RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
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RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly
Vol. 6, No. 6, 10 March 2006
A Weekly Review of News and Analysis of Russian Politics.
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HEADLINES:
* NEW BILL ON NATIONAL IDENTITY GENERATING PROTESTS
* RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS HEATING UP
* A YEAR AFTER MASKHADOV’S DEATH, CONFLICT’S END
STILL DISTANT
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CIVIL SOCIETY
NEW BILL ON NATIONAL IDENTITY GENERATING PROTESTS. An attempt by
Russia’s State Duma to define Russian national identity has run
into trouble with the country’s Muslims and national minorities.
The driving force behind a new bill on national identity was
President Vladimir Putin himself, who has argued that Russians and
Russia need to have a better sense of who they are. But when the bill
was sent out for discussion last month by Russia’s republican and
regional parliamentary assemblies, it ran into a storm of protest.
Deputies in Tatarstan, which has a large Muslim population, say
it’s an attempt to strengthen and formalize the dominant role of
Russians in the state and therefore runs counter to the constitution.
The idea of defining a concept of Russian national identity
is almost as old as Russia itself — and just as elusive. Yet Russian
leaders cannot, it seems, resist the temptation to try. In
post-Soviet times, Boris Yeltsin made his contribution through the
new constitution of the Russian Federation and the start of a debate
on the Russian national idea.
Grigory Yavlinsky, the leader of the opposition Yabloko
party, has appealed for a break from the imperial past. The Russian
national idea, he says, should be based on respect. But such modest
ambitions are not in keeping with President Putin’s vision of a
muscular new Russia pumped up by petrol and gas.
The problem is easily enough defined: how to create a sense
of shared identity in a country divided by race, language, religion
and, increasingly, class and wealth? How to give a sense of purpose
to a new state that is still only just emerging from the ashes of the
Soviet Union?
Putin’s answer is taking the shape of a bill on the
fundamentals of state national policy, which sees its main aim as
strengthening the formation of a united multicultural society. Few,
it seems, have any problem with that.
Where some do have a problem, though, is with the
“consolidating role” assigned by the bill to the Russian people
(“Russkii narod”) in “providing the unity of the country and
strengthening the vertical of power.” Perhaps they sense an echo of
the guiding role assigned the Russian people in the Soviet Union?
The proposed legislation has stirred up a hornets’ nest
of protest in the predominantly-Muslim republic of Tatarstan, which
has grown used to a considerable measure of autonomy in the years
since the Soviet collapse. On March 3, its State Council Committee on
Culture, Science, Education, and National Affairs flatly rejected the
bill. Foat Galimullin, a deputy in the republican parliament,
discussed this issue with RFE/RL’s Tatar-Bashkir Service.
“We have already survived that unrealistic experiment to
create a Soviet nation during the era of the USSR,” Galimullin said.
“And now, once more, we have plans to create the Russian nation. I
consider this law provocative in principle and I think that it should
be for sure rejected.”
Indus Tahirov, another deputy in Tatarstan’s parliament,
said the bill was at odds with the federal constitution, which
emphasizes the multiethnic nature of the Russian people (Rossiskii
narod).
“The bill cannot be accepted in its present form, first of
all because it is not in accordance with the norms of international
law, secondly because it contradicts the Constitution of the Russian
Federation, and thirdly because it does not strengthen mutual
understanding among the peoples of the country because of the
articles, which especially stand out concerning the Russian language
and the Russian people.”
Tahirov and other deputies have taken particular issue with
the provisions of the bill on the Russian language. Tufan Minnullin
points out that a demand contained in the bill that every citizen
should know the Russian language is at odds with the federal
constitution. What does “know” mean, he asks, and what is the
punishment to be for not knowing?
“This is a very insidious law. It gives the impression of
defending the Russian people, but in essence it is directed against
the Russian people. It appears to compliment the Russian people but
actually it sets the Russian people up against all the other peoples.
Then there is that terrible article where it states that citizens of
the Russian Federation are obliged to know the Russian language. What
does it mean: “obliged”? If they have to imprison me, what will they
do?”
It is not just Russia’s religious and ethnic minorities
who are alarmed. Russia’s Public Chamber — set up last year as a
sort of collective ombudsman to monitor the work of parliament, as
well as federal and regional bodies — was dismissive, with one
member suggesting the bill looked liked scraps torn at random from
someone’s dissertation.
The chamber has set up its own committee to examine the bill,
which will report back in three months. Valery Tishkov is the head of
its Commission on Tolerance and Freedom of Conscience and a leading
expert on ethnicity and nationalism. He told RFE/RL’s Russian
Service that he sees no place for a “consolidating role” for the
Russian people in the modern Russian state.
“We should be talking not just about the multicultural,
complex composition of the Russian people, but also about its unity.
It is impossible to create one people out of 100 peoples. We should
not be talking about how to make one nation out of 100, but about the
recognition — recognition not formation — of our genuinely existing
unity, while at the same time preserving all our traditions.”
The fact that this legislation is already running into
trouble suggests how much Russia may be changing. At the heart of the
debate over the new legislation lies the Kremlin’s fear over
Russia’s demographic future. Russia is a multiethnic country,
whose large Muslim population is growing as fast as the ethnic
Russian population is shrinking. The country’s national and
religious minorities are becoming increasingly aware of their growing
weight and importance in society. The Russian national idea may never
be quite the same again. (Robert Parsons)
FOREIGN POLICY
RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS HEATING UP. While European policymakers
cautiously watched the recent Ukrainian-Russian gas conflict,
debating among themselves if Russia was a reliable supplier of
energy, policymakers in the Kremlin were busy preparing for an even
greater role in the world energy market. Their attention, however,
was concentrated not on gas or oil, but on preparing the
country’s nuclear power industry for its future role.
Russian federal authorities are considering creating a
state-controlled company, one that would embrace all enterprises
operating in the nuclear sector.
In an article on March 7, “The Moscow Times” reported that
Viktor Opekunov, chairman of the State Duma subcommittee for nuclear
energy, said the industry restructuring “would involve
‘privatizing’ all of Russia’s nuclear enterprises — in
other words, incorporating them into joint-stock companies — with
the state becoming their only shareholder.”
“The Moscow Times” identified the main components of
Russia’s nuclear industry as Rosatomenergo, which runs all power
stations; Tvel, which owns a controlling interest in Russia’s key
nuclear fuel-manufacturing enterprises; Atomstroieksport, which
builds nuclear power stations abroad; and Tekhnabeksport, the export
arm trading in nuclear machinery and fuel.
All four groups are currently supervised by Rosatom,
Russia’s federal atomic energy agency, led by former Prime
Minister Sergei Kiriyenko. And all would continue to operate under
the new umbrella organization proposed by Russian federal
authorities.
The nuclear power industry in Russia continues to play an
ever-increasing role in Russia’s energy balance and is destined
to play an even more significant one in the future. Russia’s
energy strategy for 2020, adopted in 2003, forecasts that by 2020
nuclear power is expected to increase its share to 25 percent of
Russian electricity generation, up from 16 percent in 2004, as the
share from hydrocarbon-fired generators drops.
Russian policy is to gradually phase out the use of coal, oil
and gas to fire electricity generators. According to a December 2005
study by the Uranium Information Center in Australia, “Rosatom’s
long-term strategy up to 2050 involves moving to inherently safe
nuclear plants using fast reactors with a closed fuel cycle and MOX
fuel.”
MOX, mixed oxide fuel, is a process of using plutonium left
in spent reactor fuel and from nuclear warheads to generate energy.
It is essentially a recycling process and is used in some 30 nuclear
reactors in Europe.
MOX is not the only answer to reactor fuel. The Executive
Intelligence Review reported on 10 February that “on January 25,
Nikolai Sevastyanov, head of the Energia Russian Space Company,
outlined an ambitious plan to obtain fuel for the next type of
nuclear power: thermonuclear fusion. He said Russia should mine
helium-3 (which is rare on Earth) on the moon.”
Presently, Russia has 31 operating reactors, which generate
about 147 billion kilowatt-hours per year. Six new reactors are under
construction and 16 more are planned. According to the U.S. Energy
Information Administration, Russia’s nuclear power facilities are
aging. “Fifty percent of the country’s 31 nuclear reactors use
the RBMK design employed in Ukraine’s ill-fated Chernobyl plant.
The working life of a reactor is considered to be 30 years: nine of
Russia’s plants are between 26 and 30 years old, and six are
between 21 and 25 years old” the EIA reports.
Thermal power (oil, natural gas, and coal-fired) currently
accounts for roughly 63 percent of Russia’s electricity
generation, followed by hydropower (21 percent) and nuclear (16
percent).
Russia’s future role as an international nuclear power
leader, a concept which the current leadership is promoting, is
ambitious and far-ranging.
In February, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that
Russia would like to reestablish the former Soviet nuclear energy
bloc in Eurasia. Speaking at the St. Petersburg summit of the
Eurasian Economic Community (EES), in early February, Putin said
Russia was “firmly determined” to widen its cooperation with the EES,
and that a priority would be collaboration in the “peaceful uses of
nuclear energy.”
Rosatom announced plans to rejuvenate the Russian nuclear
industry, mainly through cooperation with Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and
other countries which once were part of the Soviet nuclear power
space.
On January 20, Putin met with Kiriyenko, who stressed that
nuclear power will need to receive an increase in government funding.
“We need to build two nuclear reactors per year, beginning in 2011 or
2012,” Kiriyenko was quoted by Interfax that day. In order to raise
the needed funds for such a project, Rosatom will become a joint
stock company, but will remain under government control. Kiriyenko
also stated that he intends to build 60 atomic reactors abroad.
How feasible Kiriyenko’s plans are is difficult to judge
in light of the fact that there have been substantial delays in the
construction of the six reactors presently being built. Only two or
three are expected to meet startup target dates due to funding
problems.
The other problem facing the nuclear program is the rapid
depletion of uranium in Russia. At present, Russia produces some
2,900 tons of uranium, but deposits are rapidly dwindling.
Uzbekistan, which has an extensive reserve of uranium ore,
was brought into the emerging nuclear partnership during the EEC
summit and Putin announced that the Uzbeks would provide Russia with
“additional long-term possibilities for the building of a stable
nuclear fuel energy base,” “The Moscow Times” reported on 8 February.
Russia has also expressed interest in becoming a hub for
supplying nuclear fuel and services for existing reactors in former
Soviet bloc countries in Central Europe. During his recent trip to
Hungary and the Czech Republic, Vladimir Putin stressed that Russia
will take part in bids to upgrade existing nuclear reactors such as
the Czech plant in Dukovany and the Hungarian Paksi Atomeromu plant
which supplies 40 percent of Hungary’s power needs.
The Arms Control Association reported in November 2000 that
Russia and India signed a secret memorandum of understanding on
October 4, 2000 to pursue future “cooperation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy.” The memorandum was one of several agreements,
including a declaration of strategic partnership, signed during
Putin’s October 2000 visit to New Delhi.
In an apparent move to counteract this agreement, the U.S.
signed an agreement in Delhi in March of this year to supply India
with fuel and nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
The very day when U.S. President George W. Bush signed the
pact with India, Putin told a press conference in Prague that Russia
would fight any restrictions placed on its atomic energy operations
in Europe.
“Unfortunately, we are facing certain restrictions, attempts
to limit our operations in nuclear energy and in power engineering on
the European market,” Interfax quoted Putin as saying on March 1. “We
are not dramatizing this, but we will strive for equality.”
Unlike its gas, Russia does not possess a near monopoly on
nuclear fuel in the region and will face stiff competition on the
European market from France. How this might affect Russia-France
relations is uncertain. In the case of the former Soviet republics
and Central Europe, the Russians certainly do enjoy a nuclear
advantage and could use it as they presently use gas, as a lever to
achieve their political goals. (Roman Kupchinsky)
CHECHNYA
A YEAR AFTER MASKHADOV’S DEATH, CONFLICT’S END STILL DISTANT.
On March 8, 2005, Russian media reported the death, in circumstances
that remain unclear, of Aslan Maskhadov, the former Soviet army
colonel who headed the Chechen resistance forces during the 1994-96
war and was subsequently elected Chechen president in January 1997.
Maskhadov’s death has not only made a peaceful negotiated
settlement of the ongoing conflict within Chechnya even more remote;
it has accelerated the expansion of the Chechens’ conflict
against Moscow into other regions of the North Caucasus.
On January 14, just weeks before he was killed, Maskhadov
unilaterally proclaimed a one-month cease-fire, ordering the
resistance forces subordinate to him to suspend all offensive
military operations.
That order, according to Maskhadov spokesman Umar Khanbiev,
was intended as a “gesture of goodwill,” and to demonstrate that the
Chechen resistance was subordinate to Maskhadov as supreme commander.
At the same time, Maskhadov again invited Moscow to begin
negotiations on ending the conflict, focusing on the two key issues
of security guarantees for the Chechen people and a Chechen
commitment to respect Russia’s interests in the North Caucasus.
In his last interview with RFE/RL’s North Caucasus
Service, just weeks before his death, Maskhadov said he believed
Russian President Vladimir Putin was totally unaware of the real
state of affairs in Chechnya.
“I’m deeply convinced that Putin is far from reality
about what is really going on in Chechnya today,” Maskhadov said. “It
is common practice for the army to report what their chief wants to
hear from them. Such practices probably exist in Russia’s
security services too.”
Maskhadov went on to suggest that that all could change if he
and the Russian president could meet face-to-face. Such a meeting, he
posited, could serve as a true foundation for change.
“We have been suggesting that a 30-minute, fair, face-to-face
dialogue should be enough to stop this war, to explain to the
president of the Russian Federation what the Chechen people really
want — I’m sure he doesn’t even know that — and also to
hear from Putin personally what he wants, what Russia wants in
Chechnya,” said Maskhadov.
He added: “If we are able to open the eyes of our opponents,
the Russian leaders, peace can be established.”
But Russian officials publicly dismissed that offer of peace
talks as pointless. Presidential envoy to the Southern Federal
District Dmitry Kozak said it was “irrelevant,” as Maskhadov “lost
control over the situation in Chechnya long ago,” according to
Interfax on February 3, 2005.
State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Konstantin
Kosachyov told journalists in Moscow on February 10, 2005 that
negotiations with Maskhadov are “yesterday’s option,” adding that
Maskhadov had been given the chance after the signing in August 1996
of the Khasavyurt peace accord to restore order, but lost control of
the situation. “It is senseless to try to reach another agreement
with a man who has already failed,” Kosachyov said.
Unconfirmed reports suggest, however, that the Russian
authorities may have seized upon Maskhadov’s peace overture as a
means to get rid of him. Maskhadov’s successor Abdul-Khalim
Sadulayev claimed in an address to the Chechen people in autumn 2005
that Maskhadov was “lured” into talks and deliberately killed.
In its first issue for 2006, “Novoe vremya” quoted a lawyer
for one of the four close associates of Maskhadov who were
apprehended at the time of his death and who went on trial last fall
as likewise saying that the Russian leadership agreed to
Maskhadov’s proposal and even gave guarantees of his safety to
Tim Guldimann, the Swiss diplomat who in 1995-1996 headed the
Organization for Security and Cooperation and Europe (OSCE) Mission
in Grozny.
Maskhadov then declared the unilateral cease-fire and moved
from Avtury to Tolstoi-Yurt — the village north of Grozny where he
was killed — in readiness for those talks. “Novoe vremya” cited
Maskhadov’s unnamed arrested associate as reportedly testifying
that Russian security services succeeded in hunting down Maskhadov
and killing him by means of intercepted mobile-phone calls and text
messages to Guldimann.
But those reports have never been confirmed, and Guldimann
has declined to comment to RFE/RL’s North Caucasus Service on his
involvement. Whatever the chain of circumstances that culminated in
Maskhadov’s death, it removed the last potential negotiating
partner on the Chechen side with both a claim to legitimacy (Russia
recognized his election in 1997 as fair and legitimate, as did OSCE
monitors) and authority with the resistance.
Sadulayev, whom senior resistance figures acknowledged as
president within days of Maskhadov’s death, had been named deputy
president and Maskhadov’s designated successor at an extended
session of the State Defense Committee in July-August 2002, but that
decision was not made public at the time.
Over the past year, Sadulayev, operating in tandem with
veteran field commander Shamil Basayev, has taken steps to extend the
field of hostilities from Chechnya across the North Caucasus. True,
Chechen militants had struck outside Chechnya even earlier, in the
Moscow theater hostage-taking in October 2002, the raids on multiple
Interior Ministry targets in Ingushetia in June 2004, and the Beslan
school hostage-taking in September 2004. But Maskhadov had disclaimed
any responsibility for, and voiced his condemnation of, those acts of
terrorism, and at least through 2003 he repeatedly impressed on his
troops the need to abide strictly by the Geneva Conventions and to
refrain from attacking any Russian targets outside Chechnya.
But in his last interview with RFE/RL’s North Caucasus
Service, Maskhadov signaled his retreat from that self-imposed
limitation, saying that he had given orders to establish additional
military sectors in Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Daghestan.
Sadulayev took that process even further. On May 2, he issued
a series of decrees formally dividing the western “front” into no
fewer than seven sectors (Ingushetia, North Ossetia,
Kabardino-Balkaria, Stavropol Krai, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Adygeya
and Krasnodar) and naming commanders of those sectors. He likewise
named new commanders of the eastern front as a whole and of four of
its sectors (Gudermes, Argun, Kurchaloi and Grozny), according to
chechenpress.org on May 16, 2005.
While the Chechen resistance has continued to wage
hit-and-run attacks on Russian troops, it has carried out only one
major operation since Maskhadov’s death, in Nalchik, capital of
the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic, in October 2005. Basayev
subsequently claimed to have played a key role in the “operational
planning” of that attack, but it was apparently launched prematurely
after local police and security personnel tracked down one of the
militant detachments that was to take part. The militants, many of
them reportedly young and with only rudimentary military training,
sustained proportionally heavier losses than those in the Ingushetia
raids the previous year.
The apparent waning in military activity on the part of the
resistance within Chechnya is likely to bolster the arguments of
those senior officials in Moscow who believe that it is expedient to
continue to rely on a dwindling number of Interior Ministry troops,
many of them ethnic Chechens, to marginalize and then quash the
resistance. (There are now only some 36,000-38,000 federal troops in
Chechnya, pro-Moscow Chechen administration head Alu Alkhanov said on
February 28. That compares with approximately 80,000 one year ago.)
By the same token, Sadulayev’s recent affirmations of his
commitment to building an Islamic state in Chechnya and to waging a
national-liberation struggle to “decolonize” the North Caucasus
effectively preclude any attempt by Moscow to seek compromise and
common ground. Sadulayev declared in November 2005 that the Chechen
side will not propose further peace talks, but continue fighting
“until the Caucasus is freed from the boot of the Russian occupiers.”
There thus seems little chance of ending a conflict that, as
Maskhadov repeatedly pointed out, “cannot be resolved by force.” (Liz
Fuller)
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The “RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly” is prepared
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