Against the background of the announced Iran-US ceasefire, information was circulated, particularly about the role of Turkey, especially the country’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT). Turkish sources said that even before the war, the intelligence structure of the country established intensive contacts with all sides of the conflict, and after the war, it was already in constant contact with both the American-Israeli and Iranian sides.

In addition, during this period, Turkish intelligence “cooperated” with Iraq, Pakistan, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Great Britain, Germany, France.

Furthermore, Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization used its conduits and connections with the IRGC to pass Turkish proposals and messages to Iran regarding a cease-fire.

It should be noted that there is also clear information about the serious role played by Turkish intelligence and the former head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization, now the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hakan Fidan, in preventing Kurdish and other armed groups from entering Iran.

For their part, perhaps taking all this into account, Israeli circles have noticed that there is a high probability that Turkey will become the “new monster” of the region amid the weakening of Iran, because Ankara is pursuing a policy that can harm the interests of the United States, NATO and regional security.

How realistic or true these claims in Israel’s political science and expert circles are, and why they exist, is open to speculation. On the other hand, during the military operations against Iran, Turkey mainly targeted Israel and not so much the USA, which was also understandable and expected.

On these and other issues 168.amhas talked Analytical “Base”. of the center expert Shiraz Khachatryan with

– Naturally, in the background of the Iran-US war, a new balance of power will be formed in the region, where the relative weakening of Iran will create a vacuum of new influence. States with regional ambitions immediately try to fill that vacuum, and Turkey is one of the most active among them, if not the most active.

Ankara is consistently trying to strengthen its presence in the region in all intelligence, military and political directions, especially in areas where Iran is temporarily weakened.

In this case, Israel’s concern is logical, for it Turkey is a problem not because it is a direct opponent at the moment, but because Ankara is rapidly becoming an independent player, unpredictable and not fully controllable, even for the West. If we don’t go into the historical details of the tense Turkish-Israeli relations, then the situation is quite classic: there is a redistribution of power in the region, where Turkey is gradually strengthening its positions, and Israel is trying to restrain this process.

– What changes will the increase in the role of Turkey, which already has an influential presence in the region, lead to?

– The question is extensive, but if we formulate it briefly and with axes, then the picture is approximately like this. Turkey’s role in the region continues to grow, Russia is no longer the former monopoly actor in the South Caucasus, and here the logic of creating new channels with Western and American support is practically aimed at bypassing both Russian and Iranian limiting influence. In this sense, Turkey is trying step by step to replace Moscow, becoming the main organizing force in the region. In the case of Russia, it is clear that it will not return to its previous position of absolute control. But this does not mean that he was irreversibly pushed out of the region. Moscow will try to remain in the Caucasus as a balancing and sometimes disruptive force, using its remaining leverage: security ties, energy dependencies, bilateral agreements and crisis management experience.

In other words, the role of Russia has decreased, but it has not disappeared. it moves more from the “monopoly controller” model to the “balancing player” model.

For Azerbaijan, the strengthening of Turkey is both an opportunity and a long-term risk. It is an opportunity because Baku enters deeper into the key architecture of the Middle Corridor, becoming an important energy and logistics hub in the South Caucasus. But the problem is that Azerbaijan also has strategic relations with Israel and Russia at the same time, and the need for a complex balance may arise here. If Turkey, for example, enters into a tougher competition with Israel or some centers of the West, Baku will have to make a more difficult maneuver without losing either Ankara or Tel Aviv. In other words, Turkey strengthens Azerbaijan, but also makes its foreign policy more complex and under multi-vector pressures.

And for the USA, which came to the region, the growing role of Turkey has a double significance. On the one hand, it is useful because Turkey helps contain the influence of Russia and, to a certain extent, Iran, and also contributes to the promotion of communication projects that correspond to Western economic and strategic interests. On the other hand, Ankara never operates entirely according to American rules. Turkey is trying to advance its own agenda, its own regional ambitions and sometimes shows quite contradictory behavior towards the western circles. In short, we are in the process of forming a new competitive balance in the region. Turkey is getting stronger, Russia is retreating, but still remains in the game, Azerbaijan is winning, and the USA is trying to take advantage of the situation. The most important thing in this whole restructuring is how much Armenia will be able to benefit from these regional reforms.

– In the background of all this, what developments can be expected around the TRIPP project, can there be revisions, and how much has the US interest been preserved in relation to this or about it?

– TRIPP’s competitiveness largely depends not only on what the project offers to Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also on how much Iran continues to be a regional “obstacle” or counterweight to American strategy. If we consider a theoretical worst-case scenario, for example, if Iran loses its infrastructure and political control as a result of a long war, the US may reevaluate the priority of this project passing through the South Caucasus. In that case, TRIPP can be considered not so much as an urgent geopolitical tool, but more as a backup or long-term logistical option in the context of competition between Russia and the common Eurasian channels.

– There is an article on this topic the other day publish Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, where he addressed several issues. First, according to him, new trade corridors inevitably redistribute influence, and that Russia and Iran, which derive economic and strategic weight from existing transit routes, will not view these developments neutrally. Moreover, their political and economic responses will shape the environment in which TRIPP operates. Basically, we talked about this above. And the former foreign minister is also of the opinion that the security guarantees based on the protection expected from the great powers have proven to be useless, because they are based on interests, and the interests of the great powers are variable and change over time, and etc. In the case of TRIPP, the political opposition is talking about different guarantees. In your opinion, what kind of guarantee does Armenia need to mitigate possible risks, and how do you imagine the strategic equal presence of regional players in this case?

– This question is a logical continuation of this question and my answer to it. A project like TRIPP cannot work only with the promises of one great power, because such “guarantees” are always temporary and depend on changes in interests. New trade corridors are indeed redistributing influence, and the big regional players are unlikely to look neutrally at a project that changes the existing transit balance and reduces their role, in this case it is about Russia and Iran. That is exactly the environment in which TRIPP should operate, and the stability of that environment will be determined not by statements, but by the reactions of regional powers.

In these conditions, Armenia does not need abstract protection promises, but more practical, measurable and multi-layered guarantees.

The first is the legal guarantees, where it will be clearly established that the road, infrastructure, customs and security regime remain under the sovereign jurisdiction of Armenia.

The second is the multilateral institutional guarantees, that is, not only the US, but the involvement of several actors here, so that the project does not become a political tool of one center.

It is also important to have a mechanism of economic counterbalances, so that Armenia is not only a transit area, but receives a controllable economic benefit, and has compensation and pressure reduction mechanisms in non-working or crisis moments.

Next are operational safety mechanisms, which do not depend on the will of the “guarantor”, but are based on local control, monitoring and quick response. This is the real guarantee, not the on-duty political statements.

As for the “equal presence” of regional players, I don’t think of it as a beautifully balanced symmetry, because such symmetry has almost never existed in the region. It is more realistic to talk about controlled versatility. In other words, the USA can remain the political sponsor of the project, but if Russia and Iran are completely left out of the project’s calculations, they will work to either disrupt or “make” its implementation more expensive. That is why, in my opinion, a model where Russia and Iran are not completely excluded from the regional calculation is in the interests of Armenia.

– By the way the other day, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Zulfugarov, also stated that the most important thing for them is the connection of the main part of Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan and ensuring an unhindered transition, and it is not important whether it will be through the November 9 document or TRIPP, in the latter case, Baku is not a direct party.

– This statement of Zulfugarov quite openly and honestly shows the true priority of Baku. The key thing for Azerbaijan is not the specific format in which the issue will be resolved, with the document of November 9 or through TRIPP, but to ensure the uninterrupted, controllable and stable connection between the main part of Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. In other words, the format is secondary, the goal is to create a permanent and practical connection.

This also explains why Baku is trying not to be completely tied to any one project and to maintain a wide field of maneuver. The caution towards TRIPP is due to the fact that it is more of an American initiative, and the active involvement of the US in such a project may limit Azerbaijan’s independence in managing the corridor and its political use to some extent.

On the other hand, the November 9 format is more suitable for Baku in the sense that it is closer to the logic of regional and bilateral control without an overt external dominant actor. In other words, the essence of the issue for Baku is not who builds or sponsors that road, but under what conditions it will operate. The more seamless that transition is, less controlled by Armenia and more beneficial for Azerbaijan, the more acceptable it will be for Baku, regardless of the political packaging in which it is presented. This is exactly the point that should be understood: the primary thing for Azerbaijan is not the name of the document, but the practical provision of corridor logic.

– And in the end, in the background of the war against Iran, did the geopolitical role of Syunik increase, why not also that of Nakhichevan?

– Of course, the questions related to TRIPP in my previous observations can be extended to the whole of Syunik as well. The current US-Iran war showed that Iran not only did not “collapse”, but was also able to resist and thwart the maximum goals of its opponents. In this case, the US will not lose its importance to all the points through which it is possible to exert continuous pressure on Iran, in terms of security, logistics or economy. From that point of view, Syunik remains a zone of high value, because it can be used both in the framework of new transit projects and in the framework of reshaping the balance of power around Iran. But this is where the danger lies for us, because the “increasing importance of Syunik” is not automatically beneficial for Armenia, if it grows only at the expense of competition and positioning of external actors.

In the case of Nakhijevan, the growth of its importance has a slightly different nature. If Syunik is a hub of competition for foreign powers, then Nakhichevan is more of a living platform of the emerging Turkish-Azerbaijani project, not only against Iran, but also against Russia. In other words, if there is still a struggle for the distribution of influence around Syunik, then Nakhijevan has practically turned into a base for strengthening the Turkish-Azerbaijani influence.

—

While the war against the neighboring Islamic Republic of Iran is constantly being discussed in the international press, attracting international relations and US foreign policy “attention”, the US interest in TRIPP does not seem to fade.

Although the pace of implementation of agreements has suffered significantly. Before the American side becomes active, third parties apply to participate in TRIPP-related processes. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan Yermek Kosherbaev and the Minister of Transport Nurlan Sauranbaev are making official visits to Yerevan and Baku these days. The agenda of the Kazakh side seems to be broad, Kazakhstan has been frequently mentioned in Armenian official messages and speeches in recent months, taking a key role in establishing contacts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as in wider regional geopolitical and transport processes.

However, returning to the visits, we should mention that during the official visit to Yerevan on April 8-9, Minister Kosherbaev met both RA Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Nikol Pashinyan. Ararat Mirzoyan in the meeting with his Kazakh counterpart, he noted that the establishment of strategic partnership, which took place in November last year, when Nikol Pashinyan paid an official visit to Kazakhstan, became an important stage in the development of Armenian-Kazakh relations.

“In our broad agenda, I must emphasize one important, key direction for the economic development of our two countries and regions: interconnection. I am sure that the joint efforts towards the further development of transport and logistics infrastructures, including the logic of the “Crossroads of Peace” initiative of the Armenian government, will contribute to the best realization of the economic potential of the region and the strengthening of interregional cooperation,” Mirzoyan told the Foreign Minister of a country that has started importing wheat through Azerbaijan to Armenia in recent months.

Pashinyan, in turn, noted in the meeting with the Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan that the processes taking place in the region have a positive effect on the cooperation between Armenia and Kazakhstan, in particular, the railway communication established through Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia gives a new impetus to the expansion of trade and economic ties.

Yermek Kosherbaev also said that the established railway communication will significantly expand bilateral trade and economic relations.

At the same time, Yermek Kosherbaev emphasized the unblocking of regional communication channels and highlighted Kazakhstan’s support for TRIPP and the RA Government’s “Crossroads of Peace” projects. He emphasized that Kazakhstan is also interested in the implementation of the above-mentioned projects and the expansion of regional trade and economic ties.

Nikol Pashinyan and Yermek Kosherbaev discussed issues related to the development of cooperation in the fields of infrastructure, construction, agriculture, technology, aviation and tourism. In that regard, the implementation of direct flights between Armenia and Kazakhstan, which will start in the near future, was highlighted. Kazakh officials are in Baku today, where they met with Ilham Aliyev, discussing the Middle Corridor, the Trans-Caspian Green Energy Corridor, and the fiber optic line on which Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are cooperating. Baku also mentioned the role of the process of normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the TRIPP project.

It was a short time ago when Nikol Pashinyan announced that Armenia is losing its competitive advantage in the general context of regional de-blockade due to the Russian management of Armenian railways.

According to Nikol Pashinyan, the solution to the situation should be for a country friendly to Russia and Armenia to buy the right of concession management from Russia. However, Moscow does not seem to be enthusiastic about this proposal of Yerevan. At the meeting with the Russian President in the Kremlin on April 1, Pashinyan most likely did not receive a positive response from Moscow in this regard. After that visit, on April 2, during the briefing following the Government session in RA, Pashinyan stated that they have no plans to unilaterally terminate the railway management contract. “The Republic of Armenia has that leverage, but we don’t plan and don’t want to go that way,” Pashinyan said.

To the question of whether it is possible for Yerevan, regardless of Moscow’s position, to try to negotiate and reach an agreement with the Kazakh side, Pashinyan responded by saying that they are not going to do anything behind Russia’s back and will continue to work against the Russian Federation, at least at this stage as long as the opportunities for dialogue are wide and open.

According to Pashinyan, the visit of Kazakh officials is related to the TRIPP project. According to him, the Kazakh side is interested in TRIPP. They are trying to understand what transport opportunities are opening up, including for themselves.

“We should also invite Kazakhstan to be ready to use the transit routes passing through Armenia to look at their exports, imports and the transport services they provide in the chain, because the business of the transport sector, which is private, but the state also has a certain role, cannot be taken separately, because very well, it was taken from one part of the country to another border, but in continuation, there must be a strong partnership in order for that sector to work,” Pashinyan said.

Today, during a joint press conference with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, speaking about RA-US cooperation on TRIPP, RA Minister of Foreign Affairs Ararat Mirzoyan said that partners, that is, third parties, will be needed during the construction of TRIPP, as well as in the system management phase.

“It’s no secret that, as much as this is a bilateral project, it stems from and corresponds to the interests of many countries, starting from China, ending with Portugal, not to mention our immediate neighbors. Isn’t TRIPP on another planet? One end of TRIPP should touch the Republic of Azerbaijan, the other end should end in Nakhchivan, which is also the Republic of Azerbaijan, but the logical continuation, we have talked about this a lot, is Yeraskhov, the other network of Armenian railways, the Kars-Gyur railway junction and the Turkish railway network, the countries of Central Asia are especially very interested… a day ago we met here with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, who was also in Armenia accompanied by the Minister of Transport of Kazakhstan, therefore, there are discussions, the Middle Eastern countries are interested in these topics,” said Mirzoyan.

Kazakhstan has quite ambitious plans in the South Caucasus, striving to become an economic “guarantor” in the region, connecting its interests with the stability of the Trans-Caspian international transport route. In this context, Kazakhstan’s interest is not only political, but also strategic, aimed at the uninterrupted operation of alternative land routes and the suppression of Russian influence.

For the Kazakh side, TRIPP is considered as an element of the Middle Corridor. This interest acquires a systematic and more important character, especially in the light of the proposal made by the Armenian government to the Russian side regarding the transfer of the right of concession management of Armenian railways to Kazakhstan. This is an attempt to move the management of transport infrastructure away from the sphere of Russian influence. The Russian side’s disagreement shows that the Kremlin views control over regional communications as a cornerstone of its geopolitical influence. Kazakhstan’s entry into the Armenian infrastructural field can weaken Russia’s leverage in the region, which is perceived by Moscow as an undesirable change in the status quo, even taking into account the allied relations with Astana within the EAEU framework.

It should also be noted that Kazakhstan’s involvement in the transportation hubs of the South Caucasus significantly strengthens the Turkish factor in the South Caucasus. Astana’s ambitions are seen as the completion of a unified economic chain of the “Turkic world”, which is strategically beneficial to both Baku and Ankara. As a result, the replacement of Russian concession control by Kazakh may become the point where Moscow’s influence will significantly suffer, paving the way for new alliances and communication models where the priority is not post-Soviet ties, but deepening new relations between Turkic-speaking states.

Yerevan has obviously positioned itself in this field, contributing to the establishment of Kazakhstan in new transport projects, simultaneously pushing out the Russian presence from the Armenian transport network.

—

In the “Pressing” program Satik Seyranyan the guest is Arman Grigoryan, professor of Lehigh University, USA, political scientist is.

Recently, Iran reached a two-week ceasefire agreement with the United States, and Iran’s National Security Council announced that negotiations with Washington will begin in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, on April 10, based on Tehran’s 10-point proposal.

US President Donald Trump called this plan a “working basis” for negotiations and announced a two-week ceasefire.

Iran’s state television published the 10-point program.

1. Commitment to non-aggression.
2. Continuation of Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz.
3. Adoption of uranium enrichment.
4. Removal of all primary sanctions.
5. Removal of all secondary sanctions.
6. Cancellation of all UN Security Council resolutions.
7. Cancellation of all International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Governing Council Resolutions.
8. Payment of reparations for Iran.
9. Withdrawal of American combat forces from the region.
10. Stopping the war on all fronts (a complete end to the war in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen).

Shortly thereafter, however, Israel struck Lebanon hard, breaking the ceasefire. Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian announced that Israel’s attacks on Lebanon violate the cease-fire agreement signed with the United States and threaten to make the negotiations meaningless.

Meanwhile, Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf announced that Lebanon was an integral part of the two-week ceasefire with the United States, warning that violations would have consequences. “Lebanon and the entire axis of resistance, as allies of Iran, are an integral part of the ceasefire,” Ghalibaf said in a post on X. “Ceasefire violations entail an obvious price and STRONG responses,” he added. The comments came after Israel launched its heaviest airstrikes in Lebanon since the conflict with Hezbollah began last month, killing more than hundreds of people on Wednesday.

The main theses of the interview with Arman Grigoryan are below.

• Unfortunately, there is no truce. It was very short lived. Of course, one cannot downplay the fact that Trump approved the 10 points proposed by Iran, the Strait of Hormuz was opened, but it was quickly attacked by Israel in Lebanon with the help of the UAE. One of the clauses of the truce also referred to Lebanon, which Israel violated.

• Let me ask a question to those who are defeating Iran: when you look at the 10 points that Iran presented as a basis for going to negotiations, do you see that it is part of a capitulated country? In them, the capitulation of the USA was fixed more than that of Iran. 

• In my deep conviction, these points, with a little editing, were put on the table by Iran immediately after the war started, and the USA realized that there was no other way out than to accept it. Trump resorted to intense PR, announcing the nuclear threat, then making it conditional on not going ahead as an answer to their ultimatum, Iran’s concessions. I repeat again, look at those 10 points.

• It was clear that Iran would not leave its allies alone, it would not go to separate negotiations. It was also obvious that one of those 10 points was about Lebanon itself.

• In Iran, they understand very well that there is no point in going to any truce without guarantees, because it is possible that the USA can solve the problem of buying time before a new attack. Iran’s military-strategic situation is much better than that of the USA, no matter how much they pretend that they have caused irreparable losses to Iran. I would advise you to look at the editorials of The Economist magazine, and you will understand who is in a better position in this war.

• If the US has not been able to resolve the question of striking back at Iran, because Iran’s ballistic missiles inflict very serious blows on the adversaries, it can be considered a failed operation.։

• Once again, the USA went to the illusion of defeating any country by air force only, without a ground operation, and failed. This is a selective war, based on the calculation of the best scenario and the pressures of various interests, to satisfy their plans. Meanwhile, Iran was a much stronger core than all the other states, which, by the way, the USA could not impose its will either. Even if there was a ground operation, the terrain and geography of Iran is very different, and achieving success is difficult, even if they could deploy so many military forces there.

• Now Trump has appeared, speaking in chess language, in a zugzwang. The US president has no choice. Several generals in the Pentagon were fired because I’m sure the ground generals resisted the plan to go into ground action. Even if they could land a landing party, communication with them would have to be maintained by air. And providing air power to a contingent of even 50,000 is a complete logistical nightmare. No serious specialist in the Pentagon believed it. The last story about saving the pilot cost 250 million dollars. The goal was to steal Iran’s uranium, but they fell into a trap and had to withdraw their troops.

• In fact, Trump has neither the choice of a ground operation anymore, nor of going to a truce and accepting his defeat. The problem here is Israel. Israel has the right to veto, it will not allow a ceasefire, because with that defeat, Israel will be in a more vulnerable position than even the USA։

• In the US, the war strategy is based on air power, and it is logical, because in this way you avoid large casualties. Before the Kosovo intervention, a question was asked in Congress: How many infantrymen’s lives is it worth to save the Kosovo Albanians? everyone said zero. In other words, they wanted to save the Kosovo Albanians, but only if it would not cost the lives of any infantrymen.

• In Iran, the policy of beheading the leadership, which is often used to create chaos in the country and collapse the systems, did not work, because in Iran they were prepared for this, so that if suddenly 7 people occupying a certain position were killed one after the other, there would be replacements, and … they already knew who the 8th would be.

• In Iran, they considered that anti-missile defense systems are very expensive, and that resource of the USA and Israel can be exhausted by striking with old missiles. A missile is always cheaper than an anti-missile. Iran also managed to destroy observation radars, the price of which is 2.5 billion dollars։ By the way, observations were also made with those radars in the direction of Russia and China.

• I think Vance obviously cannot publicly state that he is against this war or he will have to resign, but there are credible reports that Vance was not enthusiastic about this war. Tulsi Gabbard was also against it, but her approach was that it was better to stay inside the government and try to control something, than to have her position go to someone like Pete Hegsett. The Chief of the General Staff was also against it. I think Tulsi Gabbard will do the right thing by resigning…

• I repeat again, 5,000 or 50,000 troops cannot do anything, several hundred thousand people are needed, at least an army of 400,000 people, to achieve some kind of success. Can you imagine how many months it will take to deploy so many people to the required place?

• At the beginning of this war, Iran was not even given the opportunity to surrender or accept defeat. Actually, they expected suicide from Iran. The problem was to divide Iran, to turn it into Syria, to take Iran out of line. What would Iran have to do to satisfy such intentions? Therefore, I have no idea what the escalation will look like, what they haven’t done to Iran that they should do. It’s just resorting to total barbarism, but I don’t believe that Trump can resort to using nuclear weapons and go for it, and that he won’t be caught.։

• Of course, they can make Trump mentally ill, remove him and end this war, but Trump is not the only one responsible, they must be able to hold Israel’s hand if they want this war to stop. I consider the leaders of Israel to be the greatest enemies of the Jewish people. I declare with all responsibility that after the Second World War, the Jews have not had a bigger enemy than Netanyahu and other leaders. Israel is now suffering a terrible image defeat in the USA. The percentage of people with a pro-Israel position has increased։

• Iran’s demand for the withdrawal of American military presence from the countries of the region will not be limited to the Gulf countries. This will also apply to Armenia. Iran will not allow American military presence in TRIPP. Iran has always been against it, and now, when Iran is in a much better strategic position, there will be very serious pressure from Iran to cancel the project.

• The question is not whether to open that road or not, but the control of the road provided by TRIPP. I have a hard time imagining that in case of Iran’s victory, the TRIPP project will become a reality, at least in terms of control by the American consortium. Turkey will not control that road either, because the road connecting Iran to Armenia will disappear, and Iran cannot allow that either.

• It is visible to the naked eye that the USA is in a very bad situation in the context of the war with Iran, which weakens its influence. This allows Russia to take some steps, and the Russians began to express their tough positions. It is clear that the government relied on the fact that the West is the winning side, and it is necessary to rely on them.

• Putin threatened Pashinyan, and it does not surprise me at all. Every time Russia’s neighboring countries have adopted a pro-European policy, they have suffered. As for putting Putin’s port in place, we remember: 2018-2020․ How many times did Pashinyan “put Aliyev’s belly in place”, sometimes in such a way that he probably drank corvalol, but we saw how it ended. I am appalled at this level of degradation of speech։

• The meaning of what Putin said to Pashinyan was that if Armenia changes its strategic orientation, it will suffer serious losses. In any case, I associate Putin’s harsh speech with the situation in Iran.

• I don’t understand how it is possible to see these intense, continuous anti-Russian sentiments for 5 years, which are encouraged by the government, and be surprised by Putin’s harsh speech. This government has ambitions and is steadily pursuing them. First they “liberated” Artsakh, now Armenia is being transferred from the Russian yoke to the western “paradise”.

• I think it was very bad that Putin made such a statement about the June elections, which is now seen as interference, but remember that those who talk about it today, those who sharply criticize Putin’s speech, were happy just months ago with a similar statement by the US Vice President Zay D. Vance, who simply announced his support for Pashinyan, let them remember the statement of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan… It is not the business of Putin or anyone else who will participate in the elections in Armenia. and for whom the Armenians will vote. It is only the business of the Armenian people։

• Pashinyan’s threat of war is blackmail against the people.

• At least one good thing happened after Trump came to power․ The funding sources of influence agents were revealed: USAID, NDI, Soros Foundation…

• David Petraeus is playing basketball with the President of Syria, one-time terrorist, cannibal Al Jolani…. At one time, the same USA set a $10 million bounty on Al-Jolani’s head… The man-eater of Al-Qaeda, who organized the September 11 terrorist attack, is today the president of Syria, and they consider it normal, but anyone who disagrees with them is automatically declared an agent, a foreign agent. The beginning of hybrid warfare works on the same model.

• Those people do not want to hear any other position, except their point of view, they consider it a hybrid war waged by foreign agents.

• The political situation in Armenia is very difficult, and Pashinyan is not the only problem. When you look at the baggage of Pashinyan, who has been in power for 8 years, it is very difficult to find at least one or two things done that can be positively talked about, except for a couple of meters of asphalt and two kindergartens… It should have been very easy to remove a government with this kind of “earnings” from power. We have to ask ourselves: why can’t we do it? Until we find the answer to this mystery, the situation will not change. Almost all political forces tend to treat symptoms without determining the diagnosis։