The Geopolitics Of Turkey

By George Friedman

July 31 2007

Rumors are floating in Washington and elsewhere that Turkey is
preparing to move against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an
anti-Turkish group seeking an independent Kurdistan in Turkey. One
report, by Robert Novak in the Washington Post, says the United
States is planning to collaborate with Turkey in suppressing the PKK
in northern Iraq, an area the PKK has used as a safe-haven and launch
pad to carry out attacks in Turkey.

The broader issue is not the PKK, but Kurdish independence. The Kurds
are a distinct ethnic group divided among Turkey, Iran, Iraq and,
to a small extent, Syria. The one thing all of these countries have
agreed on historically is they have no desire to see an independent
Kurdistan. Even though each has, on occasion, used Kurdish dissidents
in other countries as levers against those countries, there always
has been a regional consensus against a Kurdish state.

Therefore, the news that Turkey is considering targeting the PKK
is part of the broader issue. The evolution of events in Iraq has
created an area that is now under the effective governance of the
Iraqi Kurds. Under most scenarios, the Iraqi Kurds will retain a high
degree of autonomy. Under some scenarios, the Kurds in Iraq could
become formally independent, creating a Kurdish state. Besides facing
serious opposition from Iraq’s Sunni and Shiite factions, that state
would be a direct threat to Turkey and Iran, since it would become,
by definition, the nucleus of a Kurdish state that would lay claim
to other lands the Kurds regard as theirs.

This is one of the reasons Turkey was unwilling to participate in
the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The Americans grew close to the Kurds in
Iraq during Operation Desert Storm, helping augment the power of an
independent militia, the peshmerga, that allowed the Iraqi Kurds to
carve out a surprising degree of independence within Saddam Hussein’s
Iraq. The Turks were never comfortable with this policy and sent
troops into Iraq in the 1990s to strike against the PKK and pre-empt
any moves toward more extensive autonomy. Before the war started
in 2003, however, the Turks turned down a U.S. offer to send troops
into northern Iraq in exchange for allowing the United States to use
Turkish territory to launch into Iraq. This refusal caused Turkey to
lose a great deal of its mobility in the region.

The Turks, therefore, are tremendously concerned by the evolution
of events in Iraq. Whether northern Iraq simply evolves into an
autonomous region in a federal Iraq or becomes an independent state
as Iraq disintegrates is almost immaterial. It will become a Kurdish
homeland and it will exist on the Turkish border. And that, from the
Turkish point of view, represents a strategic threat to Turkey.

Turkey, then, is flexing its muscles along the Iraqi border. Given
that Turkey did not participate in the 2003 invasion, the American
attitude toward Ankara has been complex, to say the least. On one
hand, there was a sense of being let down by an old ally. On the other
hand, given events in Iraq and U.S. relations with Iran and Syria,
the United States was not in a position to completely alienate a
Muslim neighbor of Iraq.

As time passed and the situation in Iraq worsened, the Americans
became even less able to isolate Turkey. That is partly because
its neutrality was important and partly because the United States
was extremely concerned about Turkish reactions to growing Kurdish
autonomy. For the Turks, this was a fundamental national security
issue. If they felt the situation were getting out of hand in the
Kurdish regions, they might well intervene militarily. At a time
when the Kurds comprised the only group in Iraq that was generally
pro-American, the United States could hardly let the Turks mangle them.

On the other hand, the United States was hardly in a position
to stop the Turks. The last thing the United States wanted was a
confrontation with the Turks in the North, for military as well as
political reasons. Yet, the other last thing it wanted was for other
Iraqis to see that the United States would not protect them.

Stated differently, the United States had no solution to the
Turkish-Kurdish equation. So what the United States did was a tap
dance — by negotiating a series of very temporary solutions that
kept the Turks from crossing the line and kept the Kurds intact. The
current crisis is over the status of the PKK in northern Iraq and, to
a great degree, over Turkish concerns that Iraqi Kurds will gain too
much autonomy, not to mention over concerns about the future status
of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. The United States may well be ready
to support the Turks in rooting out PKK separatists, but it is not
prepared to force the Iraqi Kurds to give them up. So it will try to
persuade them to give them up voluntarily. This negotiating process
will buy time, though at this point the American strategy in Iraq
generally has been reduced to buying time.

All of this goes beyond the question of Iraq or an independent
Kurdistan. The real question concerns the position of Turkey as a
regional power in the wake of the Iraq war. This is a vital question
because of Iran. The assumption we have consistently made is that,
absent the United States, Iran would become the dominant regional
power and would be in a position, in the long term, to dominate the
Arabian Peninsula, shifting not only the regional balance of power
but also potentially the global balance as well.

That analysis assumes that Turkey will play the role it has played
since World War I — an insular, defensive power that is cautious about
making alliances and then cautious within alliances. In that role,
Turkey is capable of limited assertiveness, as against the Greeks in
Cyprus, but is not inclined to become too deeply entangled in the chaos
of the Middle Eastern equation — and when it does become involved,
it is in the context of its alliance with the United States.

That is not Turkey’s traditional role. Until the fall of the Ottomans
at the end of World War I, and for centuries before then, Turkey was
both the dominant Muslim power and a major power in North Africa,
Southeastern Europe and the Middle East. Turkey was the hub of a
multinational empire that as far back as the 15th century dominated
the Mediterranean and Black seas. It was the economic pivot of three
continents, facilitating and controlling the trading system of much
of the Eastern Hemisphere.

Turkey’s contraction over the past 90 years or so is not the normal
pattern in the region, and had to do with the internal crisis in
Turkey since the fall of the Ottomans, the emergence of French and
British power in the Middle East, followed by American power and the
Cold War, which locked Turkey into place. During the Cold War, Turkey
was trapped between the Americans and Soviets, and expansion of its
power was unthinkable. Since then, Turkey has been slowly emerging
as a key power.

One of the main drivers in this has been the significant growth of the
Turkish economy. In 2006, Turkey had the 18th highest gross domestic
product (GDP) in the world, and it has been growing at between 5
percent and 8 percent a year for more than five years. It ranks just
behind Belgium and ahead of Sweden in GDP. It has the largest economy
of any Muslim country — including Saudi Arabia. And it has done
this in spite of, or perhaps because of, not having been admitted to
the European Union. While per capita GDP lags, it is total GDP that
measures weight in the international system. China, for example, is
109th in per capita GDP. Its international power rests on it being
fourth in total GDP.

Turkey is not China, but in becoming the largest Muslim economy, as
well as the largest economy in the eastern Mediterranean, Southeastern
Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus and east to the Hindu Kush,
Turkey is moving to regain its traditional position of primacy in the
region. Its growth is still fragile and can be disrupted, but there
is no question that it has become the leading regional economy, as
well as one of the most dynamic. Additionally, Turkey’s geographic
position greatly enables it to become Europe’s primary transit hub
for energy supplies, especially at a time when Europe is trying to
reduce its dependence on Russia.

This obviously has increased its regional influence. In the Balkans,
for example, where Turkey historically has been a dominant power,
the Turks have again emerged as a major influence over the region’s
two Muslim states — and have managed to carve out for themselves a
prominent position as regards other countries in the region as well.

The country’s economic dynamism has helped reorient some of the region
away from Europe, toward Turkey. Similarly, Turkish economic influence
can be felt elsewhere in the region, particularly as a supplement to
its strategic relationship with Israel.

Turkey’s problem is that in every direction it faces, its economic
expansion is blocked by politico-military friction. So, for example,
its influence in the Balkans is blocked by its long-standing friction
with Greece. In the Caucasus, its friction with Armenia limits its
ability to influence events. Tensions with Syria and Iraq block Syrian
influence to the south. To the east, a wary Iran that is ideologically
opposed to Turkey blocks Ankara’s influence.

As Turkey grows, an interesting imbalance has to develop. The ability
of Greece, Armenia, Syria, Iraq and Iran to remain hostile to Turkey
decreases as the Turkish economy grows. Ideology and history are very
real things, but so is the economic power of a dynamic economy. As
important, Turkey’s willingness to accept its highly constrained
role indefinitely, while its economic — and therefore political —
influence grows, is limited. Turkey’s economic power, coupled with
its substantial regional military power, will over time change the
balance of power in each of the regions Turkey faces.

Not only does Turkey interface with an extraordinary number of regions,
but its economy also is the major one in each of those regions,
while Turkish military power usually is pre-eminent as well.

When Turkey develops economically, it develops militarily. It then
becomes the leading power — in many regions. That is what it means
to be a pivotal power.

In 2003, the United States was cautious with Turkey, though in the
final analysis it was indifferent. It no longer can be indifferent.

The United States is now in the process of planning the post-Iraq war
era, and even if it does retain permanent bases in Iraq — dubious
for a number of reasons — it will have to have a regional power
to counterbalance Iran. Iran has always been aware of and cautious
with Turkey, but never as much as now — while Turkey is growing
economically and doing the heavy lifting on the Kurds. Iran does not
want to antagonize the Turks.

The United States and Iran have been talking — just recently engaging
in seven hours of formal discussions. But Iran, betting that the United
States will withdraw from Iraq, is not taking the talks as seriously as
it might. The United States has few levers to use against Iran. It is
therefore not surprising that it has reached out to the biggest lever.

In the short run, Turkey, if it works with the United States,
represents a counterweight to Iran, not only in general, but also
specifically in Iraq. From the American point of view, a Turkish
invasion of northern Iraq would introduce a major force native to the
region that certainly would give Iran pause in its behavior in Iraq.

This would mean the destruction of Kurdish hopes for independence,
though the United States has on several past occasions raised and
then dashed Kurdish hopes. In this sense, Novak’s article makes a
great deal of sense. The PKK would provide a reasonable excuse for
a Turkish intervention in Iraq, both in the region and in Turkey.

Anything that blocks the Kurds will be acceptable to the Turkish
public, and even to Iran.

It is the longer run that is becoming interesting, however. If the
United States is not going to continue counterbalancing Iran in
the region, then it is in Turkey’s interest to do so. It also is
increasingly within Turkey’s reach. But it must be understood that,
given geography, the growth of Turkish power will not be confined to
one direction. A powerful and self-confident Turkey has a geographical
position that inevitably reflects all the regions that pivot around it.

For the past 90 years, Turkey has not played its historic role. Now,
however, economic and politico-military indicators point to Turkey’s
slow reclamation of that role. The rumors about Turkish action against
the PKK have much broader significance. They point to a changing role
for Turkey — and that will mean massive regional changes over time.