Constitutional trap for political elite

Lragir, Armenia
Jan 16 2008

CONSTITUTIONAL TRAP FOR POLITICAL ELITE

The strange thing about the current political situation in Armenia or
its main cause is that the elite have unintentionally enhanced the
effect of the Constitution on the internal political processes. After
the amendments to the Constitution more powers were vested in the
parliament and the government, and the new parliament was elected
under the old president, waiting for the new president. And the prime
minister working in accordance with the new Constitution wants to be
the new president who is interested in using the enhanced powers of
the prime minister to accrue administrative, financial, imperative
and social capital to become president. In other words, the relations
in the public administration of Armenia are now closer to the
Constitution than ever. However, the ongoing process is evidence that
the tendency is not to apply the Constitution to relations inside the
government and the society but its gradual neutralization. In other
words, even the fragile constitutionality that has emerged at least
formally may disappear after February 19 if Serge Sargsyan wants to
be president.

If Serge Sargsyan becomes president, it will be necessary to nominate
a new prime minister. In accordance with the Constitution, the new
prime minister is a serious political figure because together with
the parliament majority he is in charge of internal policies. Now
this situation has occurred, but when Serge Sargsyan becomes
president, the issue of an equally serious figure will occur. Now no
such candidate is seen who would be able to work as prime minister
for Serge Sargsyan, and be an independent head of government
performing the actions empowered by the Constitution only.
Considering that the parliament majority is Republican, and its
leader is Serge Sargsyan, it is pointless to expect this majority to
appoint a strong prime minister. After all, Serge Sargsyan imagines
the bugbear the president will have if the prime minister uses his
levers. He would never allow it to happen. It means, if Serge
Sargsyan is elected, the Constitution will be violated, and a formal
prime minister will be appointed who will carry out the instructions
of the president.

However, there is a way out. If Serge Sargsyan becomes president, the
only way to keep the Constitution in effect in public administration
is the appointment of Robert Kocharyan as prime minister. In other
words for the sake of the constitutionality of the system Robert
Kocharyan should be appointed prime minister not to let the office of
prime minister turn into formal activities but be a serious political
function, as foreseen by the Constitution. Any other arrangement, any
other prime minister means turning the Constitution into a formal
document like it has been so far when the relations in the public
administration system of Armenia were almost opposite to the
Constitution, turning it into a piece of paper for many years. Now
that the internal political momentum, the arrangement of elections,
the end of office of the president have given rise to a situation
when the relations in the system of government have unintentionally
become compliant with the Constitution, it is necessary to continue
this process which could be the only possible benefit from Serge
Sargsyan’s election, or at least one of the few benefits. But only in
case Robert Kocharyan is appointed prime minister if Serge Sargsyan
is elected president.

In this case, the issue of the parliament majority rises, the leader,
the de jure head of which is Serge Sargsyan, if you remember.
However, let us leave aside the de facto structure of this majority
and only mention the fact that Serge Sargsyan with his majority was
unable to form a government for several weeks.

Yet apart from all this there is another way of maintaining
constitutionality in the country when Serge Sargsyan does not become
prime minister.

JAMES HAKOBYAN