THE FATE OF GUAM WILL BE DECIDED BY ILHAM ALIYEV
by Tatiana Ivzhenko
Translated by Elena Leonova
Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 101, May 24, 2006, EV
Agency WPS
What the Papers Say Part A (Russia)
May 24, 2006 Wednesday
Energy-rich Azerbaijan as a key player in an alternative to the CIS;
GUAM – the alliance of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova
– launched its new image and format yesterday. Decisions made
by President Ilkham Aliyev of Azerbaijan could either cement and
reinforce the alliance, or destroy it. Will he choose Russia or the
United States?
The GUAM summit that closed in Kiev yesterday, and the plans announced
there – predictably, not involving Russia – came as no surprise. The
presidents of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan had planned
this meeting for a long time, and given the obviously pro-Western
course taken by Tbilisi, Kiev, and Chisinau, it wasn’t hard to guess
the meeting’s political direction.
At first sight, only President Ilkham Aliyev of Azerbaijan stood out
from the Kiev Quartet; there seemed to be no reason to suspect him
of lacking loyalty to Moscow. But he did attend this GUAM summit;
what’s more, he arrived before President Viktor Yushchenko’s guests
from Georgia and Moldova. And we can’t rule ought the possibility
that his presence could be decisive. GUAM launched its new image
and format yesterday. Eventually, Aliyev could either cement and
reinforce this with his energy resources, or destroy it. The former
scenario would happen if Baku follows the lead of Tbilisi, Kiev,
and Chisinau in regarding the United States as its chief partner. The
latter scenario would apply if Aliyev decides that alliance with Russia
is more advantageous or more promising. The Azeri leader’s dialogues
with Washington and Moscow have long been described by the media as
“political see-saws.” Aliyev has already shown that he can manipulate
his interlocutors, avoiding direct pressure but cleverly using “the
enemies of his friends” to achieve his own goals.
In March, when President Vladimir Putin visited Baku for the opening
ceremony of Russia Year in Azerbaijan, Aliyev gave Moscow assurances of
loyalty and partnership. At around the same time, Azeri Deputy Foreign
Minister Araz Azimov announced that his country has no intention of
“joining a coalition against anyone, and wishes to establish neighborly
relations with all countries in the region.”
Within a few days, Aliyev met with the presidents of Kazakhstan
and Georgia, promising each of them participation in the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil transport project, which bypasses Russia. The
first of these meetings (with President Nursultan Nazarbayev of
Kazakhstan) emphasized the role of the CIS in developing cooperation;
the second meeting (with President Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia)
emphasized the significance of regional associations like GUAM.
Aliyev followed this up by giving a demonstratively warm reception
to the Iranian defense minister, and then paid a visit to Washington.
Within a few days, Azerbaijan effectively offered its chief partners
some terms that required reciprocal moves. Then Aliyev could examine
the offers and choose an ally.
Judging by a number of Aliyev’s statements, the stance taken by the
United States and Russia on Nagorno-Karabakh regulation plays the
decisive role here.
Sergei Markedonov, department head at the Russian Institute of
Political and Military Analysis, commented as follows on what Aliyev
said in Washington: “To all appearances, Baku’s primary concern is
to restore its sovereignty over the rebel territory, with the help
of a strong ally. The chances of American-Azeri cooperation becoming
stronger depend entirely on the US stance on Nagorno-Karabakh, and
whether Washington is prepared to put some pressure on Armenia.” If
there’s a “breakthrough” on Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan is prepared
to become more amenable on the Iran issue.
The US government is probably giving some serious thought to this
proposed configuration. At any rate, the impossible became reality
during Aliyev’s visit to Washington: he didn’t receive a single
reminder about human rights abuses or failure to observe democratic
standards, even though courts in Baku were convicting opposition
members even as the Washington talks were under way, and that had
been considered the main issue in American-Azeri relations.
It may be suggested that the topic of resolving “frozen conflicts”
was included among the urgent priority issues on the GUAM summit
agenda at the instigation of the United States. Thus, Washington could
temporarily fill the niche of chief parner and ally, not only for
Azerbaijan, but also for Georgia and Moldova. And Ukraine, in these
circumstances, could aspire to the politically rewarding mission of
“chief peacemaker.”
The twist, however, is that this whole construct is based on
Azerbaijan’s energy resources; presumably, Baku is supposed to use
them to safeguard its partners against pressure from Russia. The
question of whether this is advantageous for Azerbaijan isn’t being
considered as yet – but it could arise at any moment if Russia gives
Azerbaijan an alliance guarantee with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh.
Note that mistrust arose when Russia started withdrawing its troops
from Georgia; Baku started fearing that some of those forces might be
transferred to Armenia. This was one of the major issues at Aliyev’s
talks with Putin.
Judging by the outcome of those talks, Putin didn’t give Aliyev any
assurances. Putin prefers to play his own political chess-games, in
which Aliyev might not be an important piece at all. Based on this
possibility, we might speculate that the Kremlin is simply waiting for
the right moment to intervene in somebody else’s game. In that case,
Aliyev will soon receive a partnership offer he can’t refuse.
He would immediately lose enthusiasm for the United States and its
creature, GUAM – thus threatening the main component of the new
organization: the energy component.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
