NATO’s Caucasus policy not against Russia – US researcher

NATO’s Caucasus policy not against Russia, US researcher tells Armenian agency

Mediamax news agency, Yerevan
18 Oct 04

A senior US researcher has said that NATO’s cooperation with countries
of the South Caucasus and Central Asia is not directed against
Russia. In an exclusive interview with Mediamax news agency, he said
that the organization wants “to help anchor these countries to the
West, reduce the likelihood of future conflicts developing in this
region… and eliminate new threats to our security that could emerge,
especially from further south in the wider Middle East”. Ronald
D. Asmus called on NATO to pursue “a dual track strategy where it
expands its outreach to this region and tries to deepen its
cooperation with Moscow in parallel”. He told the agency that NATO’s
cooperation with each individual country depends on the latter’s
“performance”. “NATO responds to those partners who are performing,
domestically in terms of democratic reforms at home as well as
strategic cooperation in foreign policy,” he added. He urged Armenia
to improve its ties with Turkey, “an important and valued NATO ally”,
as this would allow it to deepen relations with NATO. The following is
the text of the report in English by the Armenian news agency
Mediamax; subheadings have been inserted editorially:

An exclusive interview with Ronald D. Asmus, Senior Transatlantic
Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States, [Adjunct Senior
Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations] former deputy assistant
secretary of state for European affairs in the Clinton administration
(1997-2000), to the Armenian Mediamax news agency.

[Correspondent] In your opinion, what is the activation of
Armenia-NATO relations conditioned by?

[Asmus] I don’t think it would be appropriate for me to try to
interpret Armenian foreign policy motivations. But I can talk about
why there is a growing interest in the West and in NATO in a wider
Black Sea region and Armenia. And, in a nutshell, the case goes as
follows. The main strategic challenge the Alliance faced in the 1990s
was to eliminate the potential causes of future conflicts on the
continent in the wake of the collapse of communism and the Soviet
Union. The West sought to do so by halting ethnic war in the Balkans,
anchoring and integrating Central and Eastern Europe in the West
through EU and NATO enlargement and by seeking to build a new and
cooperative relationship with Russia. That was the agenda of the
1990s.

Today much of that agenda has been fulfilled. That part of Europe
where two world wars and the Cold War originated are now democratic,
peaceful and secure. And the impact of the terrorist attacks of the
11th of September has shifted the strategic focus of the Alliance
eastward and southward. It is after all, from the broader Middle East
that the greatest threats to western security are now likely to
originate.

Looking into the future, one can suggest that one of the greatest
challenges facing the Alliance over the next decade is to stabilize
the southern flank of the Euro-Atlantic community starting with a
final settlement in the Balkans and extending through the wider Black
Sea region into Central Asia. It is an important goal in its own right
but also with an eye toward major strategic challenges confronting us
in the wider Middle East. Moreover, many of the countries in this
region themselves are now seeking a closer relation sip with
institutions like the EU and NATO. It is not a secret, for example,
that many leaders in Georgia have been inspired by the successful
example of the Baltic states successfully integrating themselves into
the West.

NATO is therefore now starting to debate whether it should make the
anchoring of this region to the West a top priority and how it can or
should pursue that goal. Last year I led a project at the German
Marshall Fund of the United States that brought together a team of
American and Europeans experts to try to sketch out what such a
strategy could and should look like. It is one of several
contributions to this emerging debate. Your readers can find that
paper on our web site at

West concerned about Russia’s “authoritarian direction”

[Correspondent] Will Armenia be able to maintain the balance between
preserving close relations with Russia and striving for further
integration into NATO?

[Asmus] It is of course up to Armenia to decide what kind of
relationship it wants to have with NATO as well as with Russia. For
the last decade NATO has been trying to build a new and cooperative
NATO-Russia relationship where we can work together in pursuit of
common security objectives. It has not been easy and we are not as far
as many of us had originally hoped. And we must note that today
relations are not getting easier as there is growing concern in the
West over the authoritarian direction in which Russia is headed.

That said, let’s go back to what Western objectives are. Our goal is
or should be to extend the zone of peace and security in the
Euro-Atlantic community to the wider Black Sea region. We want to help
anchor these countries to the West, reduce the likelihood of future
conflicts developing in this region and to be better prepared to
confront and eliminate new threats to our security that could emerge,
especially from further south in the wider Middle East. None of this
is aimed against Russia. Indeed, I would argue that in principle
Moscow should share these goals as a major Black Sea power. I believe
that the Alliance needs to try to pursue a dual track strategy where
it expands its outreach to this region and tries to deepen its
cooperation with Moscow in parallel. It is clearly in our as well as
Armenia’s interest that we succeed in doing so.

NATO wants “more regional security”, not dividing lines

[Correspondent] Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan said: “If it
happens so that Georgia and Azerbaijan become NATO members at last and
Armenia not, this will obviously bring about the appearance of new
separation lines in the Caucasus.” Are such fears justified?

[Asmus] My view is that NATO should want to reach out and deepen its
cooperation with countries in the region in a way that enhances the
security of the region as a whole. After all, the goal here is to
produce more regional security, not create new dividing lines. The
Alliance will undoubtedly be sensitive to the need to expand
cooperation in a way that helps and does not undercut the security of
other countries. We faced this question many times in Central and
Eastern Europe in the 1990s and always found ways of resolving these
issues.

At the same time, the Alliance is also not going to forgo or hold back
on cooperation just because another country may find it a bit awkward
or inconvenient. Sometimes moving forward with one or another country
can provide an inducement for other countries to reorient themselves
and also step up their cooperation. If the prospect of closer ties
between the West and Georgia also encourages Armenia to step up its
ties with us that is not necessarily a bad thing, in my view.

NATO membership depends on “performance”

[Correspondent] We can very often come across comments in the West
that NATO should forget about Armenia and pay special attention to
Georgia and Azerbaijan. What do you think about this?

[Asmus] NATO deals with countries on an individual basis. It is a core
principle of the Alliance thinking that no third country has a veto
over how NATO pursues its relations with any partner. Obviously NATO
also takes into account how its dealings with one country can affect
regional concerns and stability as well. In addition, NATO also takes
into account a country’s aspirations. Georgia and Azerbaijan have
declared their aspiration to eventually become members of the
alliance. Armenia today has not.

But the most important factor is performance. You can have the right
aspirations but if a country is not performing those declarations
won’t get you very far. NATO responds to those partners who are
performing domestically in terms of democratic reforms at home as well
as strategic cooperation in foreign policy. Look at how the West
responded to the Rose Revolution and the prospect for a democratic
breakthrough in Georgia. The history of the last decade has shown that
the most important factor in accelerating relationships between and
the Alliance is often domestic democratic reforms and the embrace of
those values that NATO represents and is pledged to defend.

NATO-Armenian ties to deepen after rapprochement with Turkey

[Correspondent] Do you agree with the point of view that NATO is ready
to go as far in its relations with Armenia as Armenia itself is ready
for it?

[Asmus] One of the advantages we have today compared to the early
1990s is that NATO now has a decade of experience in how to use
Partnership tools and programs to build relations with non-members
like Armenia. Moreover, NATO has set up these programs in a manner
that a partner country like Armenia can itself help determine the pace
or scope of cooperation. One of the points we made in the GMF strategy
paper on the wider Black Sea region was that the Prague summit gave us
new tools for building such cooperation. There are plenty of talented
people at NATO headquarters willing and able to build expanded
cooperation if the political will to do so exists on both sides. Of
course Armenia has to meet the political requirements for expanded
cooperation as well.

[Correspondent] Don’t you think that the unsettled Armenian-Turkish
relations has a negative effect on Armenia’s cooperation with NATO?

[Asmus] I am not an expert on Armenia’s public opinion. But progress
towards Turkish-Armenian reconciliation would be a very positive thing
first and foremost for the peoples of both nations as well as for
regional stability. Good neighbourly relations are at the core of the
kind of cooperative security that the alliance is all
about. Obviously, an improved Turkish-Armenian rapprochement would
make it easier to deepen NATO-Armenian relations as well. Turkey is an
important and valued NATO ally. Its importance is on the increase
given the new priority the Alliance attaches both to the wider Black
Sea region as well as the wider Middle East. I very much hope that
both sides will make this a priority in the years ahead.

South Caucasus and Central Asia belong to different “baskets”

[Correspondent] Don’t you think that NATO is not quite right to
consider the regions of the South Caucasus and Central Asia in one
plane? Taking into account serious differences between these regions,
especially different problems in the security sphere, won’t the
individualized approach to each of these regions be more effective?

[Asmus] I agree, NATO needs to modernize its approach in this
regard. I am among those arguing that the West needs to rethink how it
approaches the region. That is why I have been referring to the wider
Black Sea region. Putting the South Caucasus and Central Asia in the
same basket no longer makes sense given the different aspirations of
countries in these regions and the new strategic context. It is a
bureaucratic habit or way of thinking that is increasingly
anachronistic and which we now need to move beyond. I think it is only
a matter of time before the alliance does so.

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