The Kars-Akhalkalaki Railroad: Missing Link Between Europe and Asia

THE KARS-AKHALKALAKI RAILROAD: A MISSING LINK BETWEEN EUROPE AND ASIA

CENTRAL ASIA – CAUCASUS ANALYST
Wednesday / April 19, 2006

By Taleh Ziyadov

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE)
natural gas pipelines have transformed the strategic realities in the
South Caucasus. As a result, the energy networks of Azerbaijan,
Georgia and Turkey have become more integrated, raising the
significance of the East-West Transport Corridor even more. Today,
these states are ready to take on a new challenge by building the
Kars-Akhalkalaki interstate railroad connection that will link the
rail networks of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey and lay a foundation
for a potential China-Central Asia-South Caucasus-Turkey-European
Union transportation corridor. This project will not only boost
continental container trade between Asia and Europe via the South
Caucasus, but also further integrate the South Caucasus region with
Europe.

BACKGROUND: The idea of connecting the rail networks of Azerbaijan,
Georgia and Turkey was first discussed during the Joint Transport
Commission meeting in July 1993. The initiative was later integrated
into the Master Plan on the Trans-European Railway (TER) networks
sponsored by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(UNECE). In July 2002, the Ministers of Transport of Azerbaijan,
Georgia and Turkey signed a protocol confirming the route and at a
February 28, 2005 meeting the parties agreed to conduct a feasibility
study. UNECE lists this route among Priority 1 projects that could be
funded and implemented rapidly by 2010. The realization of this
project depends on the construction of a 98 km-long (60 miles) segment
of rail from Kars in Turkey to Akhalkalaki in Georgia (68 kilometers
in Turkey, 30 kilometers in Georgia, and the rehabilitation of the
Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi line). The estimated cost of the project is about
$400 million.

Today, there are two operational railroads in the South Caucasus,
which are part of the EU-sponsored TRACECA initiative that links
Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s transportation networks. These are the
Baku-Tbilisi-Poti and the Baku-Tbilisi-Batumi railways. There is,
however, no rail link between Georgia and Turkey. The construction of
the Kars-Akhalkalaki railroad will connect Georgian and Turkish
railroads and facilitate trade in the East-West direction. For
example, a cargo from China could be delivered to Aktau (Kazakhstan)
and then transported by railway ferries to Baku and shipped directly
to Istanbul and onward to Europe via the
Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars-Istanbul rail system. Likewise, a
shipment from Europe could be easily transported to the South
Caucasus, Central Asia or China. Hence, Kars-Akhalkalaki serves as a
rail connection that will eventually unite railway networks of
China-Central Asia-South Caucasus-Turkey and the European Union. The
governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kazakhstan have already made
some progress in expanding the current TRACECA routes to Central Asia,
which will be extended to China. In December, 2005, a container truck
from Kazakhstan was sent to Georgia via Azerbaijan as a part of a
pilot program. A 3,850-km (2406 miles) long Kazakh rail system from
Aktau near the Caspian Sea to the city of Dostlik (Druzhba) near the
Kazakh-Chinese border is currently operational. The length of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars and the Kars-Istanbul sections are 826
km (516 miles) and 1,933 km (1208) respectively.

IMPLICATIONS: One of the major outcomes of the Kars-Akhalkalaki
railroad will be the increased continental trade through the East-West
Transport Corridor. There are various estimates regarding the volume
of potential cargo shipments through this route. Most forecasts
suggest that during the initial stage (the first two years of
operation), the volume of transport will reach 2 million tons and in
the following three years it could increase up to 8-10 million tons.

The construction of the Kars-Akhalkalaki railway will also open
markets in the Mediterranean region and South-East Europe for
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Central Asian states. It will increase the
volume of container traffic through the South Caucasus and be a more
secure and shorter way of reaching Asia or Europe. Goods and products
from these countries could be shipped directly to Mersin, a costal
Turkish port at the Mediterranean Sea, from where they could be
transported by sea to the United States, Israel, Egypt or other North
African and South European states. Turkish rail networks will also
create an opportunity for uninterrupted rail shipments to and from
Southeastern Europe.

In addition, the project has significant geopolitical significance. As
was the case with energy projects, inter-state railways will bring
along questions regarding common security threats and will require
collaborative efforts to address these threats. Azerbaijan, Georgia
and Turkey will further integrate their security agendas to
accommodate Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s quest for the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. The trilateral cooperation
between Ankara, Baku and Tbilisi will move the three states into a
more integrated transportation and security arrangements, thus
cementing their ties with Europe and the United States.

Since the Kars-Akhalkalaki railroad is a component of the East-West
Transport Corridor, both the United States and the European Union will
benefit from the realization of this project. Occasional attempts by
some U.S. and European legislators and officials, especially those
under the influence of Armenian lobbying groups that oppose the
construction of this railroad, could seriously damage American and
European national interests and their states’ role in the South
Caucasus. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey could finance the
construction of the Kars-Akhalkalaki project without external
assistance. Yet, U.S. and European political and financial backing
will strengthen their commitment to the regional development and
increase their presence in the region, as it was during the
construction of the BTC and BTE energy pipelines.

Armenia’s self-imposed seclusion by continuously rejecting to pull its
troops from occupied Azerbaijani territories will further detach it
from regional developments. Azerbaijani officials have repeatedly
stated that they will not consider the Armenia-backed initiative to
use the century-old Kars-Gyumri (Armenia)-Tbilisi railway unless
Armenia ends its occupation of Azerbaijani lands. At the same time,
Baku does not want to delay strategic and economic projects and wait
until Armenia and Azerbaijan come to an overdue agreement in resolving
the eighteenth-year old Karabakh conflict. Thus, the construction of
the Kars-Akhalkalaki project, which may start in the late 2006 or the
early 2007, is likely to advance regardless of developments in the
Karabakh peace process.

CONCLUSIONS: The construction of the Kars-Akhalkalaki railroad will
address a missing link in the transportation networks connecting
Europe and Asia. It will increase the volume of continental trade via
Azerbaijan and Georgia and boost these states’ role as transit
countries. It will also move Azerbaijan and Georgia closer to the
Euro-Atlantic community and create new opportunities for American and
European engagement in the region. The project will accommodate the
EU-sponsored TRACECA initiative as well as the U.S.-backed East-West
Transport Corridor and make the region a crossroads for Trans-European
and Trans-Asian continental trade.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Taleh Ziyadov is an independent analyst, who holds an MA
form the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service.

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