Eurasianet.org
TURKEY CAUTIOUS ON POSSIBLE RAPPROCHEMENT OPENING TO ARMENIA
Mevlut Katik 11/17/04
An omission from Armenia’s draft 2005 budget has touched off speculation
that a rapprochement with Turkey may be in the offing. The missing line item
concerns Yerevan’s long-standing effort to win international recognition for
what Armenian officials portray as the genocide of 1915-16. Some observers
interpret the dropped genocide reference as an effort to extend an olive
branch to Turkey.
Even if the interpretation accurately reflects Yerevan’s intention, both
Armenian and Turkish officials indicate that they will proceed with extreme
caution in trying to end decades of mutual hostility. At the same time,
regional analysts say both states have powerful economic and political
incentives to explore ways to normalize bilateral relations. The
normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations has the potential to create a
new geopolitical order in the Caucasus.
After details of the Armenian draft budget became public, Turkish and
Azerbaijani media outlets in early November went into a frenzy of conjecture
on the implications of the genocide-recognition omission. Armenian officials
moved quickly to squash speculation that Yerevan was substantially changing
its position.
Yerevan contends that Ottoman Turkish forces systematically killed ethnic
Armenians in 1915-16. According to some Armenian estimates up to 1.5 million
of the 2.5 million Armenians then living in the Ottoman Empire died during
this timeframe. Ankara has recognized that Armenians died en masse, but says
Yerevan overstates the number of victims. In addition, Turkish officials
steadfastly deny that the deaths were the result of a coordinated government
policy, and, thus, the tragedy cannot be considered as a case of genocide as
defined by the 1948 Genocide Convention. Contemporary Turkish officials note
that the deaths occurred during World War I, adding that Armenians were
caught in the middle of the bitter fight going on at that time in the
Caucasus between Ottoman Turkish forces and Russian troops.
On November 9, the Arminfo news agency quoted Armenian Foreign Ministry
spokesman Gamlet Gasparian as insisting Yerevan’s stance on the genocide
issue had not changed. “The issue of international recognition of the
Armenian genocide does not concern only Armenia and the Armenians; this is a
universal issue and cannot be lessened to the limits of any budget or
similar financial documents,” Gasparian said.
The Turkish Foreign Ministry responded the next day, adopting a wait-and-see
stance. “”Except for the news reports, we have not received any official
information about such a change in Armenia’s [genocide-recognition] stance,”
the Anatolia news agency quoted Foreign Ministry spokesman Namik Tan as
saying.
Turkish officials say the genocide issue is just one of several obstacles
blocking the normalization of bilateral relations. Other issues, including
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, also must be addressed before Ankara can
fully repair its relationship with Yerevan, they add. Turkey has staunchly
backed Azerbaijan during the stalemated search for a Karabakh peace
settlement. Ankara, for example, is maintaining a trade embargo on Armenia
until Armenian forces withdraw from occupied Azerbaijani territory situated
outside Karabakh proper. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight
archive].
Another factor influencing the normalization question is Turkey’s bid the
join the European Union. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Representatives of the Armenian Diaspora in France are reportedly putting
pressure on the French government to withhold its approval for Turkish
membership in the EU until Ankara addresses Yerevan’s genocide claim.
While the obstacles to normalization appear formidable, regional economic
circumstances are exerting strong pressure on all parties involved to
compromise. For Turkey and Azerbaijan, a Karabakh peace settlement would
boost the profit potential of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which is
scheduled to start conveying natural resources from the Caspian Basin to
Western markets in 2005. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight
archive]. The normalization of ties between Turkey and Armenia also would
reassure EU member states as they contemplate Ankara’s entry into the
organization.
The pressure on Armenia to alter the status quo may even be stronger. Some
analysts believe it is in Armenia’s vital economic interest to secure the
lifting of Turkey’s embargo, thus opening up avenues for trade needed to
fuel continued Armenian development. Other observers point out that
normalization of ties with Turkey would aid Armenia’s effort to improve
relations with NATO and, in a broader sense, the West. [For additional
information see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Armenia’s draft 2005 budget contained language urging the government to take
action to improve ties with Georgia, Iran and Turkey, Arminfo reported.
Thus, the omission of the genocide reference in the same document may well
represent the start of a process by Armenia to search for common ground with
Turkey.
Many policy-makers and opinion-makers in Turkey remain skeptical over
whether the genocide-recognition omission in the Armenian budget represents
an initiative to engage Turkey on the issue. The general consensus appears
to be that Turkish leaders should wait and see if Yerevan takes any
follow-up action before buying into the notion that Armenia is truly open to
altering its stance on the genocide issue.
If a rapprochement eventually comes about, the geopolitical landscape in the
Caucasus could be significantly altered. Armenia has traditionally been
Russia’s strongest ally in the Caucasus. [For additional information see the
Eurasia Insight archive]. The normalization of Turkish-Armenian ties, which
would presumably accompany a Karabakh peace settlement, could prompt Armenia
to reorient Armenian political and economic policies towards the West, or,
at the very least, weaken the special relationship now binding Yerevan to
Moscow.
The potential ramifications of the genocide-recognition omission do not seem
to have been lost on Russia, which, in recent months, has expressed
displeasure in various ways over Armenian diplomatic efforts to balance
Yerevan’s relations with Moscow with improved ties with the West. [For
additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].
During a public appearance November 10, the Russian ambassador to Armenia,
Anatoly Dryukov, appeared to discourage Armenia from getting too close to
the West.
Referring to the recent efforts to by Armenian leaders to cultivate better
ties to the West, Dryukov said: “If Armenia prioritizes its national
interests, then the vector of relations [i.e. Armenia’s special relationship
with Russia] will remain correct,” the Mediamax news agency reported.
Editor’s Note: Mevlut Katik is a London-based journalist and analyst. He is
a former BBC correspondent and also worked for The Economist group