ARMENIA’S MURKY POLITICS
Economist, UK
April 11 2007
Campaigning begins for a rigged election
Campaigning for Armenia’s parliamentary election, scheduled for
May 12th, began officially on April 8th. The contest will be watched
closely by foreign observers, as it could predetermine the fate of the
country’s political leadership. Victory in the legislative election
is seen as crucial to President Robert Kocharian’s apparent plan to
hand over power to his most influential associate, Serzh Sarkisian,
who became prime minister on April 4th following the death in office
of premier Andranik Markarian. Mr Kocharian, in power since 1998,
also seems keen to retain a key role in government after completing
his second and final term in office early next year.
The president and Mr Sarkisian will therefore go to great lengths
to ensure that the former Soviet republic’s parliament continues
to be dominated by their political allies. The latter are tipped to
grab the vast majority of parliament seats through a combination of
vote-rigging, vote-buying and control of the media. For this reason,
there is widespread scepticism about government assurances that
the elections will put an end to Armenia’s post-Soviet history of
electoral fraud.
By fair means or foul Twenty-eight parties and about two hundred
individual candidates have filed for registration with the Central
Election Commission to vie for 131 seats in Armenia’s National
Assembly. Ninety of those seats will be up for grabs under the system
of proportional representation, with the remaining 41 seats to be
contested in nationwide constituencies on the first-past-the-post
basis.
With credible opinion polls practically non-existent in the country,
it is not easy to gauge the electoral chances of various contenders.
Popularity alone will not guarantee success. In terms of ability
to secure the largest number of votes, the clear frontrunner is the
Republican Party of Armenia (HHK). Nominally headed by Mr Markarian
until his death, it has over the past year come increasingly under
the control of Mr Sarkisian.
The HHK is a typical post-Soviet "party of power" mainly comprising
senior government officials, civil servants, and wealthy business
people dependent on government connections. It can wield enormous
administrative resources, through control of the electoral process
coupled with voter intimidation and heavy televised propaganda. The
Armenian press has been awash with reports of local government chiefs
being instructed by party bosses to earn the HHK a particular number
of votes in their respective areas at any cost or risk dismissal.
Accordingly, they have reportedly been forcing scores of public
sector employees such as doctors and schoolteachers to join the
governing party.
The HHK’s de facto takeover by Mr Sarkisian in mid-2006 has also
meant that it now enjoys the crucial backing of most members of the
country’s business elite. The so-called "oligarchs" often hold sway in
a particular part of the country and are in a position to bully and/or
bribe voters. Many of them already helped the HHK win the previous
parliamentary elections that were judged to be undemocratic by Western
observers. There are no indications that the HHK will be seeking to
prevail by more legitimate means this time around. A strong HHK showing
is vital for the realisation of Mr Sarkisian’s presidential ambitions.
Kocharian’s choice That Mr Sarkisian, widely regarded as Armenia’s
second most powerful man, is Mr Kocharian’s preferred successor seems a
given. Both men are natives of Nagorny-Karabakh who played a major role
in the Armenian-populated disputed enclave’s 1991-1994 secessionist
war with Azerbaijan. They have worked in tandem and jointly weathered
many political storms since moving to top government positions in
Yerevan in the late 1990s.
The question is just how strong Mr Kocharian would like his heir
apparent to be. The 52-year-old president made it clear last December
that he will not become "Armenia’s youngest pensioner" after leaving
office, suggesting that he wants to continue to pull the government
strings in some official capacity. There is mounting speculation
that he is eying the post of prime minister. Whatever Mr Kocharian’s
exact intentions, it is evident that he is trying to secure his
political future by covertly sponsoring another election favourite:
the Prosperous Armenia Party (BHK) of Gagik Tsarukian, the wealthiest
of the local oligarchs.
The BHK launched its activities little more than a year ago and claims
to have since recruited as many as 370,000 members, or 12% of the
Armenian state’s population. The party is capitalising on its leader’s
vast financial resources, which are being spent on distribution of
agricultural relief, free medical aid, and other public services
to large numbers of impoverished people. The aid, condemned as a
wholesale buying of votes by opposition and even some HHK leaders,
is earning Mr Tsarukian a populist appeal that should translate into
solid voter support for his party on polling day. BHK supporters are
too disillusioned with the traditional Armenian parties to care about
a huge disparity between Mr Tsarukian’s conspicuous wealth and modest
taxes levied from his businesses.
Expert opinion differs only on whether the BHK was set up as a
counterweight to the governing HHK or as a powerful addition to
the government camp. Despite occasional signs of friction and mutual
jealousy, the two parties are unlikely to openly clash both during and
in the wake of the May 12th vote. Furthermore, there is a conspiracy
theory that they have already amicably divided most parliament seats
between themselves and form a coalition government.
Divided opposition The BHK phenomenon makes it easier for the
Kocharian-Sarkisian duo to prevent their political opponents from
having a strong presence in the next Armenian parliament. Their task
is further facilitated by the failure of Armenia’s leading opposition
parties to form electoral alliances. Voters hostile to the government
will have a hard time picking one of more than a dozen opposition
contenders with virtually identical platforms. Many of them might
therefore not bother to vote at all.
The three largest opposition parties are led by Mr Kocharian’s
two main challengers in the 2003 presidential election, Stepan
Demirchian and Artashes Geghamian, and former parliament speaker
Artur Baghdasarian. The latter’s pro-Western Country of Law Party
was forced out of the governing coalition in May 2006. All three
opposition leaders feel that they are popular enough to do well
on their own. Only Mr Demirchian has considered teaming up with
several smaller opposition parties, notably the Republic Party of
Aram Sarkisian (no relation to the defense minister), a former prime
minister who is the regime’s most dangerous and uncompromising foe.
Those parties failed to reach agreement even among themselves,
reportedly bickering over who should be the would-be bloc’s top
leader. Only two of them, Republic and the Heritage Party of the
US-born former Foreign Minister Raffi Hovannisian, stand a chance
of clearing the 5% threshold for entering parliament under the
proportional system. The Armenian opposition also failed to put into
practice Republic’s idea of fielding common candidates in the 41
single-mandate electoral districts. The individual constituencies
are usually swept by wealthy pro-government candidates, and this is
likely to happen once again on May 12th.
With the election likely to follow an all too familiar pattern, there
is a strong possibility of joint opposition demonstrations in Yerevan
in the immediate aftermath of the polls. Whether or not the opposition
can pull large crowds is a different matter. Its most recent attempt
to topple the government with a campaign of street protests ended in
failure in spring 2004.
Aid in the balance The US and the EU have repeatedly warned that a
repeat of serious vote irregularities would be fraught with negative
consequences for the Armenian authorities. The US, in particular, has
tied provision of US$235 million in economic assistance to Armenia,
promised under the Bush administration’s Millennium Challenge Account
(MCA), to the proper conduct of the elections. But Washington will
likely tread carefully now that Armenia and Azerbaijan seem to
have made substantial progress towards a resolution of the Karabakh
conflict, a key US foreign policy aim in the region. US and other
diplomats involved in Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks say the
conflicting parties will try to cut a peace deal during the period
between the Armenian legislative elections and presidential ballots
due in both Armenia and Azerbaijan next year.
Assuming that it really sees a chance for Karabakh peace, Washington
will hardly undercut the Kocharian administration if the polls are
marred by serious fraud. The EU may likewise exercise caution, even
though it has warned that a clean vote is a necessary condition for
Armenia’s participation in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
framework for privileged ties with the bloc. Yet even the prospect of
being left out of ENP or not receiving the badly needed MCA funds will
hardly force Armenia’s two top leaders to finally hold an election
according to Western standards-for them, far too much is at stake.
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From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaysto