Background Briefing by a Senior Administration Official On President
Bush’s Trip to Turkey
Conrad Istanbul, Istanbul, Turkey
WASHINGTON, June 27 /PRNewswire/ —
7:10 P.M. (Local)
MR. McCLELLAN: We’ve got a background briefing here with a senior
administration official, who will walk you through some of the
meetings earlier today, as well as give you a look ahead to the NATO
summit. And with that, I will turn it over to our senior
administration official.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good evening, everyone. I’ll walk
through the meetings in Ankara today, and a couple in Istanbul this
afternoon. And then I’ll give you a preview of the events tomorrow. I
may be joined by another colleague a little bit later who can give
more detail about the NATO meetings.
The President today saw Prime Minister Erdogan and President Sezer of
Turkey. These were two separate meetings, followed by a lunch in
which President Sezer and Prime Minister Erdogan were both present.
He then — we then arrived in Istanbul, where the President met with a
group of Turkish religious leaders, both the Turkish government head
of the — basically, the minister for religious affairs, an Istanbul
Islamic cleric, the senior rabbi of Istanbul, the head of the Syriac,
head of the Armenian churches, and of course, most — of great
importance, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, who is first among
equals among Eastern Orthodox churches in the world.
That was followed by a meeting between the President and NATO
Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer, which is the first of the
President’s NATO events.
I’d like to characterize a little bit the discussions with the Turks
today. These were very good meetings. They were held against the
background of the very intense period we went through with Turkey,
starting in late 1992, and of course, you all remember the issue of
Iraq which came up. There was a Turkish vote not to allow U.S. troops
to pass through Turkey. Later there was a vote in the Parliament, in
the Turkish Parliament, to offer Turkish troops for Iraq, but by that
time the Iraqi Governing Council was not interested in having Turkish
troops there. So there were, in the end, no Turkish troops. There
was a lot of back-and-forth between the United States and Turkey in
the past.
These meetings today made clear that whatever the differences U.S.
and Turkish governments had over Iraq, from this point forward — and
both the Turkish President and the Turkish Prime Minister in their
meetings made this clear — from this moment forward, Turkey sees its
interests and the American interests in Iraq as parallel and
consistent. That is, the Turks made clear that they want a stable,
successful Iraq, at peace with itself, at peace with its neighbors, an
Iraq that is democratizing, an Iraq that respects minorities. Turks
made this clear.
The Turks — of course, the Turks and the Turkish leaders and the
President discussed issues such as the territorial integrity of Iraq.
And the President made clear that this is something of critical
importance to the United States.
They discussed Kurdish issues. The Turks made clear their concern
about PKK activities — PKK is, as you know, a terrorist organization
which has operated against Turks for a number of years. There are PKK
— PKK does operate out of Iraq, and we made it clear that we consider
the PKK a terrorist organization, and want to work with Turkey to
eliminate the threat of terrorism and the danger to Turkey that it
represents.
The leaders also talked about Cyprus, and the President expressed his
thanks to Turkey for its extraordinarily constructive and creative
attitude, which almost — which brought us closer to a Cyprus
settlement than we have been in the 40 — in the 30 years since the
division of the island in 1974. This was a very near thing. The
U.N. came up with a very good plan that Kofi Annan managed. Turkey
and the Turkish Cypriot community supported it. The Greek Cypriot
community did not. But Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots did a lot to
advance this process. The President expressed both his determination
to work with all the parties to try to achieve a settlement on the
basis of the Annan plan, but also expressed his real gratitude to
Turkey for what it had done and made clear that, in accordance with
the U.N. recommendations, that Turkish Cypriots no longer be subject
to isolation, that they have really done what the world asked — what
the international community, what the world asked of them, and this
needs to be recognized.
The leaders also talked about the broader Middle East, and of course
Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan had gone to Sea Island, to weigh in in
support of this initiative. Turkey is a secular democracy with a
majority Muslim population, and a history of tolerance. It is a
successful democracy. It is rapidly reforming itself to meet the
standards for EU accession. And in this way, although it is not,
strictly speaking, a model for countries of the broader Middle East,
it is certainly an example of what secular democracy — how secular
democracy can flourish. And it is an example of the compatibility of
Islam and democracy, which was the title of a conference a few months
ago in this city. So they discussed their common vision of the need
to support reform and reformers in the broader Middle East.
I’ll say a word about the President’s meeting with religious leaders,
but I must start with a confession. Due to motorcade issues, some of
us were enjoying a wonderful tour of historic Istanbul rather than
actually making it to the meeting. So I can tell you about the
thinking leading up to the meeting, but other than a brief
characterization that it went, “very well,” I can’t say much more
about it.
The purpose of the meeting was to point out that in a society — in a
secular but majority Muslim society like Turkey’s, it’s important to
recognize the contribution of minority groups and minority religions,
and to recognize that these people are a constituent part of — very
much of this city for centuries, and a couple of millennia, in some
cases, and that this is a part of the tolerant future which we all
seek.
It was a very — I asked how the meeting went; I was told very well. I
don’t want to describe a meeting that I was not — that I neither
attended, nor have great details about. The President’s meeting with
Yaap de Hoop Scheffer was a terrific meeting, and I should say,
characterizing events of tomorrow, that we are closing rapidly on a
number of real strong deliverables and achievements for NATO, both
long-range and short-range. And I think that colored the atmosphere of
the meeting.
One more point about Turkey. I should mention that the President, of
course, expressed his sympathies over the fate of the three Turkish
workers that have been kidnapped and threatened with death. The
President made clear that this episode demonstrates the kind of an
enemy we are fighting, a totalitarian enemy which terrorizes and seeks
to export chaos to the world, as well as chaos in Iraq. This is a
terrible situation. There have been others like it. And the
President said that it is important that the international community
unite and defeat these groups and these people.
Q Is that a direct quote from him?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that is not a direct quote. That
is my miserable paraphrase.
Q That was in the meeting with —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is the meeting — this came up in
the meeting with Sezer, and I believe — I recall with Erdogan, as
well.
Now, tomorrow, again —
Q — do you have any kind of quote for that — terrible situation
wasn’t a direct —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that was — I’m not giving you a
direct quote.
Now, tomorrow. You may have the good fortune — we may have the good
fortune to be joined by another senior administration official who is
even more well-versed than I in the details of what will happen
tomorrow, but in his absence, let me go through a few of the items
that you may want to look for.
We are very likely to have an agreement on a training mission in Iraq.
I suspect that there will be three parts to the decision on Iraq, and
three things for you to look for. One is a NATO statement on Iraq, a
separate NATO statement. That statement, if it is agreed — and
again, in NATO, it isn’t done until it’s done, believe me — if that
statement is agreed, it will contain a positive answer to the request
from Prime Minister Allawi for training, and it is possible that it
will contain a second mandate for NATO to study possible further steps
in support of Iraqi security. But again, look for the statement
tomorrow and look for the wording on both of those things.
NATO is also likely to agree about ISAF expansion. It is very likely
we will have the commitments necessary for the first stage of ISAF
expansion beyond Kabul. Look also for an Istanbul declaration which
in lieu of a communique. There will be a communique, but probably
none of you will read it, and in terms of style, at least, I cannot
say that that is a mistake. It’s got lots of content, but it is, like
all communiques, a difficult read. The Istanbul Declaration, however,
is much shorter, and I do commend it to you on grounds of both style
and substance. If it is agreed, it will be a very good summary of how
NATO is changing to meet the challenge of the 21st century, which is a
transformation which ought to be of considerable interest to you,
because it rather definitively answers the question, well, what is
NATO going to do now.
This is a question which has been asked for — many times since the
end of the Cold War, and it is very clear from this Istanbul
Declaration that NATO, in fact, has come to a solid policy consensus
about what its roles and missions are.
Now, I should say that all policy consensus is — develops over time
as it is realized, and so I don’t want to suggest that from now on
there will never be debates at NATO. Of course not. But it is
important to see how far NATO has come in recognizing that its
classing mission of collective defense needs to be realized in new
ways to meet new challenges, that is, the challenges of the
post-September 11th world. There was a tremendous debate after
September 11th as to whether NATO was an appropriate instrument to
take on these challenges. There were some said — some said it was;
some said it wasn’t. NATO has now decided that that, indeed, is going
to be its mission.
That is a tremendous achievement, and an achievement, by the way,
which should be seen in light of the very difficult debates over Iraq
of last year. Many journalists, reflecting a widely held, if not
fully accurate belief, wrote about the end of NATO or fatal divisions
in the transatlantic alliance. So when you read the Istanbul
Declaration, keep this in mind.
Another achievement to look for is NATO’s contribution to the broader
Middle East initiative. You may recall that this initiative has
generated a lot of ink, and I will indulge a pet peeve of mine — most
of that ink has been devoted to explaining why it has been watered
down, cut back, vitiated or shrunk. And in fact, it was launched at
Sea Island a few weeks ago in very much its original shape. The EU
signed on to this initiative with a statement about reform in the
broader Middle East a couple of days ago, and now NATO is going to
contribute its part to this overall initiative through an outreach
program to offer cooperation to the countries of the region, very much
inspired in its practical aspects by the Partnership for Peace, very
successfully launched 10 years ago.
Finally, NATO will mark its decision to successfully end its mission
in Bosnia, which has gone on for nine years. It will be handing over
that mission to the EU in what is not the first, but is the first
significant test of the European — the ESDP, the European Security
and Defense Policy. This handover should take place at the end of the
year. NATO will retain a small mission in Bosnia with some
specialized functions, but the bulk of the work will go to the EU.
Finally, day after tomorrow, there will be a NATO-Ukraine summit. The
emphasis there is twofold. One, we think — we, NATO — think Ukraine
is important and a valuable partner, and, two, democracy in Ukraine is
important and Ukraine-NATO relations will depend on the state of
democracy in that country, in particular how the elections unfold.
There will not be a NATO- Russia summit; however there will be a
NATO-Russia ministerial. Foreign Minister Lavrov will be here;
Secretary Powell will represent the United States. There will be a
Euro Atlantic Partnership Council meeting at the summit level, in
which President Bush will, of course, take part, and the Euro Atlantic
Partnership Council brings together NATO’s partners.
Now, I will leave it there, that general overview. And again, if we
are lucky enough to be joined by my more knowledgeable colleague, I’m
sure you’ll get more, and you’ll have a great time comparing the
differences, if any.
Questions, please.
Q What do you mean when you say that they may reach agreement on
possible discussing further steps for security, opening the door for
NATO possibly sending peacekeeping forces in the future?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don’t want to speculate about
that. If we get there, the language will speak for itself, and
there are a lot of things that NATO may want to do. We have to see
how this develops. NATO — it is — it was regarded as heresy that
NATO would ever do anything as exotic as a mission thousands of
miles away from its — what was regarded as its classic theater of
operations in Central Europe. The fact that NATO is in Afghanistan
and is taking on a major task, which is the training of a national
army of some size, is pretty big stuff.
What you’re referring to is a possible decision for NATO to study even
more things it might do for Iraq as the training mission unfolds. I
don’t want to speculate as to what that may be. But this is pretty
big stuff, especially in light of the debates.
Q What was the time line given, and what’s the understanding among
NATO members about how long the commitment will be to train and equip
Iraq’s security forces?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First, we just received the request
from the Iraqi government — today is Sunday — it came to NATO, I
believe, on Monday or Tuesday. So it’s less than a week. We have a
lot of work to do to find out what the Iraqi needs are, specifically
what they have in mind, what NATO can offer. This is a big deal. But
I believe that NATO will agree that this is an urgent mission and it’s
got to be carried out fast. What “fast” means I wouldn’t want to say,
because if I said that it meant I knew what precisely would happen and
when, and I don’t because NATO has to work with the Iraqis. A lot of
thinking is being done, but I don’t want to get into the details.
Q Dr. Rice said this morning that NATO has not specific training
mechanism itself, and so the training would actually be done by
individual countries. Can you spell out what is NATO actually doing?
Is it facilitating this? Is it a headquarters for this?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, NATO — Dr. Rice was pointing
out that NATO is an alliance of nations, and that NATO, itself, as an
alliance has very few multinational forces that are truly
multinational. But there is a tremendous difference between NATO
individual nations doing — running individual national programs, and
NATO as an alliance developing a training program as an alliance.
Q What is that difference?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The difference is that would be a
coherent program run by NATO, even though individual countries would
be doing pieces of that. The difference is important, whether it’s 26
programs all running around, or one program that’s being carried out.
And we have to work through the details, but this is a NATO decision
that we’re looking at.
Of course, Dr. Rice was accurate, but I’m giving you the sense of
where we are.
Q — something that needs to be done fast, if we’re talking about NATO
starting from scratch and developing a program, what’s the time line
we’re looking at on that?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as I said, I country discuss the
time line because I don’t know what it is. But it is certainly not
true the national programs are necessarily faster. In fact, if your
objective is to train the Iraqi army to help provide security for
Iraqi citizens, you do want a coherent training program rather than
lots of training programs. I mean, just logically. So that’s what we
have in mind.
Q How do you plan to deal with the PKK terror, and when, especially
after the June 30th deadline?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I’m sorry, I missed that. Could you
repeat the question?
Q PKK terror — how do you plan to deal with the PKK terror, and when?
And what’s going to happen after the June 30th deadline?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there are some — the United
States has made clear that the PKK is a terrorist organization and
that KONGRA-GEL, its latest name, is simply part of the same old
terrorist organization. We’re working with the Iraqi government and
we are working with Turkey on a variety of means to end this threat,
this terrorist threat. We take it very seriously. I have to say that
the Turkish leaders were quite firm and quite clear, and the President
appreciated both their candor and their determination to work with us.
But for various reasons, some of them obvious, I don’t want to say
exactly what we will do, and when.
Q On that, is the U.S. passing the ball to Iraqi interim government,
or the Iraqi-Kurdish forces, or does the U.S. remain to be primarily
responsible for the removal of PKK from Iraq?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would not put it that way. Clearly,
the sovereign Iraqi government that takes power after June 30th is an
important player in all of this. They are the government. They need
to be a part of the solution, working very closely with Turkey,
working very closely with the multinational force inside Iraq. And
that is all to the good. If our common objective is the end of a
terrorist threat against Turkey, and a terrorist threat, therefore,
against — more generally, the Iraqi government is to be a good
partner.
The Iraqi defense and foreign ministers are here, and I suspect that
this will come up in the discussions between Foreign Minister Zebari
and Foreign Minister Gul. That’s speculation, but I suspect that will
be discussed.
Q Dr. Rice was on TV this morning saying that Prime Minister Allawi
wants to bring back some former members of Saddam’s regime to — for
part of the security forces. Does the United States support this
idea?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I will not go into that because I
don’t do Iraq. And especially since my boss has commented, I think it
would be foolish, as well as — foolish on several grounds to explore
that further.
Q Back on the training, is that happening inside Iraq, as well as
outside in neighboring countries?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Fair question. This was one of the
issues discussed at NATO. The Iraqi request was for training inside
Iraq. Since you’ve seen Prime Minister Allawi’s letter, I assume you
know that that was explicitly asked for. And the question — the
thing to look for is whether NATO responds directly to that request.
I’m familiar with the discussions, yes, it takes place inside Iraq.
That was the request, and I believe that NATO will decide to answer
that request.
Q In spite of what the Germans have said, Chancellor Schroeder has
said that he doesn’t believe the German troops should be — German
troops should be inside Iraq training.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that’s quite true, and the
German position has been clear from the outset. I don’t believe that
the German position is going to change. We have never insisted the
Germans have to go back to Iraq. We respect the German —
Q — as part of this training mission?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is now — training can take
place inside. The question was, does training take place inside? And
I said, yes. But I did not say the training would take place outside.
All right? Now, wait — I mean, there is some kind of training that
logically does take place outside: training of officer — long-term
officer training takes place outside. The Germans are already doing
police training; that takes place outside. A comprehensive training
program, if one designed it without regard to any national position
and without regard to the last 18 months of debate, would, naturally,
have elements inside, outside, it would have short-term, near-term,
troop training, embedding officers, schooling, all kinds of things.
And there is nothing — if NATO has a coherent training operation,
it’s certainly true that individual countries can contribute as long
as it’s consistent and part of an overall plan. So this is not an
attempt to jam the Germans. We respect their position.
Q Just to be very clear, then. You’re saying that some amount of
training would happen inside Iraq, and some of that would happen
outside?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, sure. That’s right.
Q How would what Petraeus is doing inside Iraq, what you have the
Jordanians doing in Jordan, how would those two operations be part of
a coherent NATO training program? Would you bring those under the
NATO umbrella?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is actually an excellent
question, and it’s — oh, it is because that’s exactly the kind of
question that NATO is going to have to work out. So, what are the
command and control elements, how do you put these things together,
how do you link it up with the Iraqi chain of command with NATO, with
Petraeus, those are all good questions. I can’t give you a precise
answer, except I will give you a sense that we are well aware of the
need to make sure that this is linked up in some fashion.
I don’t want to suggest how that might happen in great detail. But
that’s a fair question, and I think the result will be integration of
some kind. I don’t want to say how. But we’re all aware of that, and
you’ve hit on one of the things that NATO is going to be working with.
Q As far as you’re concerned, you’re ready to do that, let Petraeus
maybe answer to a larger command?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don’t want to get into the precise
details except to suggest that we’re all aware of the need to have
this work. I don’t want to get ahead of myself and give you precise
answers before there are precise answers. I’ll give you a sense that
that’s a good question, we’re all aware of it.
Q Can you characterize the response from Erdogan and Sezer on the
Turkish — the kidnapped Turkish workers, to the President’s
sympathies?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I generally don’t like to characterize
the positions of other governments, but the sense I had was
determination on their part, as well as genuine human concern for the
fate of the workers. I think that’s a fair characterization. I don’t
want to go too much further.
Q One more. The Armenian Orthodox Patriarch said he gave the
President a letter. I know that you weren’t in the meeting, you got a
very brief description, but he got — he said he was giving the
President a letter, he said he was denouncing violence in general.
Has the President have a chance to read the letter? Has he received
the letter? What can you tell us about it?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can’t say. I really can’t say. I
do know that the head of the Armenian church here has had a good
history in the issue of reconciliation. He’s regarded as a very
positive, serious person. That’s a very general statement. So for
what’s that worth, I offer it.
Q — the religious leaders. Why did you miss it? You say there were
motorcade issues? Was it security problems, protestors, anything —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, no. There were no — certainly no
protestors that I saw. It was motorcade — the motorcade was slow,
and by the time I got to the meeting, the question was, do I barge in
in the middle of the meeting, or since the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey
was there, do I let him take the notes and give me a readout, and I
decided not to barge in. That’s all there was.
Q The motorcade wasn’t slowed down by security —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, certainly — certainly not. It
ran rather smoothly, but it’s — we were going through an old part of
town. You don’t race through it at 90 miles an hour.
Q Could you please talk about what Prime Minister Allawi means by
technical assistance, and will that be part of the agreement,
something that will be announced in the next couple of days? And
secondly, could you please elaborate what the President meant when he
said that he wants to make sure that NATO is configured militarily to
meet the threats of the 21st century?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The last one I can answer fairly
easily. NATO no longer has to worry about the Soviet army rolling
through the central plains of Europe. Yet NATO national armies are
only in the beginning process of transformation. Some of the NATO new
members have radically transformed their armies, but they haven’t had
the financial resources to do as much as they like. Some of the
pre-1989 NATO members have very good plans, they know what needs to be
done, but they’re not there, either. NATO has to develop forces like
the rapid reaction force, which was agreed to at the Prague summit,
and get these forces ready to do what needs to be done for the
future. That’s what it means.
With respect to technical assistance, look, take a look at the text in
the NATO agreement when it comes out. The Iraqi Foreign Minister and
Defense Minister are here, so you might ask them. Allawi is, clearly,
in my limited experience with him, is clearly capable of saying what
he wants and what he doesn’t want, and I think technical assistance
means a support and support in the context of training. But he also
wants — I think he wants NATO to look at other ways in which it can
be helpful, and that’s what NATO will be doing if we reach agreement.
Q But excuse me, sir, are we talking about helicopters, or —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can’t get into that because I have
to see. We don’t have — there’s no annex to the letter, a list of
the things that he wants. I think we’re going to be developing it
with the Iraqis, but I can’t — I don’t want to speculate about how
NATO will go about fulfilling its mandate if, indeed, it reaches
agreement tomorrow or the next day.
MR. McCLELLAN: — just a couple more.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay, right. Yes, sir.
Q You had mentioned that the interim Iraqi defense and foreign
ministers are here. Who did they meet with, and how were — how did
those meetings go?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The foreign minister — they were
invited by the Turkish Foreign Minister, I believe. And there was an
informal meeting of the NATO foreign ministers with the Iraqi interim
foreign minister this evening. I don’t have a readout of that
meeting. I also believe that the Iraqi defense minister was going to
meet in an informal setting with the NATO defense ministers, also,
this evening. I don’t have a readout of that, either.
Q Those meetings have not taken place?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They are taking place now. I don’t
have any readout. If my more knowledgeable senior administration
official colleague does make it here, he may have more information for
you. I’m giving you what I’ve got.
MR. McCLELLAN: It does not look like he’s going to make it here.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, alas, it doesn’t. You’ve had to
make due with me. I am sorry.
Q Afghanistan?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes?
Q So NATO is going to make a commitment on Afghanistan. They made a
commitment previously which they did not deliver 100 percent on.
What’s different about this one?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: NATO does have about 5,800 troops
right now in Kabul as part of ISAF and it is now moving outside of
ISAF. You should ask for details from people who know them more —
better than I do. But by my understanding, ISAF is going out of Kabul
in stages, and I believe that NATO will be in a position — believe —
that NATO will be in a position to announce it has sufficient forces
to launch stage one, which is an expansion to the North, through PRGs,
these provincial reconstruction teams, and that it will start to work
on assembling the forces for stage two expansion.
So how you play — how you interpret this depends on which angle you
look at it from. Would I like there to be more NATO forces and make
this easy? Sure. On the other hand, the fact that NATO is able to do
this at all, given the fact that a few years ago, only obscure
academics even considered the possibility of NATO out of area this
far, means that NATO has come a long way.
You can — you have both. It’s not — the truth isn’t in between, the
truth is both, that NATO needs to do more to have the capabilities to
set these things up more easily, but also, NATO has come a tremendous
way in terms of taking on new responsibilities and carrying out
missions that it didn’t know it would be dealing with a few years ago.
So I consider this — I consider this a major summit. And I will end
with a final thought, that this is the first NATO summit that is
dealing almost exclusively with NATO’s future role dealing with future
21st century challenges. What NATO is discussing, and what most of
our discussion this evening has been about, is about things like
Afghanistan and Iraq and NATO’s transformation.
Now, that means that NATO has already gotten its mind adjusted to its
new challenges. That makes this summit historic because now the
debate about what NATO is for is answered, and the question now is how
NATO is going to do that. That is a tremendous achievement for NATO,
and an achievement, moreover, in light of a very difficult debate it
had last year. And yet, NATO has moved forward. That’s a great
achievement. And, for once, on the eve of a NATO summit, I really am
looking forward to tomorrow. That is not always the case.
Thank you.
END 7:45 P.M. (Local)
SOURCE White House Press Office
CO: White House Press Office
ST: District of Columbia, Turkey
SU: EXE FOR
Web site:
06/27/2004 15:16 EDT
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress