European Bank

Jan 2 2024

Anyuakmedia

Jan 2 2024

Armenia, a small landlocked country in the South Caucasus region, has long struggled with limited internet access. However, a new development has the potential to revolutionize internet connectivity in the country. Starlink, a satellite internet constellation being constructed by SpaceX, promises to bring high-speed internet to even the most remote areas of Armenia.

For years, Armenia has faced challenges in providing reliable and fast internet access to its citizens. The country’s mountainous terrain and limited infrastructure have made it difficult to extend internet connectivity to rural and remote areas. As a result, many Armenians have been left without access to the digital world, hindering their ability to participate in the global economy and access educational resources.

Starlink aims to change this by deploying thousands of small satellites into low Earth orbit. These satellites will form a mesh network, providing global coverage and enabling high-speed internet access in even the most remote corners of the world. The technology behind Starlink holds great promise for countries like Armenia, where traditional internet infrastructure is lacking.

One of the key advantages of Starlink is its ability to bypass the need for extensive ground infrastructure. Traditional internet providers rely on a network of cables and physical infrastructure to deliver internet connectivity. This approach is costly and time-consuming, making it difficult to reach remote areas. Starlink’s satellite-based approach eliminates the need for extensive ground infrastructure, making it a more viable option for countries like Armenia.

Moreover, Starlink’s satellite network can provide internet access at speeds comparable to or even faster than traditional broadband connections. This is a significant improvement for Armenia, where slow internet speeds have been a major hindrance to economic growth and development. With Starlink, Armenians will be able to access high-speed internet, enabling them to participate in online businesses, access educational resources, and connect with the global community.

Another advantage of Starlink is its potential to enhance internet reliability. Traditional internet connections in Armenia are often prone to disruptions and outages, particularly in rural areas. This can be detrimental to businesses and individuals who rely on a stable internet connection. Starlink’s satellite network, on the other hand, is designed to provide a more reliable and consistent internet connection, even in remote areas. This will greatly benefit Armenians who have long struggled with unreliable internet access.

However, it is important to note that the implementation of Starlink in Armenia is not without challenges. One of the main concerns is the cost of accessing Starlink’s services. While SpaceX aims to make the service affordable, it may still be out of reach for many Armenians, particularly those in rural areas with lower incomes. Addressing this issue will be crucial to ensure that Starlink’s benefits are accessible to all Armenians, regardless of their financial situation.

In conclusion, Starlink has the potential to revolutionize internet access in Armenia. By bypassing the need for extensive ground infrastructure and providing high-speed and reliable internet connectivity, Starlink can bridge the digital divide in the country. However, ensuring affordability and accessibility for all Armenians will be key to fully harnessing the benefits of this groundbreaking technology. With Starlink, Armenia has the opportunity to overcome its internet access challenges and join the global digital community.

Deutsche Welle, Germany

Jan 2 2024

After more than a century of conflict and the mass exodus of its Armenian population in September 2023, the self-styled republic of Nagorno-Karabakh has officially ceased to exist and is now fully under the rule of Azerbaijan.

Watch the video of the report at the link below

Novaya Gazeta

Jan 2 2024

Jan 2 2023

On January 1, 2024, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR), the entity at the heart of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, ceased – officially – to exist. The self-proclaimed republic's last leader, Samvel Shahramanyan, mandated its dissolution in a decree of September 28, 2023 that was a condition of the ceasefire ending Azerbaijan's lightning military operation to crush the NKR on September 19-20.  

The existence of a second Armenian republic in Karabakh, which to the end remained unrecognized by any United Nations member state including Armenia, had been the single most divisive issue between Armenians and Azerbaijanis since it first appeared. Its very existence went straight to the heart of the "meta-conflict": the conflict over what the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is really about. 

In ways that echo Zionism's subsuming of conflict in Palestine into a wider conflict with Arabs, Azerbaijan has consistently sought to fold its conflict with the Armenian population in Karabakh into a wider irredentist framework with Armenia. In this reading there is, and has never been, a real conflict in Karabakh, only external interference. In Azerbaijani perspectives, the NKR was nothing more than a puppet regime, a stalking horse for annexation and no different from the Russian-created "people's republics" in eastern Ukraine. 

Conversely, Armenia consistently sought to downplay its role in the conflict and to depict the NKR as one of its principals. For years visitors to the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be shown a facsimile of the May 12, 1994 ceasefire agreement featuring three signatories – Armenia, Azerbaijan and the NKR – thereby asserting the latter's agency. Armenian sources frequently referred to the "Artsakh-Azerbaijan conflict," evoking an Armenian name for the area dating back to antiquity that underlined the longevity of the Armenian claim independent of modern state-territorial arrangements.     

Between these opposed visions, a tradition of scholarship sought to understand the NKR as an example of a "de facto state": a secessionist entity with a permanent population and fixed borders that is nevertheless not recognized as a state by other states. De facto states can be understood as a product of the very system that excludes the possibility of their existence: the post-Second World War and post-colonial system of sovereign and equal states covering every centimeter of the globe. 

The hegemony of this system, at least until recent years, is what created the possibility of a de facto state as an anomaly existing outside of it – or in Alexander Iskandaryan's memorable phrase, as "temporary technical errors within the system of international law." The Soviet and Yugoslav collapses resulted in the emergence of numerous such entities, several of which, including Abkhazia, Transdniester, South Ossetia and the NKR, survived in the margins of international relations for decades despite non-recognition.  

A historical tradition

The independence of the NKR was proclaimed by a joint meeting of the regional soviets (councils) from the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) and Shahumyan region to its north on September 2, 1991. It followed Azerbaijan's declaration of independence two days earlier, itself a response to the failed putsch in Moscow and the now universal realization that the Soviet Union would soon be no more. 

Sovereignty as a separate entity, however, was never the goal of the Karabakh movement, whose aim was instead unification with Armenia - miatsum in Armenian. This was not a new phenomenon in the late 1980s, but a long-standing aspiration going back to the First World War era and the formation of new Armenian and Azerbaijani republics in the aftermath of the collapse of the Russian Empire. 

Following large-scale violence in 1920 contesting Azerbaijani control over Karabakh, the incoming Bolsheviks established the NKAO in 1923 within Soviet Azerbaijan essentially as a conflict resolution mechanism. The NKAO recognized the state of play (Azerbaijani control) but sought to balance that with a compensatory autonomy for the Karabakh Armenian population. 

It did not work out that way in practice. Azerbaijan came to see the autonomous region as a Soviet intrusion on its body politic and consequently as recent, colonial and illegitimate. A few months after the NKR's proclamation of independence, Azerbaijan abolished the NKAO on November 26, 1991. In Azerbaijan today the very notion of a separate highland space – a mountainous Karabakh – is rejected as geopolitical artifice fragmenting a wider, pre-twentieth-century understanding of Karabakh encompassing mountains and lowlands between the Kura and Aras rivers. 

Apparent hesitation in the Soviet territorial delimitation process in July 1921 meanwhile left Karabakh Armenians with the perception that incorporation into Armenia had been a real possibility. Whenever the Soviet Union subsequently went through more liberal phases, letter-writing campaigns calling for unification with Armenia followed, citing concerns over discrimination, Azerbaijani migration into the NKAO and cultural rights in Soviet Azerbaijan. Days before the Soviet Union formally dissolved, local Armenian authorities ran a referendum in the territory on 10 December 1991, in which the former NKAO's ethnic Azerbaijani minority did not take part, and which returned a 99 percent vote in favor of independence.  

The ambiguity of unification

The Soviet collapse, however, transformed the meaning of unification, for miatsum implied the unification of two geopolitical bodies – the Republic of Armenia and the NKR – that were not territorially contiguous. Although the NKAO was never an enclave strictly understood, it did have an enclave geography being entirely surrounded by undisputed Azerbaijani territory.

This geography may not have been as insurmountable as it might seem in the context of the Soviet Union, where the state's hyper-centralization of power meant that linkages to the center mattered more than horizontal ties between units in the periphery (Crimea had existed non-contiguously as an oblast of Russia until 1954).

The Soviet collapse meant, however, that the Soviet framework for the organization of borders and sovereignty was replaced by the international system that was (even) less tolerant of changes in borders and the formation of new states outside of narrowly defined parameters (decolonization of European colonies).

In the context of independent Armenian and Azerbaijani republics, territorial non-contiguity implicated the Karabakh Armenians, like no other post-Soviet de facto state, in a long-term struggle against geography and in particular to strategies of encirclement, blockade and siege. Breaking out of an Azerbaijani siege constituted an initial war goal of the Karabakh Armenian leadership in the First Karabakh War that immediately followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991.

Consequently, the NKR was confronted at its birth with a geo-strategic conundrum that made it in many ways an impossible republic. In the face of international disapproval of irredentism, Karabakh Armenians opted for a second-best outcome: sovereignty as an entity separate from Armenia, rather than unification. Yet unification in the direct spatial sense was the only way to address the problem of non-contiguousness, which could only be overcome by the unlikely outcome of Azerbaijani acquiescence or an ethically corrosive strategy of military conquest of interceding areas. 

It was through the latter pathway that the problem of territorial non-contiguity was "resolved." Armenian forces conquered the seven regions of Lachin, Kelbajar, Qubatly, Zangilan, Jebrayil, Agdam and Fizuli, in whole or in part, between May 1992 and May 1994, carving out a wide belt of territories surrounding, and in area exceeding, the former NKAO. 

These regions had been almost entirely populated by ethnic Azerbaijanis prior to the conflict; more than half a million were ethnically cleansed during the conquest. This reflected a reality still true today: territorial control in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is synonymous with ethnic cleansing. Azerbaijani advances into northern Karabakh in summer 1992 had similarly resulted in the mass forced displacement of ethnic Armenians, while Armenians ethnically cleansed from other parts of Azerbaijan in 1988-90 and from Shahumyan in 1991-92 also made new homes in the NKR. The NKR was thereby doubly constituted by the ethnic cleansing of both nationalities.

The extent of territorial overspill beyond the boundaries of the original dispute made the NKR a stark exception amongst its cohort of de facto states, and implicated the NKR – and by extension, Armenia – in the politically fraught imperative of justifying its control over the territories.

If strategic framing of the territories as a buffer zone prevailed in the early years, this was subsequently overtaken by the term "liberated territories," a description that was a gift to arguments that the conflict was driven by Armenian land hunger, not the human rights of Karabakh Armenians. Maps increasingly depicted a unified ethno-territorial entity, which in my work I have described as "augmented Armenia," submerging the differences between the Republic of Armenia, the NKAO and the occupied territories, and consequently the differences between recognized statehood, a self-determination claim and a military-occupational regime. 

Governance and survival

The ambiguity of unification as a strategic necessity but political impracticality resulted in an associated ambiguity between the NKR’s tactical performance of a sovereignty separate from Armenia, combined with strategic integration with it at other levels. The NKR featured all of the symbolic and bureaucratic architecture of a state: flag, anthem, executive, legislative and judicial branches of power, a full set of line ministries and political parties that, with the exception of the Dashnaktsutyun (a pan-Armenian nationalist party that had led the First Republic in Armenia in 1918-20), did not operate in Armenia.

At the strategic level, however, the NKR's dependence on Armenia was evident in financial subsidies, military transfers and deep intersection between ostensibly separate armies. Deep integration was underlined by the fact that from 1998 until Armenia's Velvet Revolution in 2018, Armenia and the NKR were governed by a single networked elite originating in Karabakh. Armenia's second and third presidents, Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, were Karabakh natives and comprised the NKR's wartime leadership during the First Karabakh War. Lacking democratic legitimacy in an increasingly corrupt and oligarchic Armenia, preserving the NKR in the expansive form inherited from the 1992-4 war became this elite's talisman and claim to legitimacy.    

In the NKR, tactical sovereignty underpinned a carefully choreographed politics of democratization that both acknowledged the Karabakh movement's self-perception as a popular, participatory movement (the NKR was originally established as a parliamentary republic) and was designed to appeal to Euro-Atlantic understandings of the "freedom agenda" through the 2000s. 

What emerged was a variety of performative pluralism that would substantiate the NKR's claims to be a democracy but which would not risk destabilization or internal unrest. Through much of its existence, elections in the NKR were characterized by multiple candidates, sometimes high vote shares for alternative candidates (such as Vitaly Balasanyan's 31.5 percent in the 2012 presidential election) and relatively free campaigns although the end result was rarely in doubt. The high point of oppositional electoral success was a mayoral election in Stepanakert (Khankendi) in 2004, won by Eduard Agabekyan. 

Pluralistic and relatively free elections nevertheless secured the republic's coveted rating as "partly free" in Freedom House's "Freedom in the World Index," serving as the critical comparison with Azerbaijan's consistently "unfree" rating. This strategy reflected calculations that in the light of many states' recognition of Kosovo after 2008, "standards before status" was the best front on which to campaign for recognition. 

But while the internal politics of the NKR continued to matter for its legitimacy amongst its own population, it would be overtaken by international developments from 2014. The first was the decline in the security situation along the Line of Contact with Azerbaijan, which from the summer of 2014 was characterized by increasingly frequent and large-scale skirmishes and escalations. These included April 2016's "four-day war" that saw Azerbaijani forces retake small pockets of territory along the Line of Contact for the first time.  

The second was Russia's support of new de facto states – the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics – in eastern Ukraine to widespread international condemnation. Russia's actions recast the de facto state phenomenon as the installation of puppet regimes with no previous history of popular mobilization in support of sovereignty. This implicated the NKR and other surviving de facto states in a constant justification of why their case was different.  

The NKR's democratization trajectory unsurprisingly declined in parallel with these developments. Opposition representation was limited to a few seats in parliament. Civil society, isolated from international programming, remained marginal and declined over time as key individuals migrated to Yerevan. In 2017 the NKR introduced a new constitution with a fully presidential system that also enabled former security service chief Bako Sahakyan to stay in office for a total of 13 years.  

A European Court of Human Rights judgment (Chiragov and Others v. Armenia, Application no. 13216/05) in 2015 acknowledged the ambivalence of the NKR's claim to a separate sovereignty. The Court found that Armenia effectively exercised extra-territorial jurisdiction sustaining the situation in Karabakh, overturning Armenia's arguments to the contrary and effectively affirming Azerbaijan's narrative of Armenia as an occupying power.          

Multipolarity and eclipse

The post-Cold War unipolar moment may likely be seen as a high tide for unrecognized entities in Eurasia. It was a particular conjuncture defined by imperial collapse, territorial re-ordering and the weakness of newly independent states, combined with the hegemony of liberal-democratic values that – if inconsistently and hypocritically – imposed higher costs on state violence. 

Multipolarity instead bodes a context of strategic competition among major powers in a context of declining restraints on the use of force. This emerging environment presented specific threats to the NKR as a de facto state supported not by a regional hegemon (those that were faced a different threat – annexation) but by Armenia, a small state with limited resources and capacity to sustain a strategic rivalry with Azerbaijan that was bigger, wealthier, better armed and could count on allies supportive of a military resolution in its favor.  

The Second Karabakh War in 2020 was a partial Azerbaijani victory resulting in the partition, rather than total destruction, of the NKR. Alongside the recovery of occupied territories, the war successfully eliminated Armenia's capacity to act as a patron state. The war outcomes presented a stark reckoning with geography as the two Armenian geopolitical bodies were once again separated and the only connecting link – the Lachin Corridor – placed under Russian control. 

The new status quo appeared to present a convergence with other post-Soviet de facto states as the NKR effectively became a Russian protectorate surviving solely on account of Russian commitments to a military presence in the territory. Only a Russian approach – freezing the conflict and postponing status decisions to a distant future – offered a future trajectory for the NKR, as compared to the Euro-Atlantic approach that sought a negotiated re-incorporation into the Azerbaijani state with guarantees for the rights and security of the Armenian population. Demonstrations of loyalty to Russia included the NKR leadership's welcoming of Russia's recognition of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics and the dispatch of aid to the Donbas. 

Ultimately, however, the NKR's fate was sealed by Russia's decision to invade Ukraine and the subsequent course of the war in that country. Russia's invasion forced a re-evaluation of the Kremlin's relationships and interests in ways that favored Azerbaijan, as a critical node in new connectivity schemes that acquired a new importance for a sanctioned Russia, as a partner in a wider axis of cooperation with Turkey and Iran, and as an ideologically like-minded power skeptical of the liberal international order. 

As a result, many Armenians' worst fears were realized: as one former Armenian official puts it, the NKR became small change in a larger geopolitical transaction. Russia acquiesced in the blocking of the Lachin Corridor for 10 months from December 2022 and stood down in the face of Azerbaijan's military operation on September 19. The NKR ended in days of disarray, despair and tragedy as some 220 Armenians were killed and hundreds more injured in a fuel depot explosion amid chaotic preparations for the mass exodus of the population. Over the week following September 24, with the exception of a few dozen infirm and elderly, the entire population of more than 102,000 fled the territory to become refugees in Armenia. 

The mass displacement has resulted in new tensions in the ambiguities of unification between the two Armenian communities. At one level, despite holding Armenian passports, Karabakh Armenians displaced to Armenia have discovered that they are less than Armenian citizens with a full set of rights. They must apply for citizenship, with uncertain implications for their right of return – an unlikely prospect today – or to restitution. 

At another level, debates have revolved around the question of leadership. Should the NKR be succeeded by a government-in-exile? Such an entity would be less than welcome in Yerevan and doubtless seen as a provocation in Baku. It would, presumably, still be a de facto government with no greater hope of recognition than when it was based in the homeland. Beyond these considerations, any such project must confront the visceral anger of its presumed constituents. Many Karabakh Armenians feel that despite the decades-long performance of statehood, their leadership failed them in the anarchy following the September 20 ceasefire leaving the community to flee in chaos.  

As a project in aspirant statehood, the NKR is no more. Key figures of its leadership – former presidents and prominent ministers – await trial in Baku, framed as prisoners of war in Armenia and war criminals in Azerbaijan. The echoes of its violent dissolution will reverberate across other majority-minority conflicts around the globe for years to come. What remains doubtful, however, is whether a cause that anchored Armenian nationalism for so long, that overturned received narratives of historical Armenian victimhood to capture the imaginations of millions living in Armenia and in diaspora for decades, and whose own narrative of existential threat was vindicated by its violent dissolution in a new crucible of collective trauma, will simply disappear. Reports that Shahramanyan subsequently annulled the decree dissolving the NKR are an early indication that the republic will not go quietly. 

What seems certain is that as it was in life, the NKR's legacy will be contested. 

Laurence Broers is an associate fellow with the Russia & Eurasia Programme at Chatham House and the author of Armenia and Azerbaijan: Anatomy of a Rivalry.

https://eurasianet.org/the-nagorno-karabakh-republic-the-life-and-death-of-an-unrecognized-state

MSN

Jan 1 2023

The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (NKR) is set to cease its existence from January 1, 2024. It is a formality, as almost all Armenians from Karabakh left after Azerbaijan's September operation, and de facto it ceased to exist well before the declared date.

RBC-Ukraine provides details on the aftermath of the recent conflict, the mass exodus of Armenians, and whether the Karabakh issue has fully been resolved.

Sources used in preparing the article: News of Armenia, Armenpress, Caucasian Knot, websites haqqin.az and report.az, the UN mission report, statements by the Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan and the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, as well as comments from the expert on South Caucasus affairs at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (Warsaw) Wojciech Wojtasiewicz.

One-day war: How Azerbaijan unraveled the "Karabakh knot"

The dissolution of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR, Armenian name Republic of Artsakh) became inevitable three years ago. In the early 1990s, with the direct involvement of Armenia, independence was declared, followed by the first war of 1992-1994, in which Azerbaijan suffered defeat. Internationally, the territory was recognized as part of Azerbaijan, and for nearly three decades, Baku dedicated itself to strengthening its economic and military might, declaring the return to Karabakh a national idea.

In late September 2020, the Azerbaijani army launched a massive offensive using heavy machinery, aviation, and drones. The troops advanced rapidly, and within a month and a half, they gained control over several districts with centers in Shushi, Zangilan, Gubadli, and Jabrayil.

The three-party statement by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia on November 9 halted the hostilities. According to it, Armenian forces left the region, Russian "peacekeepers" took control of the Lachin corridor (the only road between Armenia and the remnants of NKR), and Azerbaijan gained control over the districts of Agdam, Kelbajar, and Lachin.

Photo: territorial results of the second Karabakh war in 2020 (kavkaz-uzel.eu)

Since then, Baku and Yerevan have focused on a peaceful agreement, and in 2022, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan publicly spoke about the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, including Nagorno-Karabakh.

Negotiations progressed slowly. In December of the same year, Azerbaijan blocked the Lachin corridor, and in the spring, they established a checkpoint, completely cutting off Stepanakert from the outside world. In a swift operation on September 19, 2023, which concluded with the republic's capitulation, Azerbaijan implemented its plan.

On September 20, the parties agreed to cease hostilities and disarm Karabakh's military. President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan announced the restoration of sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh.

"A new situation is emerging in the region," he said in his address to the nation.

Why didn't Armenia intervene? As Pashinyan said, it was no longer a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. From his perspective, non-interference was the right decision, as victory was impossible, explained Wojciech Wojtasevich, an expert at the Polish Institute of International Affairs.

"Armenia is weaker than Azerbaijan, and Pashinyan's decision can be called wise. Many thought that Karabakh refugees would be dissatisfied, express anger towards him, society would organize protests, and perhaps a change of government. But they quickly realized that Pashinyan was not to blame, and partly shifted the blame to Russia. Its 'peacekeepers' did not react at all to Azerbaijan's operation; they were passive. Looking at the mood of Armenian society and refugees, almost all of them are against Russia," he explained in an interview with RBC-Ukraine.

The end of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic: What's wrong with the dissolution decree?

After the capitulation of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, thousands of local residents headed to Armenia. However, the region remained blockaded for several days. The Armenian government prepared to accommodate refugees, demanding the opening of a humanitarian corridor.

By September 23, agreements were reached on the withdrawal of Karabakh military, and the next day, Azerbaijan opened roads through Lachin and Kelbajar. The local population mass evacuated through the Lachin corridor.

In early October, officials, security forces, and the last "president" Samvel Shahramanyan left. Before that, he signed a decree on the dissolution of state institutions. According to the document, the unrecognized NKR ceases to exist from January 1, 2024. While in Armenia, he explained that this decree guaranteed the safety of refugees and disarmed soldiers. By the way, no one touched them on their way to Armenia.

"This became possible as a result of negotiations with the Azerbaijani side," Shahramanyan said.

Photo: NKR "president" Samvel Shahramanyan dissolved the republic, but seems to have changed his mind soon (nankr.am)

As of December, the NKR bodies were functioning on public principles, with the main focus on solving the problems of displaced persons. At the same time, Karabakh activists, politicians, and civic organizations demanded the annulment of the dissolution, and a few days before January 1, confusion arose.

As opposition Republican Party of Armenia deputy Hayk Mamijanyan said, the decree was devoid of legal force from the very beginning. In his opinion, no decree "can dissolve Artsakh, which was created not on paper, but with blood," and its institutions have the function of aiding refugees and preserving cultural heritage.

The Armenian newspaper Zhoghovurd cites Shahramanyan's words, allegedly saying that the dissolution is impossible, but for some reason, the "president" does not talk about its cancellation. Moreover, Zhoghovurd sources say that there is actually a separate decree canceling the dissolution of NKR. But it is unclear why it has not been published yet.

"I don't understand why Armenians are making such statements. Perhaps the first decree was necessary for the evacuation of officials. As we know, the Azerbaijani side did not detain either military or civilians. And to say two or three days before January 1st that it is invalid is at least strange. Probably, this is purely a symbolic gesture to show Azerbaijan: you expelled us, but this is not the end of the story," said expert Wojciech Wojtasiewicz.

Karabakh without Armenians. Why and are there chances of return?

The main outcome of the events of autumn 2023 is the truly massive exodus of Armenians from Karabakh. According to official data, about 120,000 ethnic Armenians lived here. Some of them left after 2020, but the vast majority left after the capitulation of the NKR.

In October, a special UN mission visited the region. According to the report, for example, in Hadrut (Stepanakert), no damage to civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, and residential buildings, was recorded. The Azerbaijani authorities were preparing to restore medical services, all shops were closed, and there were almost no people in the city.

"The team heard from the sources that there are from 50 to 1,000 ethnic Armenians remaining in the Karabakh region… The mission was impressed by the suddenness with which the local population left their homes and the suffering that it presumably caused," the report said.

As the press secretary of the Armenian Prime Minister Nazeli Baghdasaryan reported, by the beginning of October, more than 100,000 displaced people had arrived in the country.

This massive result is quite simple to explain: Karabakh Armenians feared ethnic cleansing.

"We remember that in the early 1990s, Armenians also conducted purges; according to various data, up to a million Azerbaijanis were forced to leave Karabakh and Armenia. And now they are afraid of revenge. Ilham Aliyev offered two options: either leave or stay but accept Azerbaijani citizenship. It can be stated that in reality Nagorno-Karabakh remained without Armenians," explains Wojciech Wojtasiewicz.

The UN mission did not receive reports of violence against civilians. At this stage, it is difficult to determine whether Karabakh Armenians intend to return, but it is clear that it will require time and efforts from all sides, the report says.

Ilham Aliyev says Armenians can return. But on the condition that they accept Azerbaijani citizenship and forget about the self-proclaimed republic.

"They invented it in their dreams, in their myths," he said in December.

However, it is difficult to imagine that at least in the near future, Karabakh Armenians will return, notes Wojtasiewicz. They have been accepted in Armenia, provided with places to stay, and ensured with payments and pensions. Most likely, for security reasons, the return will not happen anytime soon. For example, former military personnel face arrests because from Azerbaijan's point of view, they are considered terrorists.

"And what will people do in Nagorno-Karabakh? Where will they live, and what will they do for a living? How will they earn a living? I think no one will return. Unless Armenia takes control of it again, but that is not a prospect for the next few years. At most, what it can do is help refugees start a new life," commented the expert in a statement to RBC-Ukraine.

The concerns are not unfounded. Azerbaijan is holding a number of former ministers, including billionaire Ruben Vardanyan, as well as former "presidents" Arayik Harutyunyan, Arkady Gukasyan, and Bako Sahakyan. Some of them have been accused of financing terrorism, involvement in shelling, and torture of prisoners.

"They can be part of negotiations with Armenia for peace. If it takes some actions, they may be released. They have become a tool in Aliyev's hands, and he will use them as it suits him," added Wojtasiewicz.

Armenians to be "replaced" by Azerbaijanis. Baku's return to Karabakh

Currently, Azerbaijan is implementing large projects. Recently, agreements were signed with Turkish companies for the operation of five small hydroelectric power stations in Kelbajar and Lachin regions. Large-scale construction is announced, President Aliyev is opening roads, and local media publish photos of his trips to cities and villages.

"There were even photos from Stepanakert when he enters the administration building, tramples the flag of the NKR, and raises the Azerbaijani flag. All this is to show – Armenians are no longer there, Karabakh is ours, and we have won," the expert said.

The authorities also regularly report on the relocation of Azerbaijanis. For example, in October, several families received keys to apartments in Fuzuli and Lachin – cities that came under control in 2020 and 2022, respectively.

Migration is taking place in stages, as not all issues related to property rights on these territories have been resolved. As of the end of November, over 3,000 people had moved to Karabakh and East Zangazur regions within the first stage of the "Great Return" program. By the end of 2023, the figure was expected to reach 5,500.

It is expected that this year the return of Azerbaijanis to Shusha and Agdam will begin. In general, the first stage is planned until 2026 and involves the resettlement of 140,000 Azerbaijanis. It is not known exactly how many will be resettled to the former capital of Nagorno-Karabakh – Stepanakert (Hankendi), as the lists are still being compiled.

The main projects are related to the city of Shusha, which Azerbaijan declared the "Cultural Capital of the Turkic World" last year. It will also become the tourist capital of the Organization for Economic Cooperation (including Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries) in 2026, and Shusha aims to become a tourist beacon. In addition to roads and residential buildings, two hotels have been almost completed here, and plans are underway to build a new hospital.

Azerbaijan will spend about $30 million on Karabakh in 2024. The funds are allocated for Hankendi, Agdere (Martakert), Khodjaly (Ivanyan), Khodjavend (Martuni). A victory square and a new educational institution, which will be part of the Karabakh University, will be opened in Hankendi.

Azerbaijan and Armenia: Challenges on the path to peace

The Nagorno-Karabakh issue has been the most critical, but not the sole problem in the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Since the end of autumn, both parties have been sending signals of progress towards a comprehensive peace agreement. Among the steps taken are the first prisoner exchange in a long time and the resumption of border demarcation efforts.

Demarcation remains a sensitive issue. In mid-December, the countries approved a regulation for an intergovernmental commission. The problem lies in President Aliyev's claims of Armenian occupation of eight Azerbaijani villages, countered by Prime Minister Pashinyan asserting territorial claims in response.

"We also have a problem with eight villages because in the same Tavush region, for example, we have territories occupied by Azerbaijan," he said.

Equally contentious is the issue of a road through southern Armenia, connecting Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhchivan and Türkiye. Baku insists on an extraterritorial status, labeling it the Zangezur Corridor (after the historical name of the region). Armenia disagrees, insisting on maintaining sovereignty over all roads within its territory.

Yerevan is promoting the "Crossroads of Peace" project, envisioning that all communications will operate under the jurisdiction of the countries they pass through, each conducting its own border and customs control.

However, Azerbaijan is not interested and hints at an alternative route through Iran. The corridor through Armenia's Syunik region is likely on hold, at least until the presidential elections scheduled for February 7, 2024.

The establishment of a transportation route was outlined in the statement that halted the second Karabakh war in 2020, but details remain unclear. Yerevan fears that launching the corridor might lead to a gradual loss of sovereignty over the border with Iran, a territory that Baku considers historically part of Azerbaijan but does not officially question its ownership.

Expert Wojciech Wojtasiewicz suggests that without a compromise, Azerbaijan may view certain sections of the main road from central Armenia to Zangezur as "occupied" and encroach on Armenian lands.

"Azerbaijan wants to control the corridor in terms of tax and customs aspects. There were proposals to involve Russia and Turkey, but the issue of sovereignty is a 'red line' for Yerevan. I constantly read about negotiations, informal contacts, and new proposals. I see no progress, but I hope they reach an agreement," he said in an interview with RBC-Ukraine.

There is a chance that the parties will reach an agreement. According to the Russian news outler Kommersant, a peace deal may be signed shortly after the new year, possibly discussed by Aliyev and Pashinyan at a recent CIS summit in St. Petersburg. However, the strength of the peace remains uncertain, especially after Azerbaijan demonstrated in the Karabakh operation that it prefers force over compromise.

It is too early to speak of a definitive end to the conflict, as all elements of the relationship between the countries have been tied to Karabakh for many years.

"It seems to me that it's just another stage that has ended. In an ideal situation, the territory would become part of Azerbaijan, and Armenians in Karabakh would have political autonomy. I don't believe that under the current authoritarian regime in Baku, a stable peace is possible. It is possible when the parties compromise, and Azerbaijan doesn't interpret concessions as defeat," noted the expert.

The forceful resolution of the Karabakh issue has affected the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. Even if the countries sign a peace agreement, it is unlikely to mark a definitive conclusion.

"For me, it's like the conflict between Israel and Palestine. It has been going on for over 70 years; leaders have signed many agreements over this time, but ultimately, they return to war. That's essentially what we are witnessing now," concluded Wojtasiewicz.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/whose-is-nagornokarabakh-result-of-year-armeniaazerbaijan-conflict/ar-AA1miGm0 

CGTN published this video item, entitled “” – below is their description.

For more:

https://news.cgtn.com/news/2024-01-01/Spirit-of-President-Xi-s-New-Year-message-peaceful-constructive-1q0NXmRjbQ4/p.html

Discussing #Chinese President #Xi Jinping’s New Year message, Hayk Mamijanyan, a member of the national assembly of #Armenia, told CGTN that the spirit of the greetings is peaceful and constructive. He said China has consistently committed to promoting peace and development and actively building bridges of communication instead of erecting barriers.

CGTN YouTube Channel

Watch the video at 

Jan 1 2024

By Dr. Taras Kuzio

The Armenian American Museum and Cultural Center of California has commenced the structural steel fabrication for the two-level, 50,820-square-foot museum building superstructure. The major announcement kicks off the second phase of construction for the historic project.
“We are excited to announce a major milestone with the commencement of the structural steel fabrication for the Armenian American Museum,” executive director Shant Sahakian said in a statement. “Our vision for the cultural and educational center will be taking shape in the new year as the museum building superstructure is elevated to the horizon.”
The museum is a world-class cultural and educational center that is currently under construction in the museum campus at Glendale Central Park. The first phase of construction featuring the museum parking garage and building foundation has been completed. The second phase of construction features the two-level, 50,820-square-foot museum building superstructure. The structural steel delivery, erection and installation is anticipated to commence in early 2024.
PNG Builders, the general contractor for the museum project, contracted with Muhlhauser Steel as the structural steel subcontractor following a competitive bidding process. Muhlhauser Steel is based in Southern California and brings more than four decades of experience with commercial, industrial, educational and entertainment facility projects.
The mission of the museum is to promote understanding and appreciation of America’s ethnic and cultural diversity by sharing the Armenian American experience. The museum will offer a wide range of public programming through the permanent exhibition, temporary exhibitions, auditorium, learning center, demonstration kitchen, archives center and more.
Learn more about the museum project at ArmenianAmericanMuseum.org.

First published in the December 30 print issue of the Glendale News-Press.