The Jamestown Foundation
Monday, April 4, 2005 — Volume 2, Issue 65
EURASIA DAILY MONITOR
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Yushchenko arrives in Washington
*What does Berezovsky want with Melnychenko tapes?
*Governance begins to disintegrate in North Caucasus
*Saakashvili and Kocharian discuss concerns of ethnic Armenians in Georgia
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YUSHCHENKO VISIT TO U.S. HERALDS RETURN TO “GOLDEN ERA”
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko’s official visit to the United
States on April 4-6 is set to radically transform U.S.-Ukrainian
relations and return them to the “golden era” under President Bill
Clinton. U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst predicted, “We expect
not only the revival of the friendly ties that existed between our
states seven to nine years ago, but the establishment of a
qualitatively new level of relations” (Kievskiy Telegraf, March
25-31).
Orest Deychakiwsky, staff advisor at the U.S. governmental Helsinki
Commission, believes, “Despite the typical past rhetoric about visits
leading to a qualitatively new relationship between the United States
and Ukraine, this one really does.” This is, “because for the first
time you have a Ukrainian leadership truly devoted to democracy and
the rule of law and determined to integrate with the Euro-Atlantic
community. In short, it’s the first time you have a relationship
based on shared values.” Deychakiwsky continued, “This will become
clear throughout the visit and cannot help but to influence
U.S.-Ukraine relations in a positive way, including building
meaningful, substantive relationships in the security, democracy, and
trade and economic spheres.”
Trust in Yushchenko’s integrity and sympathy for the poisoning he
endured last year is very high in Washington. Senator Harry Reid
(D-NV), who visited Kyiv last month as part of a U.S. Congressional
delegation, declared that Yushchenko is “an international hero”
(Ukrayinska pravda, March 26).
Yushchenko’s visit is not likely to see any major policy issues
resolved, but it will serve to break the ice after four frosty years
of U.S.-Ukrainian relations. The latest State Department report on
human rights outlines how the United States assisted Ukraine in its
election year (state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41715.htm). U.S. support
included assistance for the rule of law, independent media, civil
society, and human rights organizations. The report also highlights
numerous Congressional visits to Ukraine during the presidential
campaign, including one by Bush’s special representative, Senator
Richard Lugar (R-IN), during the second round. These visits repeatedly
underscored Washington’s insistence that Kuchma hold free and fair
elections.
A Senate Republican policy committee paper entitled “Promoting a
Robust U.S.-Ukraine Agenda: Securing the Orange Revolution in Ukraine”
was released on the eve of Yushchenko’s visit and distributed to the
legislative assistants, legislative directors, policy advisors, and
counsels in all Republican Senate offices (rpc.senate.gov).
The policy paper argues that it is in the interest of the United
States for the Bush Administration and Congress to strongly back
Yushchenko. Among the recommendations are to repeal the Jackson-Vanik
amendment, support Ukraine’s membership in the WTO, and include
Ukraine within the Millennium Challenge Account. The policy paper also
looks at ways to improve U.S.-Ukrainian cooperation and transparency
to block trafficking in weapons, narcotics, and humans. The paper also
calls for ensuring “a legitimate and stable venue [for Ukraine] to
meet its security concerns. Membership in NATO provides such a
platform.”
Yushchenko’s visit also represents a break with Kuchma’s security
policy toward the United States, according to Oleksandr
Potekhin. During the Orange Revolution, Potekhin led a rebellion among
Ukrainian diplomats while he was based at the Ukrainian Embassy in
Washington (foreignpolicy.org.ua). The Kuchma administration believed
it would gain Washington’s blessing by supplying troops to Coalition
forces in Iraq but was willing to turn to Moscow if Washington failed
to meet its expectations.
Yushchenko’s three-day visit starts off with a meeting and lunch with
President George W. Bush followed by a meeting with Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice. Later that day Yushchenko is set to speak at
Georgetown University, where Katya Chumachenko, Yushchenko’s
American-born wife, earned a bachelor’s degree in 1982.
On April 4-5, the Yushchenkos will visit Chicago. Chumachenko was born
in Chicago and received an MBA from the University of Chicago in
1986. Yushchenko will speak at the Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations. Between 1986 and 1991 Chumachenko worked in the State
Department’s Bureau for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, the
White House Office of Public Liaison, the Treasury Department’s Office
of Policy Management, and the Joint Economic Committee of
Congress. The Kuchma team seized on these U.S. government positions to
depict Yushchenko as a lackey of the United States.
In 1991, Chumachenko relocated to Ukraine as a founder and
representative of the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation, an NGO providing
U.S. democracy assistance programs in Ukraine. In 1993 she became the
resident advisor for the USAID-financed Bank Training Program managed
by KPMG Barents Group, and she worked as the company’s country manager
until 2000.
On the last day of Yushchenko’s visit, he will address a joint session
of the U.S. Congress, a rare honor previously accorded to other
U.S.-recognized “freedom fighters” Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel, Nelson
Mandela, and Boris Yeltsin. Yushchenko may use this occasion to return
an original copy of the 1776 Declaration of Independence recently
found in Ukraine’s archives.
That same day he will lay a wreath at Washington’s monument to
Ukraine’s national bard, Taras Shevchenko, which had been unveiled by
President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1964. Yushchenko, whose father spent
most of World War II in Nazi concentration camps as a German POW, will
also visit Washington’s Holocaust Memorial Museum.
Yushchenko’s final evening in the United States will be crowned first
by a joint reception organized by the International Republican
Institute and the National Democratic Institute. IRI and NDI Chairs
Senator John McCain and former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright,
respectively, are strong supporters of recent democratic changes in
Ukraine. The reception will be followed by a banquet in Yushchenko’s
honor organized by Ukrainian diaspora organizations.
–Taras Kuzio
BEREZOVSKY THREATENS TO OPEN PANDORA’S BOX CREATED BY FUGITIVE
UKRAINIAN BODYGUARD
Russian emigre tycoon Boris Berezovsky claims that he has the tape
recordings made by Mykola Melnychenko, the fugitive former bodyguard
of former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, in Kuchma’s office in
1999-2000. Many observers believe the recordings may shed light on the
murder of journalist Heorhiy Gongadze and secret sales of Ukrainian
arms to rogue states such as Iraq and Iran. Berezovsky, ahead of
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko’s visit to the United States,
has accused Kyiv of being unwilling to solve the Gongadze puzzle. He
also hinted that the recordings might cast a shadow on Russian
President Vladimir Putin.
In early March Hryhory Omelchenko, who heads the Ukrainian
parliamentary commission looking into Gongadze’s murder, failed to
persuade parliament to hear his report on Gongadze. Speaker Volodymyr
Lytvyn said that Yushchenko had asked parliament to postpone the
hearing. Omelchenko, who holds Kuchma and Lytvyn responsible for
Gongadze’s death, accused Yushchenko of having guaranteed immunity to
Kuchma — a charge that Yushchenko indignantly denied. An interview
with Volodymyr Tsvil, a former consul in Munich who helped Melnychenko
escape from Ukraine in 2000, released on March 17, strengthened
suspicions that the recordings might be used to blacken the new
authorities. Tsvil claimed that the recordings contain “a lot of
conversations of Kuchma with Yushchenko and [Prime Minister Yulia]
Tymoshenko, in which they look much worse than they claim to be.”
Melnychenko was expected to return to Ukraine after the Orange
Revolution and testify under security guarantees from Yushchenko. But
the suspicious death of former Interior Minister Yuriy Kravchenko
caused Melnychenko to fear for his life. In an unexpected move,
Melnychenko turned to Berezovsky for help. Berezovsky evacuated
Melnychenko from Warsaw to London. The head of Berezovsky’s Civil
Liberties Fund (CLF), Alexander Goldfarb, also revealed that the fund
began to financially assist Melnychenko several years ago (see EDM,
March 18).
In a March 19 interview, Berezovsky specified what kinds of assistance
Melnychenko had received. He said that the CLF paid for the
recordings’ transcription and authenticity checks in the United
States. This prompted an angry reaction from Melnychenko, who said
that Berezovsky had nothing to do with the financing of the procedures
to authenticate the recordings. But on March 28 the CLF stated that in
April 2002 it spent more than $115,000 to decipher Melnychenko’s
recordings in the United States and to publish them on the
Internet. As proof, the CLF produced a list of 16 fragments of
conversations in Kuchma’s office relating to Gongadze’s death; 14 of
them were posted on Ukrayinska pravda on March 31. Most of the
fragments are widely known and add nothing to the general picture;
they are also Russian translations of conversations spoken mostly in a
mixture of Ukrainian and Russian. As such, they can hardly serve as
convincing proof that Berezovsky has possession of the recordings.
On March 30 Berezovsky said that Melnychenko had given him all the
recordings he had. He said that U.S. experts had confirmed the
authenticity of the recordings that implicate not only Kuchma, but
also Putin. Berezovsky called the attitude of the new Ukrainian
government “strange” as, he said, Kuchma should have been officially
charged long ago. But Melnychenko issued a statement on the same day,
calling on the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) to “stop Berezovsky’s
illegal activities.” Melnychenko denied having ever passed his
recordings to Berezovsky and accused him of trying to “influence the
Ukrainian authorities for personal gain.” As is known, Berezovsky had
advertised his plans to come to Kyiv “within weeks,” but failed to
specify the goal of his visit. According to Melnychenko, Berezovsky
earlier in March offered him money for the recordings, but he turned
down the deal.
In response, Berezovsky’s aide Goldfarb accused Melnychenko of
conspiring with the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). On March
31 Goldfarb told Ukrayinska pravda that Melnychenko had visited Moscow
late last year. “They want Melnychenko’s recordings to be discredited
because they contain materials implicating Putin,” he said. And on
April 1 Berezovsky told Interfax-Ukraine that he is going to open a
whole Pandora’s box of compromising materials. Berezovsky said that
not all of Melnychenko’s recordings have yet been transcribed, and
that he also had “other similar materials from different sources.” “I
intend to publish the part of the recordings that deals with relations
between the previous Ukrainian government and the Russian government
implicating both in corruption,” he said.
Former FSB colonel Alexander Litvinenko, who is linked to Berezovsky,
revealed another sensation the same day. Speaking from London with
Interfax-Ukraine, Litvinenko said that Melnychenko had told him that
the bugging of Kuchma’s office had been organized by Yevhen Marchuk,
who was secretary of the National Security Council when Gongadze was
killed. Marchuk has denied this. But he is an easy target. None of the
known scandalous recordings reveals anything wrong about Marchuk;
furthermore in 1999, when the bugging apparently started, Marchuk ran
in presidential elections against Kuchma on an anti-corruption ticket.
Kyiv’s reaction to Berezovsky’s revelations has so far been calm. SBU
chief Oleksandr Turchynov said that his agency has started to check
Melnychenko’s accusations against Berezovsky. Previewing Yushchenko’s
U.S. visit, State Secretary Oleksandr Zinchenko has said that
Yushchenko is not planning to meet with Melnychenko
there. Prosecutor-General Sviatyslav Piskun, however, is expected to
meet with Melnychenko in the United States.
(Tribuna.com.ua, March 17; Ukrayinska pravda, March 18, 28, 31;
Korrespondent, March 19; Kievskiye vedomosti, March 29; Gazeta
Po-Kievski, Obozrevatel.com, March 30; Segodnya, Interfax-Ukraine,
Channel 5 TV, April 1; Den, April 2)
–Oleg Varfolomeyev
THE NORTH CAUCASUS SLIPS OUT OF CONTROL
The collapse of Askar Akayev’s regime in Kyrgyzstan, so similar to the
events in Georgia or Ajaria, has reinvigorated the debates simmering
in Moscow since the Orange Revolution in Kyiv: Is a revolution,
preferably of a “velvet” kind, possible in Russia? Opinions are
heavily on the “No” side, since the few liberal hopefuls are
convincingly destroyed by a cohort of skeptical “realists” and
condemned as “internal enemies” by an even better equipped legion of
mainstream commentators and pro-Kremlin political “technologists”
(Polit.ru, March 28, 30; Gazeta.ru, March 30). Putin definitely does
not seem invincible anymore, but the margin of safety built into his
regime remains anybody’s guess.
A theme that comes up only occasionally in these debates is that a
revolution of sorts has already begun; it is quite violent but so far
limited in scope, spreading across the North Caucasus like wildfire
(Ezhednedelny zhurnal, March 17). Chechnya is not the cause but rather
a catalyst of this smoldering rebellion, which has engulfed completely
Dagestan and Ingushetia, and partially Kabardino-Balkaria and
Karachaevo-Cherkessia, while North Ossetia is often under attack from
various directions. Daily news about a bridge exploding in Dagestan or
a shoot-out in Ingushetia have become so common that they capture
little attention even when they make it into newspapers or TV reports
(Lenta.ru, March 29; EDM, April 1).
Earlier this year, several clashes with militant groups surrounded in
Makhachkala, Dagestan, and Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria, did make
headlines, primarily due to indiscriminate use of heavy arms,
including tanks, in city quarters (vip.lenta.ru, January 15;
Ezhenedelny zhurnal, January 17). Public responses to these
“victories” were rather mixed, so the Federation Council in late March
approved changes in the Law on Defense that remove any restrictions on
the use of armed forces in counter-terrorist operations (Novaya
gazeta, March 28). Those restrictions had not prevented Russian
President Vladimir Putin from deploying army units, but the President
insists on tough and forceful counter-measures, which have to be
legitimized.
When Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev proudly reported about the
successes in the North Caucasus, Putin reprimanded him for using
confusing terms like “jamaat” and ordered him to call the terrorists
by their real name (Lenta.ru, February 21). This desire to simplify
the complex reality is very typical but “jamaat” in fact stands not
for a terrorist cell but for a grassroots religious organization that
performs many social functions. As Yulia Latynina, one of the sharpest
observers of brewing Caucasian instabilities, argues, the growth of
these organizations is a direct response to the state’s inability to
carry out its basic responsibilities (Ekho Moskvy, March 26). This
reduction of the state presence to just enforcement of its arbitrary
will and deep erosion of its authority are the natural results of the
progressive degradation of corrupt regimes in these republics,
resembling quite closely Akayev’s “family business” in Kyrgyzstan.
Putin has no strategy for checking this trend and his only pro-active
step was the appointment of Dmitry Kozak, one of the few capable
managers in the administration, as the presidential envoy in the
Southern District (Ekspert, October 20, 2004). For the last half year,
Kozak has been rushing from one hot spot to another, seeking to keep
the state structures functioning primarily by securing additional
transfers from the federal budget. He managed to defuse several
dramatically explosive situations, for instance when the angry crowd
stormed the government building in Cherkessk, Karachaevo-Cherkessia,
seeking to depose President Mustafa Batdyev (Kommersant, November 12,
2004; EDM, November 10, 2004). His every success, however, has only
pushed the problem deeper into the political underground, thus denying
the rather incoherent central efforts any chance for gaining public
support. As the meager results of the recent massive
search-and-destroy operation in Karachaevo-Cherkessia have indicated,
local authorities now prefer to find a way of coexisting with the
“jamaats” rather than confronting them (Nezavisimaya gazeta, March
14).
Putin continues to deny this discomforting reality and finds no
problem with weak and corrupt republican bosses, providing they remain
loyal. Meeting with Chechen president Alu Alkhanov in late March, he
approved very considerately the plans for holding parliamentary
elections in October as if these plans had not originated in the
Kremlin (Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 31). Elections have recently
proved to be risky business, but Putin is confident that glitches
might happen only in chaotic neighborhoods like Abkhazia, but inside
the country his electoral machine delivers without fail.
It is indeed very convenient to ignore the alarm signals that every
rigged election weakens rather then strengthens the authority of the
federal center and the republican presidents who are entirely
dependent upon it. The lesson from Ingushetia, where Murat Zyazikov
was practically installed by Moscow through a crudely manipulated
election and now can neither stop the spread of rebel networks nor
deal with public discontent, has obviously not registered
(Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 29). It is not just a chain of localized
conflicts that Moscow is facing in the North Caucasus; it is a more
disturbing process of disintegration of the structures of governance.
If there is a color to this rising revolution it is probably green,
since the violent but incorruptible Islamic “jamaats” are clearly
gaining in moral authority. It is not a slow spillover of violence but
rather the sheer political resonance from this march that threatens to
destroy Putin’s “vertical power structure.” As yet, the Kremlin has
not heard the political warning.
–Pavel K. Baev
RISKS IN GEORGIA’S JAVAKHETI PROVINCE CAN BE DEFUSED
Presidents Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia and Robert Kocharian of
Armenia met informally on April 1-2 in the Georgian mountain resort of
Gudauri, without media coverage. Their agenda included the situation
in Akhalkalaki, where two recent rallies by local Armenian residents
aired political and economic demands, notably for the retention of
Russia’s military base. Following the two presidents’ meeting,
Kocharian was quoted as saying, “The issue of withdrawal of Russian
bases is Georgia’s internal affair, for Georgia to resolve. Armenia
will not voice an official position.” Georgia’s National Security
Council Secretary Gela Bezhuashvili confirmed, “Armenia’s president is
not going to interfere” (Pan-Armenian Net, Civil Georgia, April 2).
A hitherto little-known organization, United Javakh, organized those
rallies on March 13 and March 31 in Akhalkalaki, the location of a
Russian military base, and seat of one of the two predominantly
Armenian-populated districts (the other is Ninotsminda) in
Samtskhe-Javakheti province. Several thousand attended the first
rally; for the second, attendance estimates ranged from less than
1,000 to several thousand. Georgia’s authorities are considering most
of the demands, though the first two demands appear designed as
nonstarters, include:
Russian military base to remain in Akhalkalaki; Georgian Parliament to
“recognize the genocide of Armenians” by the Ottoman Empire during the
First World War; Armenian language to be conferred official status, on
a par with the Georgian language, in the predominantly
Armenian-populated Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda districts; Armenian
history classes to be included in the curriculum of Armenian-language
schools, alongside the history of Georgia; School excursions to
Armenia to be sponsored by the authorities; Javakh diocese to be
created by the Armenian Church; Law on the protection of national
minority rights to be adopted by the Georgian parliament; Direct
elections to be held for local government; Passport services and tax
offices to be opened in Akhalkalaki; Customs checkpoints on the border
with Armenia to be set up near Akhalkalaki; Reconstruction of the road
along the Akhaltsikhe-Akhalkalaki-Ninotsminda-Armenian border to be
made a priority by the Georgian government; Georgian government to
sign contracts for supplying Javakheti with electricity from Armenia.
The two rallies appealed to Armenians worldwide and to Armenia’s
government to help relieve the economic situation of their kin in
Javakheti. They promised to use only legal means to attain those
goals. The question is whether those goals would escalate. The demand
for official language status was not aired at the first rally, but
made its appearance at the second.
Georgian authorities are handling the situation cautiously and
sensitively. Accommodating socio-economic demands would help defuse
the two potentially explosive political demands that top the list.
Between the two rallies, the Samtskhe-Javakheti governor (an ethnic
Georgian), the head of the Akhalkalaki administration, and the
parliamentary deputy for the Akhalkalaki district (both ethnic
Armenians), met with rally organizers and other local Armenian
activists, notably the youth and sports organization Jemi. It was
agreed to recommend that the government in Tbilisi should set up an
expert group that would draw up proposals to address most of those
issues, with participation of local Armenian groups.
The authorities have promised to meet some of the social and cultural
demands and seem inclined to meet most of them. Some of these issues
could be addressed within the country’s pending legislation, e.g., on
elections to local government, or on ratification of the Council of
Europe’s Framework Convention on the Protection of National
Minorities. Regarding road reconstruction, the Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki
road is a government priority. While Javakheti is difficult to access
because of its ruined infrastructure, its communications with Armenia
function relatively better than with the rest of Georgia. There are
very few Georgian-language schools in the areas compactly populated by
Armenians in this region.
The demand for genocide recognition, however, cannot be accepted
without launching Georgia on a collision course with Turkey and
Azerbaijan. The demand for retention of the Russian military base is
being encouraged by Moscow, which has in recent years orchestrated
managed protests in Abkhazia and Transnistria against the withdrawal
of Russian troops. Meanwhile, Russian media are stirring up among
local Armenians the irrational fear that Turkish troops would come in,
if Russian troops withdraw.
Georgian officials from Saakashvili on down have repeatedly assured
local Armenian employees of the Russian base, as well as locally
recruited military personnel at the Akhalkalaki base (many of whom are
also Armenians), that the Georgian state would re-employ them, once
the Russian garrison withdraws. They are also reassuring local
Armenians that only Georgian troops would replace Russian troops, if
these withdraw. Tbilisi is clearly aware of the need to be responsive
regarding socio-economic and cultural issues in order to defuse the
destabilizing, externally encouraged demand on retention of Russian
troops.
(Interfax, March 17, 18; Imedi TV, March 20; Noyan Tapan, March 22,
April 1; Arminfo, March 18, 23; Kavkasia-Press, March 23; NTV Mir,
March 27; Azg, April 2)
–Vladimir Socor
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