Regnum, Russia –
March 12 2006
Taleh Ziyadov: What is next in the Karabakh Peace Process?
In Paris last month, another round of negotiations between Armenia
and Azerbaijan attempting to resolve the eighteen years old Karabakh
conflict ended with no results. The OSCE Minsk group mediators from
France, Russia and the United States watched quietly as Armenia’s
President Robert Kocharyan and Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev
tried and failed to agree on a framework document, which was supposed
to be the foundation for future talks.
The so-called Prague peace progress, which has been going on for more
than two years, has reached its climax in Paris. The talks revealed
that in the view of today’s political realities and the situation on
the ground in the South Caucasus, Armenia and Azerbaijan are not
ready to sign any agreements in 2006. It suddenly became clear when
the two presidents failed to reconcile the issues of security,
self-determination and territorial integrity.
Once again the negotiations collapsed. But this time they also buried
along all hopes for a peaceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict in
the near future. This has left many western officials, regional
experts and ordinary citizens alike anxiously guessing about what is
next in the Karabakh peace process.
As cynical as it may seem, the Karabakh peace process does not have a
bright future. Out of many possible development scenarios, there are
three main courses of action: a status quo, a new war or a solution
within the framework of territorial integrity. Although the last
option holds the key to a long-term peace in the region, in the
absence of international pressure the first two choices are bound to
overweight the third one.
A status quo option is the most likely alternative between now and
2008 – a year when both countries will have their next presidential
elections. This does not mean, however, that political, economic and
military processes will go smoothly in Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Armenia has already threatened that in case the negotiations fail,
Yerevan may recognize a self-declared and unrecognized
Nagorno-Karabakh republic. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, repeated
that if the peace process is unsuccessful, Baku will use all possible
means, including the military option, to restore the territorial
integrity of the country.
Moreover, during this temporary status quo period, Armenia will be
further isolated from regional energy and transportation projects and
Azerbaijan will triple or quadruple its military budget thanks to
money from the country’s energy exports.
The growing economic and military strength will make Azerbaijan even
more reluctant to consent to solutions that are on the table today.
The increasing self-confidence and loud demands of anxious refugees
and internally displaced will compel the future Azerbaijani
governments to take increasingly drastic actions to settle the
conflict by force. Then it will be not a question of `whether or
not’, but rather `when’ a new war is likely to begin.
Yet, neither a prolonged status quo nor a new war will settle the
Karabakh conflict permanently. Instead, a peace and prosperity for
Armenians and Azerbaijanis will come out of the optimal proposal – a
solution that will guarantee the security and self-governance rights
of Armenian and Azerbaijani ethnic communities of Karabakh without
breaking up the internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan.
The security of Armenians in Karabakh has been the major concern of
Yerevan. Armenia wants to make sure that Armenians in the region will
be safe and secure after the pullout of all Armenian troops from
Azerbaijan. This genuine concern, however, becomes hypocritical and
damaging when President Kocharyan continues to reject solutions that
incorporate options that guarantee the security of Karabakh Armenians
within the framework of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.
If President Kocharyan is sincere in his statements, he should work
constructively to find an optimum, not maximum, solution. President
Aliyev has already stated that he is open to all proposals that do
not jeopardize Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.
In fact, the resolution model for the Aland Islands – predominantly
Swedish province of Finland – that was recently circulated in the
Armenian and Azerbaijani media, could constitute a good framework for
addressing concerns of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia could
obtain exclusive rights for security of Karabakh Armenians and
resolve the issue of the region’s final status without delay, while
Azerbaijan will preserve its territorial integrity and return its
extensive IDP population back to their homes.
This year might be the last time when Armenians and Azerbaijanis will
have a real chance to settle their disputes peacefully. A lack of
international attention and pressure, a rapidly vanishing mutual
trust between two nations, and further delays in the peace process
will inevitable strengthen the hands of those who advocate a military
solution for the conflict. This could lead to unanticipated actions
that would bring more misfortune to both nations and the whole South
Caucasus region.
Taleh Ziyadov holds a Master’s degree from the School of Foreign
Service at Georgetown University. He specializes in energy, security
and geopolitical issues in the Caspian region and Eurasia.
From: Baghdasarian