Agency WPS
What the Papers Say. Part B (Russia)
June 17, 2004, Thursday
CIS SECURITY: TIME TO SET PRIORITIES
SOURCE: Krasnaya Zvezda, June 17, 2004, pp. 1, 3
by Roman Streshnev
Question: What can you say about the CIS Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) nowadays?
Nikolai Bordyuzha: The decision to establish the CSTO was made a year
ago. We’ve concentrated on three directions of work.
Foreign policy activities are the first direction. The main task here
boils down to coordinating the positions of members of the CSTO on
regional security problems. There is nothing new about this form of
interaction, which is quite effective. Numerous international
structures use it. Take the European Union, for example, where
opinions on some matter are first discussed and then the common point
of view is worked out and proclaimed. Approximately the same practice
is used in foreign policy activities of the CSTO. We discuss all
global and regional issues and do our best to work out a common
stance. Considerable importance is attached to contact with
international organizations specializing in security matters. We
actively cooperate with the CIS, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, the counter-terrorism committee of the UN Security
Council, UN drug enforcement and organized crime structures, other
organizations. As for the OSCE, we even have joint international
programs with it.
Dealing with challenges and threats is the second direction. First
and foremost, the matter concerns coordination of efforts within the
CSTO against religious extremism, terrorism, drug trafficking,
illegal immigration, organized crime. We promote cooperation between
special structures and law enforcement agencies.
The military component is the third direction. It is probably the
most complicated because of the abundance of sensitive issues
inherent in it. First and foremost, the matter concerns formation and
perfection of army groups – Russia-Belarus in the West,
Russia-Armenia in the Caucasus, and the Collective Rapid Response
Forces in Central Asia. Not long ago, we wrote an important document
titled “Priorities of coalition military development to 2010.” It
stipulates establishment of new regional groups and international
integrationist systems. It also specifies some steps that will change
the military component of the CSTO beyond recognition.
At the same time, there are some serious problems within the
framework of the CSTO. I’d divide them into two blocs. The first
includes political problems. Russia’s passivity with regard to its
neighbors was noticeable throughout the 1990s, and resulted in these
countries drifting towards the West and specifically the United
States. This situation complicates the process of reaching a
consensus on key issues.
The second bloc includes the problems that concern the CIS as such.
Political courses of many CIS countries parted company. We have to
decide now in what directions cooperation and interaction within the
CIS will proceed.
I’d like to emphasize nevertheless that the CSTO has retained what
really counts – good will on the part of national leaders who say
that they are prepared to follow in the wake of common interests and
interests of Russia. Now that processes of integration are under way
in the CSTO, it is in the focus of attention of the international
community and particularly NATO. In fact, these steps on our part
worry some world leaders. We even encounter certain resistance from
them. It means that the CSTO may have problems of course but the
progress it is making is undeniable.
Question: The CIS Collective Security Council will meet in Astana on
the level of national leaders on June 18. What matters will be
discussed? Will any agreements be adopted?
Nikolai Bordyuzha: We hope to have a great deal of issued discussed
at the meeting – including the main directions of coalition military
development to 2010.
The document is supposed to specify what we aspire for in the
military sphere – united armed forces or coalitionist forces, what
actions should be taken in armed conflicts (meaning, autonomous or
coordinated). We also hope that the national leaders will discuss an
agreement on the joint use of military infrastructures in special
periods, on mutual protection of the data appraised as state secrets,
etc.
It is time we defined the place and the role of the CSTO in the
international security framework. It is time a decision was made on
political cooperation with NATO (for example). We propose contacts
with the Alliance on the level of organizations as such. In fact,
NATO countries emphasise developing bilateral relations with
post-Soviet countries. We do not have any official contacts with
Brussels – cannot have any, in fact – without a political decision
made at the level of the CIS Collective Security Council.
The concept of the CSTO’s peacekeeping resources is to be discussed
at the meeting as well. We believe that these resources – if
organized, of course – may be used within the CSTO or, with the UN’s
approval, elsewhere in the CIS. Or even on the global scale, provided
the UN made the request and the CIS Collective Security Council
agreed.
In general, national leaders of the CSTO will discuss over a dozen
documents.
Question: United Headquarters of the CSTO of the CIS Collective
Security Treaty began its work on June 1, 2004. Is it an analog of
the CIS Military Cooperation Coordination Headquarters?
Nikolai Bordyuzha: If you ask me, the CIS Military Cooperation
Coordination Headquarters is not a coordinating structure nowadays.
I’d rather call it a structure advancing military-political
cooperation. Of course, it is necessary within the framework of the
CIS to cooperate on the level of defense ministries, but integration,
coordination, transition to common military standards – that’s a
different matter altogether. All of that is becoming more and more
difficult. We all know for example that Georgia is switching over to
NATO standards. Some other CIS countries follow suit – the countries
who are involved in the work of the CIS Military Cooperation
Coordination Headquarters only nominally. Analysis of documents
signed within the framework of the CIS and dealing with military
cooperation and interaction shows that the accords are honored mostly
by members of the CSTO. It is these countries that are ready for
continuation of the dialogue and military integration and
integration.
I believe that the work of the CIS Military Cooperation Coordination
Headquarters should be rearranged. In this light, we energized
military and military technology cooperation within the framework of
the CSTO. For example, its members are permitted to buy military
hardware from each other at the producer’s domestic price.
Question: What is Russia’s role on post-Soviet territory? And what
does the CSTO think about the presence of NATO bases on its
territory?
Nikolai Bordyuzha: As for post-Soviet territory and Russia’s role
there, I’d say that we felt somewhat euphoric in the early 1990s but
discovered soon enough that neither Europe nor the United States were
actually waiting for us with open arms. We are coming to our senses
again – it is dawning on us that we have our own neighbors quite
close by. Considerable impetus to the process has been provided by
the policy of President Vladimir Putin. Strangely enough, however, a
substantial part of the Russian political elite is still pro-Western
– dismissing Belarus, Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and
other neighbors. That’s a mistake. We all used to live in a single
country. We have so much in common.
As for the presence of NATO bases on the territories of some
countries of the CSTO, Russia’s position (and positions of other
members of the CSTO) is well known. The bases were established with
the UN mandate and with the consent of national governments – for the
duration of the counter-terrorism operation in Afghanistan.