TURKISH HIZBALLAH (HIZBULLAH): A CASE STUDY OF RADICAL TERRORISM
By Suleyman Ozoren (University of North Texas & Cecile Van de Voorde, University of South Florida)
Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey
April 18 2007
Abstract
The Republic of Turkey is one of the many countries that have been
struggling with terrorism for decades. This article concentrates on
the development and activities of Turkish Hizballah. Following an
overview of the resurgence of radicalism and terrorism in Turkey, the
main characteristics of Turkish Hizballah are highlighted and compared
to other notorious terrorist groups, KONGRA-GEL (Kurdistan People’s
Congress) in Turkey and the Hizballah in Lebanon. The ideology,
goals and structure of Turkish Hizballah are also examined.
A final analysis focuses on contemporary trends, including law
enforcement and security operations against Turkish Hizballah, as
well as related policy implications.
The phenomenon of terrorism has plagued countries throughout the world
for centuries. In September 2001, when the United States experienced
its first major terrorist attacks on American soil since the World
Trade Center bombing of 1993 and the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995,
the American public suddenly became painfully aware of a variety
of fundamentalist religious terrorist groups that had been active
elsewhere in the world for many years. The Republic of Turkey is one
of the many countries that have been struggling with terrorism for
decades. This article will focus on the development and activities
of a specific terrorist group: Turkish Hizballah. An overview of
the resurgence of radicalism and terrorism in Turkey, the main
characteristics of Turkish Hizballah are highlighted and compared
to other notorious terrorist groups, KONGRA-GEL (Kurdistan People’s
Congress) in Turkey and the Hizballah in Lebanon.
Subsequently, an examination of the ideology and structure of Turkish
Hizballah will lead to a final analysis focused on more contemporary
trends of the terrorist group.
By Suleyman Ozoren (University of North Texas & Cecile Van de Voorde,
University of South Florida)
Terrorism in Turkey
For over three decades, Turkey has been affected by domestic
insurgencies and political violence without receiving from the
international community much of the attention it deserved. In
particular, Turkey has been plagued by terrorism for several years
and on many fronts. Active terrorist groups include not only the
Turkish Hizballah (Party of God), but also the Kurdish separatist group
known as the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (PKK-KONGRA GEL,
formerly called PKK), the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front
(DHKP/C or Dev-Sol), as well as other entities tied to terrorist
groups based in Syria and Iran. In order to understand the development
of Hizballah in Turkey, it is crucial not only to comprehend the
resurgence of political Islam and radical terrorism in a fundamentally
secular country, but also to distinguish Turkish Hizballah from both
the more notorious PKK-KONGRA GEL and its Lebanese namesake.
Religious Violence and Radical Terrorism in Turkey
Although religious faith itself cannot produce violence and
terrorist behavior, it may be interpreted to justify an attack on
social structure. Three circumstances must be present in order to
motivate believers to shift their thoughts towards violent action:
(1) believers must perceive a threat to their values, (2) a theology
must be transformed into a dogma produced by textual interpretation
and (3) the true believers must embrace the violence as a means
for preserving their faith. Where these criteria are met, terrorism
becomes an integral part of theology.1 Nevertheless, Islam does not
inherently condone terrorism: the word Islam shares the same Arabic
etymological root as the word peace and the Holy Qur’an condemns war
as an abnormal state of affairs opposed to God’s will.
Essentially, Islam is ‘an apolitical religion concerned solely with
spiritual and ethical guidance’ and using Islam as both a religion
and a state or global political structure may be perceived as ‘a
deviation from and a perversion of that true conception’.2 Furthermore,
political Islam may be construed as ‘an illegitimate extension of
the Islamic tradition outside of the properly religious domain it has
historically occupied’.3 In recent years, the phrase ‘political Islam’
has been used to refer to ‘the seemingly unprecedented irruption of
Islamic religion into the secular domain of politics’ as ‘Islam has
become a central point of reference for a wide range of political
activities, arguments and opposition movements’.4 Nevertheless,
even though Muslim activists often use Islam for political purposes,
it is important to note that not ‘all forms of contemporary Islamic
activism involve trying to "capture the state".’5
The role of Islam in Turkey is peculiar insofar as it is intricately
related to Turkish history, nationalism and identity. Historically,
Turkish Islam has been tolerant and respectful of other religions,
which helped Ottomans expand their empire and rule over millions of
people without significant conflicts. Furthermore, the first Turkish
Muslims, who were heavily influenced by Sufi-oriented ideas, ‘kept
a certain distance from the politics of their times in contrast to
other Islamic movements’.6 As a result, prominent religious leaders
have denounced any action associated with violence by asserting that
a terrorist could not truly be a Muslim and, conversely, a Muslim
could not be a terrorist.
Owing to its unique location between Europe and Asia, Turkey has been
composed of and influenced by a variety of cultural, ethnical and
historical entities for centuries. Diversity is still a hallmark of
contemporary Turkey and the rapidly modernizing country has seemingly
set ‘an example of what is possible in integrating Islamic movements
into its relatively democratic political system. By accommodating
Islamic voices and expanding the boundaries of participation, Turkey
has preserved and consolidated its democracy and civil society’.7
Nonetheless, fundamentalist terrorism is still a reality and such
radical terrorist groups as Turkish Hizballah are active in Turkey
today. Overall, the activities and ideologies of these groups have
been met with much resistance by the mainstream society. Major issues
have been revived and causing growing concern throughout the country,
including radicalism, integrism, separatism and terrorism.8
Major Differences Between Turkish Hizballah and PKK-KONGRA GEL
The most prominent source of Turkish terrorism, which Turkish
Hizballah is sometimes confused with, is the Kurdistan Freedom and
Democracy Congress (PKK-KONGRA GEL). PKK-KONGRA GEL was founded in
1974 by Abdullah Ocalan as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party or PKK (Partya
Karkeren Kurdistan), a Kurdish political party and insurrectionary
group adhering to a Marxist-Leninist ideology.9 The main objective
of PKK-KONGRA GEL has been the creation of an independent United
Democratic Kurdistan in southeast Turkey (Anatolia), northern Iraq,
Iran and Syria. Since the early 1980s, it has led a brutal campaign of
guerrilla warfare and terrorism against Turkey with the collaboration
and protection of various countries and groups, mainly Syria and
Greece. In the early 1990s, PKK-KONGRA GEL evolved from radical
activism in rural areas to more structured urban terrorism. Today, the
group operates in Turkey, Europe and the Middle East. It is arguably
one of the best-organized terrorist organizations in the world with an
estimated 4,000 to 5,000 members, mainly located in northern Iraq, and
thousands of sympathizers throughout Turkey and Europe. The financial
stability of PKK-KONGRA GEL is guaranteed by its heavy involvement
in narcoterrorism, arms smuggling, kidnapping (primarily children and
tourists) and other forms of organized crime. Between August 1984 and
February 2000, PKK-KONGRA GEL was credited for about 22,000 terrorist
actions. The leitmotiv of PKK-KONGRA GEL’s left-wing extremists is
the use of their ethnicity as an incentive for politico-ideological
recruitment.
Paradoxically however, PKK-KONGRA GEL has arbitrarily murdered
Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin, that is, the people on whose
behalf it allegedly acts. The group further considers both the Kurdish
Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (the two main
Kurdish groupings in northern Iraq) as enemies.10
PKK-KONGRA GEL is most notorious for its promotion and use of
terrorist suicide attacks, a modus operandi Turkish Hizballah
has never resorted to. The suicide terrorism techniques used by
PKK-KONGRA GEL are characteristic of a continuum that entails not only
a hierarchical organization with a highly charismatic leader (known
as the ‘pioneer’), but also the idea of a ‘suitable culture’ likely
to promote self-sacrifice for the sake of religion or the interests
of the group through intense indoctrination. Thus, PKK-KONGRA GEL’s
‘indoctrination of its members is based on praising valor and rebellion
against oppression and victimization’.11 Additionally, situational
factors play an important role in the continuum of PKK-KONGRA GEL’s
suicide terrorism campaign. Whereas PKK-KONGRA GEL only ordered a few
suicide attacks in prisons until the 1990s (none of which resulted in
mass casualties), several attacks took place in the 1990s that were
mainly prompted by political or internal crises. Many of the terrorist
suicide attacks perpetrated by PKK-KONGRA GEL actually coincided with
the arrest, imprisonment, sentencing or extradition of Ocalan, as well
as upsurges in repressive measures adopted by the Turkish government.
Between 30 June 1995 and 15 July 1999, fifteen terrorist suicide
attacks occurred and caused the death of thousands of people,
including many women and children. In addition, PKK-KONGRA GEL,
which strives to impose its subversive views on the uneducated and
the ignorant, is also responsible for the assassination of more than
a hundred schoolteachers.
PKK-KONGRA GEL membership is often favored by educated people who
prefer its more transparent actions. PKK-KONGRA GEL and the Hizballah
have openly clashed in Turkey since PKK militants killed the father
of a Hizballah member in 1990 and Hizballah militants retaliated by
murdering a PKK sympathizer. According to Turkish Hizballah, the main
reason for their struggle with PKK-KONGRA GEL is that the latter
is a Marxist-Leninist group that kills Muslims and collaborates
with Armenians, who are considered to be Infidels. In reality,
their rivalry results from a long-standing fight for authority over
southeastern Turkey. Both PKK-KONGRA GEL and Turkish Hizballah have
high stakes in that region, which is composed of a highly religious
Muslim population. From an ideological perspective, even though it
has nothing to do with religion, PKK-KONGRA GEL understands that
the only way to influence such a public is to use the imams (prayer
leaders). Consequently, in order to gain support from the religious
population of the area, PKK-KONGRA GEL has established the Kurdish
Prayer Leaders Association (Kurdistan Imamlar Birligi). The PKK-KONGRA
GEL strategy obviously contradicts the ideology and tactics defended by
Turkish Hizballah, which seeks to radically alter the secular regime in
Turkey by organizing religious people toward the use of violence. For
a long time, PKK-KONGRA GEL claimed to be the only dominant group in
southeastern Turkey. Yet, Turkish Hizballah has engaged in hostile
activities against PKK-KONGRA GEL interests in the region, which has
reinforced the struggle between the two groups in Turkey. As a result,
both sides lost over 500 members between 1992 and 1995, including 22
imams killed by Hizballah.
Major Differences Between Turkey’s Hizballah and Lebanon’s Hizballah
Turkish Hizballah has no official organic ties with either the
Lebanon-based Islamist terrorist group also named Hizballah12 or
its offshoots throughout the Middle East.13 Notwithstanding a few
similarities in terms of ideology, methods and goals, they are
essentially very distinct terrorist groups. Officially backed by
Iran, the Lebanese group known as Hizballah seeks to reestablish the
supremacy of Islam in the political and socio-economic life of the
Muslim world.14 Hence, as indicated by the political manifesto of
the group, its goals are mainly to eradicate any western influence
from Lebanon and the Middle East in general, to destroy Israel,
as well as to liberate Palestinian territories and Jerusalem from
Israeli occupation. The ultimate purpose underlying Hizballah’s
actions in Lebanon is to establish a radical Shia (or Shiite) Islamist
theocracy in that country. Lebanon’s Hizballah is indeed based on Shia
ideology, whereas Turkey’s Hizballah is predominantly rooted in Sunni
Islam. Besides, in Lebanese Hizballah, the spiritual leader assumes
an important function in terms of motivating his members along the
lines of the Shiite writings. This responsibility is apparently not
as primordial for Turkish Hizballah, as notably evidenced within
the Ilimciler group when Huseyin Velioglu served as political and
spiritual leader despite his weak religious background or training
(which actually led Fidan Gungor, the leader of the Menzilciler group,
to claim Velioglu was incapable of leading his group).
Lebanon’s Hizballah has been active not only in Lebanon, but also
throughout Europe, North America, South America and Africa. The
terrorist group has resorted to various tactics, including
car bombings, kidnappings and hijackings, primarily targeting
western and Jewish interests. Turkish Hizballah, on the contrary,
has not perpetrated attacks outside of Turkey, which is also why
it is not technically or officially considered an international
terrorism organization. In terms of affiliation with other terrorist
organizations, the main difference between the two groups lies in the
fact that Lebanon’s Hizballah has served as an umbrella organization
for such terrorist groups as Hamas. Turkey’s Hizballah, on the other
hand, has only had very limited relationships with such groups. In
addition, Turkey’s Hizballah does not strive to be legitimized,
whereas Lebanon’s Hizballah has become a major part of Lebanese
politics. As such, the Lebanese Hizballah has been struggling for
the liberation of southern Lebanon from Israeli occupation for years.
Furthermore, it has carried out social activities to support
social, economic and educational life of the Shiite community. It
thus functions like a de facto government for the Shiite people of
southern Lebanon. In contrast, the functions of Turkish Hizballah are
strictly limited to a very secret group that has nothing to do with
everyday life in the community. The main purpose of Turkey’s Party
of God is to establish a religious-based government by overthrowing
the existing secular government.15
Moreover, Lebanon’s Hizballah pioneered suicide bombings in the
Middle East, another important characteristic that differentiate it
from its Turkish homonym. The Lebanese group is responsible for the
wave of suicide terrorism that started in April 1983 when a truck
laden with explosives was driven into the U.S. Embassy in Beirut,
killing 49 and wounding about 120 people. The goals of Hizballah
suicide operations evolved over time as the group gained notoriety
at the local and international levels and became a role model for
and supporter of several other terrorist organizations. The group
and its Iranian benefactors used suicide terrorism as a propaganda
tool for the dissemination of the precepts of the Islamic revolution
throughout the Middle East. Foreign UN peacekeeping forces eventually
had to leave Lebanon and the Israeli army also retreated from central
Lebanon to a restricted strip further south. Hizballah further used
suicide terrorism as an instrument of deterrence and reprisal against
Israel. The use of suicide attacks as a primary method of operation
has now declined to one attack per year or less, but the overall
success of Hizballah has been observable even outside of Lebanon,
where the terrorist group inspired and occasionally sponsored several
other terrorist entities.
Ideology and Structure of Turkish Hizballah
The Growth of Hizballah in Turkey
According to a U.S. Department of State report, ‘Turkish Hizballah is
a domestic terrorist group of mostly Kurdish Sunni Islamists with no
known ties to Lebanese Hizballah. Turkish officials and media assert
that Turkish Hizballah has received limited Iranian support.’16 Turkish
Hizballah, also known in Iraqi Kurdistan as the Kurdish Revolutionary
Hizballah (Hisbullahi Kurdi Shorishger), is thus composed of Kurds, a
large ethnic group that is predominantly Sunni Muslim and concentrated
in the mountainous regions of the border area between Turkey, Iran
and Iraq. The ‘network is alleged to be responsible for numerous
assassinations and disappearances over the past decade, including a
number of high-profile terrorist incidents.
. . . 1999 estimates suggested that Hizbullah may have as many as
25,000 adherents, including 4,000 armed militants.’17 Hizballah
members are economically and socially alienated from mainstream
society: they typically come from low-income families and half of
them are not steadily employed, which reflects the situation of the
Turkish socio-economic crisis. More importantly, one fourth do not
have any kind of education and about a third of the members only have
an elementary-school-level education.18
Based in southeastern Anatolia, Turkish Hizballah originally operated
mainly in the cities of Diyarbakir, Van, Batman and Mardin. Members
of the terrorist group habitually gathered in and around bookstores,
where they discussed their ideologies and spread their propaganda.
According to official reports, the founding members of Turkish
Hizballah initially gathered at one bookstore, Vahdet, but they were
never able to form a homogenous group.19 Due to ideological divergences
and leadership disputes, Turkish Hizballah separated into two major
groups: Ilimciler (Scientists) and Menzilciler (Rangers).
The Ilimciler, led by Huseyin Velioglu, met at the Ilim Bookstore,
whereas the Menzilciler, led by Fidan Gungor, congregated at the
Menzil bookstore. Beside leadership struggle, the two factions
were opposed in the tactics they used to accomplish the goal of the
terrorist organization. While the Ilimciler defended armed struggle and
comprised Hizballah’s most brutal factions, the Menzilciler believed
it was too early for such radical action and opposed, for instance,
attacks on suspected PKK-KONGRA GEL members.20 An intra-group struggle
stemmed from the battle for leadership and caused the death of over a
hundred people on both sides. In 1994, the assassination of Menzilciler
leader Fidan Gungor by Ilimciler members almost obliterated the dispute
between Ilimciler and Menzilciler, but the truce was short-lived and
the factions remain opposed to this day.
In the late 1990s, Hizballah attempted to widen its area of operation
to cities in the western part of Turkey, especially Istanbul. The
ongoing conflict between Hizballah and PKK-KONGRA GEL in southeastern
Turkey was the major impetus for the shift. Still, western cities
like Istanbul did not prove to be as favorable an environment as
southeastern cities had been (e.g., Diyarbakir, Van, or Mardin) for
the development of Hizballah. The efforts of the group were seriously
curbed as major operations were carried out against Hizballah cells
in and around Istanbul in early 2000, one of which led to the killing
of Huseyin Velioglu, the Ilimciler group leader, and the arrest of
his two top lieutenants, Edip Gumus and Cemal Tutar.
Ideology and Goals
The ideology defended by Turkish Hizballah is similar to the principles
almost all terrorist organizations have adhered to throughout the
world and history. According to Turkish Hizballah, the world is
divided between two forces, Good and Evil, which represent the Ultimate
Truth. ‘It is likely that in closing themselves off from others, they
became isolated and lived in an imagined community that struggled to
destroy the ‘unjust other’ in order to prove that they were the "just
selves".’21 Based on such ideology, Turkish Hizballah has opposed
every group that has deviated from what they believe to be the true
path of Islam, including other Islamic movements and organizations.
Hizballah’s brand of radicalism further derives from ‘the threat
of the Modern Kharijites’.22 The uncompromising principles defended
by the Kharijites (Hariciler) were in fact the source of the first
rebellion against the rulers of the Islamic world.23 The Kharijites
divided the world into two parts, one that belonged to true Muslims
and another belonging to nonbelievers; they declared a jihad against
all nonbelievers and apostate Muslims and used any means available
to them in order to rid the world from the infidels.
The ultimate goal of Turkish Hizballah is to overthrow the
constitutional secular regime of Turkey in order to introduce a strict
Islamic state inspired by Iran. Accordingly, a two-fold scheme has
been devised: people are first invited into the group (the term
officially used is davet, to invite) and then, once the group has
secured enough supporters, it can deal with other organizations in the
region.24 Besides, as has been observed in other terrorist groups,
Turkish Hizballah follows the rigid rule of ‘you are either with us
or against us.’ Those who believe in the same values and means as
Turkish Hizballah side with the group, while those who do not are
against it. If they choose not to change their mind and join the
struggle, opponents of Turkish Hizballah are destroyed by any means
available and necessary. Thus, the ‘unjust others’ targeted by Turkish
Hizballah have included moderate Kurdish businessmen who support the
secular constitutional government, as well as religious individuals
who do not embrace the ideology of the terrorist group.
Organizational Structure
The structure of Turkish Hizballah clearly defines each position by
the specific functions assigned to each individual (see Figure 1).
There are three major levels in the hierarchy of the group: leadership,
top council (Sura) and lower-level (city) council.
Leadership. The first level of the hierarchy of Turkish Hizballah is
the leadership. It is divided between two individuals: the spiritual
leader and the political leader. The former has no power or influence
on the decision-making or the execution of the operations; he does,
on the other hand, have to support the members by means of religious
motivation. The latter has decision-making power regarding the
activities of the group: he can modify or change the directions
of general operations. Although political and spiritual leadership
positions are typically not assumed by one man, Huseyin Velioglu was
an exception, since he served as both the spiritual and the political
leader of Ilimciler, the dominant Hizballah faction.
Top council. The second major hierarchical structure of Turkish
Hizballah is the top council, or Sura, a central committee composed
of high-ranking political and military members. Important decisions
regarding the group are discussed and made by the Top Council, which
controls both the military and the political wings of Hizballah.
Lower-level council (city-level council). At the local level, that is,
in Turkish cities and towns, the hierarchy of Hizballah is divided
between the military and the political branches, following a pattern
similar to the Sura framework. The military wing is the unit that
carries out the armed operations of the Hizballah in Turkey. The
leader of the military wing, who can be a member of either the Sura
or a lower-level council, is responsible for the execution of the
armed operations on behalf of either council he has membership in.
The military wing is composed of unit leaders and operation teams or
units. Within each lower-level council, unit leaders are in charge
of directing military operations carried out by up to three operation
teams. They are supervised by the city leader and direct his orders to
the operation units. The latter come last in the chain of command of
the military wing; they are typically composed of two to six people. As
a rule in the Ilimciler group, operation teams are bound by secrecy:
members know only of the members in their own team, not of any members
of the group in general (according to official reports, members of
operation team A will have code names starting with A, for instance,
whereas members of a group B will have code names starting with B).
The political wing, on the other hand, is responsible recruiting new
members and communicating the precepts of Hizballah to persuade the
people of Turkey to establish an Iranian-like regime. The leader of
the political wing of Hizballah is a member of the Sura. High-ranking
officials of the political wing are in charge of public relations and
propaganda operations. Furthermore, Hizballah radicals perform duties
of propaganda and recruitment in units operating in local schools and
colleges. Finally, the public unit, generally organized in and around
mosques, as well as in neighborhoods and villages, has no influential
role in the decision-making process regarding the future operations
of the Hizballah.
Contemporary Trends of Turkish Hizballah
Modus Operandi, Victim Selection and Activities
When Turkish Hizballah first came to the attention of the Turkish
public, it was often mistaken for the Lebanese movement of the same
name. The major differences between the two groups, as explained
above, were rapidly clarified and Turkish Hizballah steadily gained
notoriety throughout the 1980s and 1990s ‘for the killings of Kurdish
rebel sympathizers . . . at the height of a conflict between Turkish
security forces and the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party.’25
Ever since its emergence in Turkey, Hizballah has been operating in
great secrecy. Unlike most terrorist groups, it typically does not
claim responsibility for its actions and usually does not publish any
written propaganda. Turkish Hizballah started out as ‘a mainly urban
phenomenon’ observed in predominantly Kurdish cities of southeastern
Turkey and became particularly known for its distinct ‘style of
assassination carried out in broad daylight, often by pairs of young
assassins using pistols of Eastern European manufacture’.26
Initially, only suspected members or sympathizers of the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (then PKK) were targeted by Hizballah. Opponents
of governmental policies and separatists ‘were being killed at
the rate of two a day . . . [and] more than a thousand people were
killed in street shootings from 1992 to 1995.’27 In the late 1990s,
however, Hizballah started killing secularists, moderate Muslims,
representatives of Kurdish religious charitable foundations and clerics
from other religious movements. One of the first widely publicized
incidents attributed to Turkish Hizballah was the April 1997 grenade
attack on the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.
The attack, originally attributed to ‘some hard-core group’,
specifically targeted ‘the spiritual heart of hundreds of millions of
Orthodox Christians all over the world’ and occurred in a ‘climate
of extreme nationalism and militarism’.28 In January 2000, police
and security forces became yet another tactical target to boost the
motivation of the group members when Police Chief Gaffar Okkan and
five police officers were assassinated in Diyarbakir, the largest
city in the southeastern Turkey. Okkan had led a very successful
operation to take apart Hizballah factions the year before and had
subsequently been added to the death list of the group.
A 2000 indictment of high-ranking Ilimciler members actually specified
that the activities of Hizballah in Turkey ‘included shootings,
arson, assault with meat cleavers, kidnapping, beatings and attacks
with acid on women not dressed in an Islamic manner.’29 Kidnapping
is indeed one of the methods of operation favored by Hizballah in
Turkey. Targets vary from PKK-KONGRA GEL members and sympathizers
to members of other religious movements; businessmen have also
been kidnapped for ransom, as was discovered during recent police
raids.30 Above all, Turkish Hizballah has set a gruesome record for
torture in Turkey. The Ilimciler group in particular has resorted to
extremely brutal torture techniques in a methodical and premeditated
manner. Some have argued that Turkish Hizballah is an intrinsically
fundamentalist and terrorist group in which ‘killing and torturing
were perceived of as inherently a part of their mission.’31 Turkish
Hizballah victims are characteristically bound and gagged and subjected
to severe torture prior to being killed.
Some tortured bodies are even buried alive and most corpses have
thus far been recovered from shallow graves, concrete blocks, or coal
sheds.32 Such tactics have been used either to merely inflict pain on
the victims or to persuade them of the validity and righteousness of
Hizballah’s struggle in Turkey. Even individuals from the Menzilciler
group and other religious people opposed to Hizballah’s ideology and
tactics have been subjected to torture by the Ilimciler group.
Suspected support from Iran.
The 1979 Iranian Revolution posed the first major threat to the
stability of Turkish-Iranian relations in the twentieth century.41
Regarding terrorism in particular, the activities of PKK-KONGRA GEL and
other right-wing terrorist groups have increased Turkey’s suspicions
about neighboring Iran. For example, during his interrogation,
Abdullah Ocalan alleged that Iran had served as a mediator between
Hizballah and PKK-KONGRA GEL and members of Hizballah have asserted
they received training in Iran.42
In April 1998, the daily newspaper Cumhurriyet claimed to have
uncovered evidence of links between Iran and various radical Islamist
groups outlawed in Turkey, including Hizballah. In an effort to
dismiss the allegations, the Iranian Embassy in Ankara declared:
‘Iran recognizes no group entitled Turkish Hizbollah (party of God)
in Turkey’ and also rejected ‘any link with the Turkish Hizbollah or
any other illegal group in Turkey’.43 Even Hizballah members, in fact,
have dismissed those claims as inconceivable and revolting.
However, Cumhurriyet affirmed that the Iranian regime was in effect
the ‘spinal cord’ of Turkish Hizballah and that their accusations
were supported by a ‘statement made by the Iranian Foreign Minister
Kamal Kharrazi’.44
In June 2000, as officially reported by the Representative Office
of the National Council of Resistance of Iran [RONCRI], Turkey ‘sent
Iran a detailed dossier drawn up by its security forces on the Turkish
Hizbollah, a fundamentalist organization suspected of carrying out
hundreds of assassinations with support from Iran.’45 Official reports
abound regarding members of Turkish Hizballah receiving weapons,
financial support and training from Iran, notably from the Iranian
Secret Service.46 Both Iranian and Turkish officials have vehemently
denied that members of Turkish Hizballah had ever been armed or trained
by the Iranian government, but no investigation has ever been launched
to establish the truth. Even allegations that Turkish Hizballah has
formally approved of the Iranian Revolution have not been verified and
the Turkish terrorist group therefore remains officially unrelated to
its Iranian neighbor. Overall, it has been noted that the relationships
entertained by the ‘Iranian theocratic regime with the neighboring
Turkey have never been easy ever since the victory of the Islamic
revolution of 1979.’47 Turkey keeps accusing Iran of not only helping
Turkish Islamist and terrorist groups to create an Islamic Republic,
but also supporting and protecting PKK-KONGRA GEL separatists.
Law Enforcement Response and Nationwide Security Operations
Since the early 1990s, Human Rights Watch and other organizations have
openly criticized the laissez-faire attitude of Turkish authorities
towards the activities of Hizballah in their country.
‘Belated police operations against Hizbullah often appeared to be
carried out for show, rather than as a determined move against
a dangerous illegal armed group. Initially, police did not move
against the more ruthless Hizbullah Ilim group . . . but against their
rival, the Menzil faction, which was reportedly opposed to attacks
on suspected PKK members. . . . The authorities were inexplicably coy
about their successes in combating Hizbullah and declined to respond to
Amnesty International’s repeated requests for detailed information on
prosecutions of alleged Hizbullah members.’48 Consequently, some argue,
‘by action or omission, the Turkish state bears some responsibility
for the slaughter committed by Hizbullah.’49
Following a concentrated effort to bring down the secular branch of
Turkish Hizballah, about four hundred people linked to the terrorist
group by local authorities were arrested in February 1999.50 In
addition, weapons and propaganda material were seized during raids in
three southeastern Turkish provinces. These arrests marked the first
stage of a nationwide effort by Turkish law enforcement to dismantle
the country’s Hizballah network. In early 2000, a ‘crackdown on
Turkey’s violent and shadowy Hizbullah network’ gave the formal fight
against Islamic fundamentalists ‘a more direct security dimension’,51
just as Hizballah leaders were attempting to restore the strength of
their group. Hizballah safe houses were raided methodically and mass
graves of victims tortured and executed by Hizballah members were
discovered throughout the country. According to the International
Institute for Strategic Studies,52 The operation launched by the
Turkish police . . . against suspected members of the Turkish Hizbullah
has dealt a severe blow to the operational capabilities of the militant
Islamist organisation. There are also widening splits within the
Kurdish nationalist and moderate Islamist movements. These divisions
are causing frustration among younger radicals. Unless the government
acts swiftly to improve socio-economic conditions and ease cultural
and religious restraints, there will continue to be a stream of ready
recruits for Islamic militant groups. It is becoming more likely that
the focus of armed resistance to the Turkish state will shift in the
long term from Kurdish nationalism to religious fundamentalism.
By the fall of 2000, nearly a thousand alleged members of the radical
Islamist group were taken into custody. About twenty thousand pages of
documents were also recovered from computer archives. Up to seventy
alleged high-ranking Sura members and local-level council leaders
of the right-wing terrorist group were apprehended and put on trial,
‘accused of killing 156 people and wounding 80’: most of them faced the
death penalty for ‘organizing an armed group that aimed to bring strict
Islamic law to Turkey.’53 The alleged deputy leader of the group, Edip
Gumus, declared that they had ‘fought for Islam’ but not taken part
‘in a single armed attack,’ adding, ‘we intended to make Islam rule
the world, not just Turkey. . . . We did not spend a single bullet
aiming to break the state’s constitutional order. If we had wanted to
do that we could have made Turkey a lake of blood with a group of 20 or
30 people.’54 In January 2001, Turkish authorities launched another
massive security operation following the assassination of Police
Chief Gaffar Okkan and five of his colleagues in Diyarbakir. Okkan,
as mentioned earlier, had led the successful anti-Hizballah campaign in
his province the year before. According to official reports, efforts by
Hizballah to spread out to western Turkish cities have been quelled and
the expansion movement has been stopped.55 In recent years, Hizballah’s
actions seem to have alienated more members and sympathizers and the
public has even renamed the group Hizbul Vahset, or Party of Slaughter.
Conclusion
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It has been observed in various
forms throughout the world for centuries. In the past few decades,
terrorism has developed internationally with the establishment of
global terror networks and intensified into a seemingly paroxysmal
issue that many countries have been unable to address effectively.
Turkey has been struggling with political violence and terrorism on
many fronts for more than three decades. In effect, the resurgence of
fundamentalism and radicalism has caused major concerns regarding
the revival of radicalism, integrism, separatism and terrorism
in and around Turkey. Turkish authorities have had to adapt their
policies and response strategies in order to deal more effectively
and independently with various terrorist groups, from the separatist
Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (PKK-KONGRA GEL, former PKK)
to the radical fundamentalist Turkish Hizballah. The latter, composed
predominantly of Sunni Muslim Kurds, has been striving to overthrow the
constitutional secular regime of Turkey in order to establish a strict
Islamic, Iran-inspired state. Turkish Hizballah has targeted PKK-KONGRA
GEL sympathizers and suspected members, secularists, moderate Muslims,
representatives of Kurdish religious charitable foundations and even
clerics of different religious faith. Amidst allegations of leniency
towards Hizballah and official support for the terrorist group, Turkish
authorities attempted to topple the secular branch of Hizballah in the
late 1990s and have vowed to dismantle the terrorist network. However,
Turkish Hizballah’s regimented methods and extremely violent actions,
as well as its distinctive brand of radicalism, have baffled and
overwhelmed authorities for years. The radical terrorist group is
a contemporary version of the Kharijites, a sect that deviated from
mainstream Islam: their extremism is constantly fueled by pervasive
forms of social alienation, such as widespread illiteracy and inferior
education, as well as the inadequate economic and social development
of certain segments of Turkey’s society.
The relative success of their counter-terrorism approach
notwithstanding, Turkish law enforcement authorities have had to
regularly reassess, adapt and alter some of their tactics in order to
fit the constantly evolving threat posed by the various terrorist
groups active in the country. The outcome of counter-terrorism
strategies depends largely upon the ability of law enforcement
authorities and state officials to comprehend the source of the
problem and, accordingly, to tackle it at its roots. With regards to
radical religious fundamentalist groups, it is crucial to correctly
define their goals and ideology instead of merely associating their
fanaticism with Islam in a simplistic and reductionist attempt to
justify or explicate their actions. Thus, these groups must be clearly
distinguished from mainstream Islamic society and the Islamic community
as a whole should not be stigmatized as terrorist or violent.
Having acquired much experience in the fight against terrorism over
the last few decades, Turkey has now established itself as a major
actor in the global war on terror. Indeed, Turkey could play an
important role in countering international terrorism and dismantling
global terror networks worldwide. Over the years, Turkey has acquired
massive amounts of intelligence about terrorist groups and their
members active both in Turkey and in surrounding countries. Sharing
that intelligence with the international law enforcement community
would be an invaluable contribution to the global fight against
terrorism. In addition to intelligence, Turkish law enforcement
agencies and security forces could transfer their experience to law
enforcement agencies in other countries by providing training and
education: Turkey could in fact become a training hub for agents
in Middle Eastern as well as other European countries. Considering
that many international terrorist groups have gained importance and
even established networks throughout Europe, sharing intelligence and
creating training programs would most likely provide new opportunities
and tools to counter international terrorism. More importantly,
Turkey could become a model nation for Middle Eastern countries by
effectively integrating an Islamic perspective including tolerance
and respect for other religions within a secular democratic regime.
Notes
1. Jonathan R. White, Theologies of Terror: Religion and Domestic
Terrorism (New Orleans, LA: Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of
the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences 2000).
2. Alexander Flores, ‘Secularism, Integralism and Political Islam’,
Middle East Report 183 (1993) p.32-33.
3. Charles Hirschkind, ‘What is Political Islam?’, Middle East Report
205 (1997) p.12.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p.14.
6. Bulent Aras and Gokhan Bacik, ‘The Mystery of Turkish Hizballah’,
Middle East Policy 9/2 (2002) p.156.
7. M. Hakan Yavuz, ‘Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in
Turkey’, Comparative Politics 30/1 (1997) p.63.
8. E.g., Nezihi Cakar, ‘Turkey’s Security Challenges’, Perceptions:
Journal of International Affairs 1/2 (June – Aug. 1996); John L.
Esposito, Unholy war: Terror in the name of Islam (New York: Oxford
University Press 2002); Alexander Flores, ‘Secularism, Integralism
and Political Islam’, Middle East Report 183 (1993) pp.32-38;
Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of
Religious Violence (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 2000);
Masoud Kazemzadeh, ‘Teaching the Politics of Islamic Fundamentalism’,
Political Science and Politics 31/10 (1998) pp.52-59; Heinz Kramer,
A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press 2000); Sabri Sayari
and Bruce Hoffman, Urbanization and Insurgency: The Turkish Case,
1976-1980 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 1991).
9. Sometimes also referred to as the Kurdistan Labor Party or the
Mesopotamian Army.
10. Dogu Ergil, ‘Suicide Terrorism in Turkey: The Workers’ Party
of Kurdistan’, in Anti-Defamation League (Ed.), Countering suicide
terrorism (New York: Anti-Defamation League 2002) pp.109-133.
11. Ibid., p.118.
12. The Party of God is also known as: Hizbullah; Hizbollah; Hezbollah;
Hezballah; Hizbu’llah; Islamic Jihad (Islamic Holy War); Islamic Jihad
Organization; Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine; Ansar
al-Allah, Ansar Allah or Ansarollah (Followers of God, Partisans
of God, or God’s Helpers); Al-Muqawanah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic
Resistance); Organization of the Oppressed; Organization of the
Oppressed on Earth; Revolutionary Justice Organization; Organization
of Right Against Wrong; and Followers of the Prophet Muhammed.
13. Rex A. Hudson, Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why: The 1999
Government Report on Profiling Terrorists (Guilford, CT: The Lyons
Press 2000); F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign
Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation
2003); Chris Morris, ‘Turkey’s Muslims Pray for Peace’, BBC News
(Jan. 2000) 14. The term Hizballah was not
coined in the early 1980s. In fact, it is a Qur’anic reference to
the perpetual conflict between the true believers and the infidels of
the Hizbasheitan, the party of the devil. These infidels were pagans;
today, the party of the devil is composed of the heretics belonging to
the western culture and Judaism. Hence, the teachings dictate that if
Muslims are the victims of a worldwide conspiracy, they must belong
to both Hizballah and Jundalla (the Army of God). This explains why
religious fundamentalist groups are characteristically semi-military
organizations whose members are viewed as soldiers fighting a holy
war through various forms of terrorist activities.
15. E.g., Aras and Bacik (note 6); Human Rights Watch, What is
Turkey’s Hizbullah? (Feb. 2000) ; Hurriyet,
Hizbullahin Dunu Bugunu [Hizballah Yesterday and Today] (2000)
m; Mats Warn,
Staying the course: The "Lebanonization" of Hizbullah (1999)
16. United States Department of State,
Patterns of Global Terrorism (2001) 17. Larrabee
and Lesser (note 13) p.37.
18. Taha Akyol, Hizbul Cahil [Party of Illiterate] (2000)
; Justus Leicht, Political and
Social Dimensions of the Turkish Financial Crisis (2001)
urk-m07_prn.shtml 19. See
Aras and Bacik (note 6).
20. See Human Rights Watch (note 15).
21. Aras and Bacik (note 6) p.7.
22. Michael O’Brien, The Threat of the Modern Kharijites (London:
Paper presented at the Meeting of the Royal United Services Institute
for Defense Studies 2002).
23. Taha Akyol, Hariciler ve Hizbullah [Kharijites and Hizballah]
(Istanbul, Turkey: Dogan Yayincilik Publications 2000); Department of
Religious Affairs, Bulletin (2000) 24. See
Aras and Bacik (note 6).
25. Reuters, Alleged Turkish Rebels Say They Fought for Islam (2000)
26. See Human Rights Watch (note 15).
27. Ibid.
28. Athens News Agency, Grenade Attack on Ecumenical Patriarchate
Widely Condemned (1997) 29. Chris
Morris, ‘Islamic Militants on Trial in Turkey’, BBC News (July 2000)
30. See Hurriyet (note 15).
31. See Aras and Bacik (note 6).
32. E.g., Chris Morris, ‘Turkey’s Muslims Pray for Peace’, BBC News
(Jan. 2000) ; Chris Morris, ‘More Bodies Found in
Hezbollah Probe’, BBC News (Jan. 2000) ; Chris
Morris, ‘Islamic Militants on Trial in Turkey’, BBC News (July 2000)
33. See Human Rights Watch (note 15).
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Larrabee and Lesser (note 13) p.37.
37. Dorian Jones, Hizbollah leaves trail of horror in Turkey (2000)
38. Ibid.
39. Chris Morris, ‘More Bodies Found in Hezbollah Probe’, BBC News
(Jan. 2000) 40. Chris Morris, ‘Turkish Hezbollah:
"No State Links"’, BBC News (Jan. 2000) 41. E.g.,
John Calabrese, ‘Turkey and Iran: Limits of a Stable Relationship’,
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 25/1 (1998) pp.75-94;
Emmanuel Sivan, ‘Sunni Radicalism in the Middle East and the Iranian
Revolution’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 21/1
(1989) pp.1-30.
42. Ely Karmon, The Demise of Radical Islam in Turkey (1999)
; Milliyet, Hizbullah Devlete Sizdi [Hizballah
Leak to the State] (1999) 43. Iran
News, Iran Dismisses Link with Any Illegal Group in Turkey (1998)
44. See Reuters (note 25).
45. Representative Office of the National Council of Resistance of
Iran, Brief on Iran: Absence of Turkish President Overshadows Regional
Summit in Iran (2000) 46. E.g., Calabrese
(note 41); Chris Morris, ‘Istanbul Police in Islamist Shootout’,
BBC News (Jan. 2000) ; Representative Office of
the National Council of Resistance of Iran (note 45).
47. Payame Azadi, Iran Accused of Killing Prominent Turkish Journalist
(2000) 48. See Human Rights
Watch (note 15).
49. Ibid.
50. Chris Morris, ‘Turkish Police Seize 400 Islamists’, BBC News (March
1999) 51. Larrabee and Lesser (note 13) p.37.
52. International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘Turkey’s Divided
Islamists’, IISS Strategic Comments 6/3 (2000)
53. See Reuters (note 25).
54. Ibid.
55. Chris Morris, ‘Turks Pursue Kurds Inside Northern Iraq’,
Guardian Unlimited (April 2000) ; Chris
Morris, ‘Turkey Launches Huge Security Sweep’, BBC News (Jan. 2001)
Originally published on Wednesday , 01 December 2004.
Republished 18 April 2007