Agency WPS
What the Papers Say. Part B (Russia)
December 6, 2004, Monday
DUAL-PURPOSE VISIT
SOURCE: Kommersant, December 6, 2004, p. 9
by Boris Volkhonskii
President Putin tried to end his official visit to India (the third
in the past four years) in a major key. In New Delhi on Saturday, he
denied media reports that Russia allegedly supports India’s aim to
join the UN Security Council but opposes granting veto power to
India. President Putin noted that the veto power should either be
extended to all members of the UN Security Council, or invalidated
for all members. Putin said that the latter would decrease the UN’s
influence.
After that, Putin visited India’s “Silicon Valley” – the city of
Bangalore. This is the center of India’s advanced technologies. When
in Bangalore, Putin proposed to covert part of India’s debt into
joint ventures.
Putin did not forget that military technology cooperation is the main
aspect of cooperation between Russia and India. He observed flights
of planes and helicopters built by Hindustan Aeronautics and examined
the Sukhoi fighter assembled by the Indian enterprise under license
from Russia.
Russia and India reached an agreement to conduct a joint exercise for
their paratrooper units in 2005. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said
that the Indian Airborne Troops are equipped with Russian weapons and
military hardware.
President Putin arrived in Ankara after his visit to India. Relations
with Turkey are not as optimistic as cooperation with India. Before
the Russian leaders visited Turkey 32 years ago.
In the meantime, the current state of bilateral relations between
Moscow and Ankara reached the level when a political visit by the
Russian leader became very topical. It should be noted that trade
turnover between Russia and Turkey reached $4.6 billion in the first
half of 2004. It is intended that economic cooperation with Ankara
will amount to $10 billion at the end of the year (to compare: trade
turnover with India, other than military technology cooperation,
reached only $1.7 billion in 2003).
At the same time, the state of political relations leaves much to be
desired. Mutual reproached for supporting the separatist movements
aggravate relations between Moscow and Ankara. Some economic issues
have political aspects. First and foremost, this concerns energy and
energy resources. Moscow does not hide its negative attitude to the
plan to build pipelines from the Caspian region to Turkish ports
bypassing Russian territory.
Moscow and Ankara often dispute over tanker routes in the straits
between the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea.
These problems shed light on the goals of Putin’s visit. He intends
to sign the declaration on friendship and partnership in Ankara. In
addition, the Russian leader will sign a range of intergovernmental
documents and agreements. The anti-terrorist effort will become a
very important aspect of negotiations. Russia deleted the term
“international terrorism” and references to Chechnya from the text of
the joint declaration. However, it’s obvious that the Chechen issue
will be raised during negotiations. However, it’s hardly likely that
the parties will approve juridical documents: Turkey has grievances
against Russia regarding the presence of Kurdish separatists on
Russian territory.
In addition, Russia insists on the necessity of improving the
performance of the intergovernmental commission for cooperation in
the military technology sector. In particular, Russia will try to
convince Turkey to take Russian military hardware as repayment of its
debt ($350 million). Moscow also seeks to use the potential of the
Blackseafor group and create a counterweight to NATO in the Black Sea
on its basis.
The situation in the Trans-Caucasus region will also be raised. In
particular, President Putin will try to convince his Turkish
counterparts to give up plans to isolate Armenia by building the
Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi railroad bypassing Armenia.
The problems which Putin is trying to address in New Delhi and Ankara
have a very important aspect. This is an attempt to give an
“asymmetric response” to the hegemony of the US. Putin’s statements
in New Delhi concerned “dictatorship in international affairs” and
“attempts to restructure the God-given diversity of modern
civilization along the army barracks principles of a unipolar world.”
In addition, Putin announced the need for activating trilateral
cooperation between Russia, India and China. The Asian Age newspaper
states that a trilateral Russian-Indian-Chinese summit will be held
next year.
Attempts to build a certain center of forces in South-East Asia are
not new. At the same time, it’s a new phenomenon for Russia to
consider Turkey, which is a member nation of NATO, as an ally in the
new geopolitical layout. Russia has weighty reasons to do this. The
point is that Turkey is at a historical crossroads due to external
and internal factors. The issue of negotiations regarding Turkey’s
intention to join the EU has not been settled yet. In addition,
anti-American attidutes have become stronger in Turkey. All this
gives Russia a unique chance to play on this field.
In this regard, the visit to New Delhi and Ankara could become a
successful finale to 2004. At any rate, two joint declarations might
succeed in drowning out the echo of real foreign policy failures:
Ukraine, Abkhazia, the European Union and the CIS.
Translated by Alexander Dubovoi