BY RAFFY ARDHALDJIAN
As Armenia emerged from its pivotal June 7, 2026 parliamentary elections, citizens felt that their vote represented an existential choice for the country’s strategic alignment. With a voter turnout of approximately 59 percent (the highest rate seen since 2017) voters handed Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party a victory with 49.7 percent of the vote. This outcome grants them a 64-seat majority in the 105-seat legislature, including ethnic minority mandates.
The opposition’s Samvel Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia alliance finished second with 23.3 percent (29 seats), followed by former President Robert Kocharyan’s Armenia alliance at 9.9 percent (12 seats). While all three political forces comfortably passed the legal threshold to enter the National Assembly, it remains unclear whether the two opposition alliances will choose to boycott parliament or follow through on their pledges to challenge the finalized results in court.
While the parliamentary election was “procedurally sound”, the resulting mandate for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s ruling party seemed deeply flawed and tainted by a highly distorted, polarized, and coercive political environment, as Hrair Balian argues in his recent Modern Diplomacy article. Stepping back from the immediate political noise, it is worth examining the broader environment in which these elections took place. As Greg Sarkissian noted in Armenia After the Election: Beyond Old Divides, Armenia’s political debate should now move beyond questions of patriotism and simplistic geopolitical labels. Viewed through that lens, the 2026 election was not merely a contest between Armenian parties, but a reflection of two powerful forces – geopolitical rivalry and fear — that continue to obscure the absence of a coherent Armenian-centered national strategy. The discussion below explores the broader geopolitical forces and voter anxieties that helped shape the election.
Geopolitical Rivalry
Against a backdrop of structural shifts in the global order, Armenia’s 2026 legislative elections occurred amid heightened geopolitical competition in the South Caucasus. The electoral cycle highlighted a profound domestic anxiety regarding the preservation of democratic institutions, national security, and sovereign identity during a protracted post-Soviet transition. While foreign powers aggressively utilized public endorsements and diplomatic threats to influence the incumbent administration (and at times the opposition), their deeper strategic objectives remained concealed beneath standard rhetoric. This delicate regional environment was further strained by the volatile de-escalation of the U.S.–Iran conflict, which introduced a critical variable shift to the local balance of power.
Russia continues to seek to preserve its traditional influence in the former Soviet space, using security dependence and information pressure to warn Armenians against a decisive turn toward the West. In the run-up to the vote, Russian officials and state-aligned outlets repeatedly cast Pashinyan’s pro‑Western course as a risk to Armenia’s security and economic stability. As highlighted by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, this pressure culminated at the May 2026 Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) summit in Astana. Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan issued a joint statement via Sputnik warning that Armenia’s EU integration created “significant risks” to economic security, paving the way for a formal review to suspend Armenia’s membership benefits.
Neo-Ottoman Turkey and Azerbaijan (backed by Pakistan in select diplomatic and security domains) continue to push a regional order built around new transportation and energy corridors, including potential routes through Armenia’s Syunik region (the Turan route in their view), with both powers signaling that ongoing negotiations and de-escalation are likelier to progress under the incumbent Armenian government.
Meanwhile, the European Union, whose relations with Moscow have been fractured since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, sought deeper engagement in the South Caucasus. By holding high-level meetings in Yerevan and publicly embracing Armenia’s European trajectory just weeks before the vote, EU leaders underscored their preference for continuity in Pashinyan’s policy line. Though Armenian political discourse often cites a “collective West,” the reality is more nuanced: Washington and Brussels frequently cooperate, yet their long-term interests diverge. While both actors seek to secure access to Central Asian rare earth minerals, develop Caucasus transport & energy routes that circumvent Russia and Iran, and tacitly back the incumbent administration ahead of the elections, their primary strategic objectives differ. The United States views Armenia largely through a geopolitical lens as a transit corridor to bypass regional rivals, whereas the EU in the long run aims to structurally integrate Armenia into its economic, legal, and regulatory framework.
Iran, despite recent strain from conflicts with Israel and the US, emerged from a confrontation with the world’s most powerful military having not only survived, but with some favorable circumstances. It remains a key regional actor viewing South Caucasus developments through the lens of national security. Tehran has repeatedly warned against changes to Armenia’s southern border, maintaining its role as a potent factor in the regional balance. In the run-up to the June 2026 elections, this concern deepened into acute anxiety over the US-Armenia agreement on the TRIPP transit corridor through Syunik, which Iranian officials and state media aggressively framed as a Western geopolitical maneuver designed to oversee Iran’s northern border and sever its direct boundary with Armenia. Consequently, while maintaining formal diplomacy with the government, Tehran exerted rhetorical pressure on the electorate by amplifying opposition arguments that Pashinyan’s pro-Western peace course invited dangerous foreign rivalries at the direct expense of Armenian sovereignty.
Concurrently, China views the South Caucasus through a geoeconomic lens, treating the region as a vital trade link between Western China and Europe. Beijing has strongly backed the Middle Corridor transit network to secure reliable overland trade that bypasses traditional geopolitical chokepoints and insulates Chinese commerce from Western maritime sanctions. Meanwhile, India has emerged as a vital strategic partner for Yerevan by stepping in as a major supplier of heavy artillery, missiles, and anti-drone systems. New Delhi’s rapid military support for Armenia directly counters the defense axis of Pakistan, Turkey, and Azerbaijan, making the South Caucasus a key theater for India’s strategic interests.
Ultimately, none of these actors are neutral; each is driven by its own specific interests and preferred outcomes. Each relies on a different mix of security ties, economic leverage, and narrative influence to shape Armenia’s choices.
As geopolitical competition intensified, Armenia’s elections became increasingly entangled in the strategic rivalry of larger powers. Political messaging, media narratives, diplomatic signaling, and information campaigns sought to shape how Armenians understood both the threats facing the country and the choices available to address them. The result was a political environment in which voters were often encouraged to choose between competing geopolitical alignments rather than engage in a deeper discussion about what serves Armenia’s long-term national interests. In the case of a small state situated at the crossroads of rival empires, this may be the most subtle form of external influence: not determining how its citizens vote, but shaping the framework through which they interpret their choices.
Politics of Fear
Beyond the rivalry of empires, the second major factor shaping the election was fear. Armenian voters went to the polls after years of frontline violence, devastating territorial losses, the total displacement of the population of Artsakh, economic uncertainty, and persistent existential threats to the republic’s remaining borders. In such an environment, fear became a powerful force in political mobilization, weaponized by both external powers and local political participants
On May 10, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev directly intervened in Armenia’s political discourse by warning that “it is the Armenian people who will suffer” if any candidate other than incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan came to power.
On one side, the incumbent administration anchored its campaign on the fear of an immediate, catastrophic war. By presenting normalisation efforts and border adjustments with Azerbaijan as the only path to survival, the ruling party implicitly messaged that any disruption to the status quo would trigger an instant, overwhelming invasion. Opposition factions were collectively framed as a reckless, war-mongering front whose ascent to power would nullify fragile diplomatic progress and plunge an unready nation back into conflict. For a population exhausted by near-continuous front-line losses, this narrative transformed the ballot into a raw choice between an imperfect, painful concessionary peace or total physical destruction. At the same time, the government portrayed itself as defending Armenia’s sovereignty against Russian interference, while arresting numerous opposition figures and accusing various political actors of participating in destabilization efforts.
Conversely, the main opposition alliances countered by stoking fears that the ruling party was orchestrating a slow, piecemeal surrender of the state. They aggressively attacked the government’s normalization agenda and regional transit initiatives (specifically the May 2026 TRIPP corridor agreement) framing them not as a path to peace, but as a dangerous framework that surrendered vital land and economic control to foreign interests. A central pillar of the opposition campaign warned that Pashinyan’s policies would ultimately permit the mass resettlement of Azerbaijani citizens within Armenia, permanently altering the country’s demographics. Furthermore, by alignment with the leadership of the Armenian Apostolic Church, the opposition argued that the administration’s pro-Western course was actively erasing Armenia’s national history and cultural identity to appease a hostile, pan-Turkic regional alliance.
As a result, many Armenians were not presented with a hopeful choice between competing national visions, but rather with two competing fears: fear of renewed war on one hand, and fear of gradual national decline on the other. The election thus became less a contest over Armenia’s future potential than a referendum on which danger voters considered most immediate and most credible.
The Missing Armenian Strategy
Amid growing rivalry between external powers, Armenian political discourse has become increasingly polarized between competing geopolitical orientations: pro Russian, pro Western, and more recently, a vision centered on normalization with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Missing from much of this debate is a serious discussion about how Armenia can realistically navigate this environment while preserving its sovereignty and advancing its own interests.
This shortcoming is not limited to the incumbent government. The opposition has also largely failed to articulate a convincing approach for dealing with great-power competition without becoming overly dependent on one external power or another. Likewise, given the military and diplomatic pressure exerted by Azerbaijan and Turkey, and the growing political, financial, and institutional influence of Western actors, it remains unclear how much of Armenia’s current geopolitical reorientation reflects an independently developed national vision and how much is a response to external pressures.
The deeper problem is that Armenian political debate is too often framed as a choice between rival centers of power rather than a discussion about Armenia’s own priorities. Throughout much of Armenian history, survival depended on navigating between larger empires, whether Roman and Persian, Byzantine and Arab, or Ottoman and Russian. In many periods, the primary political question was not what retrieval or strategy Armenians wanted for themselves, but which external power posed the lesser danger. Proponents of the incumbent administration argue that its current diplomatic pivot, including the normalization track and Western-backed transit initiatives, represents a conscious break from this cycle to build a modern, self-reliant state. Yet, while immediate physical survival remains the paramount strategic priority for the republic today, simply shifting dependence from a traditional regional patron to Western economic and regulatory frameworks risks repeating the same historical pattern. True endurance requires moving entirely beyond the defensive habit of choosing an external protector, focusing instead on internal institutional capabilities and an independent national strategy.
Thirty four years after independence, the central challenge is not choosing between East and West, Russia and Europe, or confrontation and accommodation. It is developing the political thought, leadership, and institutions necessary to define Armenian interests independently and pursue them consistently. Viewed from this perspective, the greatest weakness revealed by the 2026 election may not be foreign influence or political polarization, but the absence of a broadly shared Armenian vision capable of rising above the binary choices presented by both domestic politics and external powers.
Conclusion
Armenia’s 2026 elections show the difficult position of a small nation caught between the global plans of larger states and empires. While local issues certainly mattered to voters, the election environment was heavily weighed down by the strategic goals of foreign powers and the deep anxieties of an exhausted public. By forcing the conversation around competing terrors, specifically the fear of immediate war on one side or slow national decline on the other, both local politicians and foreign actors narrowed the political debate.
The immediate aftermath of the vote has only sharpened the domestic crisis following the 2020 war. Because the ruling party failed to win a two-thirds supermajority, the political landscape has shifted from a standard electoral contest into a deep battle, with the incumbents wielding state institutions against their opponents. The government has responded with aggressive legal and administrative actions against major opposition figures, prompting six opposition parties to unite in rejecting the results. This weaponization of state power proves that running smooth elections is not enough to secure a stable democracy.
This bitter internal warfare paralyzes Armenia at the exact moment it needs unity. A country consumed by existential domestic battles cannot build the internal stability required to resist outside pressure. To break this historical cycle of vulnerability, Armenia must look inward, focusing its energy on building resilient state institutions, supporting independent media, and shaping a unified strategy centered primarily on its own needs. Ultimately, the survival of a modern independent Armenia depends on the ability of its citizens to build a state capable of choosing a future based on national goals rather than collective fear.
Raffy Ardhaldjian is a Fletcher School graduate and advisor to tech companies, public institutions, and NGOs. In his spare time, he writes about strategic topics spanning Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora.
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168: Pashinyan wants to drag the opposition into a street fight before the deadline
June: 19, 2026
After the nationwide elections held in Armenia on June 7, what actions should be taken, especially in the case when the elections were held with many violations, the opposition should answer. About this 168.amsaid in a conversation with civil technologist Armen Badalyan՝ stressing that the opposition forces received the right to manage the votes, therefore, they should decide what actions should follow the elections.
“Why is the street empty now, the answer is clear, at least “Strong Armenia” is trying to go through all the legal instances after the elections, because before bringing people out onto the street, you have to go through the legal instances first.
Of course, those who apply to the legal instance, one way or another, know what decision they will get, but it is still correct to apply, so that later there are no accusations as to why they did not apply to the Constitutional Court,” said Armen Badalyan.
He reminded that he has repeatedly said that the elections in Armenia are not intra-Armenian, but extra-Armenian processes, on the territory of the Republic of Armenia. This is the struggle between the West and Russia to keep or take power.
“In other words, this is a multi-serial film. In the first series, the victory went to the West, defeating Russia, and kept the power and kept it on an unfair principle. Regarding the PAP, 4 percent had passed, they simply canceled the results of 3 polling stations, in fact, they made the people who voted in those polling stations voteless.
In fact, we can say that the ruling political force secured 3/5 for itself, which is important for them at the moment,” added the civil technologist.
According to Armen Badalyan, what steps the opposition will take, or whether it will take the mandates or not, depends on the attitude of the Russian Federation towards internal political processes. In order to keep or take power in Armenia, purely internal political resources are not enough, you need to have the support of the geopolitical centers, and in this case the CP has that support.
“With this support and the use of administrative resources, he kept the power, and the opposition, “Strong Armenia”, PAP and the “Armenia” bloc, had support, but it was not enough. The victory of the West in Armenia means the elimination of Russia’s military and economic factors in Armenia: the withdrawal of the military base, the deprivation of the railway license, etc.
That’s why the second series has started at this moment, you remember that the Russian Federation introduced economic restrictions, and the EU gives 50 million euros to the Republic of Armenia, which, of course, is a ridiculous amount, this is when the peasantry receives a profit of about 150 million from the export of the Russian Federation. In other words, now he is losing a billion worth of goods and not making a profit of 150 million.
At the moment, Armenia needs 150 million in aid, is the EU ready to compensate this amount, if it does not compensate, then the social condition of the rural voters will worsen. This, in turn, will give an opportunity to generate the grievances of those people in the internal political processes, and a street fight will begin,” emphasized our interlocutor.
According to the political technologist’s observation, at this moment, Nikol Pashinyan may want to involve the opposition in the street struggle ahead of schedule, so that the opposition will not succeed, because he was involved in the struggle ahead of schedule. If the opposition gets involved in the street struggle in time, it can register a victory.
“Political processes continue, and we have to look at the reality in this context, the struggle is going on, and we see it. Many expect that the issues will be resolved in 5 minutes, but this struggle can last months,” Armen Badalyan emphasized.
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“This Euro-counterfeiting, Euro-terror has a price. I don’t rule it out, allegedly confirmed “
June: 19, 2026
Military expert Davit Jamalyan in his opinion, the scenario of terrorizing the Armenian society with war by the authorities is entering a new phase.
Our interlocutor has a similar opinion, because Nikol Pashinyan said during a briefing in the National Assembly and then in the Government that “Aliyev’s assistant came to Armenia because there were certain risks and these risks had to be managed.”
“The government continues to speak in the language of blackmail, because it does not have the desired result after the elections, that is, it did not get the desired 2/3 after the elections, and according to everything, it will not get it. I am sure that if our opposition takes the mandates, at least those represented in the parliament will be unbreakable.
After all, during five years, the government was able to steal and take away one person from each faction, they call this cattle stealing and they say it rightly. With today’s realities, it is impossible to steal and take away or buy 6 people, because of that, 2/3 will not have it.” of 168.am Davit Jamalyan said in a conversation with
According to our interlocutor, since Nikol Pashinyan needs to have 2/3, sooner or later he will go to extraordinary elections and in order to get what he wants in those elections, he will use the blackmail of war again.
“I think Azerbaijan will practically help Pashinyan in this matter, because if he didn’t shoot until now to demonstrate peace, now he needs to intimidate even more. I do not rule out that the Azerbaijani side will be active on the border in different parts of the border, maybe not in the TRIPP part, but it will provoke in other parts. Nikol Pashinyan is now in such a dead end that he will use any scheme here to get more votes. I do not rule out that the concept of “peace” that has already been established will be replaced by the concept of “preventing an imminent war”, stressed Davit Jamalyan.
In addition, according to him, there is also the other side of the problem, that internal political developments in Armenia are clearly directed from Baku on what to do and how to do it.
“Nikol Pashinyan made promises to Baku, and Baku will go with a demand so that those promises are fulfilled.
This Euro-falsification, Euro-terror has a price, it was done for one thing, to make Nikol Pashinyan go on an anti-Russian course, if he deviates, then the whole falsification will be put against him. This is the reason why Nikol Pashinyan’s situation is really very difficult.
One more thing: if Nikol Pashinyan goes with the scenario of early elections, our pro-state forces should be ready for that scenario.
In this situation, we should not break the society, because the figures obtained by the government are completely fake, if we look soberly, we understand that there is no such thing. There is a locality where Nikol Pashinyan did not receive a vote,” Davit Jamalyan said.
He does not rule out that the “peace has arrived” scheme will turn into a “let’s prevent an adult war” scenario, with which Nikol Pashinyan will try to strengthen his power.
“There is the potential to say “no” to Nikol Pashinyan, because very few people actually voted for him,” emphasized our interlocutor.
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Satik Seyranyan, to all natashkas from KP and near KP
June: 19, 2026
Satik Seyranyan, editor-in-chief of “168 Zham” newspaper and 168.am website wrote:
“To all Natashkas
For several days now, rumors have been circulating from Turkey and Azerbaijan about the Armenian Syunik and the return of Azerbaijanis to Armenia. Let me list, I will go on to what I have to say.
• Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the “National Movement” party, a political ally of President Erdogan, announced. “Zangezur Corridor is actually Turanakan Corridor. When it opens, the idea of the reunification of the Turkic world will be much more clearly outlined.”
• In Ordubad, Azerbaijan is holding the 3rd “Return to Western Azerbaijan” conference, where the Deputy Speaker of the Azerbaijani Parliament, Ziyafet Askerov, announced that “every West Azerbaijani has the right to return to the land of his ancestors.” According to him, “return is the legal, historical and moral right of the West Azerbaijanis”, at the same time asserting that the subject of “West Azerbaijan” is not a territorial claim directed at Armenia.
• MP Aziz Alekberli, head of the fictitious union “West Azerbaijan Community”, declares that Armenia should create conditions for the safe return of “West Azerbaijanis”, and talks about the inevitability of the return of “West Azerbaijanis” to their “native lands”, declaring that Armenia should accept this reality and create conditions for the dignified and safe return of “West Azerbaijanis”.
• You are taking Aliyev’s aide Hikmet Hajiyev to Dilijan, the Dilijan that flourishes thanks to the projects and investments initiated by Ruben Vardanyan, who is also in prison in Baku, your beloved Azerbaijanis howl from morning to night as if it is their “Papa’s land”, and soon you will also hand over to them the lands just a few tens of kilometers away from Dilijan – villages, enclaves…
The others, including the statements of the Aliyevs and Bayramov-Zulfugarovs, are debating why we should air Samvel Karapetyan’s interview the next day. We did well. Any questions?
Natashka, you’d better explain why they decided not to broadcast your “interviews” without asking you. If your client said that he had disclosed confidential episodes related to Aliyev, he would have said such things that Azerbaijan would have been hacked from within…
You pitiful wretches, go and answer the Turks and Azerbaijanis, don’t draw pointless attention. Of course you’re not that lucky, you pitiful ones. At least go sell Armenian peppers and tomatoes under the Eiffel Tower, and place strawberries and roses in Lfik and Zelensky supermarkets…”
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Serious changes are expected… there will be a popular explosion. Hrant Meli
June: 19, 2026
Nothing unexpected happened for anyone. the authorities rigged the elections for months. About this 168 TVof Revue said on the air of the program Political scientist Hrant Melik-Shahnazaryan, head of “Oskanapat” analytical centerevaluating the results of the National Assembly elections.
Speaking about the reasons for the defeat of the opposition in the elections, the political scientist says that he has the answer to the question of why after the announcement of the victory of the party led by Nikol Pashinyan, the huge mass of people who voted for the opposition forces did not spontaneously take to the streets. Hrant Melik-Shahnazaryan reminds that there was no atmosphere of struggle in the public before the election day. According to the political scientist, the people rejected Nikol, but the people needed leadership.
“I am more than convinced that in this election our public voted not for the opposition, but against Pashinyan. The public was ready to reject Nikol, but was not ready to lead that change himself,” commented the political scientist.
In this situation, Melik-Shahnazaryan expects more active steps from the opposition forces and their leaders, stressing that it is necessary to stop reacting to the government’s actions and start making decisions.
Hrant Melik-Shahnazaryan absolutely does not like today’s silence of the people. He says that this silence is a bad silence. like the “calm before the storm.” The political scientist records the accumulated dissatisfaction, the growth of dissatisfaction with the government and hopes that this negative energy will not have serious consequences.
According to the political scientist, it is very possible that the repressions of the government will generate a “big explosion” in the society.
“With these moods of the public, this public dissatisfaction and the dangerous silence of the people, which I was talking about a little while ago, I cannot imagine a situation that will continue like this for 5 years. I am sure that there will be an “explosion”, or the people will be broken once and for all, and we will not have a fighting people, and therefore also a state,” added Hrant Melik-Shahnazaryan.
Referring to regional developments, the political scientist predicts. “Serious changes await us.”
Full interview in the video.
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Ankara is a comfortable partner for Moscow. it helps to “close” the space
June: 19, 2026
Prior to the NATO summit in Turkey, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Russia and held high-level meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu.
The situation in the South Caucasus and the ongoing peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia were on the agenda of Turkey-Russia bilateral discussions, the latter, as Fidan informed, was discussed in detail because it is a very important aspect for peace in the region.
For his part, after negotiations with his Turkish counterpart, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said that they agreed to closely cooperate in matters of security in the Black Sea region, as well as in the Transcaucasia, the Middle East, and North Africa. We have good relations with Turkish partners everywhere, and they work on the principle of complementarity.
Later, in an interview with Turkiye newspaper, Hakan Fidan stated that the 3 3 format is a very important mechanism for deepening the cooperation between the countries of the South Caucasus and Turkey, Russia and Iran.
“This is a very important mechanism for deepening cooperation between Turkey, Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Armenia and Georgia. As countries in the region, we must prioritize cooperation over competition and the pursuit of hegemony. We see this understanding reaching a certain point in the context of recent developments in the Middle East. With the same perspective, we can strengthen our economies and increase stability in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The quest for dominance must end. Peace, tranquility and stability will benefit everyone. We need to change our understanding. The formula 3 3 will do To implement significant cooperation in the Caucasus. Of course, there are obstacles. Mutual mistrust between some countries has reached a serious level. On the other hand, there is also a common aspiration,” he elaborated.
What messages are Turkey and Russia sending with these statements, is it in Turkey’s interest to restore Russia’s role in the South Caucasus, to what extent, and what consequences should Armenia take? On these and other issues 168.amhas talked “Henaket” Analytical Center expert Shiraz with Khachatryan.
– A very simple process is taking place. Hakan Fidan’s visit to Moscow and the statements made as a result of the meeting with Lavrov should be viewed, so to speak, from the point of view of these two regional actors opposing the possible activation of the Western vector. The idea is that regional problems should be solved by regional players without the intervention of other external power centers.
For Turkey, the “3 3” format is a platform where it, Russia and Iran can share spheres of influence, first of all pushing out Washington, why not also Brussels, and for Moscow, despite all the contradictions, Ankara remains a comfortable partner that helps to “keep” the doors of the region to the West in many issues.
In my opinion, this activity is also a preventive step against Iran’s possible independent play, because the possible tactical rapprochement between Washington and Tehran and the political and economic “strengthening” of Iran radically change the balance of power.
Freed from sanctions, Iran becomes a direct competitor for Turkey in terms of control of energy and logistics channels, and Turkey’s silent resistance to Pan-Turan projects and the idea of a “corridor” passing through Syunik gains new geopolitical weight.
For Russia, any rapprochement between Iran and the West carries a risk, Tehran can turn into a supplier of alternative energy carriers for Europe. Therefore, Moscow and Ankara are in a hurry to fix their spheres of influence before global realignments change the rules of the game.
This situation gives Armenia a vital reason to think, but the sad reality is that the foreign policy conducted by the current authorities of Armenia is distinguished by the absence of a clear strategy and long-term vision. Today, Armenia has appeared in the role of an exclusively passive follower, watching from the sidelines the positional and tough struggle of major actors, and tries to orientate itself by purely situational adaptation, which, to put it mildly, every time leads to a fatal situation and stops the Armenian people.
– Against the background of Hakan Fidan’s visit to Moscow Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the Turkish “Nationalist Movement” party, “standing on the Zangezur line”, called to call things by their true names, stating: “This is a historic route that will strengthen Nakhichevan’s ties with its native Azerbaijan, and will connect Turkey with the Caspian Sea through fraternal Azerbaijan, and from there to Turkestan (Central Asia).․) with. The Zangezur line means ensuring the connection of Nakhichevan with Azerbaijan. This corridor will create a strategic environment to spread the spirit of “One Nation, Two States” throughout the Turkic world. This line is actually the Turan Corridor. The Turan Corridor is a historical and cultural gateway that stretches from Kars to the borders of Turkestan.”
Parallel to this, from Nakhijevan Chairman of the Council of “West Azerbaijan Community” Aziz Alekberli He clearly demands from Armenia to create conditions for the return of “West Azerbaijanis”. Coincidence or pattern, especially when both try to emphasize “historicity”?
– Those two statements are interesting both in terms of their content and because they reflect the high degree of harmony between the actions of Ankara and Baku. It is clear to many that Turkey is advancing not only its immediate political and economic interests in the region, but also a wider pan-Turkish strategic vision, one of the key components of which is the idea of the geographic and political unification of the Turkic world. In that context, the formulation “Turan Corridor” is the expression of that ideological project. At the same time, Azerbaijan continues to advance the “return of West Azerbaijanis” agenda on various platforms, filling the corridor topic with new political and “demographic” pressure components.
It is clear that Ankara and Baku act with complementary and coordinated logic in many strategic issues, often guided by their own long-term goals, which do not always coincide with the interests of other actors in the region. As a result, the topic of the “corridor” is constantly kept at the forefront of the regional agenda, with different formulations and different components, which proves that all this is part of a wider geopolitical strategy and is a key topic of regional politics.
– 2025 Amendments were initiated in the constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan, according to which the cabinet of ministers of the autonomous republic, which is part of Azerbaijan, will be subordinated not to the Supreme Mejlis, but to the President of Azerbaijan, coordinating its work order with him.
In addition, it was decided to remove references to the Moscow and Kars treaties from the constitution of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic and to emphasize that “the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic is an inseparable part of the Republic of Azerbaijan.” In other words, Aliyev decided to limit the autonomy of Nakhichevan. We have repeatedly discussed the strategic goals of the developments around Nakhichevan and the risks for Armenia with you And today information was published, that Aliyev decided To grant the status of a state body of the 1st class to the authorized representative office of Azerbaijan in the Autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan. K:can we say that Baku, Aliyev, is trying to take “control” of Nakhichevan from Turkey, or even in this case, the Turkish presence will remain influential there?
– Let me say this: although in recent years Aliyev has consistently concentrated the political and administrative management of Nakhijevan in his hands, at the moment, purely from the point of view of the two countries’ opposition, he does not openly show that there is an attempt to “take” Nakhijevan from Turkey. Or, more precisely, Aliyev seeks to exclude the existence of any independent power center there and tries to keep the entire governmental control in his hands. At the same time, Turkey’s influence in Nakhichevan, especially in the military and strategic spheres, remains key.
Therefore, even if Baku strengthens its direct control over Nakhichevan, this still does not mean a weakening of the Turkish presence here, it is more likely that the close Turkish-Azerbaijani system will continue to operate in the region, where the political leadership will be concentrated in Baku. And no matter how significant Ankara’s influence remains, in this situation it does not hinder Baku from the point of view of promoting common strategies.
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Instead of congratulations, a note of protest from Russia. What does “Moscow” mean?
June: 19, 2026
Although 12 days have passed since the June 7 elections in the Republic of Armenia, the highest authorities of the Russian Federation are in no hurry to congratulate Nikol Pashinyan on the results recorded in the elections. This prolonged silence is an unprecedented impulse in Armenian-Russian relations, which indicates that there are no stabilization tendencies in the current crisis in bilateral relations.
Moreover, instead of congratulations, the Russian Foreign Ministry sent a note of protest to the Armenian authorities regarding the act of vandalism committed against the “Mother Armenia” memorial dedicated to the heroes of the Second World War in Gyumri. Maria Zakharova, the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, announced this yesterday.
On June 10, unknown persons tore the gilded letters with the names of hero-cities from the monument.
The Russian side described the incident as a “deliberate attack on the common historical memory” and demanded the Armenian authorities to give a clear assessment of the incident, as well as to hold the culprits accountable. The law enforcement officers arrested the suspect the other day.
Returning to the topic of elections, we should note that the top leadership of the Russian Federation, as a rule, is guided by well-developed traditions that directly express the level and warmth of political relations with the given country. In the case of states with high ally or strategic status for Moscow, congratulations are usually given immediately, the day after the election, when preliminary official data from the Central Electoral Commissions are published.
However, in cases where there is tension in bilateral relations, the congratulation process is postponed. In such situations, the Kremlin often adopts a “wait-and-see” stance, delaying an official announcement until the final, legal results of the elections are finalized, appeals rounds are over, or even the inauguration ceremony of the newly elected government, which is seen as a clear diplomatic gesture of cooling or revising relations. On June 12, at the reception organized at the Russian Embassy in Armenia, who recently left for Russia for consultations and has already returned Russian Ambassador to Armenia Sergey Kopirkin He referred to the current stage of Armenian-Russian relations. In his speech, the ambassador noted that Moscow is ready to redefine relations with Armenia in the conditions of newly formed realities, and is ready to do so in a constructive spirit.
“It is obvious that our relations have reached the stage of reinterpretation and adaptation to the changing global and regional realities. “Moscow is fully ready for such joint work in a constructive and mutually beneficial manner, based on the existing bilateral mechanisms,” the ambassador said.
At the same time, high-ranking Russian officials are raising the question of EAEU-EU election before RA.
By rethinking, Ambassador Kopirkin probably means this question. However, the RA authorities still consider the topic of such an election to be out of date, moreover, Nikol Pashinyan is going to deal with EAEU issues in the near future.
“There is a session of the EAEU intergovernmental commission scheduled, I will participate in this session, as I said, we will deal with it, but we are still dealing with it today,” he said in a conversation with journalists the day before, talking about the current tension in the structure related to RA. By the way, he mentioned at the session of the RA government that it is illogical to export low-quality goods at the expense of sovereignty. It should be noted that the upcoming session of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council (EAEU Intergovernmental Commission) will take place on August 6-7, 2026, in the city of Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyz Republic. In other words, the authorities tend to settle the product restrictions or political issues with the Russian side.
Obviously, Moscow is consciously maintaining a political hiatus, trying to put pressure on the authorities along with economic restrictions with a belated congratulation.
Against this background, the main intrigue remains the lack of Russian congratulations to the KP. The Russian side is most likely waiting for the completion of all legal processes related to the elections, including in the CC, after which there may be a congratulation, which, however, may require a few more weeks. It is unlikely that there will be no congratulations from Moscow at any stage, but the Russian side will do it at the stage in order to show as sharp a political position as possible. Against this background, another interesting question is what will be the fate of the post-election meeting between Pashinyan and Putin, the preliminary agreement of which was reached on June 1. Pashinyan-Putin in a telephone conversation. However, the Russian invitation, along with the congratulations, was never received.
At the same time, Moscow is most likely not interested in a sharp escalation of Armenian-Russian relations. This is evidenced by the statement of Ambassador Kopirkin. For that reason, the current silence can be evaluated not as a prelude to the break of relations, but as a tool of political pressure and transmission of impulses, through which the Kremlin tries to clarify the future geopolitical intentions of Yerevan. The upcoming weeks, as well as the meetings scheduled within the framework of the EAEU, will perhaps be of decisive importance for the future architecture of Armenian-Russian relations.
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Are there any strange coincidences? Nikol Pashinyan in Armenia c
June: 19, 2026
Although the parliamentary and presidential elections in the Republic of Turkey hardly are noted on the horizon, local political the field significantly there is a storm. Striving to create the most comfortable conditions possible “Ajustice and development» for the party and for him personally (or for his successor, in case of force majeure circumstances), Recep Erdogan tries by all possible means to weaken, divide, and if it works, also break down main opposition «People’s Republic» the party, about which we wrote in a previous series in publications։
In March 2025, the famous mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu, was behind bars, accusations were also made against the mayor of Ankara, Mansur Yavash, and last May, a serious split was created in the “Kemalik” camp, which is deepening day by day.
One of the courts in Ankara last month recognized as annulled The regular 38th congress of the People’s Republican Party (CHP), which took place in early November, removed the party’s chairman, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, and replaced him with Ozgur Ozel. However, later the former mayor of Hata, Lutfu Savas, and a number of delegates filed a lawsuit demanding the annulment of the voting results.
At the same time, the Prosecutor’s Office of Ankara continues to investigate possible violations during the party congress. the indictment was published on June 3, and the above-mentioned Ekrem Imamoglu is among the 12 defendants in the case, whose participation in the election process is clearly going to be closed for good. All the defendants are charged with vote fraud, this article provides imprisonment for a term of one to three years.
Currently, the supporters of Ozel and Kılıçdaroğlu are actively clarifying the relationship, disputing the right to speak on behalf of the party in the parliament building, which is fraught with further scandals and fights, as it happened many times before. Ozel thoroughly accuses Erdogan’s party in using the judiciary to weaken the “People’s Republicans”, stating that the issue cannot be presented as an intra-party dispute. Ozel’s supporters are pushing for an extraordinary congress by July 26, suspecting that a delay could jeopardize the party’s participation in the upcoming elections, which could be snap. For his part, Kılıçdaroğlu, who previously lost to Erdogan in the presidential elections and poses no threat to him, insists on his legitimacy and accuses his opponents of bribery and seeking support abroad.
If the elections in Turkey are still ahead (if they are not held early, then in 2028), then in the Republic of Armenia they have already been held, marked by many scandals and active use of administrative resources. Military historian, Doctor of Political Sciences Armen Ayvazyan writesthe word It is about the first elections of the Turkish or “Erdogan” model in Armenia. Despite the fact that protests have accompanied most election campaigns over the past 30 years, it is very likely that The political technologists of the “Civil Pact” were guided by the political technologies, with the help of which Recep Erdogan has shaped the results of the election companies he and his party needed in recent decades. Note that this has not always been successful. The municipal elections of 2024 were successful for Ozel’s “People’s Republicans” and now, apparently, it has been decided to get rid of the inconvenient competitor once and for all.
Armenia’s ruling Civil Pact party, despite its relative (but not constitutional) majority, is clearly concerned about its declining popularity in the five years since the snap election on June 21, 2021, suggesting a more active implementation of an “Erdogan” hybrid authoritarian governance model in which, according to Ayvazyan’s assessment, “the elections are formally held, but the real political competition is seriously limited.”
According to international organizations, “the election process has become deeply unfair due to abuse of state resources, information inequality and systematic pressure on the opposition”.
It was mentioned above that the judicial system in Turkey is widely used to neutralize the most dangerous competitors for the government. Besides E. From Imamoglu and O. Selahattin Demirtaş, leader of the “pro-Kurdish” People’s Democratic Party from Ozel, has been in prison since 2016 on trumped-up “terrorism” charges, barring him from fully participating in the 2018 and 2023 election campaigns. Municipalities controlled by the People’s Republicans are under the scrutiny of law enforcement agencies and their leaders are regularly sacked, as has happened not only in Istanbul but also in many Kurdish-majority eastern and southeastern provinces (e.g. In the city of Van)։
The absolute majority of Turkish media is under the direct or indirect influence of the government, while many critics have gradually been forgotten, such as the once very popular Zaman newspaper. During the 2023 elections, the state TV channel TRT gave Erdoğan hundreds of hours of air time, while his rival, the same Kılıçdaroğlu, got only a few minutes.
The use of emergency powers received by Erdogan as a result of the constitutional referendum of 2017 also plays in favor of the current government. The 2018 elections generally took place under a state of emergency, which allowed limiting political activity and opposition actions.
Thus, Erdogan’s regime has formed a “hybrid regime” in Turkey, where the institution of elections seems to be preserved, but the basic prerequisites of fair and equal political competition are actually destroyed.
A. According to Ayvazyan, the similarity of modern Turkish and Armenian cases “is hard not to notice. Here too, criminal prosecutions of opposition figures have become a common tool of political struggle, local governments are subjected to pressure, administrative resources are used for the interests of the ruling party, and voters are constantly forced to face the same dilemma: “either Pashinyan or war”. The difference so far is only in scale. Erdogan built that system earlier and brought it to perfection, while Pashinyan, it seems, is only diligently learning the lessons of the Turkish political school.”
This conclusion is completely confirmed by the prime minister’s scandalous statements threatening the opponents with criminal cases and restricting their right to free movement. In his pre-election speeches, the leader of “Civil Agreement” promised that Robert Kocharyan, Gagik Tsarukyan and Samvel Karapetyan would be “broken” and their property would be redistributed. “You will dream of escaping from Armenia, but you will not have such an opportunity,” Pashinyan was quoted by the local media. He openly talks about the prison terms of opposition leaders, accusing them of election bribery.
The so-called “Anti-corruption Committee”, led by Artur Nahapetyan, has already appealed to the Minister of Justice, demanding to ban the parties involved in “election bribery” from participating in the elections (a term that can be used to summarize any undesirable person).
Along with threats, intimidation and blackmail, the methods of bribery suggested by Rasim Musabekov, already a deputy of the Milli Mejlis of Azerbaijan, will also be used.. allegedly, “Strong Armenia”, which received 29 parliamentary mandates, is a “weak, ideologically completely uncoordinated force composed of opportunists… Most likely…, in that “Strong Armenia” (by the authorities) there will be a person who, occupying the position of deputy speaker of the parliament, will in general have a constructive cooperation with the ruling majority, and we will see how the 29-member faction will disintegrate. One of them will most likely go after the allies and Kocharyan’s Armenia faction in the parliament, and the second part will have a constructive situational interaction with the ruling majority, and in reality, I think Nikol Pashinyan will have a constitutional majority, albeit a situational but necessary one.
It must be assumed that the methods developed by Ankara and Baku, masked by “pro-European” rhetoric, will be increasingly used in the process of transition to the “fourth Republic”, the national-cultural identity of the Armenian people. with a radical reformulation։ It is not excluded that following the recommendations of senior friends, the authorities may go for early elections, as reported by some biased persons. Before announcing new elections, it is necessary to clean up the political field as much as possible by trying, as described above, to bribe (and if it doesn’t work, to imprison the MPs of the opposition factions).
The reason is on the surface. Baku is applying pressuredemanding a constitutional referendum, without which the signing of the peace treaty is not possible, and the border with Turkey will not be opened, where all preparations have been completed. Pashinyan’s regime does not need uncontrollable members of the National Assembly, who are ready to discuss serious issues with Russia.
The leader of the “Civil Pact” speaks directly about the intention to carry out a new “revolution”, isolating all his opponents who allegedly got their votes thanks to “bribes” and are against the peace agreement with Azerbaijan, for which it is necessary to achieve a constitutional majority by all means. In case of success of such a combination, the next legitimate step is the withdrawal of the Russian 102nd military base and border guards and the further steps of integration into the Turkic world.
TIGRAN BAGHRAMIAN
vpoanalytics.com
Translation by Zhanna Avetisyan
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168: Oil and gas will not come to Armenia with the support of Europe. did he bring it in buckets?
June: 19, 2026
The guest of 168TV’s “Zara has a question” program is economist, public administration specialist Hovhannes Avetisyan.
During the conversation, Hovhannes Avetisyan touched on a number of issues on the agenda, including why Nikol Pashinyan is making noise, what is expected of post-election Armenia, and what does the opposition have to do at this stage. The main theses of the interview are below.
- At the center of all this is Pashinyan’s statement that before the elections he said that if they do not get a constitutional majority, there will be a war in September with disastrous consequences. And now they don’t have a constitutional majority, and according to what he said, there should be a war in September, two days ago he also announced that he was able to prevent the war, and it won’t happen. all this speaks of a big lie.
- For example, when he says in the National Assembly, “whose vote has been faked, go to the streets, etc.?” Frauds in electoral processes do not happen only by falsifying votes. First, canceling the election results in the actual 2 precincts, leaving PAP out is already an election fraud, a very big election fraud. Also, when you go to the election process by terrorizing, blackmailing, terrorizing the public with war, this speaks of several things: you are collaborating with the enemy, you are trying to elect you by terrorizing the people of the state of Armenia.
- And here, I think, the most important thing is the messages addressed to the outsiders, to the outsiders to whom he had promised to amend the Constitution, which he would be able to do, having a constitutional majority. But I am sure that he will find some other illegal way to do this, because he is in a Turkish trap, one might say, he has become Aliyev’s slave and fulfills all his not only wishes, but also his whims. Changing the Constitution of Armenia is a whim to humiliate Armenians. Azerbaijan will not gain any political dividend, geopolitical dividend from this, apart from the humiliation of the Armenian nation.
- The USA is interested in Armenia to the extent that it will be able to use this region against Russia. And this has a price. the price is that Armenia should come under Turkish influence, so that the Turkish worlds will unite and become economically stronger, so that Turkey, which has the largest army in NATO, will come out against Russia at some point. Here we are just playing the role of a coin. And Iran does not want this to happen, purely out of its own interests, because it knows that the strengthening of the Turkish worlds will not only threaten Russia, but also Iran, in the north of which millions of Tatars who consider themselves Azeri live.
- I think another factor annoys him: the Russian president not congratulating him and having reservations about the elections. This indicates that the administration of Pashinyan’s next period (if this period lasts) will be very difficult and difficult, which means that the Armenian people will face great difficulties.
- Europe supports, but with Europe’s support, oil and gas will not come to Armenia, will Europe bring that oil in buckets or with what? Europe itself needs oil and gas: here they said that there should be one to support Europe. Today, no significant, tangible action or support has been provided by Europe, nor will it be provided, because they are interested in Armenia to the extent that they will be able to use Armenia to make Armenia a platform for actions against Russia.
- There are people who have been brainwashed saying that Russia does not want Armenia to become stronger. It does not correspond to the truth. If Russia did not want it, it would not have sold fuel to Armenia on preferential terms, it would not have helped Armenia in the development of infrastructure, in the management of the Nuclear Power Plant, it would not have helped Armenia in overcoming various problems.
- Here, there are concrete kennels, which allegedly act from the positions of free speech and awareness, but they work against Russia, collecting data and transferring it to various relevant structures.
- Pashinyan was not even going to hand over power through the elections, transfer power, and not realizing this will lead to the fact that the people who voted for the opposition will be disappointed once again, because those people did not vote for a few people to go and sit in the National Assembly and, so to speak, ask Pashinyan sharp questions. Those people voted for the opposition, including me, in order for there to be a change of power, and in the process of this change of power, the elections are just a bubble, especially in the conditions of the Armenian reality, that there has never been a transfer of power through elections. The transfer of power in Armenia has always been actually decided, and then directly ratified by elections.
- In order for the street to revolt, people need quality leadership, quality leadership will mean a person who is devoted, a person who is ready to sacrifice even his life in that process.
- Due to the change in the law, the state debt is automatically less visible. From now on, the debt of the Central Bank, which is about half a billion dollars, does not appear in the state debt.
That debt is much bigger in reality, and I repeat that they changed the law hastily, and now since the beginning of the year they have already reduced the debt a little, but that will not help them either. Actual debt continues to grow.
Details in the video
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RFE/RL – Armenian Oppositionist Prosecuted Again
- Naira Bulghadarian
An Armenian opposition politician was briefly detained and charged with spreading antigovernment “hate speech” on Friday less than one year after his release from prison.
Ruben Hakobian briefly spoke to RFE/RL’s Armenian Service as he was being taken to a police station in Yerevan in the morning. Hakobian said he is prosecuted for his statements made in 2024. Police officers did not allow him to comment further.
Hakobian, 70, was released from policy custody several hours later. The Investigative Committee said he is prosecuted for posting on the Internet comments “aimed at inciting hatred, intolerance and hostility.” The law-enforcement agency did not elaborate on the accusation or confirm whether it stems from what he said two years ago. Hakobian’s lawyer, Varazdat Harutiunian, dismissed the charge.
“It’s Article 329 [of the Armenian Criminal Code,] which is widely used against opponents of the current authorities,” he said.
A former member of the Armenian parliament currently not affiliated with any party, Hakobian was already arrested in July last year on charges of calling for a violent overthrow of Armenia’s government. The charges stemmed from his interview with a pro-opposition TV channel in which he accused Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian of systematically violating Armenia’s laws and said Armenians have therefore a legitimate right to revolt against their government.
The veteran politician was released from jail at the start of his trial in August. In a subsequent verdict, a Yerevan court fined him about 3 million drams ($8,000), rejecting prosecutors’ demand for a 3-year jail sentence. Both sides to the trial appealed against the ruling.
Hakobian’s son Samvel linked the latest criminal case to the June 7 parliamentary elections in which he ran as a candidate of former President Ronbert Kocharian’s Hayastan alliance.
“I’m not surprised by what they are doing because we thought that if Pashinian succeeds in holding on to power he will go after oppositionists,” Samvel Hakobian said, describing the case as a “clear infringement on freedom of speech and pluralism.”
Samvel Karapetian, a billionaire leading the main opposition Strong Armenia alliance, was likewise charged with calling for a violent regime change after condemning Pashinian’s crackdown on the Armenian Apostolic Church in June 2025. The same charge has been brought against Gyumri-based Archbishop Mikael Ajapahian and about a dozen other people critical of Pashinian.
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