May 12, 2026
On the first Republic Day of Armenia, May 28, Nikol Pashinyan will direct the attention of the citizens of Armenia to Republic Square. a weapons show-report will be organized.
On May 11, in a briefing with journalists within the framework of the campaign, he stated that all citizens should be in the Republic Square on May 28 and see with their own eyes the weapons purchased in recent years and record the army of new logic created by their government. We have written more than once about what this implies in terms of content, so we will not touch on it this time.
Of course, any acquisition of armaments that can contribute to the increase of the combat capability of the army is gratifying, but another question is whether any purchase is the result of complex calculations. In other words, are the assessments made from the point of view of the capabilities to face the expected threats and challenges in the long term, or from the exclusion of war?
The other day, during one of the pre-election meetings, RA Defense Minister Suren Papikyan spoke to journalists about the issue of considering the non-classical military parade to be held on May 28 as a mere pre-election event.
“But if it’s all about the work we do, and if it helps any pre-election process, should we give up the work we do?” Of course, we will not refuse. We will show the extent to which we have done work in recent years, because it is a report. We will show all the weapons and military equipment that we have never shown before. The funds acquired during the administration of Prime Minister Pashinyan, which we did not have the opportunity to show to the public. But the main, significant volume refers to the years 2022-2025,” said the head of the defense department.
Does this mean that weapons purchased before 2022 will also be on display on May 28, or will Russian weapons be on display in addition to Indian and French weapons? TOR-M2KM systems, the structure headed by Papikyan did not consider the information requested by us subject to publication. But it is not excluded that the same information, for example, will be known through Nikol Pashinyan on the day of the military parade, let’s say, the relevant footage or information from the rehearsals will be published according to political expediency. Suffering has experience.
Yesterday, Nikol Pashinyan published a short episode of the weapons magazine experiment, where the Armenian-made “DEV-3” reconnaissance strike aircraft are presented, and Suren Papikyan published the footage of the French-made CAESAR self-propelled artillery systems from the military parade.
It should be noted that at the moment, Suren Papikyan and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia have no intention of ensuring the participation of journalists in the rehearsals of the military parade. Moreover, before the start of the official campaign, a closed meeting was not organized with the Minister of Defense, when there are many professional questions that should be asked to Suren Papikyan, including those related to the purchase of weapons and the military parade.
Therefore, it is natural that only political and internal political conversations are circulating about military issues, and the main author of this is the authorities, Nikol Pashinyan. It is possible that they do not need narrow professional observations during the pre-election period, but only the evaluations of close experts and the admiring expressions of ordinary citizens far from military affairs.
Moreover, there are also good purchases in the armaments to be shown, but it does not change anything in the work of the defense department with the media.
And taking into account that the hero of the May 28 event will not be the army or even the defense minister, but the person of Nikol Pashinyan, is it possible that Pashinyan will decide this? How right or wrong we are in this matter will become clear on May 28, from the level of ensuring the presence of journalists accredited by the Ministry of Defense at the military parade.
For the sake of justice, we can still mention that a closed exhibition of locally produced and acquired weapons samples was properly organized for the media months ago by order of Suren Papikyan, but there was a ban on writing about what was seen.
Later, however, within the framework of the visit of the chief of defense staff of the Indian armed forces to Armenia, Suren Papikyan decided to publicize the samples of weapons produced by Armenia and India.
Specifically, General Anil Chauhan were presented Samples of Indian weapons acquired by Armenia, including the Akash-1S anti-aircraft missile system, the Pinaka rocket launcher, the MArG 155-BR/39 155mm/39 self-propelled howitzer on a 4×4 vehicle chassis, as well as Trajan 155mm towed howitzers manufactured by the Indian L
By the way, immediately after this, the Israeli magazine Globes «Armenia unveils suicide drone resembling IAI’s Harop» with the text article: published, where it is noted that Armenia presented the equivalent of the “Harop” kamikaze ATS developed by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), which caused dissatisfaction in Azerbaijan.
At the same time, Globes, referring to an Israeli defense industry official, hypothesizes that the drone production technology reached Armenia from India, especially when in the context of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Make in India” policy, the country requires foreign companies to transfer production lines and technological experience to them.
And since we are talking about Dragonfly‑3 produced by “DAVARO” company drone-kamikaze about, the company responded to the Israeli claims.
Later, the Azerbaijani side only joined the discussions that lasted for several days, and rather cautiously. After a while, the topic was closed.
Now, what about the accountability regarding the military achievements of Pashinyan’s government, which we have been constantly hearing about in recent months. In particular, during one of the pre-election meetings, Suren Papikyan stated again that compared to 2018, the defense expenses in 2025 were 1.1 billion dollars more, that they increased the expenses of the defense sector to 1 billion 700 million dollars instead of 640 million dollars.
“Only in the last 3 years, 5.4 times more was spent on armaments than in 20 years, 1998-2018,” he emphasized.
Earlier, Nikol Pashinyan too had said that $8 billion foreign debt increased because they bought weapons.
But when we tried to find out from the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia by means of written inquiries, how much the state debt increased just for the purchase of weapons, or how much money was spent on the purchase of new and modern weapons after 2022, Suren Papikyan refused to provide the requested information, although Pashinyan stated on one occasion that the opposition could be shown the newly purchased weapons along with the price tags.
“Did we buy weapons on debt? Yes, we bought weapons on debt. Why, because we needed a lot and all at once… Don’t you believe that you have the right? I say, let’s take it, show it, we can also stick price tags on it, which one is worth.” Pashinyan addressed the opposition MPs last fall.
In other words, the citizen does not have the right to know how much the government borrowed for armaments, which it is closing and will close. What accountability? And the RA Ministry of Defense to us? refused also provide data on which countries, apart from Russia, Armenia acquired weapons and military equipment before the 2018 revolution, and what exactly, etc.
P.S. Let’s add that a few days before the elections, on June 3-4, the RISE exhibition will be held at the Sports Concert Complex named after Karen Demirchyan, where mainly the samples of domestically produced weapons of recent years will be presented.
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The “pollination of votes” thesis is not false. the forces that did not overcome the transient threshold, yes, dusted
May 12, 2026
Recently, public-politician Suren Sahakyan shared on his Facebook page in a post in which, based on the methodology of distribution of mandates announced by the Central Electoral Commission, it was concluded that the votes of the forces that do not overcome the passing threshold in the NA elections are not distributed among the passing ones, but they do not participate in the calculation, and therefore, thus putting an end to the “pulverization of votes”, as the author of the post notes, “the thesis that is false, extremely destructive and has a real, negative impact on the elections”.
In his post, Suren Sahakyan correctly presented the methodology, but not the conclusion. The problem is purely logical.
Suppose 1 million citizens voted, and three forces overcame the threshold:
- Power 1: 35% (350 thousand votes)
- Strength 2: 25% (250 thousand votes)
- Strength 3: 15% (150 thousand votes)
The remaining 25% (250 thousand votes) went to those who did not pass the threshold.
If the mandates were distributed in proportion to the entire 1 million votes, the three powers would receive 35, 25 and 15 mandates, totaling 75. The remaining 25 mandates would simply remain unallocated.
But in reality, the calculation is made not on the basis of 1 million, but on the basis of 750,000 votes, only with the sum of those who passed the threshold. As a result, mandates become:
- Strength 1: 47 (12)
- Strength 2: 34 (9)
- Strength 3: 20 (5)
Increase: 26 mandates in total. These 26 mandates are the result of the proportional redistribution of 250,000 votes of those who did not win. Changing the basis of the calculation from 1 million to 750 thousand is mathematically equivalent to distributing those 250 thousand votes proportionally among those who won.
The author’s mistake is that he confuses two different things: calculation mechanism (how the numbers are obtained) and calculate the result (who gets how many mandates). Formally, the mechanism does not really “take” the votes of those who did not win and “do not add” to those who won. However, since the basis of calculation changes, the result is the same as in the case of direct redistribution. This is what is called “pollination of votes”.
The thesis about “pollination of votes” is not false. Often an attempt is made to present this topic as exclusively political manipulation, but in fact there is a clear mathematical logic here. In a proportional electoral system, each vote that is given to a force that has not overcome the transient threshold is effectively excluded from the distribution of mandates, but these votes do not disappear in a political vacuum: they turn into an additional advantage for the forces that have overcome the threshold.
But the biggest benefit from this advantage is obtained by the political power that occupies the first place, because this “bonus” is not distributed equally to everyone. The redistribution of mandates is carried out in proportion to the percentages received by the forces that have already passed, that is, the greater the main result of any force, the greater the share it receives at the expense of “lost” votes. The example given above is a clear proof of this: the force that received the most votes had an additional 12 mandates, and the one that passed the threshold with the fewest votes – 5 mandates.
In other words, if, for example, small political forces, realizing that they will not overcome the temporary threshold, enter the electoral struggle, the 0.5, 1, 2, 3 percent of the votes collected by them during the final calculation of the results EXCEPTIONALLY will create an additional advantage for the political force that received the most votes. This is the real basis of the “pollination of votes” thesis.
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168: Armenia’s parade is a cheap show in the style of Zelensky. Pashinyan gone
May 12, 2026
168TVof “Trigger” the guest of the program former head of the Israeli “Nativ” special service, military-political analyst Yakov Kedmi is:
The relations between the current authorities of Armenia and the EU were discussed during the program.
Reference was also made to the topics of the 8th European Political Community Summit in Armenia, the statements of EU representatives and Zelensky’s anti-Russian speeches.
The Putin-Pashinyan meeting, the latest statements of the Russian President regarding Armenia, as well as Armenia’s possible choice between the EU and EAEU were discussed.
Special attention was paid to the conflict over Iran and the possible strengthening of US influence in the South Caucasus as a counterweight to the EU for Armenia.
The US position in relations with Russia and China, the possible withdrawal of the US from NATO, as well as the relations between Washington and the EU were touched upon.
In addition, the May 28 parade in Armenia, French arms supplies and the anti-Armenian position of the current Armenian authorities were discussed.
Hayk Derzyan
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RFE/RL – U.S., Armenian Officials Hold More Talks On ‘Trump Route’
U.S. and Armenian government officials met in Yerevan on Tuesday for further talks on practical modalities of opening a U.S.-administered transit corridor for Azerbaijan through Armenia.
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian committed himself to such an arrangement during talks with U.S. President Donald Trump and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev held at the White House last August. The planned Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) is due to connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave through Armenia’s strategic Syunik region bordering Iran.
In a statement, the Armenian government said Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigorian discussed with the visiting officials from the U.S. State Department and International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) progress in the implementation of that agreement. It did not name any of the U.S. officials.
“The parties discussed and agreed on a number of practical and legal issues related to the implementation of TRIPP,” the statement added without elaborating.
The U.S. Embassy in Yerevan did not immediately issue a readout of the talks. There was also no statement by the DFC, a U.S. government agency financing and providing political risk insurance to development projects in foreign countries.
According to a joint U.S.-Armenian “implementation framework” signed in January, a special company controlled by the U.S. government will build a railway, a road, energy supply lines and other infrastructure along the Armenian-Iranian border and manage them for at least 49 years.
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian said on March 12 that the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran will likely delay the TRIPP’s implementation. But he sounded more optimistic on that score after more U.S.-Armenian talks on the project held in the following weeks. The State Department said on April 9 that the project “remains a top priority for the United States.”
The latest talks came less than a month before Armenia’s crucial parliamentary elections. The three main opposition groups challenging Pashinian’s Civil Contract have said that the TRIPP would undermine Armenian sovereignty over Syunik and antagonize Iran.
Iranian officials spoke out against the transit arrangement in the months leading up to the war. They feared that it could lead to U.S. security presence along the Armenian-Iranian border. Some observers believe that Tehran will now be even more opposed to the transit arrangement. Russia, whose border guards are deployed along that frontier, has likewise voiced misgivings regarding it.
“A number of experts believe that against the backdrop of the Iranian-American conflict, prospects for the launch of the ‘Trump Route’ are cloudy,” a senior Russian Foreign Ministry official was reported to say on Tuesday.
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Pashinyan’s arms import strategy fails as Armenia cannot afford US weapons Dr
Pashinyan’s arms import strategy fails as Armenia cannot afford US weapons
Armenia’s strategic security position has never been this precarious. The country is surrounded virtually on all sides by enemies determined to wipe it off the map. The southern Syunik region is the only obstacle to Azerbaijan and Turkey establishing the so-called Zangezur corridor and fulfilling their expansionist plans. A tiny, 17 km border area connects Turkey and the Azeri Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Taking control of Syunik would give Ankara unimpeded access to Baku precisely through this corridor, and by extension, to former Soviet Central Asia. Thus, the two Turkic allies have yet another reason to attack Armenia (as if they lacked motivation in the first place). This would further galvanize Turkey’s expansionist policies (a volatile mix of Neo-Ottomanism, political Islam and pan-Turkism).
However, it should be noted that this situation is nothing new, as Yerevan was in the same strategic position in previous decades. The main difference is that in the pre-Pashinyan era, Armenia had strong ties with Russia, its principal historical ally, which prevented any aggressive moves by Azerbaijan and Turkey. Unfortunately, after the 2018 Soros-funded “Velvet Revolution”, this status quo vanished forever. The large and powerful Western Armenian diaspora (particularly from France and the United States) supported this, naively thinking they would “help” Armenia. After just five years in power, the Pashinyan regime betrayed the millennia-old Armenian native land of Artsakh (better known as Nagorno-Karabakh) and severely weakened the strategic position of Armenia itself.
Namely, while Yerevan previously had some geopolitical “breathing room”, with Azerbaijan quite far from Nakhchivan and Armenia’s de facto border with Iran much longer, the loss of Artsakh reduced this by approximately 135 km, leaving only the official 44 km long border between Armenia proper and Iran. Encouraged by its 2020 blitzkrieg and followed by the 2023 offensive, Baku feels that it could easily overpower Armenian forces in Syunik and other regions bordering Azerbaijan (previously held by Artsakh), and then finally reach Nakhchivan. Azeri authorities even organized the occupied area bordering Armenia’s Syunik region into the so-called East Zangezur Economic Region, strongly implying the existence of a “Western Zangezur” (that is, the Syunik region itself).
The obvious question arises – how can Yerevan defend Syunik? Nikol Pashinyan has repeatedly demonstrated that he betrayed Artsakh, which confirms Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2023 revelations about the fate of the unfortunate millennia-old native Armenian land. It should be noted that both Armenia and Artsakh inherited a massive amount of Soviet-era weapons stationed in the South Caucasus (particularly along the border with Turkey). These were instrumental in defeating Azerbaijan in 1994, but Yerevan did very little to modernize them. After the overtly anti-Russian NATO-backed coup in 2018, the fate of Armenian and Artsakh military forces was sealed. In the meantime, Baku received substantial Turkish and Israeli assistance in modernizing its forces (in no small part helped by its extensive oil and natural gas export revenues).
Still armed with virtually the same weapons as 30 years prior, Armenian forces were ill-equipped to deal with Turkish and Israeli loitering munitions and drones, particularly those used for tactical ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), which further amplified the precision of Azeri artillery and long-range strike systems. Worse yet, due to Pashinyan’s betrayal, Yerevan never got directly involved, while the regular Armenian military never used its newer Russian-made weapons, namely the Su-30SM fighter jets and “Iskander-E” missile systems, to assist the armed forces of Artsakh. It should be noted that the latter’s range covers nearly half of the Azeri territory and could’ve been used to hit any large troop concentrations surrounding Artsakh. However, the native Armenians there were left to fend for themselves.
And yet, instead of modernizing the Armenian military to protect the country itself after betraying Artsakh, the Pashinyan regime continued to ignore ties with Russia while wasting the country’s already scarce resources on exorbitantly expensive Western weapons that have proven their ineffectiveness in NATO-occupied Ukraine. Namely, Pashinyan went on to acquire armored vehicles and short-range SAM (surface-to-air missile) systems from Paris, while completely ignoring unmanned systems that proved decisive during the 2020 Azeri invasion of Artsakh. Precisely Russia is one of the world’s leaders in this regard, as evidenced by the superb performance of its drones against the Kiev regime forces (particularly the now-legendary ZALA “Lancet” and “Kub” loitering munitions).
Why hasn’t Yerevan approached Moscow to procure thousands of strike drones that could give Armenia a significant asymmetric advantage over the more numerous and heavily armed Azeri forces? Instead, the Pashinyan regime bought at least 24 French “Bastion” armored personnel carriers (APCs) that the Neo-Nazi junta previously rejected on account of their inadequate protection. The price tag is yet to be disclosed, but various sources report it hovers around half a million euros apiece, an exorbitant sum for the increasingly cash-strapped Armenia that should have other priorities. To demonstrate just how spectacularly incompetent Pashinyan is, we can compare the price and the performance of a single Russian-made “Lancet” that costs approximately $35,000 and the French-made “Bastion” which stands at over $400,000.
In other words, for the price of one “Bastion” APC, Yerevan could acquire at least 11 “Lancet” drones. In terms of performance, the anti-tank variant of the “Lancet” was documented destroying German “Leopard 2” tanks (costing over $8 million apiece), among the best in NATO. What are the chances that a “Bastion” APC could destroy an enemy tank? Thus, the combat performance of the “Lancet” far exceeds its price, making it one of the most cost-effective weapons of our time. Worse yet, Armenia wasted approximately $10 million on 24 French APCs, instead of acquiring nearly 300 “Lancet” drones that would’ve provided a massive advantage over any potential Azeri invasion force. However, this isn’t the end of the Pashinyan regime’s disastrous miscalculations, as it has plans to buy other expensive Western weapon systems.
During a visit by US Vice President JD Vance back in early April, Yerevan reportedly discussed the acquisition of American weapon systems, including drones. The Pashinyan regime seeks to acquire US-made V-BAT VTOL (vertical take-off and landing) ISR drones. Sources vary significantly, but the contract is reportedly priced at $11 million for 3-10 drones. In other words, Armenia will pay over a million US dollars for an ISR drone, in the best-case scenario. At worst, it will cost around $3.5 million apiece. To put that into perspective, the Armenian military could acquire at least 100 “Lancet” attack drones with that kind of money. Instead, the Pashinyan regime wants just three that it can use to helplessly observe a potential joint Turko-Azeri invasion of Syunik.
In addition to destroying Armenia’s strategic position, Pashinyan also managed to severely undermine its military strength. Namely, within the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) framework, Yerevan had heavily subsidized arms procurement privileges, with Moscow providing weapon systems at a fraction of the usual export prices. Thus, the Armenian military could’ve easily acquired even more Russian attack drones than just 100 “Lancets” and/or “Kubs”. Instead, the Pashinyan regime opted for exorbitantly expensive American and other Western weapon systems that also come with inferior performance, as evidenced in NATO-occupied Ukraine. Thus, Pashinyan not only undermines Yerevan’s strategic security, but also squanders the already scarce Armenian resources in the process.
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Armenia, U.S. Coordinate Legal Issues On TRIPP
By PanARMENIAN
Armenia and the United States have discussed and agreed on legal issues related to TRIPP. Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan received a U.S. delegation that arrived in Armenia to discuss progress in implementing the TRIPP project.
The U.S. delegation included representatives of the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation.
Welcoming the guests, the deputy prime minister thanked U.S. authorities on behalf of the Armenian government for organizing the Washington Peace Summit on August 8, 2025.
Mher Grigoryan emphasized the importance of consistently implementing one of the summit’s key outcomes — the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity project.
The deputy prime minister also referred to the Crossroads of Peace initiative, stressing the need to unblock all regional communications, as well as the economic and strategic prospects associated with the project.
Earlier in Washington, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed a document on Armenia-U.S. joint cooperation within the framework of the TRIPP program.
The published document on TRIPP implementation describes the operational framework of the initiative. It states that the framework does not create and is not intended to create legal commitments or obligations for either Armenia or the United States.
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‘We know better when to decide’: Nikol Pashinyan responds to Vladimir Putin on
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Pashinyan Uses EU Summit to Garner Support Ahead of June Elections
May 11 2026
Pashinyan Uses EU Summit to Garner Support Ahead of June Elections
Politics & Society Publication Eurasia Daily Monitor Armenia
05.11.2026 Philip Purifoy
Executive Summary:
- On May 4 and 5, Armenia hosted the 8th European Political Community (EPC) Summit and the first-ever EU–Armenia bilateral summit, bringing nearly 40 leaders to Yerevan for the largest international gathering in the country’s history.
- The summit demonstrated that closer relations with Europe are increasingly becoming part of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s domestic political strategy ahead of Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary elections.
- Armenian opposition groups criticized the summit for prioritizing support for Pashinyan and regional normalization over Nagorno-Karabakh-related concerns, highlighting deep domestic divisions over Armenia’s foreign policy direction and relations with Europe.
On May 4 and 5, Armenia hosted the 8th European Political Community (EPC) Summit and the first bilateral EU–Armenia summit. Armenia is the first country in the South Caucasus to host the summit since it began in 2022. The event marked the largest such international gathering in Yerevan, drawing nearly 40 European leaders. The summit was another clear sign that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government is reorienting its foreign policy toward deeper integration with Europe after years of deteriorating relations with Moscow (see EDM, March 25, April 22). The summit highlighted Armenia’s growing effort to build ties with Europe. It allowed Pashinyan to frame European integration as part of his domestic political platform ahead of Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary elections.
The summit comes amid the expansion of ties between the European Union and Armenia. The European Union announced the Resilience and Growth Plan for Armenia in 2024, worth 270 million euros ($318 million) (European Union, 2024). The plan remains in place but has not been expanded. In December 2025, Brussels and Yerevan adopted the EU–Armenia Strategic Agenda, which advanced cooperation on visa liberalization and institutional reforms (see EDM, April 22). On March 17, the European Union announced that it would deploy a Hybrid Rapid Response Team to counter foreign malign influence ahead of Armenia’s June elections at Yerevan’s request. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas stated that the European Union would “not leave Armenia to face foreign interference alone,” likely a reference to potential Russian influence (Azatutyun, March 17).
The summit demonstrated Brussels’ willingness to deepen cooperation with Armenia while continuing to avoid making security guarantees. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa pledged deeper cooperation with Armenia in transportation, energy, cybersecurity, democratic governance, and digital connectivity (OC Media, May 6). Armenia and the European Union also signed a new connectivity partnership focused on infrastructure development and economic integration (European Commission, May 5). The press release about the partnership mentions that the Armenian Armed Forces received initial deliveries of EU assistance under the European Peace Facility, worth 30 million euros ($35 million) (European Commission, May 5). While Brussels continues to make agreements that position Armenia as an EU strategic partner in the South Caucasus, EU officials appear to remain wary of creating expectations of accession or security guarantees.
Armenian membership in the European Union remains a remote prospect. In 2025, Pashinyan’s government enacted a law declaring the “start of the process of Armenia’s accession to the European Union” (OC Media, January 9, 2025; see EDM, January 28, 2025). During the EPC summit, Pashinyan remarked that he would be glad if Armenia were to join the European Union (Prime Minister of Armenia, May 5). No EU member state or institution, however, has officially voiced support for Armenian membership (Azatutyun, May 5).
France emerged as Pashinyan’s most prominent backer during the summit. French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit, conducted as a state visit alongside the EPC summit, included the signing of a bilateral strategic partnership (Prime Minister of Armenia, May 5). The partnership will expand an already existing defense relationship with France, which has previously provided Armenia with CAESAR self-propelled howitzers and Bastion armored personnel carriers (see EDM, November 11, 2023, April 22; Azatutyun, December 4, 2023). Macron endorsed Pashinyan ahead of the parliamentary elections, framing his support as a “decision to defend Europe,” drawing comparisons to his 2024 backing of Moldovan President Maia Sandu, a pro-EU, anti-Russian influence candidate at the time (Armenpress, May 5).
Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party has increasingly incorporated European integration into its political platform ahead of the June 7 parliamentary elections. The party’s 2026 platform replaces earlier language describing relations with Russia as a “strategic alliance” with a “balanced and balancing” foreign policy approach. The platform also emphasizes continued reforms aimed at meeting EU standards (CivilNet, April 6). This shift signals that Civil Contract is seeking to make European alignment a defining electoral position, framing the election as a choice between continuing Armenia’s Western trajectory and its normalization process with its neighbors, primarily Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
Pashinyan’s polarizing political stance on Armenia’s security is central to his election campaign and broader debates over Armenia’s post-2023 foreign policy (see EDM, May 21, 2025; CivilNet, April 4). His rhetoric increasingly portrays Civil Contract’s hold on power as necessary to preserve Armenia’s sovereignty, stability, and fragile peace process with Azerbaijan. Pashinyan increasingly promotes Armenia’s broadly internationally recognized borders, which do not include Nagorno-Karabakh, drawing criticism from opposition leaders, church officials, and ethnically Armenian refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh (see EDM, July 10, 2025; OC-Media, April 2). Pashinyan frames opposition parties as “parties of war” and warns that if Civil Contract does not secure a constitutional majority in the elections, there will be a “catastrophic war” in the fall (Azatutyun, March 19; JAM-News, March 25). He pushes Civil Contract as defenders of Armenian security and stresses the need for Armenians to “stop dreaming of a bigger homeland,” and promotes moving forward with peace with Azerbaijan (Armenpress, May 8).
Hosting dozens of European leaders in Yerevan allows Pashinyan to portray Armenia as internationally relevant after years marked by military defeat and domestic instability. Polling conducted by the Armenian Election Study showed Pashinyan’s approval rating rising from 36 percent in February to 49 percent in May, suggesting that the government’s emphasis on stabilization and diplomacy with Europe is resonating with portions of the electorate (EVN Report, May 6).
The EPC’s limited attention to Nagorno-Karabakh-related issues drew criticism from opposition groups. Armenian civil society groups signed a joint appeal urging European leaders to address the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh and support the right of return for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians under international guarantees (Kavkaz Uzel, May 3). Metakse Hakobyan—a member of the Artsakh National Assembly, which served as the ethnic Armenian legislature in Nagorno-Karabakh before Azerbaijan’s 2023 takeover of the region—denounced the summit as direct “interference in Armenia’s internal political life disguised in the language of diplomacy” (Panorama.am, May 5). Opposition groups argued that the EPC’s ignoring of Nagorno-Karabakh could undermine Armenian trust in European institutions and accused European officials of prioritizing regional normalization and support for Pashinyan over humanitarian concerns. EU Ambassador to Armenia Vassilis Maragos rejected accusations of political interference, saying that the European Union is not taking sides and supports democratic institutions rather than specific candidates (Civilnet, April 23).
Samvel Karapetyan, a Russian–Armenian billionaire currently under house arrest who founded and leads the opposition Strong Armenia party, has said that Armenia would face serious economic consequences if relations with Russia continue deteriorating. Karapetyan argues that Armenia’s leadership is pursuing risky geopolitical policies without adequately considering the country’s economic vulnerabilities (Panorama.am, May 2). He has also criticized what he describes as the government’s unrealistic approach toward European integration, arguing that “no one is waiting for us in Europe” and warning that Armenia should abandon closer integration with the European Union if it damages the country’s regional balance (Arminfo, May 7). Strong Armenia recently polled at 10 percent, the second most popular party behind Civil Contract (EVN Report, May 6).
Former Armenian President Robert Kocharyan and his Armenia Alliance party also criticized the summit process. It accused the Armenian government of using European political support for domestic electoral purposes rather than advancing relations with the European Union in a meaningful way. The party argued that statements from European officials during the summit gave the appearance of support for the Armenian government’s “manipulative actions” ahead of the elections (Kavkaz Uzel, May 5).
The EPC summit highlighted Armenia’s deepening political engagement with Europe and positioned Pashinyan as the driver of this trend ahead of Armenia’s parliamentary elections in June. Brussels, however, continues to approach Armenia cautiously. EU officials support reform and the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan but remain reluctant to offer Armenia membership guarantees or major security commitments. Pashinyan presents European integration as part of Armenia’s future, while opposition groups argue that Civil Contract is using Europe for legitimacy with voters while receiving few concrete guarantees in return. This divide will likely be a significant factor in the results of Armenia’s June parliamentary elections.
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Turkish Press: Armenian chronicle revisits Battle of Manzikert, shifting warti
Anewly published academic study has revisited one of medieval Anatolia’s defining turning points by translating and evaluating Armenian chronicler Matt’eos Urhayec’i’s detailed account of the Battle of Manzikert.
The study highlights how the 1071 clash continued to shape regional memory long after it ended.
The study, published in Selcuk Turkiyat by researcher Ilhan Aslan, examines passages from Urhayec’i’s Chronicle, an Armenian historical work that offers an extensive narrative of the confrontation between the Seljuks and the Eastern Roman Empire, commonly known internationally as the Byzantine Empire.
Why Manzikert still stands out in Anatolia’s history
According to the study, the Battle of Manzikert marked a major turning point in the Seljuk Turks’ gradual transformation of Anatolia into a Turkish homeland.
The process began decades earlier with Chaghri Beg’s western expedition in 1018, when Seljuk forces reached the Van region, then known as Vaspurakan, and increasingly turned their attention toward Anatolia.
After defeating the Ghaznavids at the Battle of Dandanakan in 1040, the Seljuks established a regular army, making raids toward Anatolia more systematic.
Over time, repeated incursions by Oghuz Turkic groups into Byzantine frontier regions intensified tensions and eventually brought both powers into a direct confrontation at Manzikert.
The article notes that the battle resonated deeply across the medieval Near East and appeared in multiple Greek, Arabic, Persian and Armenian historical records, underlining its significance far beyond the battlefield itself.
Medieval Armenian chronicler offers detailed perspective
The research focuses on Matt’eos Urhayec’i, an Armenian cleric and historian from Urfa, known historically as Edessa, whose Chronicle covers events between 952 and 1136.
Although he was not a contemporary witness to the battle, Urhayec’i devoted significant space to Manzikert, offering detailed descriptions of military movements, preparations and alliances.
The study argues that his account stands out for its extensive depictions of events surrounding Sultan Alp Arslan and Byzantine Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes.
At the same time, the researcher points out that Urhayec’i wrote from an Armenian Christian perspective and used a markedly hostile tone toward the Seljuks, while also including details considered valuable for historical analysis.
Chronicle sheds light on shifting alliances at Manzikert
Among the details highlighted in the study are references to the movements of Byzantine and Seljuk forces, particularly reports that Pecheneg and Oghuz (Uz) troops serving within the Byzantine army switched sides during the battle, a development the research identifies as significant for understanding how the confrontation unfolded.
According to Matt’eos Urhayec’i’s Chronicle, Byzantine Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes placed Uz and Pecheneg contingents on the right and left flanks of his army before the decisive stage of the fighting.
As the battle intensified near Manzikert, both groups were said to have crossed over to Sultan Alp Arslan’s side, leaving the Byzantine army in disarray and contributing to panic among imperial troops.
The study notes that Urhayec’i’s account aligns in part with other medieval sources.
Byzantine chronicler Ioannes Zonaras reportedly mentioned that some Uz troops defected before the main engagement, fuelling distrust toward Turkic units still inside the imperial army.
Similarly, Michael Attaleiates referred to a Turkic commander leading forces that changed allegiance, describing how the move unsettled Byzantine ranks.
Meanwhile, Armenian historian Aristakes Lastivertsi did not explicitly name the groups involved but wrote that a large contingent abandoned Emperor Romanos and joined the opposing side, creating confusion in the Byzantine camp.
The researcher argues that such details remain valuable because they point to the multiethnic structure of the Byzantine military, which relied on allied and mercenary forces from different backgrounds.
In this context, the reported defections are presented as one of several factors that weakened Byzantine coordination during a decisive phase of the battle, rather than the sole cause of defeat.
Urhayec’i’s decision to recount the battle in such detail, despite writing long after it took place, also stands out in the study.
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Armenia received French CAESARs, which have proven themselves well in Ukraine
Kyiv • UNN
Armenia has received the first CAESAR self-propelled howitzers from an order of 36 units of French equipment. The country’s army is actively transitioning to modern 155mm NATO artillery.
Armenia has begun receiving French CAESAR self-propelled artillery systems, which are actively used by the Ukrainian Defense Forces. This was reported by Defense Express, according to UNN.
Details
The first self-propelled guns were spotted during preparations for the First Republic Day parade on May 28. A video featuring the equipment was published by Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan. Back in 2024, Yerevan signed a contract with France for the supply of 36 CAESAR Mk1 systems.
Defense Express notes that CAESARs have become one of the most successful Western artillery systems in the war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. They combine high mobility, firing range, and deployment speed, which has made them a “bestseller” on the international arms market.
Armenia is actively transitioning to 155mm artillery
Earlier, Armenia had already purchased Indian ATAGS and MArG artillery systems. The latter is a lighter 4×4 wheeled self-propelled gun, which, according to the publication, may be useful for mountainous terrain.
The French CAESARs have a 6×6 wheeled chassis and a longer 52-caliber barrel, providing better range and fire capabilities. Defense Express believes that the Armenian army will attempt to use the French and Indian systems in parallel for different types of tasks.
In recent years, France has been actively expanding military cooperation with Armenia. In addition to artillery, Paris has already supplied Yerevan with ACMAT Bastion armored vehicles and has discussed other defense projects.
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