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A vast ancient water management system has been uncovered near the ancient city of Argishtikhinili in Armenia, shedding new light on the engineering capabilities of the Urartian Kingdom more than 2,700 years ago.
Archaeologists from Poland and Armenia have identified traces of an extensive network of canals, riverbeds and irrigation infrastructure in the fertile Ararat Basin, revealing what they describe as one of the region’s most ambitious ancient development projects.
The discovery was made by researchers from the University of Warsaw and the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia with satellite imagery, historical aerial photos and advanced remote sensing techniques. The report was published in the Journal Antiquity.
The study covered the area around Argishtikhinili, a major Urartian centre, established during the reign of Argishti I in the 8th century BC.
Researchers have identified over 1,000 kilometres of water-related features throughout the landscape. These include about 135 kilometres of ancient canals, nearly 420 kilometres of former riverbeds and streams, around 429 kilometres of modern irrigation channels, and 36 kilometres of ancient canals.
The findings suggest that the Urartians transformed what had once been dry and underutilised land into a productive agricultural heartland capable of supporting a growing population and strengthening the kingdom’s economy.
Ancient inscriptions discovered in the region indicate that five major canals supplied water to Argishtikhinili and its surrounding agricultural lands, including fields, orchards and vineyards. One inscription records that the area had remained uncultivated before the construction of the irrigation system, highlighting the importance of water management to the kingdom’s prosperity.
The scale of the newly documented network points to a highly organised and technically sophisticated undertaking.
“This skill was brought by the Urartians, who understood perfectly well that the lands around the recently founded city of Argishtikhinili were potentially very fertile,” said Krzysztof Jakubiak. “Unfortunately, the lack of access to water prevented their intensive use. The royal administration had the appropriate means to change this situation, and thus a network of canals appeared in the valley landscape, thanks to which these areas became the granary of the entire kingdom.”
According to the researchers, constructing such an extensive irrigation system would have required advanced engineering knowledge. Canal builders needed to calculate gradients precisely to ensure water could flow over long distances without pumps while also controlling erosion and maintaining the channels.
The research also suggests the existence of a specialised administrative system responsible for overseeing water distribution and infrastructure maintenance. Such a large-scale enterprise would have required substantial labour resources and effective management.
To reveal the old network, scientists combined modern satellite data with imagery captured by American CORONA and GAMBIT reconnaissance satellites during the Cold War. These photos from the 1960s and 1970s show the country before heavy farming and modern irrigation had changed the landscape.
The researchers found that traces of ancient canals can still be detected through subtle variations in soil moisture, vegetation growth and ground elevation. Digital terrain models which could identify changes of a few centimetres were particularly useful for locating buried channels and embankments.
Even in light of this discovery, questions still surround the age of many of the structures. Some of the canals are thought to date back to the Urartian period, but some of them are thought to have been built centuries later after the kingdom was dismantled around 590 BC.
“Dating irrigation canals is extremely difficult because they were constantly silting up during use,” Jakubiak said. “To determine when they were first created, it is necessary to drill into the canal beds and recover sediments containing organic material that can be radiocarbon dated.”
Further fieldwork and analysis will be needed to establish a detailed chronology of the irrigation system and the settlements it supported. However, the discovery already provides compelling evidence of the scale and sophistication of ancient water management in the Ararat Basin and highlights the crucial role irrigation played in the rise of one of the ancient Near East’s most powerful kingdoms.
Header Image Credit : Krzysztof Jakubiak
Sources : PAP –
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Washington Can Change the South Caucasus
Armenia’s prime minister won re-election on June 7 in spite of the clergy, Moscow, and history. He proved that with proper leadership, hard work, and the courage to look forward rather than back, leaders can take their people along even the hardest roads.
Pashinyan showed that even a small, landlocked nation in a difficult neighborhood can refuse to act as a pawn in someone else’s game, and start building its own place in the world through open borders, better transport and data connections, and integration into global trade corridors.
By working toward a settlement with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and opening the door to normalization with Turkey, Pashinyan has created a chance that this fractured corner of the world could function as a cooperative region, rather than a collection of frozen conflicts and closed borders.
Armenia is not the only small country in the neighborhood where there was reason for hope. For years, Georgia championed a better neighborhood and became a beacon for post-Soviet transformation, consistent and deliberate in its European, democratic choice, even under the most relentless pressure from Moscow.
Georgia was never confused about where it belonged, and it built the infrastructure to go with its choice. These included the BTC and TANAP energy pipelines, the BTK railway running from Azerbaijan to Turkey, road and energy connections, and trade corridors. None was an accident of geography. They were the product of deliberate political choices, of trust built over years, of enormous Western investment in Georgia.
These foundations have now been undermined by the Georgian Dream government, which won power in 2012 and has eroded many of the democratic and diplomatic gains of the previous years in order to hold onto it.
The US push for a settlement with Azerbaijan (and the associated TRIPP road corridor), however promising in the wake of Armenia’s vote, faces a structural problem precisely because Georgia is now nearly absent from the picture. That is a gap no serious strategy can afford to ignore, and a region defined by its interconnections cannot be stabilized by a deal that accounts for only part of it.
The question is whether Washington recognizes that the South Caucasus is a puzzle and that Georgia is a key piece. If it does, Washington could exercise considerable leverage in Tbilisi, certainly more than anyone else. Applied with consistency and purpose, that could bring Georgia back to a path it never should have left.
Georgia did not lose its potential; it lost its way politically. Washington helped build Georgia’s path to democracy and cooperation, and can help rebuild it now.
Some will argue there are ways to bypass Georgia (Armenia also borders both Turkey and Azerbaijan, for example). But these come at far greater cost, in time, in money, and in political capital. The more rational course is to treat Georgia as a central player on which a functional regional architecture depends.
The Georgian Dream government is acutely aware of this calculus and is playing its own hand accordingly. It has been deepening engagement with China through high-level meetings, declarations on deep and comprehensive strategic cooperation, and a deliberate presentation of alternatives. By publicly elevating its partnership with Beijing, Tbilisi also appears intent on signaling to Washington that it has other strategic options, using its ties with China as leverage to challenge US influence and demonstrate that American disengagement will not leave Georgia without powerful partners.
But Tbilisi knows the path back to stability runs through Washington, and the conditions for that are well understood: democratic governance, the primacy of the rule of law, and a return to the Euro-Atlantic path that Georgian Dream has been turning away from.
Washington understands this, too, and it is the only player with the tools to act. The European Union (EU) has influence but has already been rebuffed on accession and lacks the hard tools to compel action. Meanwhile, Russia’s interest is in Georgian instability, not in making Georgia a stable and sovereign state.
Iran has its own regional calculations, but no credible offer to make to a country whose society is genuinely European. China can offer investment and political flattery, but not the security or the future that Georgians voted for.
It is Washington, through bilateral security relationships, financial institutions, and the backing of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic orientation, that holds the cards.
Targeted pressure on individuals responsible for democratic backsliding, conditionality to security cooperation, and direct diplomatic engagement are instruments that have been used effectively elsewhere. What has been missing is the sustained will to deploy them in Georgia.
Washington wants a South Caucasus deal that works, not one that looks good on paper but falls apart when it comes into contact with reality. Pressing for democratic stability in Georgia is not a detour; it is the most direct path.
The South Caucasus has seen peace initiatives before. They have come with summits and frameworks and cautious optimism, and they have unraveled. The region has lived through cycles of ceasefire and conflict, of Western engagement followed by fatigue and retreat, of progress that looked durable until it was not.
But this moment is different. For the first time, there is a leader in the region who has staked everything on a genuine transformation and won a democratic mandate for it. Notably, this came with significant support from the US, despite Russia’s aid for the opposition.
Acting in Tbilisi and winning in the South Caucasus are not choices between two separate objectives; they are the same thing.
Tinatin Khidasheli heads Civic-IDEA, a think-tank fighting the Soviet legacy in Georgia, confronting Russian propaganda, and advocating for a sound defense and security policy. Tinatin is the author of the first Georgian-language book on Hybrid Warfare and teaches Hybrid Warfare and Defense Policy in Georgia. Mrs. Khidasheli served as Georgia’s first female Minister of Defense. She is a lawyer by education, holds an LLM in International Law from Tbilisi State University, and an MA in Political Science from the Central European University in Hungary. Mrs. Khidasheli is a Visiting Researcher at the Graduate School of Law, Hitotsubashi University.
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Armenia’s New Pro-Russian Opposition Leader
While Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan won almost 50% of the vote on June 7, and his Civil Contract party secured another parliamentary majority, a political movement built around Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, won 23% and became the largest opposition force in the country.
And that outcome may prove much more consequential than the raw numbers suggest.
That’s because it’s a familiar pattern in the South Caucasus. Wealthy businessmen with deep ties to Russia periodically reinvent themselves as political leaders during moments of crisis and transition.
Bidzina Ivanishvili in Georgia, and Ruben Vardanyan in Nagorno-Karabakh, are among the most prominent examples. Karapetyan is just the latest to follow that path.
Karapetyan made his money after moving to Russia in the late 1990s. After taking over a logistics and supply company that counted Gazprom among its main clients, he built Tashir Group into one of Russia’s largest conglomerates, with interests spanning commercial real estate, construction, energy and retail.
Karapetyan entered politics a year before the election. Within six months, he had launched Strong Armenia, which went on to become the country’s largest opposition force. The speed of both his rise and Strong Armenia’s emergence is striking. So are the circumstances.
He spent much of the campaign in detention or under house arrest on charges of calling for the overthrow of the government. He rarely appeared in public, yet his image was everywhere — on billboards, on social media, and across Armenia’s political debate. Campaign rallies were led by his nephew Narek Karapetyan.
Strong Armenia’s showing does not threaten Pashinyan’s hold on power, but it has changed the dynamics.
Karapetyan is more than just a businessman entering politics, he is now a central figure in the political debate. And his rise is not just about personal popularity, it reflects deeper disagreements about the country’s future direction.
Pashinyan won re-election with a message of peace, stability, and economic development, and was able to show new roads, schools, kindergartens, and infrastructure projects as visible symbols of that promise.
Yet not all Armenians were convinced. And the shadow of Armenia’s military defeat to its neighbor Azerbaijan after a long and bloody war hangs over the country.
Many remain skeptical about the current peace process, while others are uneasy about the government’s foreign policy course and its push for closer ties with Europe. For some, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 and the expulsion of 100,000 Armenians is an open wound, while others are more concerned that Armenia is giving up too much in exchange for promises of stability.
Karapetyan did not create those doubts, but he gave them a political vehicle.
That’s significant because, in the past, political forces advocating closer ties with Russia have struggled to refresh their image. Their leaders remained the same, their messages largely unchanged. Karapetyan offered a new face.
And that is where Moscow enters the story.
Investigations and reports have described Russian efforts to cultivate political alternatives to Pashinyan, and Karapetyan’s emergence fits neatly into that pattern.
He combines substantial financial resources, public visibility, ties to influential conservative and religious circles, and decades of experience operating in Russia’s political and economic system. His support for the Armenian Apostolic Church during its confrontation with Pashinyan strengthened those ties at a moment when the Church remained one of the country’s most trusted institutions.
And that combination matters because it means Karapetyan does not need to look like a traditional party leader to be politically useful. His value lies in the network around him: money, business interests, institutional allies, and a public profile large enough to unite voters who are uneasy with the country’s course but tired of the old opposition.
For Moscow, that makes him valuable even without an election victory. Influence does not always require winning power, sometimes it‘s about building a durable and effective political instrument.
Whether one views Karapetyan as a Kremlin project, or simply a politician whose interests happen to align with Moscow, is less important than the political reality facing Armenia. Nearly a quarter of voters backed Karapetyan, with his close ties to Russia and a more skeptical view of Armenia’s current European trajectory.
That should not necessarily be read as Armenians turning back to Moscow, or abandoning Brussels, because Armenian politics rarely fits such clean categories.
Even Pashinyan, with his fresh mandate, is not looking for a rupture with Russia, and many voters who question his course are not simply pro-Kremlin.
Moscow does, however, now have a stronger channel through which to influence Armenian politics, and Karapetyan has emerged as someone around whom the Kremlin can build its next strategy.
For Pashinyan, that creates a distinct challenge.
No government wants a powerful opposition movement closely associated with a foreign power, and the temptation to weaken it through investigations, court, or administrative pressure is obvious. Pashinyan himself signaled as much after the election, describing the opposition as a “three-headed party of war” and saying its leaders should face criminal liability and that the “criminal-oligarchic system” must be eradicated from Armenia.
How he responds may prove to be just as important as the election result itself.
Agnieszka Filipiak is a Polish journalist and senior editor specializing in the South Caucasus, Russian influence, and democratic resilience. She is Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Forbes Women Polska, author of several publications on the region, including the College of Eastern Europe’s report ‘At the Crossroads of Asia and Europe: Poland’s Foreign Policy towards the South Caucasus,’ and creator of the Filipiak Insights newsletter.
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Modi Pledges Closer India-Armenia Defense Cooperation
By PanARMENIAN
India and Armenia agreed to deepen bilateral cooperation, including in the defence sector, during a phone conversation on June 24.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said on X that he and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan discussed expanding cooperation across a range of areas, including defense.
Modi also said he congratulated Pashinyan on the parliamentary election results.
“We reaffirmed our shared commitment to further strengthen our warm and multifaceted partnership in key areas, including trade, defence, technology and people-to-people ties. We look forward to working closely together to elevate India-Armenia relations to a new level,” Modi wrote.
Earlier, the Armenian government’s press service said Pashinyan and Modi discussed further steps to deepen bilateral ties across several areas of the Armenia-India agenda.
“The leaders stressed the importance of intensifying political dialogue, as well as expanding cooperation in the economy, high technology, education, culture, and other areas of mutual interest,” the statement said.
Armenia and India have signed defense procurement agreements worth about $1.5 billion, under which Armenia has received Indian-made artillery systems and air defence systems.
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Opinion: ‘ECHR ruling is indisputable historical fact’
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Albania and Armenia advance as Kosovo, Malta stay perfect
June 25 2026
Albania and Armenia advance as Kosovo, Malta stay perfect
The Group Phase concluded after three days of action in Kosovo with the last four set.
PEJA (Kosovo) – Hosts Kosovo and 2024 runners-up Malta remained unbeaten through the Group Phase, while Albania and Armenia secured the remaining Semi-Finals spots at the FIBA Women’s European Championship for Small Countries 2026.
Malta finished top of Group A after opening the tournament with a 67-59 victory over Albania before recording a dominant 97-53 win against Georgia to maintain their perfect record heading into the Semi-Finals.
Amber Constance Melgoza had two huge performances for Malta with 38 points and 20 rebounds in their opening win, before following it with 35 points to help her side to 2-0.
Meanwhile, Kosovo also completed an unbeaten Group Phase campaign in front of the home crowd in Peja with victories over Armenia, 72-44, and an 85-39 success over Andorra to finish first in Group B.
Albania joined Malta in the Semi-Finals following a 98-78 victory against Georgia in the decisive Group A clash. Although Georgia remained competitive through much of the contest, Albania gradually pulled away in the fourth quarter with several key baskets from beyond the arc.
Ornela Lalaj starred with a triple-double of 16 points, 15 rebounds and 10 assists as Albania secured second place in the group.
Armenia earned the last remaining Semi-Finals spot after defeating Andorra 63-54 in a tightly contested Group B showdown. The game remained close throughout with both sides trading momentum before Armenia eventually pulled away late in the fourth quarter.
Lia Krumian led the victors with 25 points, 7 rebounds, 3 assists and 3 steals in the crucial victory as Armenia secured second place in Group B.
Georgia and Andorra will now move into the Classification Games after narrowly missing out on the Semi-Finals.
Semi-Finals: Malta vs Armenia Kosovo vs Albania
FIBA
https://www.fiba.basketball/en/news/albania-and-armenia-advance-as-kosovo-malta-stay-perfect-2026-scw
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EU’s von der Leyen to go to Armenia and Azerbaijan next week
June 26, 20261:26 PM GMT+3Updated
Reporting by Sudip Kar-Gupta; Editing by Alison Williams
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Israel on path to recognize Armenian genocide
Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar will bring a historic and particularly sensitive resolution to the government for official recognition of the Armenian genocide, including an explicit condemnation of Turkish efforts to deny and obscure it.
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The Armenian elections, the Caucasus, and great power competition
June 25 2026
The Armenian elections, the Caucasus, and great power competition
Published on 25.06.2026 13:42
By Barış Doster
As anticipated, the general elections held in Armenia on June 7 resulted in a victory for the Civil Contract Party, led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, which secured approximately half of the vote. Equally expectedly, despite this victory, the party fell short of a constitutional (two-thirds) majority. This political landscape is poised to yield significant ramifications, not only for Armenia’s domestic politics but also for regional dynamics and the overarching great power competition in the Caucasus.
Why so?
Let us examine the reasons point by point:
First, despite suffering a crushing military, political, and diplomatic defeat over Karabakh—a conflict widely recognized as Azerbaijan’s just and legitimate cause—Pashinyan retained robust public support. In the wake of this defeat, his vision of a “real Armenia” rather than an “imaginary” one, combined with his intention to swiftly normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, and his promises of economic revitalization and prosperity, clearly resonated with the electorate.
Second, upon assuming office, Pashinyan underestimated Russia’s geopolitical weight in the region, placing excessive trust in the West, specifically US and European imperialism. Observing this, Russian President Vladimir Putin chose not to chastise Pashinyan directly; instead, by refusing to restrain Azerbaijan or prevent Baku from delivering a decisive blow to Yerevan, he forced Pashinyan to confront geopolitical realities.
Third, Russia maintains a formidable presence within Armenia’s domestic politics, economy, and security apparatus, compounded by the vast Armenian diaspora residing in Russia. It is impossible for Pashinyan to dismantle this entrenched reality overnight. For a country of roughly three million people, spanning a mere 30,000 square kilometers, and burdened with a fragile economy, the structural dependency is stark: Armenia sends 90 percent of its exports to Russia, relies entirely on Russian natural gas (secured at a fraction of the price paid by European nations), and has an estimated two million citizens living in Russia. Consequently, Pashinyan cannot afford to escalate tensions with Moscow, even if he were inclined to do so. This explains why, prior to the elections, he announced that his first state visit upon victory would be to Moscow, with Brussels to follow. Despite receiving significant backing from the United States and Europe, his designation of Moscow—which actively supported his domestic opposition—as his premier foreign destination demonstrates that he has, to some extent, internalized the lessons of his early leadership failures since 2018.
Fourth, while Armenia remains eager to cultivate the closest possible relations with NATO and harbors aspirations for European Union membership, Russia has countered this ambition by making it clear that Armenia cannot simultaneously belong to both the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the EU, forcing a choice between the two. Given Armenia’s geographic isolation, trade structures, energy dependence, and Russia’s pervasive influence over Yerevan, the country is in no position to easily abandon the Eurasian Economic Union.
Fifth, Pashinyan believes that a rapid normalization of relations with Türkiye and Azerbaijan will dismantle the Armenian diaspora’s leverage over Armenia’s domestic and, in particular, foreign policy. In doing so, he hopes to place Yerevan’s relations with Western nations on a healthier, more pragmatic footing.
Sixth, Armenia’s relations with Georgia are also fraught, overshadowed by historical mistrust and remaining tepid at best. Consequently, while Armenia struggles with varying degrees of tension and complex issues with Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Georgia, it possesses only one neighbor with whom it shares amicable ties: Iran, with which it shares a brief 44-kilometer border. Yet, preoccupied with its own severe domestic and international crises, Tehran is currently unable to offer much meaningful attention or support to Yerevan, despite years of historical alignment.
Ultimately, this new era in Armenian politics carries profound implications, not merely for the nation itself, but for the wider region and the grand strategy of the major powers—specifically the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and Russia in the Caucasus.
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Iran, Armenia determined to open new trade, transit routes
Iran, Armenia determined to open new trade, transit routes
TEHRAN- A specialized meeting between the Head of Iran’s Road Maintenance and Transportation Organization and the Deputy Minister of Economy of the Republic of Armenia was held at the Ministry of Economy in Yerevan, focusing on facilitating trade and transit and reducing international transportation barriers between the two countries.
According to IRNA from the Road Maintenance and Transportation Organization, during this meeting, the Head of the organization, referring to Iran’s strategic position in the North-South and East-West international corridors, emphasized the need for the full activation of transit and logistics capacities on both sides.
Reza Akbari stated: The Islamic Republic of Iran, as one of the region’s main transit routes, has always welcomed the development of transportation cooperation with its neighbors, and Armenia, due to its special geographical location and cultural and historical ties, is considered a key partner on these routes.
The Deputy Minister of Economy of Armenia, while appreciating the active presence of the Iranian delegation and the accompaniment of the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran and diplomatic representatives, announced that his country is determined to remove road transportation barriers and reduce transit costs.
Emphasizing that Armenia is seeking mechanisms to make the movement of transport fleets between the two countries smoother and more economical, he added: Adjusting border tolls and coordinating customs procedures are among our main priorities.
The Deputy Minister of Economy of Armenia added: The presence of senior customs and transit officials from both sides in this meeting demonstrates a serious determination to implement the agreements.
In this meeting, five main axes were discussed and exchanged with an operational approach and the active participation of the Iranian and Armenian delegation members.
The two sides agreed on reducing border tolls, deciding to form a joint working group under the direct supervision of customs managers to review the cost structure of crossing shared borders and plan for their gradual reduction.
The expansion of truck and cargo fleet traffic was also placed on the agenda, and it was decided that, in addition to increasing the traffic quota, smart systems for reserving crossing times and controlling traffic at the borders should be launched to prevent the formation of long queues.
Activating transit and logistics capacities was another important axis of this meeting, based on which both sides emphasized the full utilization of logistics terminals on both sides of the border and the creation of joint centers with private sector cooperation.
Also, the development of border crossing infrastructure and access routes, including improving roads leading to common border crossings and examining the construction of a new bridge at the zero border point, was prioritized in the joint commission.
Reducing international transportation barriers was also raised as another axis, and in this regard, eliminating unnecessary bureaucratic formalities, standardizing transit permit documents, and coordinating the implementation of international transport conventions were welcomed by both sides.
The Director General of the Organizational Commercialization Office of the Road Maintenance Organization emphasized the need to facilitate trade procedures and coordinate with relevant bodies.
The Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Armenia, while welcoming the positive atmosphere of the negotiations, emphasized full support for implementing these agreements within the framework of economic diplomacy.
At the end of this meeting, both sides emphasized their determination to become regional transit hubs and make maximum use of the communication corridors between Asia and Europe, and it was decided that the next meeting would be held as soon as possible to finalize the executive details of the agreements.
EF/MA
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