WHY THE CYPRUS PROBLEM CANNOT BE SOLVED PRINT
View By Ata Atun
Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey
july 9 2007
The main factors that have made Greek Cyprus unwilling to help solve
the dispute on the island are international powers requiring that
the roots of the problem and the responsible party be disregarded
and clearing the path for Greek Cyprus’s membership to EU.
Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktaº has been characterized as
intransigent, but this does not conform to reality. As a matter
of fact, it was the Greek side that rejected all UN proposals for
reunification of the island.
The Turkish side, while in favor of Cuellar’s "Set of Proposals"
in March 1986, Boutros-Ghali’s "Set of Ideas" in 1992 and finally
the Annan plan on April 24, 2004, the Greek side, beguiling the
international community to the last minute, looking for support by
pretending to be the underdog and supporting it until the very last
moment, was always the side against a solution.
On top of that, although the current administration of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) came to power on rallying cries of
a solution to the Cyprus problem and EU membership, the Cyprus problem
is drifting away from a solution. In this context, it is possible to
line up the basic elements complicating the solution as follows.
* International recognition of Greek Cyprus, as the continuation of
the 1960 Cyprus government since March 1964.
* The resolutions of UN Security Council based on this concept,
which reverberated in the leading cases at the European Court of Human.
Rights:
* March 4, 1964/181: The creation of a UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus
and official recognition of Greek Cyprus as the government of Cyprus.
* Nov. 18, 1983/541: Considering the declaration of the KKTC as
legally invalid.
* May 13, 1984/550: Defining the formation of the KKTC as a
"secessionist action" and calling for the transfer of Varosha to the
administration of the UN.
* Greek Cyprus’ possession of rights and the possibility of becoming a
member, to participate, vote and speak on behalf of the whole island,
in international organizations.
* Alongside the conflicting benefits and arguments of both communities
on the island, the involvement of regional and global powers in the
Cyprus problem.
* The participation of too many international actors, topping the
judicial framework of the 1960 agreement.
* The double standards of the EU by accepting Greek Cyprus as a full
member irrespective of international law.
* Greek Cyprus’s position in the decision-making side on Turkey’s
membership talks with the EU.
* Taking advantage of the over-willingness of Turkey to join the EU,
playing the Cyprus issue as a trump card and transforming it into an
EU instrument in the form of a provision.
* The belief of the Greek side that they would get the most compromise
by means of threatening Turkey it will veto its EU accession process.
* Aiming to be recognized by Turkey as the legal representative of
the Cypriot government by dragging the problem to the judicial organs
of the EU.
* Within the short and medium term, the opening of the closed area of
Varosha and the approval and exercising of the Additional Protocol
to the Ankara Agreement by opening Turkish harbors and airports to
Greek Cypriot traffic.
* Working to reduce the Turkish Cypriots from a politically equal
community to a minority once again and invalidating the existence,
rights and status of Turkey on the island.
* Importing the EU as an actor alongside the claims of the Greeks
to the solution of the problem by mentioning that the resolution in
Cyprus will be within the UN framework and relying on EU principles in
the Turkey-EU Negotiation Framework Document and Accession Partnership
Document.
* By this method, shifting the solution from the UN floor, where Turkey
is a member, to a platform where the EU participates but Turkey and
the KKTC do not
* The usage of Greek Cyprus by the other members of the EU who are
against the membership of Turkey for other reasons as a subcontractor.
* The continuation of sanctions imposed on the KKTC and no penalty
for the Greeks vis-a-vis a resolution.
* In this context, the unwillingness of Greeks to sit down for
a solution.
* The extremely nationalist and racial feelings of Greeks stretching
to fascism, and rejecting coexistence with the Turkish Cypriots. In
addition, the increase in the supporters of neo-Nazism, far-right
groups and violent EOKA-like organizations such as Hrisi Avgi/Golden
Dawn.
* The role of the Greek Orthodox Church and the Greek Cypriot
education system.
* The strong support of the Greek Cypriots for the Pappadopoulos
factor, in the April 24 referendum and onwards,
* Greek Cyprus profiting significantly from international laws and
propaganda against the Turkish side.
* The conveyance of property affair, which should be the part of a
comprehensive and bilateral solution, to the European court by the
Greek Cypriots, for a solution within the level of the rights of
an individual.
* The efficacy of the Greek Cypriot and Greek lobby within Western
countries and their collaboration with the Armenian lobby.
* The psychological operations conducted for years in the KKTC for
a solution along the Greek Cypriot thesis.
The final position reached within this framework neither leads to
a solution under a joint state due to the obstructions of the Greek
Cypriots nor does it leave a gap for the recognition of the KKTC and
the lifting of sanctions.
06.07.2007 Ata Atun is columnist, Todays Zaman
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