ANKARA: Turks In USA Urged To Take Part In Demos Against Armenian Cl

TURKS IN USA URGED TO TAKE PART IN DEMOS AGAINST ARMENIAN CLAIMS

Anatolia News Agency, Turkey
March 15 2007

NEW YORK (A.A) -15.03.2007 -Ulker Aksu, chairperson of the Association
of Turkish American Contend with Armenian Lies (ATACAL), has called on
all Turkish people living in the United States to attend demonstrations
to be held in New York and Washington D.C. to protest the allegations
on so-called Armenian genocide.

Holding a news conference, Aksu said that the first one of protests
would take place in New York’s Times Square on April 21st, and the
second one in Washington D.C. on April 22nd.

"We also want to erect a monument in New Jersey out of respect to
Turkish diplomats who were slain by Armenian terrorists. We held talks
with Turkish Consul General in New York Mehmet Samsar," Ulker added.

Meanwhile, Hayati Tekin, mayor of Kutlukent town of the northern
Turkish city of Samsun from the delegation of Turkish mayors visiting
New York, said in his part, "Armenian allegations are nothing but
lies. They unfoundedly accuse the Ottomans which embraced all nations."

"The monument to be erected in New Jersey for the memory of Turkish
diplomats will cost about 300,000 dollars. We, as the Union of Turkish
Municipalities (TBB), will be pleased to pay it," Tekin added.

A Radar In The Face

A RADAR IN THE FACE
by Albert Yeremjan, Demis Polandov
Translated by A. Ignatkin

Source: Gazeta, March 15, 2007, pp. 1, 3
Agency WPS
What the Papers Say Part B (Russia)
March 15, 2007 Thursday

How long before Georgia is hosting American missile defense radars?;
Ukrainian-American consultations on deployment of US missile defense
system elements in the Czech Republic and Poland took place at the
Ukrainian Defense Ministry in Kiev yesterday. America was represented
by Lieutenant-General Henry Obering, director of the US Missile
Defense Agency.

The lower house of the Czech parliament killed the draft law that would
have arranged a nationwide referendum on the issue of deployment of a
radar of the American missile defense system on the territory of the
republic. It is common knowledge that Mirek Topolanek’s government
is all for the deployment. General public is not convinced that
the American radar is what the Czech Republic really needs, but it
doesn’t matter anymore. There will be no referendum on the issue,
and so the matter is all but settled.

Ukrainian-American consultations on deployment of US missile defense
system elements in the Czech Republic and Poland took place at the
Ukrainian Defense Ministry in Kiev yesterday. America was represented
by Lieutenant-General Henry Obering, director of the US Missile
Defense Agency.

Obering is well known in Russia – best of all for his recent remark
to the effect that the Pentagon would like to have a radar in the
Caucasus. According to Obering, this additional radar would be quite
useful but not exactly crucial for the future missile defense system.

It would only relay information to a more powerful radar, to be built
in the Czech Republic.

Obering all but took it back yesterday. He said that the United
States had never discussed establishment of elements of the missile
defense with any country but the Czech Republic and Poland. Obering
then proceeded to deny reports that some elements of the system were
to be installed in the Caucasus.

Obering was late. President Eduard Kokoity of South Ossetia exposed
"the Pentagon’s plot" yesterday in the morning. "Preparations for
installing a powerful military radar are under way in the Kazbeg
district of Georgia, not far from Russia’s borders," Kokoity said. He
added that another radar would be built on the territory of Georgia
in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone.

Konstantin Gabashvili, chairman of the Georgian parliament’s foreign
relations committee, described Kokoity’s statements as "nonsense."

Gabashvili said that had this decision been made, he would have
been certainly informed of it. Senior Deputy Defense Minister
Levan Nikoleishvili denied consultations with the Americans over
installation of US radars in Georgia. "Georgia isn’t the only country
in the Caucasus, is it?" he said.

But Nikoleishvili isn’t being entirely honest, is he? Out of three
countries in the southern part of the Caucasus, Russia has military
contingents in two. It has a military base in the Armenian city
of Gyumri. It has a radar in Gabala, Azerbaijan, and official Baku
doesn’t demand that it should be closed down. Deployment of American
missile defense elements alongside Russian military facilities is
unlikely. That leaves Georgia – and Russian military bases are to be
pulled out of Georgia by late 2008.

Commenting on South Ossetian president’s statements is essentially
a waste of time. When the matter concerns Georgia, he isn’t exactly
an impartial observer. On the other hand, neither do contradictory
statements from the Pentagon inspire trust. Add here the voting in
the parliament of Georgia the day before yesterday – it voted in
favor of joining NATO – and all this makes appearance of US radars
near the Russian borders a distinct possibility.

Moreover, Obering’s remarks on the possibility of missile defense
elements in the Caucasus are more than just speculation. It would be
logical. If a missile defense system is to be established against
Iranian missiles, then the Czech Republic and Poland alone won’t
suffice. Something will have to be installed in Ukraine and Georgia
as well. Even if no preparations for it are under way in Georgia at
this point, then their beginning is only a matter of time.

Slain Journalist’s Family Demands Probe Against Turkish Police

SLAIN JOURNALIST’S FAMILY DEMANDS PROBE AGAINST TURKISH POLICE

Agence France Presse — English
March 15, 2007 Thursday 3:06 PM GMT

Lawyers for the family of slain Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant
Dink on Thursday filed a motion for a judicial probe into officials
they accused of being implicated in the murder.

"We submitted to the prosecutor a request for a (judicial)
investigation against all public officials already facing
administrative charges in connection with the case," Lawyer Bahri
Bayram Belen told reporters here.

"We believe it will not be possible to shed light on this political
assassination if all the blame is put on a few children from poor
families," he added.

The January 19 murder of the editor of the Turkish-Armenian weekly
Agos is the work of a "well-structured organisation… that aims to
prevent democracy from functioning in Turkey," Belen said.

Police have so far arrested 11 suspects in connection with the killing,
including Ogun Samast, an unemployed 17-year-old a high school dropout
who, officials say, has confessed to gunning down Dink, 52, outside
the Agos offices in Istanbul.

Most of the suspects are from the Black Sea city of Trabzon —
a bastion of nationalism — and are believed to be close to
ultranationalist groups who hated Dink for his views on the World
War I killings of Armenians under Ottoman rule.

Dink described the 1915-1918 killings as genocide, a label that Turkey,
the Ottoman Empire’s successor, categorically rejects.

Interior ministry inspectors are currently looking into allegations
that Istanbul police received a tip-off last year about a plot to
kill Dink being organised in Trabzon, but did not follow up.

Showing a copy of a note from Trabzon police informing their colleagues
in Istanbul of a plot to murder Dink, lawyer Fethiye Cetin said 17
similar messages in all had been sent to the Istanbul police.

"These prove that it was not negligence or forgetfulness, but the
conscious participation of the authorities in this crime," she said.

A preliminary investigation has been launched against Istanbul police
chief Celalettin Cerrah and another senior officer on charges that
they failed to act on the intelligence received from Trabzon.

Another investigation is under way against Trabzon’s governor and
police chief, already removed from office amid accusations that they
failed to seriously investigate groups of ultra-nationalist youths
in the city.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Azerbaijan Seeks To Restore Its Territorial Integrity – Aliyev

AZERBAIJAN SEEKS TO RESTORE ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY – ALIYEV

ITAR-TASS News Agency, Russia
March 15, 2007 Thursday 10:35 AM EST

Azerbaijani President Ilkham Aliyev said his country seeks to restore
its territorial integrity.

Speaking at a joint press conference with his Tajik counterpart
on Thursday, Aliyev said Azerbaijan has faith in restoring its
territorial integrity.

In his words, "20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory is occupied by
Armenia." "We seek to restore Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.

Azerbaijan welcomes a possibility of settling the conflict with the
norms of international law and in compliance with the U.N. Security
Council resolution on the withdrawal of Armenia’s occupational troops
from Nagorno-Karabakh," the Azerbaijani president stressed.

"In 1990’s Azerbaijan suffered ethnic cleansings organized by
Armenia." "Over one million of people became refugees and 20 percent
of our territory is occupied by Armenia," Aliyev said.

Azerbaijan will never agree with such situation, he added.

Ancient Armenia Fights To Survive Isolation

ANCIENT ARMENIA FIGHTS TO SURVIVE ISOLATION
by Sebastian Smith

Agence France Presse — English
March 15, 2007 Thursday

Tantalisingly close and cruelly distant, Armenia’s national symbol,
the legendary Mount Ararat, soars just beyond reach for a country
fighting to escape isolation.

The snow-capped mountain — named in the Bible as the place Noah’s
Ark grounded after the Great Flood — dominates the horizon from as
far away as Armenia’s capital Yerevan.

But that proximity is an illusion. The extinct volcano lies just
across Armenia’s hostile border with Turkey, turning a centuries-old
source of inspiration into an emblem of this Christian people’s
growing difficulties.

"Ararat symbolises all Armenia, all the pain in our soul," Arsen
Yegikian, 32, an auditor, said as he visited the church of Khor Virap,
a popular viewing point on the frontier.

All four of Armenia’s borders are either closed or problematic,
forcing this landlocked and resource-poor state of three million
people to struggle for access to the world.

Turkey shut its land border in 1993 in support of Armenia’s eastern
neighbour, Azerbaijan, which lost a war in the early 1990s with
Armenian forces for control of Nagorny Karabakh and a swath of other
Azeri territory.

On the Azeri-Armenian border, the cut-off encompasses air, rail,
road, telephone and postal links.

Meanwhile, Armenians can only access their main economic and military
ally, Russia, through Georgia to the north and the road route is all
but excluded due to Russian-Georgian tensions.

The way south to Iran is open and a new pipeline bringing Iranian
gas is about to enter service, but with Tehran and Washington in a
dangerous stand-off many here are afraid that border could also shut.

"If something happens tomorrow with Iran — God forbid — it will be
even harder," Deputy Foreign Minister Arman Kirakossian told AFP.

Increasingly Armenia, a proud nation with an ancient language
and unique alphabet, finds itself left out of projects that are
transforming the rest of the ex-Soviet Caucasus.

New oil and gas pipelines snaking from Azerbaijan to Western markets
bypass to the north. Just last month, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey
agreed to build a new east-west railway route — again missing Armenia.

The people of this starkly beautiful and rugged land are trying
to fight back and last year gross domestic product (GDP) posted
double-digit growth.

One key to salvation has been a diaspora estimated at almost nine
million people scattered across the United States, Russia, Europe,
Asia and the Middle East.

These are descendants of refugees from the mass killings of Armenians
in the Ottoman Empire at the start of the 20th century and about a
million others who left the poverty of post-Soviet Armenia during
the last 15 years.

Their donations and transfers to Armenia amounted to 1.2 billion
dollars (900,000 euros) last year, an impressive chunk of the country’s
6.5-billion-dollar (five-billion-euro) GDP, economist Tigran Jrbashyan
said. "Emigres are Armenia’s version of oil."

About 30 percent of the population lives in poverty, according to
the World Bank, and the countryside beyond Yerevan is littered with
shut-down ex-Soviet factories.

But according to Jrbashyan, the cutting of Armenia’s traditional trade
routes has also forced the economy to switch from cheap bulk exports to
more profitable high-tech sectors, such as IT and diamond processing.

Construction is also booming — rising 43 percent last year — and
Yerevan is being transformed into a sophisticated city.

"I don’t want to exaggerate, but in conditions of a blockade by
Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as a conflict, we have still managed
economic success," Kirakossian said.

Such confidence, however, masks widespread fears about Armenia’s
vulnerability. Many ordinary people, for example, worry how Russian
investors are gobbling up strategic enterprises, including most of
the energy network.

Yegikian, standing by the stunning church of Khor Virap, said his
people were desperate to join the outside world.

"Everyone here is for opening that border," said Yegikian, gazing
across no-man’s land to a Turkish village. "Globalisation is happening
and we can’t stay outside."

Armenians may "never" trust Turks, Yegikian said, "but when you
talk in the language of business, then everything else falls into
second place."

Of course, even reopening the border would not change the fact that
Mount Ararat is likely always to remain Turkish.

>>From Khor Virap you plainly see the border fence and watchtowers.

Chimney smoke rises from a Turkish village.

"Of course this is hard to bear," said Kirakossian, whose office is
decorated with a picture of the iconic mountain. "But if we had normal
relations with our neighbours, then people could at least visit."
From: Baghdasarian

Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony: US-Turkish Relations By Daniel Fried

CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY: US-TURKISH RELATIONS BY DANIEL FRIED FROM STATE DEPT.

Congressional Quarterly
CQ Congressional Testimony
March 15, 2007 Thursday

COMMITTEE: HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE: EUROPE
HEADLINE: U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS
TESTIMONY-BY: DANIEL FRIED, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
AFFILIATION: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Statement of Daniel Fried Assistant Secretary, European and Eurasian
Affairs Department of State

Committee on House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe

Chairman Wexler, Ranking Member Gallegly, Members of the Sub-
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here. I will speak to
you today about how the United States and Turkey are working together
closely to address our common challenges, particularly in the Middle
East but also more globally.

Secretary Rice has instructed me to shift the focus of the U.S.-
Turkey relationship from one of simply managing challenges to
one where the United States and Turkey are working cooperatively
to advance a broad range of issues, putting in action our shared
interests and common values. Our shared interests include stability
and freedom in Iraq and Afghanistan, democratic reform in the broader
Middle East, energy security across Eurasia, and Turkey’s deeper
anchoring in Europe. Our common values start from our two countries’
deep commitment to democracy. Turkey, a majority Muslim state with
a deepening democracy with a tradition of secular governance, is
of strategic importance to the United States. Its 160-year legacy
of modernizing reform, dating back to the late Ottoman period, can
inspire people throughout the broader Middle East who thirst for
democratic freedom and market- based prosperity.

Turkey also has a rapidly growing market economy. Over the past five
years it has had the highest GDP growth rate of any OECD country,
averaging over seven percent a year. The Turkish authorities have
tamed inflation from over 25 percent for a generation to under 10
percent from 2004-2006.

Washington and Ankara have developed a blueprint to reinvigorate
our bilateral relations. It is the "Shared Vision" statement that
Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Gul concluded in Washington in
July 2006. This document identifies ten key sectors for cooperation.

It also establishes new diplomatic mechanisms to structure our
engagements on the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. We
have made significant progress in implementing the "Shared Vision"
statement, as I’ll discuss below. But much work remains, with
anti-Americanism remaining at a historic high among the Turkish public
and providing a context for Turkey’s complex political dynamic.

Iraq and Afghanistan

We have made steady progress over the past two years in elevating
bilateral U.S.-Turkish relations from their low point on March 1,
2003, when the Turkish Grand National Assembly voted not to allow
U.S. forces to deploy through Turkey to Iraq. Today, Turkey supports
U.S. objectives in Iraq and has urged us not to abandon the Iraqi
people. Coordination between our embassies in Baghdad is working
well, with our Turkish ally offering us insights and support. Turkey
actively encourages various Iraqi communities to participate in Iraq’s
political processes, and provides training to Iraqi political parties,
diplomats, and security forces. Most recently, Turkey participated
in the first Iraq Neighbors Conference in Baghdad, and has offered to
host the ministerial meeting of the Iraq Neighbors group in Istanbul,
as we pursue a shared goal of a stable, democratic, and unified Iraq.

Turkey provides extensive logistical support to our troops in Iraq.

This critical lifeline includes:

The cargo hub at Incirlik Air Base, through which we ship 74 percent of
all air cargo to Iraq, with six US military C-17 aircraft transporting
the amount of cargo it took 9-10 aircraft to move from Germany,
saving $160 million annually.

The land border crossing at Habur Gate accounts for delivery to Iraq
of approximately 25 percent of the fuel used by Coalition forces.

Turkey’s grant of blanket over-flight clearances to U.S. military
aircraft is of critical importance to our military operations in both
Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, KC-135 tankers operating out of
Incirlik have flown 3,400 sorties and delivered 35 million gallons
of fuel to U.S. fighter and transport aircraft on missions in Iraq
and Afghanistan.

More than military support, Turkey’s technical and financial assistance
has played a crucial role in the economic stability and development of
Iraq, particularly of northern Iraq. Turkish businessmen were among
the first to arrive in Iraq after U.S. forces, and have played a key
role in rebuilding infrastructure and commerce.

Turkish truckers have risked their lives plying the roads of Iraq to
deliver to Iraqis the necessities of everyday life.

Turkey supplied a significant portion of Iraq’s total fuel supply,
primarily for consumers in the northern governorates. Billions of
gallons of fuel have entered through Habur Gate in the past year
despite occasional Iraqi arrears in payments.

Turkey has the capacity to export 270 megawatts of electricity
to northern Iraq, and averages around 220 megawatts, depending on
the season.

Turkey has played a vital role in Afghanistan in combating terrorism
and promoting freedom and democracy. After commanding International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) II in 2002 and ISAF VII in 2005,
Turkey is now sharing joint rotational command of ISAF Capital Regional
Command for two years with France and Italy. Turkey opened a Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Wardak province last November. Turkey has
also pledged $100 million in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan’s
reconstruction and operation of schools and hospitals. We continue to
press Turkey, a dependable NATO ally for almost 60 years, to contribute
more troops in Afghanistan and to remove caveats to its deployment.

Middle East

Under Secretary Burns spoke to the House Foreign Affairs Committee
last week regarding our comprehensive strategy for addressing the
challenges posed by Iran. Turkey is part of the robust international
coalition working to achieve a diplomatic solution to Iran’s continuing
noncompliance with its international nuclear obligations.

Our cooperation with Turkey on these efforts is evidence of our close
working relationship to promote international peace and security. It
has stood firm with us and others to counter Iran’s threat to
regional stability. Turkey has committed itself to implement fully
the provisions of UNSCR 1737, which imposes sanctions under Article
41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic
missile programs.

Additionally, Turkey is helping to apply targeted financial pressure on
the Iranian regime by restricting banking transactions which support
Iran’s proliferation and terrorist activities. We will continue to
discuss with Ankara how best to make clear to the Iranian regime the
costs of its confrontational path. While we may occasionally differ
somewhat over tactics, there is no disagreement between us as partners
that an Iranian nuclear weapons capability is unacceptable.

Turkey has been a partner in the efforts to achieve Israeli-
Palestinian peace and, because of its close relations with both
Israel and Arab states, has played a helpful role as honest broker
in bridging some of the gaps. Turkey has a long history of close
military and economic cooperation with Israel. Prime Minister Erdogan
and Foreign Minister Gul have conducted their own shuttle diplomacy
between Tel Aviv and Arab capitals to help advance peace, security,
and stability in the Middle East. They have played a helpful role in
encouraging the Palestinians to accept the Quartet principles.

Another helpful Turkish initiative involves its desire to contribute
to the economic development of the Palestinians by developing the Erez
industrial zone, creating jobs and providing hope and opportunity
for otherwise disillusioned individuals potentially vulnerable to
recruitment by terrorists.

One of the most tangible Turkish contributions has involved
peacekeeping and safeguarding the integrity of Lebanon. Turkey has been
actively engaged in Lebanon, notably by contributing about 900 troops
to UNIFIL last fall, helping to bring stability to a violence-wracked
region. During last summer’s Israeli- Hezbollah clashes, Turkey helped
evacuate almost 2000 American citizens from a war-torn Lebanon and
assisted in their repatriation to the United States via safe haven
in Turkey. In January, Turkey pledged $50 million in grants for
reconstruction at the Lebanon international donors’ conference, hosted
by French President Chirac, which resulted in an overwhelming global
response of $7.6 billion in pledges, including the Secretary’s pledge
of $770 million in humanitarian, reconstruction and security support.

Turkey is also a key partner in our efforts to empower civil society
and advance democratic freedom in the broader Middle East. No state
is a model, and certainly no state is a perfect one. But Turkey’s
example of secular democracy with a Muslim majority population, a
burgeoning open economy, worldwide commercial networks, and its long
experience with modernizing reform, make it a crucial partner in the
Forum for the Future. Turkey is a co-sponsor – along with Italy and
Yemen – of the Forum’s Democracy Assistance Dialogue, and is making
important contributions to advance women’s rights and develop non-
governmental organizations in a wide range of Muslim societies
stretching from North Africa to Central Asia.

Energy Security

During the late 1990s, cooperation on energy security became
a cornerstone of the U.S.-Turkey partnership. The Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline grew from a vision of an energy corridor
that would resurrect the Great Silk Road, articulated at that time
by Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Many were skeptical, but the
United States offered strong support to help realize this vision,
working with these governments and with companies to establish a
public-private partnership that has resulted in one of the most complex
and successful pipeline projects of all time. BTC was inaugurated in
July. It will reach full capacity of one million barrels of oil per
day over the next few years, and connect oil fields in the Caspian
Sea with global markets reached from Turkey’s Mediterranean Sea port
of Ceyhan. A companion natural gas pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum
(BTE), is about to begin delivering Azerbaijani natural gas from the
Shah Deniz field in the Caspian to Georgia and Turkey.

There is also the Samsun-Ceyhan project, a Bosporus Bypass oil pipeline
that takes oil from Turkey’s Black Sea coast and delivers it to the
Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. This particular project may be already
on its way to commercial viability, something we would welcome.

We now stand at the edge of a new generation of Caspian energy
investments, which will build on BTC and BTE and help the Euroatlantic
community strengthen its energy security. Oil producers in Kazakhstan
are negotiating on ways to ship their product by barge across the
Caspian Sea and into BTC, whose capacity could be expanded by as much
as 80 percent. Perhaps of even greater strategic significance is the
prospect for enlarging BTE with expanded gas production and exports
from Azerbaijan. We are now working with governments and companies
to help Azerbaijan increase its gas production sufficiently by 2012
to 2014 to fill the emerging Turkey-Greece-Italy pipeline and the
prospective Nabucco pipeline linking Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania,
Hungary, and Austria. Over the next decade, we hope a trans-Caspian
gas pipeline from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan will connect with
BTE. We have also just launched trilateral discussions with Ankara
and Baghdad on developing gas production in northern Iraq for export
to Europe via Turkey.

As these natural gas projects develop, they will emerge as a Southern
Corridor of infrastructure that will offer fair and transparent
competition to Gazprom’s massive network of gas pipelines that is in
place – and expanding – in Northern Europe. The Southern Corridor can
change Eurasia’s strategic map by offering Europe its best hope for
large volumes of natural gas supplies that will allow diversification
away from a deepening reliance on one supplier or network. Turkey,
if it continues to act as a partner with its neighbors, including
by reaching a commercially attractive gas transit agreement with
Azerbaijan, will be the centerpiece of this grand strategic effort.

Counterterrorism

We are committed to eliminating the threat of PKK terrorism in northern
Iraq, where this terrorist group is headquartered and from which it
continues to launch deadly attacks in Turkey. We have made progress
against PKK operatives and support networks in Europe. As a result of
this close cooperation, France and Belgium recently arrested several
PKK terror financiers linked to financing attacks against Turkey. But
we also must achieve concrete results against the PKK in Iraq. The
Secretary last August appointed General (ret) Joseph Ralston,
formerly Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, as Special Envoy to
Counter the PKK. General (ret) Ralston has been coordinating closely
with his Turkish counterpart, General (ret) Edip Baser, and his Iraqi
counterpart, Minister of State Shirwan al-Waili, to end the PKK threat.

Turkey has also made major contributions to our own efforts to
combat terror. I have already discussed Turkey’s crucial efforts in
Afghanistan. Additional counterterrorism support from Turkey came
in mid-February when it hosted in Istanbul the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism, a U.S.-Russia led initiative, which will
seek to prevent such particularly destructive acts.

Domestic Politics: Elections, Trends of Nationalism, Liberalism,
and Democracy

Turkish-American partnership must rest on a foundation of Turkey’s own
democratic development. Turkey remains a secular, democratic state. But
it is today a very different and a far more robust democracy than the
Turkey of a generation ago. Former boundaries of expression and limits
upon political opinions are gone or much widened. Basic freedoms are
more respected.

But with greater democratic freedoms has come increased volatility
and deeper debate within Turkey about its strategic course, about
its identity, and about the role of religion in public and political
life. These debates within Turkey are taking place as the country
enters a double-election year, with presidential elections in May
and parliamentary elections in November.

The volatility of debate has given rise to and coincided with an
undercurrent of popular nationalism, frustration with Europe, and
even anti-Americanism. One cause of these trends is Turkish citizens’
frustration with PKK terrorism from Iraq, and a popular belief that the
United States could do more to combat the PKK terrorists, whom Turks
view as the greatest threat to their national security. Another cause
is the identity crisis dominating Turkish society as Turkey strives
for admission in the European Union. Many Turks feel humiliated by
what they perceive as the shifting of accession requirements by the
EU even as Turkey advanced serious constitutional and market economic
reforms, and made significant compromises on the Cyprus question. While
it is up to the Turks to meet the EU’s requirements for accession,
many Turks believe that some in Europe use the complex EU accession
process to mask a bias against Turkey.

This political turmoil and the widening boundaries of democratic
expression have propelled a new nationalism as one factor common
across Turkey’s political spectrum. At the same time, a growing and
sophisticated middle class also supports the emergence of progressive
and liberal ideas in Turkey. The ruling Justice and Development (AK)
Party, with its foundation in Turkey’s traditional Islamic culture
but also including progressive and liberal elements, is one expression
of the different strains in Turkish political life today.

Turkey’s secular elite, rooted in the civilian and military
bureaucracies that play a key role in Turkey’s democracy, also reflects
these trends. And these two diverse political camps are in competition
with each other.

As political tension heightens with the advance of Turkey’s election
campaigns, additional political strains can undermine our ability
to sustain our improvement in U.S.-Turkish relations and continue
to reap the benefits in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East, and the
Caspian region that I have described above.

Turkey-Armenia Relations

Against this complex background of shared interests, common values,
and political turbulence, Turkey now faces the possibility of a U.S.

Congressional resolution defining as genocide the mass killings and
forced exile of as many as 1.5 million Armenians in the final years of
the Ottoman Empire. The Administration has never denied – nor does it
dispute or minimize – the historical facts of these mass murders and
ethnic cleansing. Each year, the President issues a solemn statement
on April 24, Armenian Remembrance Day, recognizing these atrocities
and the suffering inflicted on Armenians. The Administration’s goal
is to stimulate a candid exploration within Turkish society of these
horrific events in an effort to help Turkey reconcile with its painful
past and with Armenia. This is not easy.

It was not easy for the United States to address its own historical
dark spots, including slavery and the internment of U.S. citizens
of Japanese descent during WWII. We will have to be persistent and
thoughtful.

But after a long silence, Turkey is making progress. The terrible
murder of Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink by an ultra-
nationalist accelerated an intellectual opening in Turkish society,
with more than 100,000 Turkish citizens of all political, confessional,
and ethnic backgrounds demonstrating at Dink’s funeral in support of
tolerance and a candid exploration of Turkey’s past.

Their shouts of "We are all Hrant Dink; we are all Armenian" resonate
in the ears of millions of people in Turkey and the world over who
believe in freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and human dignity
for all of Turkey’s citizens.

Political leaders across the political spectrum in Turkey condemned
the killing. President Sezer said the murder was "ugly and shameful."

Turkish Chief of General Staff General Buyukanit called the killing a
"heinous act" and said the "shots fired on Hrant Dink were . . . . .

fired on Turkey." We are seeing growing calls, including from Prime
Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Gul, for changes to Article 301
of the Constitution, which, in criminalizing "insulting Turkishness,"
stifles Turkey’s ability to discuss openly the events of 1915. We
welcome Turkish leaders’ and opinion makers’ calls to amend or repeal
Article 301.

Against this backdrop, we believe that H.Res. 106 would undercut
those voices emerging in Turkey who call for a truthful exploration of
these events in pursuit of Turkey’s reconciliation with its own past
and with Armenia. We hear from members of the 60,000-70,000 strong
Armenian-Turkish community that any such resolution would raise popular
emotions so dramatically as to threaten their personal security.

This Administration, like the previous Administration before it,
opposes any resolution that attempts to define how free-thinking
people should term the horrific tragedy of 1915. We believe this
question, which is of such enormous human significance, should be
resolved not by politicians, but through heartfelt introspection by
historians, philosophers, and common people. Our goal is an opening
of the Turkish mind and the Turkish heart. Our fear is that passage
of any such resolution would close minds and harden hearts.

Secretary Rice has an ambitious agenda with Turkey over the next two
years, and we hope to work with Congress to achieve success in these
goals. We look forward to close consultation with the Subcommittee,
Committee and other Members interested in our agenda with Turkey.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Gallegly, members of the Committee, I am
grateful for the opportunity to speak before you, and I look forward
to your questions.

Assistant Secretary Of State For Public Affairs Sean Mccormack Holds

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS SEAN MCCORMACK HOLDS STATE DEPARTMENT REGULAR NEWS BRIEFING

Congressional Quarterly
CQ Congressional Testimony
March 15, 2007 Thursday

SPEAKER:
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS SEAN MCCORMACK
LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

STATE DEPARTMENT REGULAR NEWS BRIEFING
MARCH 15, 2007
SPEAKER: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS
SEAN MCCORMACK

MCCORMACK: Hello, everybody. Good afternoon.

Who wants to start off? We don’t have any opening statements.

QUESTION: Do you have anything, any comment on the new Palestinian
government? They have actually released parts of their platform.

MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: And Israel is saying that, you know, based on this early
information, it’s not someone with whom they can deal with and that
the aid embargo should continue.

MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: I wondered if you’d had a chance to look at this platform.

MCCORMACK: Well, a few things.

One, the government hasn’t been officially seated; it has to get
approved by the Palestinian legislature. It has, at this point,
just been proposed to President Abbas. And while there are perhaps
pieces of their platform that may be floating around out in the
electronic ether, we’re going to withhold any final judgment about
the government, its platform and its actions until we have a sense
of exactly who finally is going to be sitting in this government,
what exactly they are going to base their governing decisions on —
what’s their platform — and then what actions they take.

So we’re going to take a look at those things, and then we’ll have
a judgment. Until that time, we’re just going to reserve comment.

QUESTION: If you’re going to be waiting for actions — so, I mean,
that’s several steps along. I mean how long will it take you? I mean,
actions, that could take months to see exactly what they’re going to
be doing.

MCCORMACK: Or it could take the day after it’s officially seated and
their platform is announced.

At the time when we feel as though we have the fact set that we
need to make a determination about this government, its composition,
its platform and its actions — or what, based on those things, our
extrapolation of what we expect that they will do, and whether or
not it meets those foundational principles for peace that have been
outlined by the quartet — we’ll make a judgment.

But, until that time, we’re going to withhold any further comment.

QUESTION: Have you spoken to President Abbas today at all about the
new government?

MCCORMACK: Secretary Rice has not. The secretary…

QUESTION: Right.

MCCORMACK: I’m making sure you hear that. Secretary Rice hasn’t. I
don’t know if anybody else has talked to him, whether from the
consulate or anybody else.

QUESTION: Is David Welch there at the moment? Do you know?

MCCORMACK: He is not — I have to get an update on his travel. He is,
I do not believe, in the Palestinian territories at the moment.

QUESTION: North Korea. Correct me if I’m wrong but I thought that,
in the run-up to the decision yesterday, Chris Hill and you were
giving the impression that you were hoping this would resolve the
outstanding issues on the BDA and that it would help the six-party
talks and the deal that was signed on February 13th.

Is that still your position? Are you hoping that now this should have
solved all the issues that the North Koreans had on BDA?

MCCORMACK: Well, there are a couple steps here. One, the United States
has quote/unquote resolved, come to a conclusion with respect to the
BDA accounts. Treasury issued its rule yesterday. There’s a next step
to this.

MCCORMACK: And that is the actual implementation of it, which is
going to be up to the Macanese authorities.

And what, I understand, the Department of Treasury is doing is sending
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Treasury Danny Glaser, who’s been the
point man working with the Macanese on this issue, to consult with
the Macanese authorities, provide them the information — all the
information that we have managed to accumulate; our analysis of the
accounts — so that they can make a fully informed decision as to
the final disposition of the funds that are in those accounts.

And remember, it’s the Macanese authorities who are the ones holding
those actual funds. The United States has acted in good faith and in
accords with the February 13th agreement.

So the process is moving along. Chris Hill referenced some further
consultations, which I think he was referring to Danny Glaser’s trip
out there.

So it will now soon be in the hands of the Macanese authority, once
they have all of this information that they can possibly have.

QUESTION: And the next part of it, which was: Do you think they should
remove any obstacles to the nuclear negotiations or the implementations
of the deal?

Because the North Koreans didn’t come back to the six-party talks
for a year because they had a problem with it. So, now are you…

MCCORMACK: Well, the actual implementation of the February 13 agreement
is proceeding. And the fact that you have the Department of Treasury
issuing this rule is one indication of that.

Another indication is that Chris Hill is in Beijing. He’s attending
the working group meetings. I believe that all the other — four of
the other parties; I don’t know if the North Koreans are there or
not. I know Kim Gye-gwan isn’t expected to arrive in Beijing until
Saturday, either tomorrow or Saturday.

So it is being implemented. We are moving forward with what we need
to do. And I understand that the other parties are doing so as well.

The North Koreans have met with Director General ElBaradei, which
is another piece of the agreement that needs to be set in place so
that you can move beyond the 30-day agreement and into the 60-day
time frame.

QUESTION: I ask because I’m just so (inaudible) — because the Chinese
said today they don’t think that this would actually resolve the
North Korean objection to this.

QUESTION: So…

MCCORMACK: Well, again, you know, the U.S. has taken the steps that
it needs to in terms of resolving the issue by making public this rule.

We don’t actually have the assets under our control. They’re not
controlled by the United States government. They’re actually frozen
by the Macanese authorities.

(CROSSTALK)

QUESTION: As a result of your — as a result of the United States
going to the Macanese authorities, actually alerting them…

MCCORMACK: Correct.

QUESTION: … to the activities of the bank, right?

MCCORMACK: Correct. Correct.

QUESTION: So now you’ve lifted those objections and they can do
whatever they decide to do. Is that right?

MCCORMACK: Well, what they, as well as we think is important, that they
have access to all the information that we have managed to accumulate
through our forensics, as well as our analysis of the situation so
they can make a judgment about the money in all of the accounts and
what the disposition of those funds will be.

So at that point it will — once they have all the information, it
will be up to the Macanese authorities to decide on how those funds
are distributed and to whom.

QUESTION: So has the U.S. told the North Korean government that they
can expect to get some of the money that had previously been frozen,
they can get it back? I mean, is that an understanding between the
U.S. and North Korea?

MCCORMACK: Again, the way that this works is the U.S. has issued this
rule, the treasury has issued this rule, and then it’s going to be
up to the Macanese authorities to decide on what monies…

QUESTION: But you must have some understanding…

(CROSSTALK)

MCCORMACK: … what funds and to whom those are disbursed. And I’m
not going to get involved, dig any deeper into that process.

QUESTION: Is it fair to assume that Chris Hill outlined to the North
Koreans what was going to be in this decision yesterday and exactly
how that was going to work, talked them through it before it was…

MCCORMACK: He obviously consulted with the North Koreans on this. It
was part of the February 13th agreement. Beyond that, I’m not going
to get into any of the diplomatic conversations that we may have had.

It is accurate to say that we committed to resolving the issue. We
believe that this is on a pathway to being resolved. The United States
has issued the rule that it needed to issue in order to allow the
Macanese authorities to take the steps that they deem appropriate
in terms of a final disposition of the funds that were in those
BDA accounts.

QUESTION: But had he gotten any indications from the North Koreans
that this kind of an approach by the U.S. would satisfy their demands?

MCCORMACK: Everybody’s goal is to resolve the issue, and we believe
that it will be resolved.

MCCORMACK: We just need, I guess, a couple of more steps in terms of
the consultations. We want to provide the information to the Macanese
authorities, and then they are going to take the steps that they
deem appropriate.

QUESTION: China has a very different view about all of this. And
they say that far from resolving this dispute, it actually, kind of,
muddies the water further and raises questions about Macau’s, sort of,
financial reputation and puts their financial stability into question.

(CROSSTALK)

MCCORMACK: Understandably, they have (inaudible) concerns about,
well, how does this rule affect the perceptions of Macau’s financial
institutions, as well as China’s by extension? And we understand that.

The BDA rule is limited to BDA. I think Treasury can get into any
other description of the rule, but this is focused on BDA.

We are in the process of providing the information that we think we
need to. And as I said, the issue is on its way to being resolved. We
believe that we have done our part in that regard through the issuance
of this rule.

QUESTION: Two weeks ago, Mr. Hill said how important each one of these
deadlines is, and that to miss one could create this broken window
theory. It seems that there are still some steps left to resolve
this. So given anyone’s talk about what 30 days is, today would have
to be the outside deadline. So has the U.S. broken the deadline?

MCCORMACK: Again, we have done our part of this. The next step of
this — the actual implementation and execution of the decision —
is going to be up to the Macanese authorities.

Let me assure everybody that we, as well as the other members of
the six-party talks, are acting in good faith, in accordance with
the agreement that was signed on February 13. And we would hope that
everybody views it in that light as well.

QUESTION: But since the Macanese are not party to the six-party talks,
it’s feasible that the North Koreans may not think that, you know,
them deciding all this stuff is good faith on the part of the U.S.

MCCORMACK: Well, it’s a practical matter. The United States — it is
not within the power of the United States to release funds that we
don’t control. So just as a practical matter of executing the steps
necessary to resolve the issue, the Macanese need to be involved in
some regard. I think everybody understands that.

And again, we hope to provide any information that they might need
to take those final steps to resolve the issue.

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) when you expect them to release the funds?

MCCORMACK: It’s going to be — that is going to be their decision.

QUESTION: I got the impression, you keep talking about the Macanese
authorities and the bankers, as two separate entities that have
nothing in common, but in fact the financial authority of Macau,
which is part of the government, manages the bank, right?

So their treasurer said yesterday that they got good cooperation,
and then a few hours later, the Macanese government releases this
statement that says it deeply regrets the U.S. action.

How does that, in effect, you know, cooperate with exactly the U.S.

decision to do this? I mean, it seems to me that you are praising
them for cooperating with them, and they’re criticizing you for your
decision. How does that square? I don’t get it.

MCCORMACK: They’re not — those things aren’t mutually exclusive.

QUESTION: On Pakistan, do you have any comment on the arrest of the
chief justice of the supreme court? There is — opponents of President
Musharraf say that his move is unconstitutional and it’s created a
rather difficult situation.

MCCORMACK: Right. Now, understood, we have — it’s a situation,
actually, that we have been monitoring very closely for some time.

And I think this occurred several days ago. And we are watching it
closely. It is a matter of — it is a matter of deep concern.

And we believe that the resolution of this matter should take place
in a way that is completely transparent and strictly in accordance
with Pakistan’s laws.

It’s essential for any developing democracy to adhere to the rule of
law and conduct any investigations, any proceedings, that may follow
on from those investigations in a clear, above-board, transparent
manner that strictly accords with Pakistan’s laws.

QUESTION: And has it been conducted in a transparent manner thus far?

MCCORMACK: Again, we’re early on in this, and we’re going to be
watching it very closely.

QUESTION: And have you sent a formal complaint to the Pakistani
government asking…

MCCORMACK: It’s not a matter of our complaining about it. It’s an
internal Pakistani matter.

But clearly it’s something that, in terms of Pakistan’s functioning
as a democratic state, that we would watch very closely and that we
would have initially deep concerns about what has taken place.

QUESTION: But your ambassador has not approached the Pakistani
authorities for more information…

MCCORMACK: We have talked to them about it. I can’t tell you at what
level we have, but we have talked to them about it.

I wouldn’t use the word "complaint," because I don’t think it’s
appropriate in this particular case, but we have talked to them
about it.

QUESTION: So would it be appropriate then to say that you’ve just
approached them for more information or…

MCCORMACK: We want to understand better the action that was taken.

QUESTION: On Greece, Mr. McCormack, the Greek prime minister, Costas
Karamanlis, and the presidents of Bulgaria and Russia, Purvanov and
Putin, signed the agreement of the well-known pipeline Bourgas-
Alexandroupolis. Do you have anything to say either in favor or
against this agreement, a huge energy project of Southeast Europe?

MCCORMACK: I think that very basically we have no problem with
agreements that do a couple of things: further the cause of
diversifying supplies of energy for Europe and diversifying the
means of transport of those supplies of energy. So this certainly
contributes to it.

There are a number of other pipeline proposals that are on deck, and it
is important that the states of Europe, as well as the energy suppliers
— Russia as well as those of the Caucasus — work in a cooperative
manner, that they act based on market principles. And part of those —
part of that set of principles is diversifying the supplies, as well
as diversifying the means of transport of those energy supplies.

QUESTION: One more, Mr. McCormack.

May we have a readout about DAS Matt Bryza trip to Istanbul, Athens
and Thessaloniki? And do you know if Mr. Bryza discussed also in
Greece energy issues into which…

(CROSSTALK)

MCCORMACK: We’ll have to get something for you on that…

QUESTION: On the pipeline, you have been criticizing the policy —
the Russian policy of using energy for politician reason. Do you
think there is a risk it would happen again with this pipeline?

MCCORMACK: I certainly don’t want to foreshadow or try to predict
such events occurring.

There have been events in the past with respect to Ukraine and Georgia
as well as others in the immediate border area of Russia that have
caused concern. I’m not going to try to predict that that may happen
in this case, but we do think that it’s important to diversify supplies
as well as the pipelines that deliver those energy supplies.

QUESTION: On Iran, President Ahmadinejad has said that the Iran
resolution is nothing more than just a torn piece of paper and it’s
going to have no impact at all. I wondered if you had any comment
on that.

And then also, I know this is a broad question, but how much of
an impact do you think these sanctions will have on the Iranian
government? And why do you think that these are going to be so
effective this time?

MCCORMACK: Well, the initial sanctions have actually had an effect
on the Iranian government. They haven’t succeeded in changing their
behavior to this point, but you’ve noticed that there are once
again on the eve or coming up on passage of a new Security Council
resolution all of a sudden some — the Iranians trying to lay out the
perception of flexibility, when, in fact, they’re really not offering
anything new.

In terms of his referring to this just as a torn piece of paper,
I think that more than anything it would cause distress among the
members of the Iranian regime and among the population of Iran.

It’s not just a piece of paper. This has the force of international
law. It’s a Chapter 7 resolution. Serious business.

And it has had an effect on the ability of the Iranian government to
participate and use the international financial system for ends that
we, as well as other members of the international system, have said
are at the very least suspicious and at worst wrong.

And so we are taking action, together with other members of the
international system, to see that they aren’t able to exploit the
global financial system to build a nuclear weapon or to be able to
further develop their missile technology that could be used to deliver
a nuclear warhead potentially.

So it does have a real effect. It’s not just a torn piece of paper.

We take this very seriously. And I suspect that the other members
of the Security Council take passage of this kind of resolution very
seriously. And I expect that they would be dismayed by that kind of
reaction from President Ahmadinejad.

Sadly, it’s the kind of reaction that we’ve come to expect from him,
flouting the will of the international community.

MCCORMACK: And if the Iranian government continues down that
pathway, you’re going to see further such actions. And that’s rather
unfortunate, because that’s not what we want for Iran.

There still is a pathway to negotiation that is available to them.

There’s an attractive offer that is on the table. They haven’t taken
us up on it yet.

One can only say that the pathway that President Ahmadinejad is
pursuing on behalf of the Iranian people is misguided and unfortunate.

But it’s important that the Iranian people know that they have a way
out. And that way out is via the negotiating table and having this
regime take up the P-5-plus-1 on its offer of negotiation.

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) Madam Secretary sent a letter to Congress on
the Armenian resolution.

MCCORMACK: I’ll have to check and see if anything’s actually gone
up today.

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) secretary’s agenda for the meeting with the
Vietnamese foreign minister, especially whether she intends to raise
reported backsliding by Vietnam in the human rights area?

MCCORMACK: She is going to meet with Deputy Prime Minister Kiem,
and they are going to touch on, really, the whole spectrum of U.S.-
Vietnam relations. They’re going to touch on trade, human rights,
Vietnam’s role in the broader Southeast Asian region.

They’re also going to discuss preparation for a possible visit by
Vietnamese President Triet to the United States later this year.

So that’s all that is on the agenda.

Human rights will be at the top of our agenda. It continues to be.

The Vietnamese have made some advances in that regard. They’ve made
some advances with respect to religious freedoms in Vietnam.

There have, however, been some detentions that have been of real
concern to the United States, and we have raised those issues with
the Vietnamese officials. Secretary Rice has done that in the past,
and I would expect that certainly a general discussions about human
rights, if not a specific one about these cases, will take place
during the meeting.

QUESTION: Do you have any comment on President Mugabe’s comments
today, saying that Western governments should, you know, basically
go hang themselves because of their criticism of his handling of
protests and…

MCCORMACK: It’s a real sad state of affairs in Zimbabwe. It’s a
real tragedy, what’s occurring there, in terms of the systematic
dismantling of democratic rights, the abuses of human rights that we
have seen recently, and just the terrible economic destruction that
the Mugabe regime has wreaked on the Zimbabwean economy. This is now
an economy that is suffering from hyper-inflation.

And it’s sad, because it’s the people that suffer. Certainly they
suffer as a result of the lack of political rights or the lack of
human rights, but they’re also suffering the very real effects of an
economy that is going down the drain. And it’s a sad thing to watch.

So it’s — you know, while Mr. Mugabe may want to paint this as
an issue of his defying the rest of the world trying to dictate to
him what should be happening in Zimbabwe, it’s really a case of the
international system expressing real concern for a tragedy that is
unfolding in that country.

QUESTION: The U.N. and E.U. have suggested that imposing new sanctions
on Zimbabwe will make the situation even more difficult for people
who’ve already faced inflation of, like, 1,700 percent or something.

I know that the U.S. is considering new sanctions against Zimbabwe.

How are you looking at those new sanctions, and how will you be able to
impose without causing even more grief to people on the ground there?

MCCORMACK: It’s a tough issue. It’s always a hard issue when you try
to balance the possible effect of diplomatic tools you might have at
your disposal — for instance, sanctions — and the effect it will have
on the regime versus the effect that they may have on the population,
which is already suffering.

So we’ll take a close look at what we might do to try to bring about
a change in behavior — in the behavior of this regime, and that we
are working very closely with the E.U., as well as others on this
we’re consulting closely.

MCCORMACK: I can’t tell you that we’ve come to any final conclusions
in that regard.

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) a joint effort, in terms of sanctions, or are
you going to go unilaterally?

MCCORMACK: We’ll take a look at what we think is the right thing to do.

QUESTION: Are you looking at some U.N. action? Is this going to be
something circulating in the next few days, or?

MCCORMACK: Like I said, there are a number of options available to us,
so we’ll — we want to try to do what’s effective as well as what is
something that has as minimal effect as possible on the humanitarian
situation that’s unfolding in Zimbabwe.

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) Iraq, this conference (inaudible) the weekend.

Do you have any sense yet that progress is being made in terms of
these working groups? Have they been established? Are you confident
they’ll be able to report back to the ministerial level within the
next month? Do you get a sense of how the process is playing out?

MCCORMACK: You know what, honestly, I have to check on that one. I
have to check with David Satterfield and see — get his assessment
of where we stand with these things.

I know that people are already talking in terms of travel dates and
locations for a ministerial-level conference, so there is a degree of
optimism that we are going to get to that point. But I have to check
for you exactly on the working groups and exactly what’s happening
there.

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) what the make-up is of them, and are they
completely international and just basically what is happening between
now and then would be good.

MCCORMACK: What’s the process? Yes. We will get you an answer.

QUESTION: And do you think this is — this is, again, a rather broad
question, but do you think this has put extra pressure on the Iraqi
government to step up themselves, I mean in terms of — I’ll give one
specific here, something like de-Baathification, you know, certain
benchmarks that they’re expected to be reaching, do you think this
is giving them more momentum? Are they held more to account now…

MCCORMACK: Well, they have their own motivations for getting things
done in terms of de-Baathification or the hydrocarbons law or their
budget or amendments to the constitution. So they have self- generated
interests in getting those things done and moving forward.

The international support that manifested itself by attendance at
the conference and expressions of support for the Iraqi government
certainly helped.

MCCORMACK: And that helps reinforce the work of those in Iraq who
want to push forward on all of these political issues because they’re
really important.

And in terms of the budget, there has been progress. They actually
passed a budget, voted on it, and they’re now working on disbursing
about $10 billion, so that’s positive.

The hydrocarbons law is going to be up for debate in the Council of
Representatives coming up here soon in the coming weeks. I expect that
to be a healthy debate because it gets to the really fundamental issues
of the division of the patrimony of Iraq, its oil wealth, how that is
used and how that is controlled. And that gets, again, to core issues
of Sunnis, Kurds and other working together for a common good in Iraq.

De-Baathification there’s been less progress on. And that’s
something that we have urged the Maliki government and the Council
of Representatives to move forward on.

So there has been progress.

The Iraqis themselves set up some benchmarks that they — notional
benchmarks that they had hoped they could meet. They’re a little
behind on that. We understand that. Not to draw a direct comparison,
but our own legislative process doesn’t always move at the pace that
they would have wish.

But the bottom-line story here is that the political process is moving
forward. It is functioning. It is functioning within an atmosphere
of extreme violence, which makes the process more difficult.

But to get back to your original point, the international support that
is manifested by these meetings and these conferences is important. It
helps reinforce the idea for the Iraqis that they do need to move
forward, and that there are benefits in moving forward.

Just, I think, tomorrow, the members of the International Compact for
Iraq, which is a separate yet related effort, are actually going to
work to try to try to finalize the terms of the deal on both sides:
both what the Iraqis are going to do, and what might get done by the
international system.

So those are all positive, reinforcing moves for the Iraqis, and the
benefits for the neighbors and for others in the international system
are that Iraq starts to take its place in the region.

QUESTION: Can we really expect — in real terms from the compact
group tomorrow, is there going to be some, kind of, a list of, like,
a manifesto or how they’re going to move forward or…

(CROSSTALK)

MCCORMACK: Well, it’s essentially a contract in simple terms everybody
understands. On one side, the Iraqis commit to take certain steps
on the economic reform front, and that, in return, the international
system will take certain steps.

MCCORMACK: Those are going to differ for each individual state.

But it’s essentially a deal: If you commit to doing X, we will commit
to doing Y. We, being the collective international system.

QUESTION: Did you have any date on the new resolution on Sudan that
you would like to be discussed at U.N.?

MCCORMACK: I don’t. Let me see where we are on that.

(CROSSTALK)

QUESTION: Andrew Natsios: Did you ever check whether he was traveling
to Khartoum again?

MCCORMACK: Did we? Did we check to see if he’s traveling to Khartoum
again?

QUESTION: Gee, thanks.

MCCORMACK: We didn’t. We didn’t.

(CROSSTALK)

QUESTION: OK. That’s OK.

MCCORMACK: We will get you an answer.

QUESTION: Mr. McCormack, on Kosovo, because somebody criticizes you
as a troublemaker, but I consider you as a troubleshooter.

MCCORMACK: Some people call me a troublemaker?

QUESTION: Yes, but I consider you as a…

MCCORMACK: Who’s calling me a troublemaker?

QUESTION: Let me say the question.

The well-known publication "(inaudible) Life in New York City"
criticizes your recent statement that Kosovo is a unique situation and
not a precedent, (inaudible), wrote, quote, "But what is so unique"
— in quotation, the "unique" — "about Kosovo? Apparently, Kosovo
is unique because the Department of State says so. If the U.S.

will support or oppose self-determination on a case-by-case basis on
the supposed, quote/unquote, ‘uniqueness’ of a situation, but not
on the principle of self-determination, are we to assume that by
(inaudible) of divine right the U.S. is the Earth’s court of last
resort?" unquote.

MCCORMACK: Is there an end here?

QUESTION: How do you respond?

(LAUGHTER)

MCCORMACK: Just comes with the territory here. Sometimes people like
what you say and sometimes people don’t.

I’m expressing the view of the president and the secretary of state
on this matter.

QUESTION: Thank you.

Affaire Dink: La Famille Reclame Des Poursuites Judiciaires Contre L

AFFAIRE DINK: LA FAMILLE RECLAME DES POURSUITES JUDICIAIRES CONTRE LA POLICE

Agence France Presse
15 mars 2007 jeudi 1:16 PM GMT

Les avocats de la famille de Hrant Dink, journaliste turc d’origine
armenienne assassine le 19 janvier, ont reclame jeudi a Istanbul
l’ouverture de poursuites judiciaires contre des responsables de la
police, impliques selon eux dans le meurtre.

"Nous venons de deposer auprès du Parquet une requete demandant
l’ouverture d’une enquete (penale) contre tous les agents publics
vises par une procedure administrative en lien avec ce dossier",
a declare a la presse Me Bahri Bayram Belen en sortant du tribunal
stambouliote instruisant l’affaire.

"Nous pensons que si les responsabilites restent imputees a quelques
enfants de familles pauvres de Trabzon, la dimension politique de
ce crime sera passee sous silence", a-t-il poursuivi. "Nous pensons
qu’il s’agit du travail d’une organisation bien structuree (…)
voulant nuire au fonctionnement democratique de la Turquie".

Le meurtre de Dink, abattu devant le siège de son journal bilingue
Agos, a Istanbul, a ete impute par la police a Ogun Samast, un chômeur
de 17 ans originaire de Trabzon, un bastion nationaliste du nord-est
du pays.

L’assassin presume a ete rapidemment arrete avec 10 complices presumes,
tous proches de milieux ultra-nationalistes haïssant le journaliste en
raison de ses prises de position sur le genocide armenien de 1915-1917,
que la Turquie nie categoriquement.

L’affaire a cependant provoque un scandale, la presse reprochant a
la police d’Istanbul de ne pas avoir su assurer la protection de Dink
alors qu’elle avait obtenu des informations sur le projet d’assassinat
un an avant sa realisation.

Une enquete administrative preliminaire a ete lancee contre le chef
de la police d’Istanbul Celalettin Cerrah et un des ses ex-adjoints,
tandis que le gouverneur et le chef de la police de Trabzon, accuses
de negligence, ont ete limoges fin janvier.

Montrant a la presse une copie d’une note de la police de Trabzon
informant celle d’Istanbul du projet de meurtre, l’avocate Fethiye
Cetin a affirme que pas moins de 17 messages similaires avaient
circule.

"Cela prouve qu’il n’y a pas eu de negligence ou d’oubli, mais
une participation consciente de certaines autorites a ce crime",
a-t-elle dit.

–Boundary_(ID_Pi7tondFf20JGWIDiZZmbQ)–

Iran-Armenia Gas Pipeline To Be Put Into Operation On March 19

IRAN-ARMENIA GAS PIPELINE TO BE PUT INTO OPERATION ON MARCH 19

Noyan Tapan
Mar 15 2007

YEREVAN, MARCH 15, NOYAN TAPAN. The Iran-Armenia gas pipeline will
be put into operation on March 19 with the participation of the
presidents of the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of
Iran. NT correspondent was informed about it by Sahak Abrahamian,
Director of High-Voltage Electric Networks company.

Vartan Oskanian And Nikolay Bordyuzha Discuss Situation In CSTO Resp

VARTAN OSKANIAN AND NIKOLAY BORDYUZHA DISCUSS SITUATION IN CSTO RESPONSIBILITY ZONE

Noyan Tapan
Mar 15 2007

YEREVAN, MARCH 15, NOYAN TAPAN. The Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan
Oskanian on March 15 received the Secretary General of the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Nikolay Bordyuzha.

During the meeting, the sides discussed the situation in the CSTO
responsibility zone, as well as a number of CSTO activities-related
issues, which include prospects of the organization’s further
development and the preparatory work for next sittings of the CSTO
regulatory bodies.

According to the RA MFA Press and Information Department, the
interlocutors pointed out the efficient cooperation between the
Armenian side and the CSTO Secretariat. They expressed satisfaction
over cooperation with member states in various international
organizations.