Armenia: the next Ukraine?

David Nargizian
Lowy Institute
June 5 2026

Armenia is tilting West and Moscow is not happy – but neither side can afford to push too far.

Ian Hill
5 June 20264 min read

Could Armenia become the next flashpoint of tension between Russia and the West?

Moscow has made plain its unhappiness over Yerevan’s pivot to diversify away from dependence on Russia by strengthening ties with the European Union and United States.

This comes amid a flurry of high-level EU and US visitors seeking to encourage Armenia’s pro-Western course under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

Early May saw the first-ever EU–Armenia summit(Opens in new window), held alongside the European Political Community(Opens in new window) summit in Yerevan. Soon after, US Secretary of State Rubio visited Yerevan(Opens in new window), signing agreements on the planned Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a transit corridor through southern Armenia linking Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhchivan – and beyond that to Türkiye. Vice President JD Vance(Opens in new window) visited Yerevan in February, foreshadowing bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation. All this in the wake of President Donald Trump’s brokering of a deal last August(Opens in new window) ending the decades-long conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Moscow’s response has been sharply negative – and admonitory.

Armenia is not intrinsically as important to the Kremlin as Ukraine, a country viewed as part of Russia’s national identity and historical patrimony.

President Vladimir Putin warned last week that Armenia would have to choose between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union. Ominously, Putin recalled that the Ukraine crisis had started back in 2013 with Kyiv’s efforts to move closer to the EU – a clear rebuke and veiled threat to Yerevan(Opens in new window).

Putin pointedly underscored Armenia’s heavy energy (gas and nuclear) and economic (35% of Armenia’s foreign trade and substantial remittances) dependence on Russia, while Moscow recalled(Opens in new window) its ambassador from Yerevan to signal its unhappiness.

Armenia, like its South Caucasus neighbours, Azerbaijan and Georgia, lies at the historical intersection of competing great powers – Russia, Iran (earlier, Persia) and Türkiye. For the past 200 years, Russia has been the dominant power. There are deep and long-standing ties between Russia and Armenia: political, economic and security, underpinned by extensive people-to-people and elite connections.

Post-Soviet Armenian politics have been notably fractious, but the country’s Russia-aligned business elite long played a dominant role in Armenia’s government. The coming to power of populist democracy activist Pashinyan as Prime Minister in 2018, though, irked Moscow, and relations with Yerevan have been cool and suspicious ever since.

Armenia’s disenchantment with Russia intensified in late 2020 with Azerbaijan’s surprise attack on the contested Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, held since 1991 by Yerevan but never accepted by Baku. Yerevan’s disappointment at Moscow’s equivocal response, contrary to its alliance obligations to Armenia, was palpable. Yerevan’s dissatisfaction deepened in September 2023 after Azerbaijan’s lightning seizure of all of Nagorno-Karabakh, while Russian peacekeepers stood by, leading to the enforced exodus of some 100,000 Armenian Karabakhi.

Disillusionment with Russia has accelerated Yerevan’s moves to diversify its international connections: strengthening Armenia’s ties with Europe and the United States, but also looking to improve hitherto-acrimonious ties with both Azerbaijan and Turkey.

What’s in it for the US, Europe and Türkiye(Opens in new window)? Improved relations with Armenia open up trade and energy connectivity between Europe and Eurasia (bypassing Russia), provide access to strategic minerals, and strengthen the West’s foothold in a contested region.

Tensions will come to a head in the parliamentary elections on 7 June. Pashinyan enjoys a strong lead in pre-election polls, but Armenian politics are volatile, and there remains considerable unhappiness among Armenians over his pragmatic acknowledgement of Azerbaijani sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh.

As in Moldova’s elections last year, there are allegations(Opens in new window) of aggressive Russian interference in the election(Opens in new window) – disinformation campaigns and facilitation of large-scale diaspora voting.

Is Yerevan likely to break ties decisively with Russia? How far will Moscow go to prevent Armenia’s growing tilt to the West?

Talk of Armenia as the next Ukraine seems overblown: Armenia is not Ukraine. While offering Moscow a foothold in the strategic South Caucasus region, and historically part of Russia’s sphere of influence, Armenia is not intrinsically as important to the Kremlin as Ukraine, a country viewed as an inalienable part of Russia’s national identity and historical patrimony, and fundamental to Russia’s security.

And both Armenia and Russia face hurdles constraining an outright rupture of relations.

Armenia’s heavy dependence on Russia, especially in trade and energy, makes it impracticable for Yerevan to contemplate breaking with Moscow completely. For all the positive EU and US rhetoric, there’s no immediate prospect of early EU membership or substantial Western economic assistance large enough to offset the damage Armenia’s economy would suffer were its energy supplies and market access to Russia to be cut long-term.

Equally, there are limits to what Moscow can do. The lack of a contiguous border, coupled with Russia’s heavy commitments in Ukraine, argue against a Ukraine-style military intervention in Armenia – although it does maintain a permanent military base at Gyumri. And Moscow will be conscious of the Trump administration’s strong support for Pashinyan.

More likely, Armenia will try to maintain its balancing act, expanding ties as much as possible with both the EU and US, but without alienating Russia completely. Likewise, Moscow will apply sustained political and economic pressure to deter Armenia from pushing its pro-Western orientation too far, – but stop short of military intervention.

Rather than Ukraine, the greater risk might be that Armenia shares the fate of Moldova, where for years Russian interference has fuelled instability and dysfunction, impeding (until recently) efforts to move closer to the EU.

Armenia, Ukraine, Moldova: the common thread is the Kremlin’s refusal to accept the Soviet empire’s gradual disintegration.

About the author

Ian Hill

Ian Hill is a retired senior career diplomat in the New Zealand foreign ministry.

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Russia Pressures Armenia to Stay in EEU Amid Shift Toward EU

Hunanian Jack
The Chosun Daily
June 5 2026

Moscow suspends Armenian fruit imports, wages disinformation campaign ahead of general election

By Jung Ji-sup

Last week, at the summit of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), an economic cooperation body of former Soviet states held in Astana, Kazakhstan, an unusual joint statement was issued. The statement, co-authored by the leaders of four member states—Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan—effectively pressured Armenia, another member. It labeled Armenia’s early last month summit with the European Union (EU) to strengthen cooperation as a “serious threat to the economic security of EEU member states.” It further demanded that Armenia hold a referendum to decide whether to remain in the EEU or join the EU. On the 2nd, Russian food quarantine authorities announced a suspension of imports of Armenian fruits, citing failure to meet sanitary standards. Russia is also waging a disinformation campaign to influence the upcoming Armenian general election on the 7th in its favor.

Armenia has historically maintained close ties with Russia. After enduring centuries of oppression under empires like Rome, Persia, and the Ottoman Turks, Armenia sought survival by aligning with the Russian Empire, a fellow Christian power, from the 17th century. Even after the Soviet collapse, the two countries remained close. However, as Armenia recently strengthened cooperation with the EU and the U.S. in economic, resource, and security fields, signaling a shift away from Russia, Moscow has escalated its offensive across multiple fronts.

Russia Anxious Over Loss of Regional Control

Armenia is the smallest former Soviet state by area (13.5% of the Korean Peninsula) and has a population of 3.1 million, roughly a third of Seoul’s. Russia’s sensitivity to Armenia’s moves stems from its role as a “geopolitical pressure point.” Located in the South Caucasus, a strategic crossroads connecting the Middle East, Europe, and Central Asia, Armenia’s potential alignment with the West could drastically weaken Russia’s control over the region, which has served as a gateway for Russian influence into the Middle East for over 200 years. Armenia borders NATO member Turkey and Iran, which is at war with the U.S.

A decline in Russian influence over Armenia could enable NATO’s eastward expansion and sever Russia’s ties with Iran. This could also unsettle other nations in the Russia-led former Soviet cooperation bloc. Anna Ohanyan, a Eurasian expert at Stonehill College in the U.S., told France 24, “Armenia is diversifying its foreign policy to escape Russia’s periphery, but Putin insists on a geopolitical dichotomy centered on Russia.”

Russia Attempts Disinformation Ahead of Elections

On the 5th of last month, Armenia and the EU held a summit in Yerevan, the Armenian capital, discussing cooperation in energy, trade, and security. The EU pledged 30 million euros in military aid. Earlier, the Armenian parliament passed a resolution in March to pursue EU membership, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited Armenia. On the 27th of last month, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Yerevan. During this trip, Armenia signed an agreement with the U.S. on mineral resource supply and the establishment of a transport corridor linking Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. For Putin, these events constituted a series of provocations.

Signs of strain in Armenia-Russia relations emerged in 2023. Armenia was deeply disappointed when Russia did not support it during its decades-long territorial conflict with Azerbaijan, an Islamic country within the former Soviet sphere. In response, Armenia boycotted meetings and joint exercises of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a military alliance of former Soviet states, to express discontent. Since then, it has accelerated its pro-Western, anti-Russia policies under the guise of diplomatic diversification.

Leading this policy shift is Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, a former journalist who came to power in 2018 after leading protests that ousted a pro-Russia regime. After ending the war with Azerbaijan, he has further accelerated pro-Western policies. If Pashinyan, who is seeking a third term, wins the general election on the 7th, Armenia’s shift away from Russia and toward the West is likely to gain momentum. Analysts predict Russia will intensify its disinformation campaigns in the coming days to sway public opinion. The European Parliament’s Legislative Research Service stated, “Signs of Russia’s election interference and disinformation campaigns in Armenia are being detected on the ground.”

· This article has been translated by Upstage Solar AI.

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Armenia’s election to test Pashinyan’s peace drive after war defeat

Garnik Tadevosian
Reuters
June 5 2026
By Lucy Papachristou
  • Pashinyan seeks peace with Azerbaijan, closer Western ties
  • His reforms credited with growth, infrastructure improvements
  • Russia threatens energy supplies amid Yerevan’s pivot to West
  • Pashinyan leads polls but faces accusations of authoritarianism
IJEVAN, Armenia, June 4 (Reuters) – When Anna Yegoyan first moved from the Armenian capital to the northern mountain town of Ijevan, she had to reach it along bumpy, potholed roads.
Years later, she points to newly paved streets and highways as proof of change under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who grew up there, and says ‌she will back him in Sunday’s election.

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Armenia has become “a proper country,” said the 40-year-old, who attended a rally for Pashinyan in the town of about 20,000 people. “Our place in the world is more recognisable.”
Armenians vote in a parliamentary election on June 7 in a test of Pashinyan’s efforts to forge peace with longtime foe Azerbaijan, and deepen ties with Western countries, moving away from traditional patron Russia. He says he wants to turn the landlocked nation of 3 million into a “crossroads of peace”, re-opening long-closed borders with Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey.
Polls show Pashinyan’s Civil Contract leading with roughly 30% support, while his main rival, Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who is advocating for closer ties with Moscow, trails at between 6 and 11%.
The pivot away from Russia is a delicate ⁠one. Armenia sends around a third of its exports there and has long been dependent on Moscow for energy. In recent weeks, Russia – which maintains a large military base in Armenia – has stepped up pressure, restricting a wide range of Armenian exports and threatening to cut off cheap gas and oil.
The government in Yerevan has largely played down the risks, but surveys show a third of Armenians now view Russia as a threat, behind only Azerbaijan and Turkey.

PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE DEAL

Pashinyan has won a resounding endorsement from U.S. President Donald Trump, who helped broker a meeting between him and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and is pushing a transit corridor across southern Armenia as part of a peace deal.
Europe, too, is watching closely. Anxious for a foothold in a region sandwiched between Russia and Iran, it has a clear interest in Armenia “being more sovereign, more autonomous, and more able to trade westwards,” said Thomas de Waal, a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe.
Sunday’s vote is the first since Armenia’s 2023 military defeat, when Azerbaijan retook the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh, prompting the exodus of around 100,000 ethnic Armenians.
Pashinyan is keen to trumpet his progress towards peace and the re-opening of the frontier with Turkey, shut since 1993. But no deal with Baku has been ‌signed, and ⁠critics say he has conceded too much.
“Although there are still some outstanding issues – like Armenian territory being occupied and Armenian prisoners of war being held in Baku, the ruling party says peace has arrived,” said Tigran Grigoryan, director of the Regional Centre for Democracy and Security think tank in Yerevan.
This messaging around the peace process “diverts the responsibility for all the security failures we’ve had throughout the years,” he said.
Should Pashinyan fail to secure a two-thirds majority in parliament, a pledge to Azerbaijan to call a referendum to change Armenia’s constitution would be difficult for him to fulfill, and peace efforts could stall.
He also faces allegations of authoritarianism from the opposition and international rights groups. Dozens of ⁠opponents have been detained, including allies of his main challenger Karapetyan, who is under house arrest for calls to usurp power.
Karapetyan and another contender, former President Robert Kocharyan, want to maintain friendly relations with Russia, and warn Pashinyan is getting too close to Azerbaijan.

KARABAKH EXODUS LEAVES SCARS

In the 2021 election, Pashinyan drew support from voters far from the centres of power, while underperforming in the wealthier capital.
“Pashinyan is able to talk the language of the common people, the ⁠language people understand,” said Mikayel Zolyan, a political analyst and former member of parliament.
Since coming to power in the 2018 Velvet Revolution, he has overseen a doubling of GDP per capita, opened hundreds of kindergartens and paved thousands of kilometres of road.
That progress means little to Anahit Grigoryan, who fled Nagorno-Karabakh with her young son after her husband was killed in an explosion at a military fuel depot during the ⁠chaotic one-day war.
Now 26, she lives with four generations of her family in a village outside Yerevan, surviving on a small refugee allowance and selling cakes made with eggs from her backyard chickens.
As a former Karabakh resident, Grigoryan would need Armenian citizenship documents to vote, but said she was not interested.
“I feel like my voice will not be heard,” said the mother of four-year-old Karen. “Justice, for me, is not realistic…It’s very hard for me to look my mother, my grandmother, and other women who lost their kids in the eyes.”

Reporting by Lucy Papachristou Editing by Ros Russell

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The Kremlin explained the fate of Armenian cognac

Albert Nalbandian
Eurasia Daily
June 5 2026
The Kremlin explained the fate of Armenian cognac

Boris Titov, special Representative of the President of Russia for relations with international organizations, on the sidelines of the SPIEF said that the Russian market will be able to replace Armenian cognacs in case of any restrictions on their import. Details are provided by TASS.

According to Titov, our country will find an alternative without any problems, while Armenia will obviously suffer significant losses.

“Russia will definitely survive,” said Titov, who is also the owner of the Abrau-Durso group of companies.

At the end of May, the Rosselkhoznadzor imposed temporary restrictions on the import of a number of agricultural products from Armenia. First, fresh tomatoes, cucumbers, peppers, greens and strawberries were banned, then cherries, cherries, apricots, peaches, plums, nectarines and grapes. Later, the list was supplemented with seed crops, eggplants, potatoes and dried fruits. Cognac, it seems, is next in line.

More details: https://eadaily.com/en/news/2026/06/05/the-kremlin-explained-the-fate-of-armenian-cognac

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Turkish Press: Armenians’ choice may set course of ties with Türkiye

Vorskanian Yeghisabet
Daily Sabah, Turkey
June 5 2026

Armenians’ choice may set course of ties with Türkiye

by Emine Gider

Armenians head to the polls Sunday in a closely watched election that could determine the future of normalization efforts with Türkiye and Azerbaijan while shaping the country’s geopolitical orientation between Russia and the West, experts say

Armenia on Sunday will hold parliamentary elections, the first since Azerbaijan’s Karabakh victory under incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and a crucial vote in which the nation will also decide on the tone of rapprochement with Türkiye.

Like its neighbor Türkiye, Armenia looks to balance alignments with Asia and the West. At Sunday’s parliamentary elections, the Caucasus country may test this balance, as well as its normalization with Türkiye. It will be the first election for the prime minister since Azerbaijan retook Karabakh in a decisive 2023 military victory and a vote that will follow a growing pace of rapprochement with Ankara. Experts argue that Armenia’s upcoming elections have the potential to reshape political dynamics in the Caucasus, making them a matter of strategic importance for regional and international stakeholders.

“Armenia’s upcoming elections have the potential to influence the strategic balance in the South Caucasus,” Sinan Demirtürk, an assistant professor at Gazi University and the chair of the Türkiye Policy and Strategic Research Foundation (TURPAV), told Daily Sabah.

Armenia is counting down to parliamentary elections scheduled for June 7 as the country continues efforts to normalize relations with Türkiye and Azerbaijan. The election will determine Armenia’s next prime minister.

Armenian voters are set to head to the polls on Sunday to elect a new parliament and next prime minister.

According to Demirtürk, Armenia has historically been positioned as a military and political partner of first the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union in the region.

“From a historical perspective, Armenia has long been integrated into Russia’s geopolitical strategy in the South Caucasus,” he said, arguing that Moscow continues to view Armenia as a key component of its regional security architecture, making Armenian elections an issue with implications extending beyond domestic politics.

The election is taking place amid ongoing debates over Armenia’s foreign policy orientation, including discussions about reducing dependence on Russia and deepening engagement with the West. Political observers say the vote could mark a turning point for the country’s future direction.

One of the factors drawing significant attention to Armenia’s parliamentary elections is Pashinyan. Known for his active use of social media, Pashinyan has remained at the center of public debate due to his efforts to normalize relations with Türkiye and Azerbaijan, as well as his outspoken statements and political initiatives.

While widely regarded as the frontrunner in the race, Pashinyan is also among the most heavily criticized political figures in the country. He has advocated both the normalization of ties with Türkiye and Azerbaijan and closer relations with Western countries.

“The outcome of the elections will not only affect Armenia’s internal political trajectory but could also have broader consequences for regional dynamics, particularly relations involving Russia, Azerbaijan and other actors in the South Caucasus,” Demirtürk noted.

Armenian voters will choose among 17 political parties and two electoral alliances in a parliamentary election widely viewed as a test of the country’s future geopolitical orientation, as debates continue over closer ties with either Russia or the West.

Pashinyan and his ruling Civil Contract Party remain the frontrunners, according to recent opinion polls. However, analysts say that even if Pashinyan’s party finishes first, it may fall short of securing enough votes to govern alone.

One of Pashinyan’s main challengers is Russian Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who leads the Strong Armenia alliance.

Drawing attention to the normalization of trade, transportation and border cooperation between Türkiye and Armenia while addressing long-standing historical and political disputes through bilateral agreements, “The goal is to create a more stable framework for border security and regional logistics,” Demirtürk said.

Such developments could further reduce Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus, particularly following Azerbaijan’s victory in the Karabakh conflict and the changing regional security environment, according to Demirtürk.

“The concern in Moscow is that deeper regional integration could gradually diminish Russia’s military and political leverage in the region.”

Recent normalization efforts mark the most active and tangible phase since the 1990s in Turkish-Armenian relations, which have long been at a minimum. As of early May, the process has moved toward frequent diplomatic contacts and a focus on confidence-building measures, including direct technical projects such as the joint restoration of the ancient Ani Bridge, which stands on the border between the two.

Demirtürk remarked that a victory by Pashinyan could accelerate ongoing regional normalization efforts and expand transportation and trade connectivity across the South Caucasus.

“If Pashinyan remains in power, agreements reached between Armenia and its neighbors could pave the way for new transit routes linking Türkiye with Central Asia,” he stressed.

Türkiye and Armenia have signed a deal for the joint restoration of the ancient Ani Bridge on the border during a visit in May by Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz to Yerevan. Yılmaz was the highest-ranking official since former President Abdullah Gül to visit Armenia. His visit is more significant, though, as Yerevan and Ankara explore more ways to further cooperation and eventually, fully normalize their relations.

“In that context, Armenia could become an important transit hub alongside projects such as the proposed Zangezur Corridor, particularly through the development of road and railway infrastructure.”

He also said greater regional connectivity could contribute to broader social and political normalization among countries in the region.

“Improved transportation links and economic integration would likely be accompanied by a gradual easing of tensions and increased people-to-people contact.”

Since 2020, Türkiye and Armenia have held a string of talks at various levels to explore the way forward in relations. Most recently, delegations from the two sides met in Kars of eastern Türkiye to discuss the revival of a railway between the two neighbors.

Earlier, direct passenger and cargo flights were launched mutually. Ankara and Yerevan also approved the opening of the Alican border crossing to citizens of third countries and diplomatic passport holders. Before Yılmaz’s visit, Pashinyan met President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan last June in Istanbul.

Azerbaijan, Armenia affairs

The process aimed at achieving lasting peace and normalizing relations between South Caucasus countries Azerbaijan and Armenia is set to continue in 2026, building on concrete diplomatic, political and economic steps taken over the past year

The year 2025 marked a period of intensified engagement between the two former Soviet nations, with contacts expanding from political dialogue to confidence-building measures on the ground.

A major breakthrough came on Aug. 8, when Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Pashinyan met in Washington under U.S. mediation and signed a joint declaration reaffirming their commitment to ending decades of conflict. On the same occasion, the foreign ministers of both countries initialed a peace agreement, underscoring a shared determination to advance toward full normalization.

Pointing out the cruciality of Armenia’s upcoming elections that are being closely observed by both global powers and regional actors, “As for Azerbaijan, Baku continues to adhere to the fundamental principles of international law and does not interfere in Armenia’s internal affairs,” Najiba Mustafayeva, an assistant professor at the Bahçeşehir University, stated.

“However, the prospect of revanchist opposition forces coming to power is viewed as a potential threat to the peace process,” she continued.

“The future of the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace agreement will be shaped to a large extent by the outcome of the elections,” Mustafayeva warned.

She underlined that some opposition groups have campaigned on revisiting the terms of the peace agreement initialed by the parties in Washington last year and have sought to revive rhetoric surrounding the now-resolved Karabakh issue.

“From Baku’s perspective, attempts to reopen discussions on the Karabakh question or renegotiate the framework of the peace agreement could undermine regional stability and complicate efforts to achieve a lasting settlement between the two countries.”

Sargis Khandanyan, a member of the ruling Civil Contract Party and chair of the Armenian Parliament’s Standing Committee on Foreign Relations, recently said that his party would seek to advance the signing and ratification of a peace agreement with Azerbaijan while maintaining existing economic cooperation initiatives.

Khandanyan also condemned incidents involving the burning of Turkish and Azerbaijani flags in Yerevan.

“There can be no more absurd way of delivering a political or diplomatic message to a country than by burning its flag,” he said.

“The peace process currently underway reflects a convergence of interests between Azerbaijan and Armenia,” Mustafayeva noted.

“For Baku, the most important issue is the extent to which Armenia continues to adhere to the peace agenda, and the elections are expected to provide a clearer indication of that commitment.”

Both Azerbaijan and Armenia have taken steps aimed at fostering mutual trust. Azerbaijan eased restrictions on cargo destined for Armenia, contributing to the functioning of regional trade and transportation routes. The launch of Azerbaijani oil exports to Armenia was recorded as a notable milestone in economic relations and a shift toward pragmatic cooperation.

According to Demirtürk, if Pashinyan remains in power, ongoing bilateral agreements could further strengthen regional connectivity and expand Armenia’s role as a transit route.

The country could become an increasingly important transportation hub alongside the proposed Zangezur Corridor, with the potential development of new road and railway links facilitating trade and movement across the region.

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Elections in Armenia: Between East and West

Arpi Talalian
Italy – June 5 2026
by Vladimir Rozanskij

The vote on 7 June in Yerevan is set to resolve the turbulent domestic political situation, either ushering in a new phase oriented towards Europe or bringing the country back under Russian control, whilst seeking to avert civil war between the various factions of the Armenian people. Meanwhile, the current Prime Minister Pashinyan has indicated that he intends to meet Putin immediately after the vote.

Yerevan (AsiaNews) – Armenia is set to go to the polls on Sunday 7 June for parliamentary elections that are being watched very closely, not only within its borders. The country has in fact long been torn by a bitter divide between its current leadership, which looks to the West, and its opponents who criticise its handling of negotiations with Azerbaijan and – more generally – the cooling of historic relations with Moscow.

On the eve of the election, the current Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan – the favourite in the polls – has announced that he intends to meet Vladimir Putin immediately after the vote, in a meeting agreed during a recent telephone conversation on the occasion of Pashinyan’s birthday on 1 June, during which “various outstanding issues” were discussed. Previously, the Russian president had made statements suggesting that, should Armenia pursue integration with the EU, it would then have to terminate its free trade agreement with Russia, repeal documents relating to technical regulations and phytosanitary standards, and forfeit other benefits granted to the country by virtue of its membership of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

Previously, the Russian side had warned Armenia of a possible termination of the 2013 gas agreement, and the agency Rosselkhoznadzor had consequently begun restricting the supply of Armenian products to Russia. At the same time, several Armenian imports into Russia – including fruit, vegetables and alcohol – were blocked, on the grounds of ‘inadequate health standards’, after Putin himself had pointed out that ‘Armenia’s GDP depends on trade with Russia’.

Putin’s threats were accompanied by various statements from senior figures in Moscow’s political establishment, such as those by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov regarding the “possible development of the situation in Armenia along the lines of that in Ukraine”, where conflict had erupted in 2014 precisely because of the Ukrainians’ desire to forge economic agreements with the European Union. Yerevan has in fact expressed a desire to integrate with Europe, whilst still being a member of the EAEU, and this choice could provoke a reaction similar to that which led to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The tension with Russia mirrors that within Armenia itself, a country historically very close to Moscow, due to its defence against Turkish claims following the genocide of the early 20th century. All of Armenia’s leaders have always been heavily dependent on the Kremlin, whilst Pashinyan had, from his youth, opposed the leadership in Yerevan, which he accused of corruption. In 1999, he spent a year in prison for refusing to pay a fine of around ,000, imposed for criticism in the newspaper he founded, Oragir, of the then foreign minister Serzh Sargsyan, who later became president of the republic between 2008 and 2018, after serving as prime minister.

Having become one of the main figures of the opposition, Pashinyan organised protests following the referendum imposed by Sargsyan to extend his term of office further, eventually becoming prime minister in 2018 with the new Civil Agreement party. Over the past eight years, he has therefore sought to free Armenia from its dependence on Russia, and has had to deal with the crisis of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan, which had been dragging on since the early post-Soviet years. After 44 days of war, during which Russia refused to intervene, effectively facilitating the Azerbaijani military campaign, an armistice was signed with Baku in November 2020, without ever reaching a genuine peace agreement.

Now the chickens are coming home to roost: Pashinyan has now re-established a constructive relationship with Azerbaijan, breaking away entirely from Russia and taking advantage of US mediation, which envisages the opening of the ‘Trump Peace Corridor’ as a final solution that would effectively exclude the Russians from the trade routes of the South Caucasus. The Armenian Apostolic Church, led by its Catholicos Karekin II, has taken a stand against the Prime Minister; the Prime Minister would like to see him resign on grounds of “immorality” and corruption, and the Church is represented by the pro-Russian oligarch Samvel Karapetyan, leader of the opposition to the government. Sunday’s vote is set to resolve the turbulent situation, either ushering in a new phase of Armenian politics oriented towards Europe or bringing the country back under Russia’s control, whilst seeking to avert civil war between the various factions of the Armenian people.

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Nikol Pashinyan: Drummer PM steering Armenia away from Russia

Boshkezenian Garik
The New Indian Express
June 5 2026

Nikol Pashinyan: Drummer PM steering Armenia away from Russia

When war with Azerbaijan erupted in 2020 over the breakaway region of Karabakh, the then polished politician with a soft handshake and a bashful smile transformed almost overnight into a bellicose military leader.

AFP

YERAVANA: Armenia’s drum-playing social-media-savvy leader Nikol Pashinyan, on course for re-election on Sunday, has spent years navigating a fraught balancing act between Russia and the West, drawing accusations of creeping authoritarianism while in office.

The 51-year-old ex-journalist rose to power on the back of a 2018 peaceful street revolution and has built much of his political appeal on a carefully cultivated image of accessibility.

For supporters, Pashinyan remains the same man of 2018: the maverick who walked hundreds of kilometres across Armenia to challenge a corrupt post-Soviet elite, sleeping in the open and speaking to crowds from benches, rooftops and courtyards.

“For me, the most important change that occurred is that the government and the people of Armenia love each other,” he told voters during the campaign, saying Sunday’s election should become “the day of victory for our love.”

But, eight years on from the revolution, the mood around Pashinyan is divided.

When war with Azerbaijan erupted in 2020 over the breakaway region of Karabakh, the then polished politician with a soft handshake and a bashful smile transformed almost overnight into a bellicose military leader.

He regularly addressed the nation on television with impassioned war cries, calling on Armenians to “unite and break the enemy’s backbone” and saying there can be no diplomatic solution to the conflict.

Two military defeats later, Karabakh lost and hosting 100,000 ethnic Armenian refugees, Pashinyan now portrays himself as the only man who can secure long-term peace.

The conflict also pushed him to look for new allies, loosening Armenia’s dependence on traditional backer Moscow — angering the Kremlin — while deepening ties with the EU and the United States.

Polls suggest Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party has a comfortable lead.

Authoritarian methods

Before coming to power, Pashinyan was a seasoned campaigner against the country’s Russia-friendly leadership.

He spent more than a year in hiding after being accused of provoking riots following the 2008 presidential election, when 10 people died in clashes between police and supporters of the defeated opposition candidate.

He surrendered in 2009, was jailed until 2011, and then elected to parliament the next year.

Activists and analysts say Pashinyan’s record in office has not been the clean-cut democratic reformer many imagined in 2018.

Critics accuse him of using the courts, police and bureaucracy to pressure his opponents — including the powerful Armenian church.

“The state of democracy in Armenia can be described as a gradual transition from populism to authoritarian methods of governance,” said analyst Gevorg Pogosyan.

“The prisons are overcrowded with people persecuted for their political views,” said another analyst, Vigen Hakobyan.

Pashinyan has compared opposition leaders to “mafia bosses” who “should work in penal colonies.”

‘I love you’

On the campaign trail, he has travelled on a bus across Armenia, stopping to greet supporters with his trademark phrase: “Hello, beloved people. So, how are you, how are things?”

Between stops, he broadcasts live from the bus, showing himself eating local snacks — part of a constant stream of social media content aimed at showing he has not retreated behind the walls of power.

“I love all of you,” he recently wrote on Instagram, celebrating that his videos — often showing him just sitting in his office with popular music in the background — had racked up 100 million views.

This year he formed a band, in which he plays the drums — holding concerts in Yerevan and out in the country to loyal supporters.

In a display of performative diplomacy in May, Pashinyan picked up the sticks as visiting French President Emmanuel Macron took to the microphone to sing a power ballad by French-Armenian singer Charles Aznavour.

The made-for-TV moment was a clear sign of who Europe wants to stay in power.

Born in 1975 in the northern town of Ijevan, Pashinyan studied journalism at Yerevan State University in the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

He was expelled — he says for his political activity, though the university said for absences.

In previous campaigns, he brandished a hammer as a symbol of political confrontation.

This time, hand hearts have become his emblem.

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The hidden front: How disinformation is targeting Armenian voters

Emil Lazarian
France 24
June 5 2026

The hidden front: How disinformation is targeting Armenian voters

On the ground

Issued on: 05/06/2026 – 11:04

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One ballot box, two competing battles: In Armenia, voters are heading to the polls to decide the future direction of their country. But beneath the political campaigns lies a far more insidious warfare. Analysts warn that a massive, coordinated network of foreign disinformation – much of it tracing back to Russia – is systematically weaponising the deep-seated trauma of recent wars. FRANCE 24’s team on the ground reports.

Video by:
Taline OUNDJIAN
Olivia BIZOT

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Elections Amidst Tension: Armenia’s Political Turmoil

Maghakian Mike
DevDiscourse
June 6 2026

Six candidates from the pro-Russian Strong Armenia party were arrested before the elections, spotlighting Armenia’s complex relations with Russia. The arrests reflect internal tensions as the nation navigates its foreign alliances, with the ruling party leading in polls. The election tests peace initiatives with Azerbaijan and highlights Russian influence claims.

Key Takeaways

AI Summary

  • Armenian authorities detained six candidates from the pro-Russian Strong Armenia party just a day before the elections.
  • The arrests target the party led by billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who is under house arrest facing charges of inciting governmental overthrow.
  • The elections are seen as a test of Armenia’s diplomatic balance between Moscow and the West amid Russian export restrictions.
  • Polls show Prime Minister Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party leading, while civil society groups express concerns over potential Russian disinformation campaigns.

In a dramatic electoral twist, Armenian authorities detained six candidates from the pro-Russian Strong Armenia party just a day before the pivotal elections, as state media reported. The surprising arrests were made without public reasons, targeting a party under billionaire Samvel Karapetyan’s leadership, who himself faces charges.

Karapetyan, placed under house arrest for allegedly inciting governmental overthrow, denies the accusations as politically charged. The elections emerge as a litmus test of Armenia’s diplomatic balance between Moscow and the West, with Russia imposing export restrictions in response to Yerevan’s evolving Western ties.

Polls indicate Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party holds a lead over Strong Armenia. Civil society groups have voiced concerns over potential Russian disinformation campaigns, while Armenian authorities, including the Central Election Commission, approved legal proceedings against the detained candidates.

(With inputs from agencies.)

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