LASTED TO THE ELECTION, SETTLED THE KARABAKH PROBLEM
by Grigori Alexandrjan
Translated by A. Ignatkin
Source: Novoye Vremya (Yerevan), February 17, 2007, EV
Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
February 28, 2007 Wednesday
Karabakh Conflict Resolution As Seen From Yerevan: Baku Is Waiting For
Election Of A President Of Armenia Who Will Accept Azerbaijani Terms
Baku is waiting for the election the next president of Armenia in
the hope that he will be more amendable.
Earlier this week, foreign ministries of Azerbaijan and Armenia
exchanged caustic comments on each other’s Karabakh conflict
settlement policy. Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister, Araz Azimov,
spoke of a step backward in the peace process and pinned the blame
on Armenia. Acting Press Secretary of the Armenian Foreign Ministry,
Vladimir Karapetjan, spoke of how Baku was setting in advance a
thoroughly non-constructive approach to the talks. It seems that the
exchange was simply a means of marking an end to another failed round
of talks over Karabakh.
In the meantime, nothing extraordinary happened. This correspondent in
his previous articles predicted this turn of events more than once,
basing his assumptions on the fact that the Azerbaijani authorities
wouldn’t discuss anything with the Armenian regime that did not
think in terms of capitulation. Capitulation meanwhile is the only
scenario Baku will accept, a fact made quite plain when Heydar Aliyev
denounced all previously compromises reached within the framework of
the Minsk process.
That is, Aliyev made it possible for his son and heir, Ilham,
to make it necessary to start the negotiations from scratch. It
meant the abandonment of all and any compromises. Needless to
say, this attitude made the continuation of talks an exercise in
futility. OSCE Minsk Group chairmen had to sweat to compel Aliyev
to resume negotiations. They even invented a new name for the whole
process and began calling it the Prague Process. This "innovation"
enabled the president of Azerbaijan to resume the talks without any
loss of face.
In other words, this Prague Process is allegedly the "beginning from
scratch" Aliyev once insisted on. As a matter of fact, there was no
beginning at all because the very idea is a diplomatic absurdity.
Something altogether different took place: using the Prague Process
to provoke Armenia into denouncement of talks, Azerbaijan merely
feigned constructivism and did its best to prevent an agreement on
reasonable terms.
That was what Azerbaijan did throughout 2006, the year international
intermediaries proclaimed "a window of opportunities" because neither
involved party (Armenia, Azerbaijan, or Nagorno-Karabakh itself)
was bracing itself for elections. Armenia alone offered compromises
and concessions to the other side then, earnestly hoping for an
agreement. Some terms among what OSCE Minsk Group chairmen were
suggesting did not suit Armenia, but it proved itself pliable more
than once – catching the Azerbaijani negotiators unprepared and
eliciting emotional political demarches from them.
There is no saying what Aliyev and his Foreign Minister, Elmar
Mamedjarov, were telling their Armenian counterparts behind closed
doors, but their statements in public made it absolutely plain that
Azerbaijan would only accept unconditional capitulation from Yerevan.
How else can a sane man understand statements from Baku to the
effect that the very presence of Armenians in Azerbaijan is already
a compromise on its part? Even more cynical statements were made,
more often than not by Aliyev himself. Statements calling Baku’s
participation in the negotiations a compromise in itself.
In any case, the task Aliyev set for the "window of opportunities"
period was implemented by only 50%. A compromise was never reached (a
pro) but Armenia would not be tempted to cancel negotiations (a con).
Aliyev the gambler would not have been himself had he not started to
bluff. Elated by the fact of the forthcoming election in Armenia,
he apparently resolved not to meet with Robert Kocharjan anymore
since the latter’s term of office expires next year. It means another
president in Armenia and a chance for Azerbaijan that Yerevan will
hopefully capitulate in the matter of Karabakh. Hence the necessity
to behave in a manner that will preclude any desire on the part of
Kocharjan to meet with Aliyev in his remaining time.
Hence the latest demarche on the part of Azerbaijan when Azimov
questioned the expediency of future negotiations. We were correct
to assume that Azerbaijan only pretended to accept the idea of
a referendum in Karabakh, provided the Azerbaijani population
could come back there and participate in it. To make sure that
nothing would come out of it (what if these Armenians agree with the
Azerbaijanis’ return?), Baku began insisting in the return of Lachin
to its jurisdiction. That is an undisguised attempt to get everything
back to square one, i.e. into what created discontent among Karabakh
Armenians in the first place. And since the latter are not suicidal
types and therefore will never accept this scenario, they are left
with only one alternative; namely, leaving their homes altogether
which is essentially what Aliyev is after.
By the way, political scientist Eldar Namazov (former head of the
secretariat of the president of Azerbaijan who resigned to become the
head of the Foundation For Azerbaijan) wrote that Baku was bluffing
in the matter of the Karabakh referendum in the middle (!) of 2006.
Pointing out that not even the return of Azerbaijani refugees would
have any effect on the outcome of the referendum, since they accounted
for only 30% of the population of the region, he offered the following
explanation of the seeming acceptance of the idea by official Baku:
"The Azerbaijani tactic is based on the knowledge that the Armenians
will never put up with turning over all seven districts occupied
beyond Nagorno-Karabakh and 30% of territories on Karabakh territory
including Shusha, and this referendum will therefore be denounced as
a failure because the Armenians are not constructive…
What can the Armenians do about it? Object to the return of the
refugees? There will be no referendum then… This is apparently
what the Azerbaijani authorities count on. Formally, they say "yes"
but fully expect at the same time that the Armenians themselves will
fail to pass this test for "democratic procedures" and call it off…"
The Azerbaijani political scientist is correct. In the meantime, Baku
keeps hoping that the new president of Armenia will capitulate. The
same Namazov ventured an opinion in an article the other day that
"there is no use waiting for anything unless the election takes place
in Armenia and the politician coming to power in Yerevan are found
to be hostages of the package solution idea."
"A breakthrough is not impossible, but the president of Armenia
will probably play his negative role to the last," Rasim Musabekov,
another Azerbaijani political scientist, said. "In other words, it is
Kocharjan himself who is the principal obstacle to the negotiations."
The political scientist maintains in the meantime that "two politicians
will run for president in Armenia – pro-Western Foreign Minister Varsan
Oskanjan and Defense Minister Serj Sarkisjan who is pro-Russian… In
any case, each of them will allow for better maneuvering in Karabakh
talks than the acting president of Armenia."
Better come out and be on the level like Rauf Mirkadyrov, a prominent
Azerbaijani journalist, who offers the Armenians a "mutually
acceptable" and "mutually beneficial" compromise – Azerbaijani
territories in return for Armenia’s security and economic prosperity.
"That is what ex-president of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosjan tried to
tell Armenian society in 1998," Mirkadyrov said.
In short, Baku decided to wait for the appearance in Armenia of a
"constructive" president who will accept Azerbaijan’s terms. We will
be waiting too (just do not hold your breath)…