WILL TBILISI FACILITATE AN ANTI-ALIEV REVOLUTION IN AZERBAIJAN?
By Zaal Anjaparidze
Eurasia Daily Monitor
The Jamestown Foundation
Sept 13 2005
In recent weeks both the Georgian and the Azerbaijani media have
actively speculated whether the government of Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili would support a popular revolution in neighboring
Azerbaijan. Some analysts tend to link the recently cooled relations
between Tbilisi and Baku with this issue.
On August 26 Azerbaijan’s State Border Service detained a Georgian
citizen, Merab Jibuti, for illegally crossing the border of
Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani law-enforcement officials claim that Jibuti was
connected with the Azerbaijani opposition youth movement Yeni Fikir
(New Thinking), and he reportedly admitted to attending a secret
meeting with Yeni Fikir leader Ruslan Bashirli and his associates
in Tbilisi on July 28-29. Moreover, Bashirli, who was arrested on
August 3 on charges of plotting a coup in Azerbaijan, met with an
Armenian special services agent in Tbilisi and received cash from him
to organize public unrest in Baku. Against the backdrop of hitherto
good Georgian-Azerbaijani relations, this widely advertised news
could not pass unnoticed.
Before this incident Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev had told border
service officials on August 17 that he would not spare any money in
improving control over the border with Georgia in order to “preserve
stability in Azerbaijan.” Aliev’s statement was clear evidence of
Baku’s concerns.
On August 29, the Georgian Intelligence Agency confirmed reports by
Georgian and Azerbaijani media outlet that Batu Kutelia, chief of
Georgian intelligence, had visited Azerbaijan and met with Aliev
to discuss bilateral issues, including cooperation between the
Georgian and Azerbaijani special services to ensure the security of
the region. Meanwhile, the Georgian Interior Ministry denied that
Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili had visited Baku on August 15,
while the Azerbaijani media reported that Merabishvili had met with
Aliev. Georgian media speculated that both of these visits were linked
to the investigation of an alleged revolutionary plot in Azerbaijan and
aimed at warming the chilly relations between Aliev and Saakashvili.
Symptomatically, on September 6 Saakashvili openly stated that
Georgia’s top priority is the victory of democracy worldwide.
Therefore Georgia would always support democracy in any region but
would do so within the parameters of the law. Saakashvili made this
announcement when he welcomed home two activists from the Georgian
youth movement Kmara (Enough) after they had been detained in Belarus
for one week for training the Belarusian opposition youth organization
Zubr in methods of civil disobedience. Kmara was modeled after the
Yugoslav youth group Otpor. It was a key player in the Georgian Rose
Revolution and a contributor to the Ukrainian Orange Revolution.
The Azerbaijani media, both pro-governmental and opposition, have
actively speculated about the possibilities of a Western supported
“color revolution” in Azerbaijan and the inevitable replacement of
Aliev by an “Azerbaijani Saakashvili.” Russian analysts have anxiously
noted that the Azerbaijani opposition widely uses the methods tested
during the Rose and Orange Revolutions, hinting at the possible
involvement of Georgian envoys in training the anti-Aliev opposition
(RBK, August 17; Nezavisimaya gazeta, August 29). Some supporters
of Aliev have also accused Tbilisi of clandestinely supporting the
anti-Aliev opposition groups.
Aliev and his entourage likely suspect that Saakashvili might be
willing to sacrifice his friendship with Aliev to cause of global
democracy. Symptomatically, Aliev has so far refused to join
the declaration about a “Commonwealth of Democratic Choice,” that
Saakashvili and his Ukrainian counterpart Viktor Yushchenko signed at
the Georgian health-resort Borjomi on August 12 (see EDM, August 15).
Most Georgian officials and analysts have vehemently excluded any
possibility of Georgia’s involvement in the would-be revolution
in Azerbaijan.
Any support of an anti-Aliev revolution in Azerbaijan looks almost
suicidal for Georgia both politically and economically, taking into
account neighborly relations and Georgia’s dependence on Azerbaijan’s
goodwill regarding the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and other joint
international energy projects. However, Saakashvili’s opposition
argues that the concerns of Azerbaijani officials over Saakashvili’s
“revolutionary” plans are not groundless, because Saakashvili wants
to curry favor with the West.
Givi Targamadze, chair of the Georgian parliamentary committee
for defense and security, who was an informal consultant for the
Kyrgyz “Tulip Revolution” (see EDM, March 25) said that the Georgian
government “must help and helps indeed” the nationwide public movements
that fight the authoritarian rules “but it is not any kind of force
that plans revolution.” “So far, I don’t see this kind of movement in
Azerbaijan,” he added. Targamadze, a former member of the influential
NGO Liberty Institute, however said that some attempts “on the level
of individual initiative” might take place.
Meanwhile, Levan Ramishvili, director of the Liberty Institute,
said that although Georgian state bodies must not be involved in the
internal processes of Azerbaijan, “The NGOs’ hands are unbound in this
respect.” “We have contacts with certain Azerbaijani NGOs. We share
with them our experience on how to make the changes in a bloodless
way,” he added.
The meeting between Aliev and Saakashvili on the sidelines of the
August 26-27 Commonwealth of Independent States summit in Kazan was
quite cool, sources say. This suggests that, contrary to the claims by
some Georgian officials, the Azerbaijani leadership remains concerned
about the Georgian leadership’s plans regarding the situation in
Azerbaijan.
(Resonance, August 18, 21; , August 26; Civil Georgia,
Turan, Regnum, RBC daily, August 30;Caucasus Press, September 6)