A few days ago, there were reports of American strikes against Iran, and today Iranian sources wrote that Iran has published a 14-point memorandum of settlement with the United States.

According to Mehr, the document includes the following provisions: an immediate cessation of fighting on all fronts, including in Lebanon, the lifting of the naval blockade within 30 days and the withdrawal of US forces from the territories bordering the Islamic Republic, the submission of at least $300 billion in reconstruction projects by the US and its allies to Iran, and the suspension of sanctions on the sale of Iranian oil and petroleum products. In addition, according to the document, within 60 days, Iran and the USA should hold negotiations on the nuclear issue, as a result of which an agreement will be signed.
What developments will there be, will there be a new wave of serious military conflict on these and other issues? 168.amhas talked With Iran expert, political analyst Aram Shahnazaryan.

– The next potential Iran-US-Israeli military conflict is likely to be somewhat different from the 12-day and 40-day wars, as all sides already have a clearer understanding of the capabilities and vulnerabilities tested in the previous two wars. In case of a possible next conflict, the parties will act on the basis of already accumulated experience and revised military calculations. This means that the actions will be more targeted, technological and strategic in nature.

A key feature of a possible next war may be that the parties will try not to simply increase the number of strikes, but to more effectively target the enemy’s decision-making, command and control, air defense, communications and intelligence systems, and strategic economic and civilian infrastructure.

During the 40-day war, it became clear that even the most advanced defense systems cannot completely prevent Iran’s missile and anti-aircraft missile threats, and mass strikes have a significant economic and psychological impact. Therefore, in a future conflict, priority will be given to those actions that will weaken the enemy’s control and reaction capabilities, as well as the rear.

At the same time, the possible war will most likely take on the character of a multi-domain and multi-layered conflict, including military, cyber, maritime, economic and energy directions, they will become the key elements of the conflict. The experience of the 40-day war showed that cyberattacks, operations against satellite and intelligence systems, attempts to control maritime communications, and influence energy markets can be as important as direct military operations.

From the global point of view, the main difference of the next conflict will be that it will take place in the conditions of the new military-political realities that have already formed. The 40-day war showed that a regional conflict can quickly turn into a challenge for international security and the world economy. In other words, the key issue in a possible future war will be not only the military outcome, but also whether the US will succeed in preventing the escalation of the conflict into a wider regional or international crisis or not.

– On the one hand, Turkish President Erdogan continues to consider Netanyahu’s administration to be genocidal, on the other hand, Turkey has started not to exclude the issue of normalization of relations with Israel, of course, setting specific conditions, including demanding the cessation of Israeli operations in Gaza. I would like to consider this issue also in the context of actions against Iran and Turkey’s position on this matter.

– That circumstance is important to take into account, because it changes the logic of the regional power equation.

If Turkey and Israel move in the direction of partial or gradual normalization of relations, then the possible next Iran-US-Israel conflict will take place in a significantly changed geopolitical environment. The experience of the 40-day war showed that the positions of regional actors can be no less important than direct military operations. In that sense, Ankara’s policy can become an important factor affecting the development of the conflict, especially if Turkey tries to simultaneously maintain its influence in both Western and regional directions.

From Iran’s point of view, the settlement of relations between Turkey and Israel can be perceived as an element of a new regional power arrangement. Tehran is traditionally sensitive to such processes that can increase Israel’s political, economic or security presence in Iran’s immediate neighborhood. Therefore, if the Ankara-Tel Aviv dialogue is restored, Iran will most likely try to activate its relations with other regional partners and strengthen its own deterrence mechanisms.

At the same time, the settlement of relations between Turkey and Israel does not necessarily turn into an anti-Iranian alliance.

Ankara usually strives to maintain its strategic independence and foreign policy maneuverability. Therefore, it is more likely that Turkey will try to use the settlement of relations with Israel as an additional diplomatic and economic resource, rather than getting involved in an open war architecture against Iran. However, even such a limited settlement could affect Iran’s strategic calculations and become an important external factor in future conflicts.

– Before the NA elections A framework agreement on strategic cooperation on the “Trump Path for International Peace and Prosperity” project was signed between the Republic of Armenia and the United States of America.  Today, when there are unresolved Iran-US issues and the page of military conflict is not closed, How do you see the fate of TRIPP, is there a change in the Iranian position or can there be?

– The fate of TRIPP, the “Trump Path to International Peace and Prosperity”, depends to a large extent on the extent to which it will be perceived by the states of the region as a platform for economic cooperation or as a tool for new geopolitical realignments. From Iran’s point of view, the main reservations about the initiative are preserved, because in Tehran it is viewed not only as an economic and transport project, but mainly as a mechanism for strengthening the influence of the USA and its partners in the region. The security challenges arising from the project are especially highlighted, as well as the fact that such projects can generally bypass Iran’s territory and significantly weaken its traditional role as an East-West and North-South communication hub. At the same time, the 40-day war has somewhat changed Iranian calculations.

The war showed that a regional strategy based on military and security factors alone is not enough to maintain long-term influence. Economic ties, logistics corridors, technological cooperation and regional integration projects are also turning into important tools of power. For this reason, Tehran will probably still not seek to openly obstruct all such initiatives, but will try to ensure that they do not lead to Iran’s isolation or a reduction in its regional role.

The main challenge for Iran is related to the security component. There is a fear in Tehran that some economic and transport cooperation projects could turn into political and security cooperation platforms over time, where Israel’s presence or influence will expand in Iran’s immediate neighborhood.

After the 40-day war, these concerns have become more acute, as Iran has begun to consider issues of regional infrastructure and communication networks not only from an economic perspective, but also from a national security perspective.

Therefore, there is no radical change in Iran’s position yet. Tehran continues to treat TRIPP with reservations, but after the experience of the war, it pays more attention not to the complete rejection of the initiative, but to what kind of place and role it can have in these processes.

Iran’s strategic goal is likely to remain the same: to prevent the formation of a regional economic and security architecture that would target its own security, diminish its geopolitical importance, or strengthen the positions of competitors in the immediate vicinity of its borders.

– What is Iran’s position in the region today?

– Iran strives to maintain the position of an influential and balancing actor in the South Caucasus, considering the region as an important and key component of its own national security atmosphere. For Tehran, the South Caucasus has long ceased to be only a neighboring region. it has become an important component of Iran’s northern security zone, where the ongoing geopolitical changes have a direct impact on the country’s strategic interests.

Especially in recent years, Iran has consistently emphasized the immutability of internationally recognized borders in the region and the need to exclude the political, military and security involvement of extra-regional forces in regional processes.

After the 40-day war, Iran’s position has gained a clearer security character. Tehran is watching with concern the deepening of the military-political cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan, the growing presence and influence of Israel in Azerbaijan, as well as the steps taken by the current authorities of Armenia towards the eastern change of Armenia’s foreign policy.

According to Iran, the formation of a possible new balance of power in the region should not lead to a situation where anti-Iranian security systems will be formed in the immediate vicinity of its northern borders or the influence of competing actors will be strengthened.

At the same time, Iran is trying to act in the South Caucasus not only as a security, but also as a transport and economic actor.

One of Tehran’s strategic priorities is the development of the North-South international transport corridor and ensuring its own participation in regional communication projects.

In this context, Iran is interested in communication solutions that will not change regional borders or balance of power and will not reduce Iran’s transit importance.

In general, Iran’s current positioning in the South Caucasus can be characterized as an “active defense strategy”. Tehran strives to prevent unfavorable geopolitical changes, to maintain the balance of power in the region, and at the same time to strengthen its own economic and transport role. For this reason, the South Caucasus continues to be considered not a secondary direction in Iran’s foreign policy, but a key area of ​​national security and regional influence.

– What picture do we have of Iran-Azerbaijan, Iran-Turkey relations now?

– Iran-Azerbaijan relations are currently in a complex and tense balance phase, where both the need for cooperation and the deepening strategic mistrust are combined. From Tehran’s point of view, the developments in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy in recent years, especially the high-level strategic relations with Israel and the expanding security and military cooperation, are seen as a direct challenge to Iran’s northwestern security zone.

The experience of the 40-day war only reinforced these concerns, showing that regional conflicts can quickly involve external actors and create a chain of new threats in the immediate vicinity of Iran’s borders.

At the same time, Iran is trying to avoid an open military or political escalation with Azerbaijan, taking into account economic, energy and transportation interdependencies. In such a context, Iran’s position is simultaneously tough in security matters, but cautious in terms of maintaining business relations.

Iran-Turkey relations have a relatively more stable and systematic nature, but here too there is strategic competition. Both countries are trying to expand their influence in the South Caucasus and the Middle East, often with different approaches.

Turkey is more active in the use of military and allied instruments, while Iran prefers the methods of deterrence, balancing and multilateral diplomacy. Despite this rivalry, the two sides maintain high-level economic ties and common interests in the energy and trade sectors, which prevents relations from turning into open conflict.

The experience of the 40-day war also affected perceptions here. Iran has more clearly begun to consider Turkey as a regional power, whose actions can quickly change the balance of power, while Turkey, in turn, is wary of expanding Iran’s direct or indirect influence in the border zones. Thus, Iran-Turkey relations can be characterized as “managed competition”, where cooperation and competition coexist.

In general, the prevailing logic in both Iran-Azerbaijan and Iran-Turkey relations is not open conflict, but balancing due to strategic calculations. But any new regional escalation can quickly change this balance, especially if it involves the involvement of external forces, the reshaping of communication channels or the formation of new security architectures.

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Edgar Ghazaryan and Davit Sargsyan of the “Erku front” podcast in the next edition, they discuss the voting results of the national elections held on June 7, the widespread election violations committed by the administration, the significant inaccuracies, as well as the political positioning of the main actors of the opposition in the post-election period, first of all, the resolution of the issue of whether or not to take the mandates.

Details in the video

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A few days have passed since the parliamentary elections held in Armenia on June 7, but the traditional congratulatory message to the “Civil Agreement” party and Nikol Pashinyan himself has not yet been heard from the Kremlin. This is despite the fact that, according to preliminary data, Pashinyan’s political force received almost half of the votes (49.81%), although the Armenian opposition, politicians, and public figures do not accept the results of the elections, they talk about administrative resources, unequal election campaign and other violations.

The Armenian domestic political discourse on this topic is a separate topic of analysis, referring to Russia’s positioning, let’s note that this marked silence of Moscow, combined with tough economic impulses, becomes the most eloquent indicator of the current crisis of Armenian-Russian relations.

Commenting on the results of the Armenian elections, the press secretary of the Russian President, Dmitry Peskov, tried to make it clear that Moscow will not be in a hurry. He mentioned that the Kremlin will wait for the final and official results of the elections to be summarized by the Central Electoral Commission, after which only appropriate announcements will be made. Maria Zakharova, the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, adopted a similar expectant and restrained tone, referring to the “unclear moments” in the electoral process and the legal stage of the appeal of the results by the opposition blocs (“Strong Armenia” and “Armenia”). However, in addition to this, on June 8, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a rather harsh statement about the elections, talking about repressions, pressures on opponents, etc.

However, Russia’s waiting for official CEC data is not just a legal tact. This is a political position. Moscow shows that it does not accept the victory of the current administration in Yerevan as an absolute and unconditional reality, and that the new level of relations still needs to be “earned” at the negotiation table.

Along with the diplomatic pause, Moscow switched to practical “whip” tactics. On June 11-12, Russia applied new, rather painful trade restrictions to Armenia. From June 12, “Rosselkhoznadzor” restricts the import of all quarantine products originating and delivered from Armenia, as well as the transit through the territory of Russia to EAEU member states. This is a classic Russian tool used in politically tense situations. Thus, Moscow reminds Yerevan of the true extent of economic dependence at the very moment when Pashinyan is trying to strengthen his domestic political legitimacy.

Yerevan seems to perfectly understand the seriousness of the situation and is trying to soften the atmosphere. Today, June 12, Nikol Pashinyan sent a congratulatory message to Vladimir Putin on the occasion of Russia Day. In the text of the message, “readiness for an open and constructive dialogue based on mutual respect for sovereignty and state interests” was emphasized. And on June 11, Pashinyan openly stated that if there is an invitation from Russia, he is ready to go to Russia to meet Vladimir Putin. He also reminded that during his phone conversation with Putin on June 1 (his birthday), there was already a preliminary arrangement for such a meeting.

In similar crisis stages, the president of the Russian Federation has a clear behavioral model. he uses time as a means of political pressure. The Russian side is forced to remain in uncertainty, to experience economic and political discomfort, so that at the time of the meeting, the negotiation positions of the other side are as weak as possible.

Geopolitical logic suggests that events will develop in the following scenario. after June 14, when the RA CEC will publish the final data of the elections and the first wave of appeals will end, perhaps the Russian president will call Pashinyan. As the procedure in such cases implies, during that call, the official congratulation (which will be on record) will be formulated and there will be an invitation to Moscow. That meeting in Moscow will not be easy for the Armenian side. It will be a meeting to clarify “red lines” and report. Putin, again, as in similar cases, can put several key issues on the negotiation table, the main of which is the limitation of the foreign political vector, clarification of the choice of “EU or EAEU”. It is difficult to say how the Armenian side will behave, by what mechanism it will try to reach an agreement with the Russian side, but judging by the post-election rhetoric of the RA authorities, there is a desire to reach an agreement.

However, it is important to note that Nikol Pashinyan will go to Moscow with the vote he received in the elections, according to experts, with weakened legitimacy and economically besieged. In the Kremlin, he is expected to have a pragmatic but forceful dialogue, within the framework of which the agreement will imply a certain price. And what that price will be for Armenia or maybe for Russia, perhaps it will become clear already after that possible meeting.

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The main intrigue of this election process, one can say, is whether the PAP will enter the parliament or not as a result of the National Assembly elections held in Armenia on June 7. About this 168 TVof Revue said on the air of the program Gagik Minasyan, former member of the National Assembly, member of the RPA Executive Bodycommenting on CEC yesterday the decision about invalidating the voting results in two polling stations.

“The Electoral Code says that if processes take place during the electoral process that significantly affect the outcome of the elections, and it is not possible to restore it, then another article of the Electoral Code should call for re-voting in the entire territory of the republic. Now this evil government is taking steps that lead to a dead end. He wants to do everything to be good for himself, but he will pay for it in front of the anger of the whole people. See what will happen if the situation that objectively should have been formed, when the PAP objectively appeared in the parliament. If the PAP enters the parliament, the ruling force gets 61 mandates, the collective opposition gets 44 mandates, and in this case, the government did not have 3/5 of the NA deputies, which it needs to make changes in the constitutional laws,” commented Gagik Minasyan.

According to Minasyan, it is not possible to restore the true picture of the voting in the mentioned polling stations, because there was a gross election violation – voting after 20:00, and in this case, the only way is to organize a new vote.

Referring to election violations and the issue of rigging elections in general, in this context: During the pre-election campaign, the second president of the Republic of Armenia, the leader of the Armenia alliance, Robert Kocharian, said that “if they try to brazenly steal the people’s victory, they will get a revolution.”, Gagik Minasyan expressed the opinion that we are still at the beginning of the revolutionary process.

According to Minasyan, in this situation, everything depends on how the PAP problem will be solved, and the future of Armenia is decided today.

“This is not only the problem of PAP, this is not even the problem of the opposition forces that entered the parliament, this is the problem of all of us. either we keep this state Armenian, or Turkish-Azerbaijani agents make it Turkish. We must understand that this cannot be allowed. Every citizen, every political force, regardless of whether they have entered the parliament or not, should unite around this idea. I think that we should be guided by the call and joint decision of the titular opposition, “Strong Armenia”, “Armenia” alliance and “Prosperous Armenia”, and we should all combine our efforts to get rid of this evil,” added the interlocutor.

According to the former deputy of the “RPA” faction, Nikol Pashinyan deceived the people in the most vile way, declaring that if the CP does not form a constitutional majority in the National Assembly, “there will be a catastrophic war in September.”

We remind you that yesterday, June 11, The Central Electoral Commission in an extraordinary session declared invalid June 7 National Assembly election results in polling stations No. 10/51 and No. 35/65.

Full interview in the video.

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