The Armenian elections, the Caucasus, and great power competition

Harici, Turkey
June 25 2026

The Armenian elections, the Caucasus, and great power competition

Published on 25.06.2026 13:42
By Barış Doster

As anticipated, the general elections held in Armenia on June 7 resulted in a victory for the Civil Contract Party, led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, which secured approximately half of the vote. Equally expectedly, despite this victory, the party fell short of a constitutional (two-thirds) majority. This political landscape is poised to yield significant ramifications, not only for Armenia’s domestic politics but also for regional dynamics and the overarching great power competition in the Caucasus.

Why so?

Let us examine the reasons point by point:

First, despite suffering a crushing military, political, and diplomatic defeat over Karabakh—a conflict widely recognized as Azerbaijan’s just and legitimate cause—Pashinyan retained robust public support. In the wake of this defeat, his vision of a “real Armenia” rather than an “imaginary” one, combined with his intention to swiftly normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, and his promises of economic revitalization and prosperity, clearly resonated with the electorate.

Second, upon assuming office, Pashinyan underestimated Russia’s geopolitical weight in the region, placing excessive trust in the West, specifically US and European imperialism. Observing this, Russian President Vladimir Putin chose not to chastise Pashinyan directly; instead, by refusing to restrain Azerbaijan or prevent Baku from delivering a decisive blow to Yerevan, he forced Pashinyan to confront geopolitical realities.

Third, Russia maintains a formidable presence within Armenia’s domestic politics, economy, and security apparatus, compounded by the vast Armenian diaspora residing in Russia. It is impossible for Pashinyan to dismantle this entrenched reality overnight. For a country of roughly three million people, spanning a mere 30,000 square kilometers, and burdened with a fragile economy, the structural dependency is stark: Armenia sends 90 percent of its exports to Russia, relies entirely on Russian natural gas (secured at a fraction of the price paid by European nations), and has an estimated two million citizens living in Russia. Consequently, Pashinyan cannot afford to escalate tensions with Moscow, even if he were inclined to do so. This explains why, prior to the elections, he announced that his first state visit upon victory would be to Moscow, with Brussels to follow. Despite receiving significant backing from the United States and Europe, his designation of Moscow—which actively supported his domestic opposition—as his premier foreign destination demonstrates that he has, to some extent, internalized the lessons of his early leadership failures since 2018.

Fourth, while Armenia remains eager to cultivate the closest possible relations with NATO and harbors aspirations for European Union membership, Russia has countered this ambition by making it clear that Armenia cannot simultaneously belong to both the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the EU, forcing a choice between the two. Given Armenia’s geographic isolation, trade structures, energy dependence, and Russia’s pervasive influence over Yerevan, the country is in no position to easily abandon the Eurasian Economic Union.

Fifth, Pashinyan believes that a rapid normalization of relations with Türkiye and Azerbaijan will dismantle the Armenian diaspora’s leverage over Armenia’s domestic and, in particular, foreign policy. In doing so, he hopes to place Yerevan’s relations with Western nations on a healthier, more pragmatic footing.

Sixth, Armenia’s relations with Georgia are also fraught, overshadowed by historical mistrust and remaining tepid at best. Consequently, while Armenia struggles with varying degrees of tension and complex issues with Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Georgia, it possesses only one neighbor with whom it shares amicable ties: Iran, with which it shares a brief 44-kilometer border. Yet, preoccupied with its own severe domestic and international crises, Tehran is currently unable to offer much meaningful attention or support to Yerevan, despite years of historical alignment.

Ultimately, this new era in Armenian politics carries profound implications, not merely for the nation itself, but for the wider region and the grand strategy of the major powers—specifically the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and Russia in the Caucasus.

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Iran, Armenia determined to open new trade, transit routes

Tehran Times, Iran

June 26, 2026

Iran, Armenia determined to open new trade, transit routes

TEHRAN- A specialized meeting between the Head of Iran’s Road Maintenance and Transportation Organization and the Deputy Minister of Economy of the Republic of Armenia was held at the Ministry of Economy in Yerevan, focusing on facilitating trade and transit and reducing international transportation barriers between the two countries.

According to IRNA from the Road Maintenance and Transportation Organization, during this meeting, the Head of the organization, referring to Iran’s strategic position in the North-South and East-West international corridors, emphasized the need for the full activation of transit and logistics capacities on both sides.

Reza Akbari stated: The Islamic Republic of Iran, as one of the region’s main transit routes, has always welcomed the development of transportation cooperation with its neighbors, and Armenia, due to its special geographical location and cultural and historical ties, is considered a key partner on these routes.

The Deputy Minister of Economy of Armenia, while appreciating the active presence of the Iranian delegation and the accompaniment of the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran and diplomatic representatives, announced that his country is determined to remove road transportation barriers and reduce transit costs.

Emphasizing that Armenia is seeking mechanisms to make the movement of transport fleets between the two countries smoother and more economical, he added: Adjusting border tolls and coordinating customs procedures are among our main priorities.

The Deputy Minister of Economy of Armenia added: The presence of senior customs and transit officials from both sides in this meeting demonstrates a serious determination to implement the agreements.

In this meeting, five main axes were discussed and exchanged with an operational approach and the active participation of the Iranian and Armenian delegation members.

The two sides agreed on reducing border tolls, deciding to form a joint working group under the direct supervision of customs managers to review the cost structure of crossing shared borders and plan for their gradual reduction.

The expansion of truck and cargo fleet traffic was also placed on the agenda, and it was decided that, in addition to increasing the traffic quota, smart systems for reserving crossing times and controlling traffic at the borders should be launched to prevent the formation of long queues.

Activating transit and logistics capacities was another important axis of this meeting, based on which both sides emphasized the full utilization of logistics terminals on both sides of the border and the creation of joint centers with private sector cooperation.

Also, the development of border crossing infrastructure and access routes, including improving roads leading to common border crossings and examining the construction of a new bridge at the zero border point, was prioritized in the joint commission.

Reducing international transportation barriers was also raised as another axis, and in this regard, eliminating unnecessary bureaucratic formalities, standardizing transit permit documents, and coordinating the implementation of international transport conventions were welcomed by both sides.

The Director General of the Organizational Commercialization Office of the Road Maintenance Organization emphasized the need to facilitate trade procedures and coordinate with relevant bodies.

The Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Armenia, while welcoming the positive atmosphere of the negotiations, emphasized full support for implementing these agreements within the framework of economic diplomacy.

At the end of this meeting, both sides emphasized their determination to become regional transit hubs and make maximum use of the communication corridors between Asia and Europe, and it was decided that the next meeting would be held as soon as possible to finalize the executive details of the agreements.

EF/MA

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Von der Leyen to visit Azerbaijan and Armenia to build on EU engagement

EuroNews

June 26, 2026
By Peter Barabas & Aleksandar Brezar

The European Commission president will visit Baku and Yerevan to build on the EU’s strategic engagement with the South Caucasus and to strengthen energy cooperation, trade and regional connectivity for the EU economies.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will visit both Azerbaijan and Armenia next week to further develop the EU’s strategic engagement with the two former rivals in the South Caucasus, sources in Yerevan and Baku with knowledge of the matter confirmed to Euronews.

The head of the EU executive is set to visit Baku on 1 July, where she will hold talks with Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev on the country’s expanding energy supplies to Europe as the main pillar of EU-Azerbaijan relations, as well as cooperation on key regional infrastructure projects that are now crucial for the EU economies.

This will be von der Leyen’s first visit to Baku since 2022, when the EU and Azerbaijan signed their strategic energy partnership as Europe moved away from Russian energy and needed urgent alternative gas supplies.

It is also the first visit since Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to make peace after decades of war over Karabakh, in a region formerly in Moscow’s orbit.

The visit continues the strategic EU political dialogue with the region, following European Council President Antonio Costa’s talks with Aliyev in Baku back in March, when Costa said that Brussels and Baku were now working on a new framework for closer cooperation on defence, security, and digital developments intended to widen relations beyond the existing energy and key infrastructure links.

“This sends a strong signal of our joint vision for the future,” Costa said in March, adding that “energy security is a cornerstone of the EU’s cooperation with Azerbaijan,” and underlining how Azerbaijan has been central to the EU’s efforts to diversify its supply sources for gas, oil, and green energy.

A total of 16 European countries currently receive Azerbaijani gas, with 10 EU member states among the recipients, and Italy is the top EU importer of Azerbaijani energy, as underscored by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s visit to Baku in May.

The Middle Corridor, Europe’s new trade priority

Connectivity is now another key area for EU-Azerbaijan cooperation, with the development of the Middle Corridor representing a strategic opportunity for new, alternative transport connections between Europe and Asia through the South Caucasus following the Iran-generated disruptions.

European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos, who is expected to join Von der Leyen on both visits, launched this week the EU’s new Connectivity Agenda Platform by which the EU will participate in the Middle Corridor projects with investments from governments, financial institutions and private investors, which up to now have reached more than €80 million in EU funding, with a goal of over €2 billion for transport, energy and digital infrastructure investments.

In a video posted on X, Kos outlined the new EU connectivity project, saying it was critical for Europe to make its trade routes and energy more secure, avoid the now-unreliable traditional routes, and that it was time for Europe to do its part.

“Take a look at the plane map before and after the start of the recent war in Iran. Almost all planes started passing through the Caucasus. It’s through here, the Middle Corridor, that we can secure our trade, energy and digital links,” Kos said by explaining that the Middle Corridor connects Europe and Asia through Turkey and the South Caucasus.

The EU commissioner for enlargement explained that trade along the route is now four times higher than in 2022 due to bottlenecks and hurdles, and that shipping cargo to Europe can still take up to 45 days to reach Romania.

“Our goal? Cut that to just 15 days, this is significantly faster than shipping by sea to Europe. How? By improving roads, railways, ports and reducing delays at borders,” Kos outlined the EU’s ambitions.

“This will help lower costs for our businesses and make goods cheaper for people in the EU. It will help us grow our economy,” the EU enlargement commissioner said.

“It will also support the improving relations between countries in the region after decades of conflict, also strengthening the economies of our neighbours to the east. That is what coal and steel did for us in Europe after World War II,” Kos explained.

She concluded that “this is the priority for the European Commission, securing our trade, energy and digital links via routes we can trust,” setting the stage for the EU leadership’s visit to Baku.

Back in March, Aliyev told Costa that amid disruptions to global transit systems caused by the war in Iran, the South Caucasus’ economic and transit potential was growing, including new opportunities to develop the Middle Corridor connecting Asia and Europe.

During her visit to Baku in May, Meloni said she wanted Azerbaijan to strengthen its role as an energy hub between Europe and Asia, with Italy serving as “the privileged gateway to the European market.”

Expanding capacity would require enlarging the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, the final leg of the Southern Gas Corridor that carries Azerbaijani gas across Turkey, Greece and Albania into southern Italy.

Peace as backdrop for new regional agenda

The new initiatives are now possible after Azerbaijan and Armenia signed their historic peace agreement after almost four decades of a tragic conflict, and are now fully engaged in forging a common economic future for their nations and the region.

The Commission president’s visit to both countries carries not just a political message but also the symbolism of the EU now engaging with them within a peace framework, rather than confrontation, for joint economic projects ahead.

Von der Leyen will travel to Yerevan for talks with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan as the EU has just rolled out a support package for Armenia and to further develop the strategic EU-Armenia relations after Pashinyan secured a decisive pro-West mandate in the recent elections.

The European Commission endorsed Pashinyan just days before the crucial elections on 7 June and announced a support package to counter the Russian onslaught of sanctions following Yerevan’s cautious pro-Western, pro-EU turn.

Pashinyan carefully balanced Armenia’s approach to Russia in the last days of the election campaign, stating that Armenia’s EU membership bid was “theoretical” at this time.

The EC announced at the time a support package of financial assistance and practical measures to support Armenian agri-food trade after Moscow unleashed an economic onslaught, restricting imports of various Armenian fruits, vegetables, flowers, and fish products, as well as wine, brandy and mineral water, while also threatening to cut critical Russian oil and gas supplies to Armenia.

Von der Leyen’s visit will take place following a new announcement by the European Commission last Friday that it “disbursed €34 million to Armenia to help mitigate the impact of Russia’s trade restrictions on the country’s private sector.”

“The EU is delivering swiftly on its commitments to support Armenia and its people,” the European Commission said in a statement.

“Additional support will be provided to sectors affected by the trade restrictions, including agri-food products, flower production and other export-oriented industries, through trade initiatives, business matchmaking events and targeted market access initiatives,” the statement added.

The EU-Armenia Task Force on Economic Resilience continues to meet regularly to steer and monitor the implementation of these measures, the Commission added.

Kos earlier said that “the EU stands firmly with Armenia, a sovereign, democratic and independent country” and that the EU package would “help address immediate economic challenges while opening new opportunities for Armenian businesses to trade with regional and European markets.”

“This is European solidarity in action,” she emphasised.

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Why Armenia-Kazakhstan Ties Are Expanding

The National Interest

June 26, 2026

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Students & Parents Ask for Armenian Classes to be Expanded; French Most Popula

Watertown News, MA

June 26, 2026

Watertown High School students, alumni, and parents of students who took part in the Armenian language program urged School officials to bolster the program for fear of losing the classes that are more than just about learning a language.

At Monday’s School Committee meeting, several people spoke about the Armenian classes, which are part of the World Language offerings at the High School. During the meeting, the School Committee also heard a report about the district’s World Language Program, a survey of what languages students and parents are interested in, and the progress of students who have been in the elementary school Spanish immersion program.

The speaker noted that the Armenian teacher recently resigned, and said that having students with four levels of proficiency in the same class is not something that other languages or subjects would have to do.

Some pointed to the Armenian classes as an important cultural asset, keeping the culture and language alive that has been threatened in years past during the Armenian Genocide and during Soviet rule of Armenia, as well as today when parts of Armenia have been under military attack.

The parents asked for at least a 0.6 FTE (full time equivalent) teaching position for the Armenian program to teach three periods, instead of the 0.4 in the budget, because it will be hard to find a person who can teach Armenian part time.

World Language Coordinator Adam Silverberg said that a candidate for the Armenian language teaching position has been interviewed and the school is in the process of hiring someone.

WHS Principal Joel Giacobozzi said he understands where the people who spoke are coming from. His grandfather came to the United States fleeing genocide in Armenia.

“So I completely and wholeheartedly agree with not only the comments about the history that involves the Genocide, but also the current atrocities that are happening in that country. We can’t forget that, and we won’t forget that,” Giacobozzi said. “With that said, we have infinite need and finite resources.”

He and Silverberg set up a meeting with representatives from the group that spoke, he said.

“We’re really discussing, listening deeply to the suggestions from the public,” Giacobozzi said. “We’re very proud of what we’re offering, and we can always do better, and we will continue to look at how we can do better in the immediate and in the future.”

World Languages Program

A survey about interest in World Language was sent out to students in grades 6-12 and parents of students in grades K-12. Currently, WHS offers Spanish, Italian, Arabic, and Armenian. The survey also asked about interest in French, Portuguese, Mandarin, Latin, and American Sign Language (ASL).

Silverberg said there was significant interest in adding French. The school previously offered that language.

“French was eliminated in my first year here as Arabic transitioned into the program, so we thought it was time to see if there were other needs or wants from the community,” Silverberg said.

Spanish is the most popular language, and Silverberg added that the Italian classes at the middle school are full, and there are six classes. The Arabic classes have dropped a bit to between 12 and 17 students per class.

The survey did not lead to any immediate changes to the World Languages program.

“We’re not necessarily recommending adding or subtracting the language,” Silverberg said. “We believe we have a solid core programming for the number of students and number of staff in our district, and I think it could be something that we look into in the future if we wanted to reintroduce French.”

With the strong interest in French, School Committee member Rachel Kay asked why the district is not starting to phase in the language. Silverberg said he could discuss that with the district, high school and middle school administration.

“I think we have robust offerings right now, and my fear would be if we were to add a language, would it hurt the other languages?” Silverberg said. “It’s by all means worth looking into, and seeing if there would be a desire.”

School Committee Chair Kendra Foley said she would not want the school to jump into a decision because it could have other impacts.

“This is one good data point. Certainly, I don’t want to make decisions based on one good data point. And we’re a small school, and sometimes we have to decide, make trade-offs, and so it’s already hard,” Foley said. “I know scheduling is very hard when you have small groups, and so if we were going to take a look at different options, there may be a need to phase things out if you add new things in.”

Silverberg also discussed the progress of students in the Spanish immersion program, which begins in kindergarten in the Watertown Public Schools. The first set of students reached the ninth grade, and tested at an intermediate range of proficiency in Spanish. Those scores were higher than ninth-graders in the Italian and Arabic classes.

Watertown High School students can earn a Seal of Biliteracy, and an average of 20% of students receive that honor each year, Silverberg said. In 2026, 37 students, which was 20% of the seniors, earned the Seal of Biliteracy.

See the slides from the World Languages update by clicking here.

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[Israeli] FM to propose cabinet resolution to officially recognize Ottoman gen

The Times of Israel

June 25 2026

Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar plans to propose on Sunday a cabinet resolution to officially recognize the genocide against the Armenian people during the final years of the Ottoman Empire, his office says, in a move that will no doubt provoke diplomatic rival Turkey.

Armenians have long sought international recognition of the killings in the early 20th century, which reportedly left some 1.5 million of their people dead, as a genocide. Turkey — the Ottoman Empire’s successor state — strongly rejects the allegation that the massacres, imprisonment and forced deportation of Armenians amounted to genocide.

Israel long avoided recognizing the killings as genocide due to the diplomatic sensitivity of the matter, but the sharp deterioration of relations with Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has repeatedly accused Israel of genocide in Gaza, has led it to take certain steps toward recognition in recent years. Last August, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said for the first time that he recognized the genocide.

“Despite extensive and unequivocal historical documentation, the Armenian Genocide remains the subject of an organized campaign of denial and minimization, including the manipulative rewriting of history books, primarily by Turkey,” the explanatory text for the proposal says.

“In light of this moral and historical obligation, it is proposed that the Government of Israel recognize the genocide committed against the Armenian people during the final years of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, given ongoing attempts to blur, minimize, or deny the atrocities of the Armenian Genocide, the proposal calls for condemning all efforts to distort the historical truth of these events.”

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How Armenia Is Overcoming Its ‘Lost Cause’

The National Interest

June 26, 2026

How Armenia Is Overcoming Its ‘Lost Cause’
June 26, 2026 By: Joseph Epstein

Armenia’s pursuit of an irredentist claim to Nagorno-Karabakh has long trapped it as a Russian client state. Nikol Pashinyan has chosen a different path.

Conventional wisdom holds that a country guards its independence by holding its ground, and that to surrender a claim to a part of its imagined territory, even one outside its control, is to surrender a part of its sovereignty. This attitude helps to explain the dozens of ongoing territorial disputes across the world—Venezuela’s desire for the Essequibo region of Guyana, dueling Indian and Pakistani claims to Kashmir, and the controversy around China’s “nine-dash line” in the South China Sea, among others—and why they are so intractable.

Armenia is no stranger to this view. For decades, it vigorously defended its claim to the Nagorno-Karabakh region, an ethnic Armenian enclave within the internationally-recognized territory of Azerbaijan. Even after the enclave, known as the Republic of Artsakh, fell to an Azerbaijani offensive in 2023, Armenian politicians railed against Azerbaijan and vowed to liberate the territory from Baku’s control in a future conflict.

But this attitude has its limits. After Armenia lost the war, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan recognized that for Armenia—a small state wedged between far larger powers—an unwinnable claim could also become the mechanism by which his nation’s sovereignty was lost, and sought to win long-term peace in the south Caucasus by giving up Armenia’s claim to Nagorno-Karabakh. The deeper meaning of Pashinyan’s reelection on June 7 is a vote of confidence from the Armenian people in this approach—and a reward for Pashinyan’s remarkable personal courage in pursuing it.

How Irredentism Traps Nations

Sovereignty is rarely lost when a small nation reaches for a larger foreign patron. More often, the process plays out in reverse: the patron detects a useful grievance held by a smaller power and approaches it, playing on its hatreds and promising it the arms, money, and protection that make an unwinnable fight feel winnable.The sponsor’s interest, however, is in the conflict itself, not its resolution. A frozen grievance is a dependable instrument of control. The client soon can no longer make peace without the patron’s permission; it cannot run an independent foreign policy; it cannot even picture a future not organized around the lost land. To further a claim it will never make good on, it must accept a dependency it cannot break.

Armenia was trapped inside such a claim for a generation. Its war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh began in the late 1980s, during the final days of the Soviet Union, and killed tens of thousands of Armenians and Azerbaijanis before its final resolution. To hold the territory against a larger, wealthier, and militarily stronger neighbor, Yerevan mortgaged itself to Moscow, which was only too happy to keep both Armenia and Azerbaijan tethered to Russian goodwill by keeping their quarrel alive. As a result, Armenia spent decades as a poor, corrupt, and strategically captive Russian client state. The very thing it was fighting to prove—that it was a sovereign nation—became a casualty of the fight.

For Armenians, this is an old pattern. Long before Moscow weaponized Karabakh, the Russian Empire and France each cultivated Armenian national aspirations as a lever against the Ottoman Empire—Russia casting itself as protector of Christianity in the Near East, France arming and encouraging the Armenians of Cilicia during and after World War I. In each case, the great power nurtured the hopes and aspirations of a stateless people, so long as those hopes served its own interests—then walked away when they did not, leaving the Armenians to face the terrible consequences alone.

How Nikol Pashinyan Changed Armenia’s Path

Pashinyan did not start out as a skeptic of Armenia’s relationship with Russia. When the 2018 Velvet Revolution carried him to power, he defended the claim to Karabakh as ardently as the men he replaced. What ultimately broke the spell was the 2020 war, which stripped away three-quarters of the Armenian-held territory in six weeks—and laid bare how little Russian patronage was worth when it counted.

In the years that followed, Pashinyan came to believe that the pursuit of Nagorno-Karabakh itself, not Armenia’s defeat, was the problem. As long as Yerevan defined itself by land it could not keep, it would remain the ward of whatever great power would help it pretend otherwise. Letting the claim go was not surrendering its sovereignty, but the first step toward its recovery. 

Pashinyan took that step at a staggering personal cost. He signed away the occupied districts, formally recognized Azerbaijani sovereignty over the region, and absorbed the rage that followed when Baku retook the enclave in 2023 and its Armenian residents fled. He was branded a traitor; the Russia-linked Apostolic Church and a Moscow-funded opposition mobilized to bring him down. Yet Armenians returned him to office anyway on June 7—not because the loss had stopped hurting, but because a majority had reached the conclusion that the alternative to peace was a future mortgaged permanently to another nation’s interests. 

Armenia Is Doing What Palestine Won’t

The Palestinian movement sits in the identical trap and keeps making the identical wrong choice. Its claim to all of historic Palestine is no more feasible than Armenia’s claim to Karabakh, and clinging to it has carried the same price: a people kept perpetually mobilized, perpetually dependent, and perpetually useful to sponsors, Iran foremost among them. Tehran professes to care for the suffering of the Palestinian people, yet it has done virtually nothing to alleviate that suffering; it has not helped to build a viable Palestinian state, improved the capacity of the Palestinian Authority to govern, or invested in development efforts in the West Bank and Gaza. Its strategic interest lies in the continuation of the struggle, rather than in any Palestinian state being built. Palestinian grievance is the asset, and Iran can be counted on to oppose any resolution of the grievance, even one that would benefit the Palestinian people.

The cost of that approach is on display right now. The American-brokered agreement that paused the Gaza war in late 2025 has stalled—not over borders or aid, but over Hamas’ refusal to disarm and give up on its farcical desire to wipe Israel off the map. A temporary ceasefire can be signed, but a true peace cannot be reached while one party’s identity still rests on the other’s destruction.

Armenia is doing the unglamorous and unpopular work that actually ends conflicts. Its constitution still reaches, through a preamble that invokes a 1989 act calling for the “reunification” of Armenia with Karabakh, toward a claim on territory the world recognizes as Azerbaijani, and Baku has made clear there can be no settled peace while a neighbor’s founding charter lays claim to its land.

Pashinyan is moving to remove that language. Armenia’s constitutional court has ruled that this cannot be accomplished by simple amendment, but only by adopting an entirely new constitution, approved in a national referendum. This is a politically perilous undertaking, and the vote, expected around 2027, is no sure thing. But it is the institutional form of the choice he made after 2020—the act that turns one leader’s decision into a country’s commitment, so the peace rests on the Armenian state rather than on a single exposed prime minister. The Palestinian leadership has spent thirty years dodging the equivalent step, and that dodge is why the conflict outlives every truce. 

None of this requires pretending that Armenia’s defeat is painless, or that it is fair. It is neither. What Armenia is demonstrating is narrower and far harder won: that for a small nation, sovereignty is not measured by the claims it refuses to abandon, but by its freedom to choose its own future. This freedom begins the moment it stops letting a lost cause be owned by someone else. Pashinyan understood that the only way to peace and sovereignty was to set down the one thing he had always been told he must never release. Swallowing defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh will be bitter for the Armenians. But Armenia will survive it, and it will emerge a better, stronger, and freer nation on the other end.

About the Author: Joseph Epstein

Joseph Epstein is the director of the Turan Research Center, a senior fellow at the Yorktown Institute, an expert at the N7 Foundation, and a research fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University. He also sits on the advisory board of the Alekain Foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to providing education to women and girls in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. He specializes in Eurasia and the Middle East, and his work has been featured in various outlets such as Newsweek, The Wall Street Journal, The Hill, the Atlantic Council, Novaya Gazeta, RFE/RL, Foreign Policy, and others.


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Armenia’s Election Deals Another Blow to Putin as EU Accession Talks Begin fo

June 25 2026

Earlier this month the pro-EU Prime Minister Nikol ⁠Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party won a landslide election victory in Armenia. The result was a significant setback for Vladimir Putin since Armenia, a formerly close Russian ally, has been reducing its economic and strategic reliance on Russia under Pashinyan’s stewardship, while looking towards Europe.

This has occurred in the context of increasing difficulties for Russia, including Ukraine’s increasingly effective mid and long-range strike ability and the loss of Russia’s most important ally in the EU with the election rout of Victor Orbán in Hungary.

To compound Russia’s woes, the EU has launched the formal opening of accession negotiations with both Ukraine and Moldova as a result of the new Hungarian government’s removal of a longstanding veto.

While Russia maintains strong structural advantages in the conflict over Ukraine, recent events suggest that it is struggling to impose its will on the battlefield in Ukraine while Europe as a whole is becoming more adept at containing evolving Russian hybrid threats.

Armenia’s Pro-EU Election Victory

Since coming to power in 2018 Pashinyan has slowly shifted the focus of his government and country from Russia to Europe. This process accelerated after a lack of Russian support contributed to the 2023 loss of Nagorno-Karabakh in a military conflict with Azerbaijan.

To counter this westward drift Russia undertook a significant disinformation campaign in the recent elections and imposed trade restrictions on a range of key exports, including Armenian brandy.

Russia backed the pro-Russia opposition candidates, but Civil Contract ended up with almost half the vote and well over half the seats, although it fell short of the two thirds majority required to change the Constitution.

Following pro-EU election wins in Moldova and Hungary the election demonstrated the limits of Russia’s electoral influence when faced with concerted efforts to counter disinformation.

Hungary’s Outsized Influence On Ukraine

Russia lost its most potent European ally when Victor Orbán was removed from power in April.

As a member of the EU, Hungary had been able to weaken support for Ukraine and limit sanctions on Russia by upsetting the unanimity required for key EU decisions.

The new pro-EU government of Péter Magyar worked quickly to remove Hungary’s veto of a 90 billion euro loan for Ukraine, which will help fund a significant portion of Ukraine’s military and financial requirements over the next two years.

The new government also removed its veto on Ukraine and Moldova joining the EU, allowing the EU to launch “the first cluster”, focused on rule of law and democracy, with those countries last week, the first step towards EU membership.

The new Hungarian parliament also voted to reverse the decision by the Orbán government to leave the International Criminal Court.

With the ICC having an outstanding arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin this was a poke in the eye for the Russian leader.

Battlefield Challenges For Russia In Ukraine

These political developments are occurring in the context of significant battlefield challenges for Russia in the conflict with Ukraine.

Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure has caused petrol shortages across the country, hindering Russia’s crude oil production and refinement.

This campaign resulted in multiple embarrassing attacks on a naval yard, oil terminal and other targets near St Petersburg as Putin attended his flagship St Petersburg Economic Forum earlier this month.

While Russia has continued significant oil and gas exports due to the sanctions waiver provided by the US during the war with Iran, the US allowed the waiver to expire on 17 June, the same day Trump signed a memorandum of understanding with Iran.

Russia’s offensive in Ukraine itself has lost momentum, with negligible gains across the frontline in Ukraine over the Spring offensive, despite enormous troop losses.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s mid-range drone strike capability has become a major problem for Russia in occupied Ukraine, with the campaign targeting Russian military convoys and fuel trucks supplying troops on the frontline or traveling to or from Crimea.

In addition to the long-range strike campaign on Russia’s oil infrastructure this localised campaign is resulting in severe petrol shortages for civilians and military alike in occupied Ukraine.

The Road Ahead

Despite these positive developments for Ukraine and Europe more broadly there are many potential impediments that could stymie progress.

In Europe, populist far right parties are seeing record support and could join or lead governments in various European counties in the near future. In France, in particular, they may win the presidential election in April next year, resulting in a warming of relations with Russia and cooling support for Ukraine.

In Bulgaria, a new government has pledged to end military support for Ukraine and seek better relations with Moscow, including importing more Russian oil and gas.

While significant extra EU assistance for Ukraine has emerged as a result of the fall of the Orbán government, there is no guarantee that these propitious circumstances will last.

Europe should reinforce all areas of support for Ukraine while it has the opportunity if it wants the European project focused on peace and democracy to endure.


Dr Adam Simpson is a Senior Lecturer in International Studies within the School of Society and Culture at Adelaide University. He researches authoritarianism, democratisation and civil conflict.

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.


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Yerevan Metro Pushes Ahead With Expansion and Upgrades

The Traveler

June 25 2026

Yerevan’s Soviet-era metro is seeing renewed investment, with new stations, digital ticketing and modernization plans reshaping how residents move around the Armenian capital.











Oliver BrandtJun 25, 2026
Yerevan’s compact but strategically important metro network is entering a new phase of expansion and technological upgrade, as city plans for new stations and a unified ticketing system begin to take clearer shape.

Historic Backbone of Yerevan’s Transit Network

The Karen Demirchyan Yerevan Metro has served as a core element of the Armenian capital’s public transport since its launch in 1981. Today it operates a single main line with a short shuttle branch, linking key residential districts with the city center and the main railway hub. Publicly available information indicates that the system covers roughly 13 kilometers and includes 10 stations, a modest scale by international standards but one that plays an outsized role in daily commuting.

Passenger data summarized in recent transport overviews show that metro ridership remains strong, with tens of millions of journeys recorded annually. The system’s reliability and separation from road traffic continue to make it a preferred option at peak hours, especially as congestion and air quality remain major concerns in Yerevan’s growing urban area.

The metro also retains symbolic importance. Built in the late Soviet period, it has long been regarded locally as a marker of big-city status. Current debates about extending the line and upgrading rolling stock are therefore not only about efficiency, but also about what kind of city Yerevan intends to be in the coming decades.

Ajapnyak Station: Flagship Project Under Scrutiny

The most prominent development around the Yerevan Metro is the planned Ajapnyak station, frequently described in municipal communications and local media coverage as the next major step in the network’s growth. The project, conceived more than three decades ago, gained momentum in recent years as design contracts were awarded and technical documentation advanced through multiple stages of review.

Reports from late 2025 indicated that the Ajapnyak project had passed all required expert assessments and was considered ready for implementation. Budget documents and subsequent explanations from the municipality show that significant sums were allocated to design and preparatory work, with a portion directed to specialized engineering firms responsible for detailed construction plans.

Despite this, the construction timetable has repeatedly shifted. Earlier expectations that building would begin in 2024 gave way to projections of work starting around the end of 2025 or the beginning of 2026. More recent coverage from spring 2026 portrays Ajapnyak as a stated top priority for the city leadership, with instructions for frequent progress reporting, but without a publicly announced groundbreaking date.

The evolving timeline has prompted public debate about cost, feasibility and overall strategy. Commentators in Armenian outlets and civic discussions often compare the projected cost of Ajapnyak to light rail and tram projects elsewhere in the region, questioning whether a single new underground station can deliver sufficient benefits relative to its price. Others argue that the station is necessary to improve access for densely populated western districts that currently rely on congested surface routes.

Surmalu and a Gradual Move Toward a Larger Network

Ajapnyak is not the only expansion under consideration. Municipal reports and coverage by local news agencies describe design work for another station, Surmalu, to be built between the existing General Andranik and Sasuntsi Davit stations. The proposed ground-level facility would improve access to busy shopping areas and a major park, potentially relieving pressure on nearby road corridors.

Discussions at Yerevan’s city hall in 2024 and 2025 framed Surmalu as the potential twelfth station in the network, following Ajapnyak as the eleventh. Planning documents referenced in international urban development assessments for Armenia also speak more broadly about two new metro stations as part of a longer-term transport and land-use strategy for the capital.

Urban planning analyses note that better integration between the metro, buses and trolleybuses is central to this strategy. Future extensions toward districts such as Davtashen have been discussed in concept, although no firm timelines have been publicized. For now, Ajapnyak and Surmalu function as test cases that will likely shape political and financial appetite for deeper metro expansion in Yerevan.

Regional cooperation programs and multilateral development reports describe the metro as one component of a wider push to reduce emissions from transport, which is identified as a dominant contributor to urban air pollution. An expanded metro, if paired with carefully planned feeder services on the surface, is presented as one way to shift more trips away from private cars.

Modernization, Safety and Unified Ticketing

Alongside physical expansion, the metro is undergoing a measured program of modernization. Updates from the Yerevan municipality in 2024 and 2025 highlighted efforts to replace or refurbish escalators, improve station lighting, and upgrade ventilation and safety systems. Officials have also emphasized making platforms and concourses more accessible and user friendly, including clearer signage in Armenian, English and Russian.

A central reform is the introduction of a unified ticketing system across the city’s public transport. Coverage by regional business media and Armenian news outlets describes how validators and electronic equipment have been installed on buses, trolleybuses and within the metro network in preparation for full rollout. The scheme aims to allow passengers to use a single payment medium across all modes, replacing the long-standing token system in the metro.

Municipal statements and independent reporting indicate that the unified payment system was initially targeted for launch in 2024, then shifted toward a 2025 start. By late 2025 and early 2026, public communications suggested that the core components were in place, with the metro expected to phase out tokens once the system was fully operational and tested across the network.

Policy documents circulated in connection with Armenia’s climate commitments also refer to large-scale modernization of Yerevan’s urban transport, including the metro. These plans envision closer integration between schedules, priority measures for high-capacity vehicles and digital tools that provide real-time information, all of which are seen as prerequisites for a more attractive public transport offering.

Balancing Ambition, Cost and Daily Service

The Yerevan Metro developments are unfolding at a time when the city is also investing heavily in surface transport. Dozens of new buses and trolleybuses have been ordered or already deployed, replacing older privately operated vehicles whose condition and emissions were frequent sources of complaint. Urban transport reform studies portray this fleet renewal as critical to improving reliability and reducing pollution.

Within this context, some local observers question whether the capital should prioritize relatively expensive underground construction or focus more on buses, trolleybuses and potential future tram lines. Discussions in Armenian media and public forums often contrast Yerevan’s metro plans with lower-cost rail projects in neighboring cities, highlighting the trade-offs between depth of coverage and financial sustainability.

At the same time, there is broad recognition that the existing metro line already provides fast, congestion-free travel for many residents and could handle greater volumes if extended and better connected to restructured bus routes. Urban transport experts contributing to recent international assessments argue that aligning bus corridors and interchange points with current and future metro stations could significantly increase system-wide capacity without waiting for every planned station to be built.

For now, travelers in Yerevan continue to rely on a familiar set of stations that have changed little in map form for decades, even as ticketing machines, rolling stock maintenance and surrounding bus networks slowly evolve. Whether the coming years see Ajapnyak and Surmalu move from planning documents to operational stops will likely determine how central the metro becomes in the next chapter of the city’s transport story.

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Armenpress: Russia and Ukraine exchange prisoners of war in 160-for-160 swap

Russia18:37, 26 June 2026
Read the article in: ArmenianRussian:

Russia’s Defence Ministry said 160 Russian servicemen were returned from Ukrainian captivity on June 26, Interfax reported.

“In exchange, 160 prisoners of war from the Armed Forces of Ukraine were handed over. The returned Russian servicemen are currently on the territory of the Republic of Belarus,” the ministry said.

The ministry added that, after receiving the necessary psychological and medical assistance, the Russian servicemen will be transferred to the Russian Federation for further treatment and rehabilitation at medical facilities operated by the Defence Ministry.

According to the ministry, the United Arab Emirates provided humanitarian mediation efforts to facilitate the return of the Russian servicemen from captivity.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed the prisoner exchange. In a post on social media, he said all 160 individuals had been held in captivity since 2022.

Read the article in: ArmenianRussian:

Published by Armenpress, original at 
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