TURKEY: Little progress on religious freedom
Forum 18, Norway
June 26 2006
By Dr. Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office of Missio
<;
Despite hopes, there has been little progress in
achieving true religious freedom in Turkey, argues
Otmar Oehring of the German Catholic charity Missio
en/themen/menschenrechte.
Delays in changing the Foundations Law; declining official interest
in acting on EU and Council of Europe advice; the lack of concrete
impact of limited changes in the way the state records individual
religious affiliation; "massive nationalistic indoctrination" in
schools; and continuing systematic discrimination against Muslim
and non-Muslim minorities contribute to Turkey’s religious freedom
deficit. In this personal commentary for Forum 18 News Service
, Dr Oehring maintains that the Turkish
government no longer seems willing to improve the religious freedom
and human rights situation. Many think that EU accession negotiations
may fail, and he suggests that this is likely to end any progress
towards religious freedom.
The Turkish parliament has now departed for the holidays – without
approving the new Law on Foundations as it had been expected to do.
The proposed Law would regulate how "community foundations" – the
organisations allowed to some non-Muslim ethnic/religious communities –
own and recover property. Parliament said it would come back early
from holiday and reconvene in September, rather than October, to
consider this proposed law and other laws aimed to bring Turkish laws
into line with European Union (EU) norms. The aim is, reportedly,
to approve at least the Foundations Law before the EU reports again
on accession in early October.
Although politicians and the EU are concentrating now on the
Foundations Law, this focuses only on one fairly narrow issue:
what to do with buildings and other property taken from religious
communities by the government and sold to third parties (see F18News
13 December 2005 ) .
The government cannot now give these properties back, so it will
have to offer compensation. However, it is not willing to do so
and parliamentary deputies think Turkey should not offer such
compensation. As the European Commission is telling the Turkish
government it must do so, the issue is deadlocked.
Despite the urging of the European Commission’s Enlargement
Directorate-General that Turkey should use the good offices of
the Council of Europe, both to help it understand what needs to
be done in the area of religious freedom and to help draw up laws
on religious freedom and the status of religious communities, the
Turks are reluctant. In April 2006, the Turkish government contacted
the European Commission to ask for specialists who could advise on
these issues. The EU was willing to send three experts, two from the
Council of Europe as well as a French expert on "laicism". But to the
astonishment of those involved, the day before the experts were due
to travel the Turkish government informed them there was "no need"
to come.
The involvement of the Council of Europe in helping Turkey’s
transformation is very tricky. Its Venice Commission – which advises on
how constitutions and other fundamental laws could conform to European
democratic standards – could help Turkey on religious freedom, but
can only get involved if Turkey invites it to do so. But Turkey is
not interested.
Official religious affiliation records
One small step has been taken in the way the state records individuals’
religious affiliation. A new Personal Status Law approved on 25
April gives citizens for the first time the possibility to ask the
authorities to remove information about their religious affiliation (or
presumed religious affiliation) from their official records. However,
the law is contradictory: while Article 35 paragraph 2 allows
individuals to ask for their religious affiliation to be removed
from their records or amended, Article 7 paragraph 1(e) specifies
that citizens have to provide such information.
Yet despite discussion for at least the past decade, Identity Cards
still carry a section giving the holder’s religion. One of the
major contributors to the debate was Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who is now
Turkey’s President, in his former capacity as Chief Justice of the
Constitutional Court. A committed secularist, he argued that, in a
secular state, an individual’s religion should not be mentioned in
official documents.
Changing religious affiliation on an individual’s personal records
was possible before, but required an individual to do this through the
courts. Fear of social ostracism or hostility meant that few did this.
Although the new Personal Status Law appears to be a positive step,
this is not the case. In practice, individuals trying to change
their religious affiliation in their official records could still
face problems. For a start, they would have to tell officials –
who could just record that the individual had requested to change
their religious affiliation without actually changing it. At least
this Law offers the possibility to remove any religious affiliation
from individuals’ Identity Card, but if this does not become common
any official or police officer would then ask an individual why no
religion was given. Giving no religion would be tantamount to an
admission that the individual is possibly a Christian or a Jew –
the only faiths apart from Islam allowed to be listed.
It remains unclear how many people have asked to change the affiliation
on their official records since the new law came in. In the past,
individuals did of course change their religion, but were not always
prepared to do so publicly through the courts. The authorities have
given conflicting numbers of such converts. In February 2005 the
Interior Ministry’s Directorate-General for Administration of the
Provinces told parliament that 344 people had converted from Islam
to Christianity between 1997 and 2004, while six had converted from
Islam to Judaism. No converts to other faiths were mentioned. However,
Minister of State Mehmet Aydin, quoting figures from the government’s
Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) (see F18News 12 October
2005 ) , said 368
people had converted "under the influence of missionary activities".
There is much hostility to the peaceful sharing of
non-Islamic beliefs, which may have been a factor in the
murder of Fr Andrea Santoro (see F18News 9 February 2006
=724).
The way officials record religion on personal records is predictable.
Children born to parents who are recorded as Muslims are automatically
recorded as Muslim. De facto, only three religions are permitted in
the records: Islam, Christianity and Judaism. Atheist or non-believer
are not in practice allowed as options. Nor are Baha’i or Jehovah’s
Witness, to take two other examples. It remains unclear whether this
has now changed, though in practice the whims of the official are
likely to override any official decision. And if an individual asks
to change the religion on their identity card, there is no guarantee
officials will also change it on their personal record on the national
register. And when you need any official document, the first place
officials look is on the register.
Islam, Islamic Minorities and Citizenship
In the Muslim world, there is a tradition that the nationality is
Islam: the nation is the umma, the body of Muslim believers. The
concept of citizenship separate from religion is not known in Islamic
law and tradition. Despite the government’s insistence that it is
"secular", Turkey remains a deeply Islamic society so these views
have a strong hold on the population.
For almost a quarter of a century, Alevi Muslims have been
pushing for recognition as a distinct community able to organise
themselves in accordance with their own beliefs. But in May,
Professor Ali Bardakoglu, the head of the government’s Diyanet
– which controls all official Muslim
life in Turkey, despite the claimed secularism of the state – declared
once again that Alevis are de facto Sunni Muslims. This is like saying
that all Protestants are Catholics. Predictably, Alevis were unhappy
over this statement, which means that in practice, the government does
not recognise that Alevis and Sunnis are different. The government
maintains that Cem Houses, where Alevis worship, are not considered
places of worship but cultural centres. "We’re not against Cem Houses,
but they’re no alternative to mosques," is the government message.
The Alevis are divided as to how to respond to the government’s
attitude – some groups are broadly pro-government, some anti-government
and some pro-Kurdish. The Republican Education Foundation, which
is under Alevi control, is regarded as more ready to work with the
government. It says it does not want to see a separate government body
to handle Alevi affairs, but argues that taxes from Alevis are being
used (or misused) solely on Sunni mosques and imams. It insists that
as Alevis are Turkish citizens and taxpayers it wants to see their
taxes used to support Alevi structures.
Islamic groups that do not regard themselves as being under government
control – such as the Islamic brotherhoods (the Sunni Nakchibendis,
Mevlevis and others as well as the Shi’ite Bektashis) or new Islamic
movements (such as the Nurcus and Suleymancis) – are in practice
left alone. Yet there is no chance that the government will recognise
Muslim differences, even though Turkey has Sunnis, Alevis and a small
Shia minority. This indicates that the government is not just Muslim,
but specifically Sunni Muslim, despite its proclaimed secular nature.
Nationalism in Education
Discussion continues over changing the school curriculum to treat
all faiths in Turkey in a new way. The Alevis – like other religious
minorities – complain that no progress has been reached for their
teachings to be mentioned in school curricula. Further, Alevis have
warned that if the government does not introduce separate religious
education for Alevi children, they will lodge a case against it at
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg – to which Turkey
is subject, as a member of the Council of Europe.
Education remains very nationalistic (see F18News 12 October 2005
=670). Some officials of
the EU and of EU member states have complained of what one privately
described as "massive nationalistic indoctrination" in schools. So it
is highly unfortunate that the Education and Culture chapter (Chapter
26) in the EU accession negotiations was opened and closed on the
same day, without addressing this central point. Without change in the
curriculum and teaching, there can be no progress in a society whose
nationalism has a noticeable impact on social attitudes (see F18News
19 January 2006 ) .
Non-Muslim Minorities
Meanwhile, tensions for religious minorities remain high, as
evidenced by the murder of one Catholic priest and attacks on other
priests this year. Speculation persists that the "deep state" –
the nationalist circles in the army, police, National Intelligence
Organisation (MIT) secret police and state administration which
regard themselves as the custodians of the Ataturkist ideology –
might have been behind the murder in February of Italian priest
Fr Andrea Santoro in his church in the Black Sea port of Trabzon,
an area well known as a nationalist stronghold. Other factors
behind the murder are also suggested (see F18News 9 February 2006
=724). Such attacks
on priests could spread to other nationalist areas. Some Catholic
leaders still have police outside their residences, though how an
unarmed, plainclothes police officer could offer any protection
remains unclear. Some wonder whether they are there more to listen
to what those leaders are saying than to protect them.
Of course, all religious minority leaders remain under government
surveillance, forcing them to be very cautious in everything they
say – or to be willing to pay the price for their frankness. They
know their telephones are occasionally tapped and mail is sometimes
opened before it is delivered. "Walls have ears," religious minority
leaders say. Secretive officials occasionally come to visit them to ask
questions – people speculate that they are from the MIT secret police.
In what is seen by Turkish Christians as a continuing humiliation,
all Christian Churches – whether their leaders and members are Turkish
citizens or not – are regarded as foreign. This attitude persists,
even though Christian communities were present on the territory
of what is now Turkey many centuries before the Turkish state, its
ancestor the Ottoman Empire, and Islam. Discussions between Christian
Churches and the state are normally handled by the Foreign Ministry,
or sometimes by another state authority chosen by the government. This
humiliation is clearly deliberate.
Nothing has happened about plans for the Ecumenical Patriarchate to
be able to reopen its seminary on the island of Heybeliada (Halki in
Greek) in the Sea of Marmara, once famed for its scholarship throughout
the Orthodox world. Closed in 1971, Turkey has grudgingly promised
to reopen it under US and EU pressure, but that now seems further
off than ever. Discussion has now fizzled out, though Patriarch
Bartholomew always tries to raise the issue whenever he can. The
Armenians saw their Holy Cross seminary in Istanbul closed at the
same time, but have given up any hope to be allowed to reopen it as a
separate institution. Armenian Patriarch Mesrop has instead proposed
inaugurating a chair of Armenian Studies at one of Istanbul’s state
universities – so far with no result.
Pope Benedict’s Planned Visit
The planned visit of Pope Benedict XVI, due in November 2006,
could also raise tensions. Benedict is scheduled to meet the Turkish
President and government in Ankara, and address a selected public in
the capital. Presumably, the Pope will want to talk about relations
between the Christian and Islamic worlds and seek to overcome ideas
about the "clash of civilisations". The Turkish public is unlikely to
be present. Any views they might have of the speech will be formed
by how the local media covers it. In Istanbul, Benedict will meet
the Ecumenical Patriarch, the Armenian Patriarch and other local
religious leaders, as well as the Catholic community.
Most Turks either do not want the Pope to visit, or are indifferent
to his visit. Some Western-oriented Turks welcome it, as they think
it could help Turkish society better understand both the Catholic
Church and western views of Islam. Some of these Turks also hope
that the visit will help Turkey understand the progress it needs
to make on religious freedom. But nationalists who strongly oppose
Europe and accession to the EU – who are growing more influential –
could cause headaches for the police during Benedict’s visit.
The government too will be closely scrutinising the Pope’s words
for any hint of anything that could be interpreted as anti-Turkish
and anti-Islamic. As soon as any comments are linked to Turks as a
people and a society, problems will arise. The Pope will doubtless
be very delicate.
The row stirred up by remarks about the Armenian genocide in the final
years of the Ottoman Empire made by the Armenian Catholicos, Karekin
II, on a visit in June is ostensibly related to a historical ethnic
conflict dating back ninety years. But it is relevant to a discussion
on religious freedom, especially as the Istanbul prosecutor’s office
decided to investigate the remarks for a possible prosecution of the
Catholicos for "anti-Turkish remarks". The very prospect of a criminal
case over these remarks shows the lack of freedom of speech. But
whenever religious leaders are prosecuted there is a knock-on effect
on the rights of the religious community. The Armenian Apostolic
community – the largest of Turkey’s Christian communities by far –
was embarrassed by Karekin’s remarks, knowing they will make their
already precarious existence more difficult.
What Prospects for the Future?
The prospect of Turkey’s EU accession seems to be the only thing
capable of driving change in the area of religious freedom and human
rights more widely. Yet the government is now not willing to enact
change. Indeed, it is becoming ever more nationalist – even if this
might simply reflect the AKP’s need for votes from the nationalist
constituency. It is careful not to show too openly that it is Islamist,
as this would cause problems with the President and the military.
All this could change after the next parliamentary elections (due in
late 2006 or early 2007) and the presidential election (due next year),
if the current ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) wins. If the
current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan – or a puppet – succeeds
in becoming President, the Ataturk legacy could be changed. There
will then not be a President willing to veto laws that contradict
this legacy. This would definitely lead to a worsening climate for
religious freedom. The position for Sunni Muslims would improve,
while for Alevis the situation would remain as restrictive as it is
now. Despite the religious differences with the majority population,
the Sunnis are still seen as Turks. For other minorities – especially
Christians – the situation would be worse.
Government officials sympathetic to the ideal of secularism – and
secularists more widely – are growing increasingly concerned. They
fear that, if the AKP substantially increases its vote at the next
election, it would be strong enough to change the Constitution –
even against the wishes of the opposition. It could also install a
President from its ranks, who would not then veto laws deemed to be
part of an Islamist agenda, as the current President has done.
Secularists in particular are afraid for the future. Turkish diplomats
– who are already concerned over the changing mood among state
officials as an increasing number of AKP supporters fill official
positions – are very afraid of a fundamental change in the country’s
course. Many believe any sweeping AKP victory in the next national
elections would speed up the replacement of state officials with
AKP loyalists.
The old establishment is seeking to build up political forces
attractive to the electorate, in a last-ditch bid to head off the
AKP challenge. However, it remains unclear if the electorate will
back them. Voters threw out the old establishment in disgust at its
corruption and ineffectiveness. The AKP has been careful to be on
its best behaviour during its current period in office.
Although there is much talk of a military coup in the event of such
fundamental changes, no-one knows if the majority of army officers
still support Ataturk-defined secularism – or if they would be prepared
to back such an anti-Islamist coup.
Prospects for EU Accession
The level of optimism or pessimism over the future depends on who you
talk to. Western-oriented Turks still hope EU accession negotiations
will continue and that Turkey will eventually join the EU. They hope
desperately that the process will generate its own momentum that
would force the government, the administration and the army to look
forward and support reforms. This could happen, but it looks unlikely.
As the general election looms, the government is doing nothing that
could be seen as a positive step towards the reforms the EU would
welcome.
Many observers are not optimistic. They do not believe the Turkish
side – whether the current AKP government or the "deep state" –
is interested in seeing such reforms. Many Turks have not even
understood what religious freedom – for example as defined in
the rights set out in Article 9 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) – actually means (see F18News 13 December
e_id=704). Or they understand
it – but reject it. Turkey ratified the ECHR in 1954, but over 50
years later has yet to abide by it.
Ataturkists fear that granting religious freedom as outlined in the
Convention would give power to the Islamists. Yet Paragraph 2 of the
ECHR’s Article 9 prevents the abuse of religious freedom by freedom’s
enemies. This states that "freedom to manifest one’s religion or
beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." Indeed,
Article 9 would safeguard a real separation of religion and the state,
as the Ataturkists claim to want.
This fear is also felt on the EU side, which means that it too is
increasingly reluctant to clearly advocate religious freedom along
the lines of the ECHR. EU governments also fear such rights would
open the doors to Turkey’s Islamist groups. Although EU officials
involved in the accession process are interested in seeing religious
freedom promoted properly – indeed, they regard it as the second most
important issue after recognition of Cyprus – they seem to know that
this is seen as a political issue which is over their heads.
Many believe the accession negotiations will fail this autumn, not over
democratisation and human rights, but over the Turkish government’s
refusal to recognise the government of Cyprus in Nicosia. Many Turks
would not be unhappy at this. Yet if the EU suspends the accession
negotiations, the Turks will feel insulted and spurned by Europe. Some
believe the European Commission is therefore trying to manoeuvre to
find a way for Turkey itself to suspend the negotiations.
Possible Impact on Religious Freedom
Yet any suspension will have a very negative impact on religious
freedom – indeed, the position for religious minorities could end
up being worse than when the negotiations started. Suspension would
incite nationalist feelings and many Turks would openly say that the
negotiations and even membership of the EU itself would not benefit
Turkey. Then a hunt would begin for those who had caused the mess.
Most Turks would not point to their own government but to the
Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Armenian Patriarchate, the Catholic
Church, the Protestants, and other obvious symbols of the outside
world.
The only hope many can see for progress towards religious freedom
is that the EU accession negotiations continue. If EU negotiations
stop completely, no hope for religious freedom will remain. Yet even
if the negotiations stagger on, it is doubtful that the majority of
the population is prepared to change its attitude to nationalism and
religion, and even consider accepting Alevis and non-Muslim Turks
as full Turkish citizens. The only other possible hope is that the
reform process will gather its own momentum independent of the EU.
However, at present, there is little sign of this happening. (END)
– Dr Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office of Missio
en/themen/menschenrechte,
a Catholic charity based in Germany, contributed this comment to
Forum 18 News Service. Commentaries are personal views and do not
necessarily represent the views of F18News or Forum 18.
For further overviews by Dr Oehring of religious freedom in Turkey,
and of the need for fundamental reform of the Constitution, see
For commentaries by the Anglican Chaplain in Istanbul
on the roots of Turkey’s attitude to religious freedom see
716, and on Turkish
society’s reaction to the murder of Roman Catholic priest Fr Andrea
Santoro, see
For a personal commentary on religious freedom under Islam, see
227
For a personal commentary assessing western European "headscarf laws",
see
A printer-friendly map of Turkey is available at
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Dr. Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office of Missio
<;, contributed this comment to Forum 18 News
Service. Commentaries are personal views and do not necessarily
represent the views of F18News or Forum 18.