.
Such bias was a feature in previous elections as well. Armenians have
responded by transmitting news in a familiar, more trusted and legitimate
source: word of mouth. But in addition, what is different this time is that
individuals have begun using new forms [28] of communication technology –
mobile-phones, email, blogs, and video-sharing websites such as YouTube – to
share and exchange information and opinions about the latest developments.
These innovative means of sharing information, news, and comments have
circumvented the official television and radio channels’ information
blockade, and created a "virtual public sphere" for debate and deliberation.
You Tube in particular has added a new dimension by hosting all sorts of
clips including demonstrations, arguments at polling stations, and
discussions with people on the street.
Third, the election itself and especially the demonstrations in their
aftermath have witnessed the emergence of a generation of young Armenians as
an active political constituency. The festive atmosphere in Liberty Square
has attracted increasing numbers of young people, despite threats of
expulsion or suspension against them (allegedly) made by the deans and
rectors of some universities. This, again, is a contrast with previous
elections, particularly in 1998 and 2003, when protest rallies were composed
mainly of older people whose nostalgia for the good old Soviet days led them
to support former Armenian Communist Party leader Karen Demirchian [29]
(1998) and his son Stepan Demirchian (2003).
There is a debate here between those who argue that many young people
support Ter-Petrossian because they do not remember how difficult life was
during the early years of his rule, and those who believe they are attracted
by his charisma and message of democratic reform. But the fact of change in
elite opinion, technology and generation is striking.
The outcome
After Armenia’s first four presidential elections, protests either dwindled
of their own accord or were violently suppressed by the authorities. The
option of force has been used too after the fifth election, yet – so far –
it does not appear that this is the end of the story.
Whatever happens next, it is clear – and encouraging – that these elections
engendered heated public debate about Armenia’s future, the past it has
traversed since gaining independence in 1991, the nature of its leadership,
and the country’s political culture. However an increasingly tense situation
is resolved, the early weeks of 2008 will have a significant impact on
political developments and the future of democracy in Armenia.