10:17,
YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 21, ARMENPRESS. The National Cinema Center of Armenia and the French Center of Cinema and Animation have signed a cooperation agreement during the European Film Market in Berlin.
The Armenia-France Action Plan in cinema includes cooperation in film heritage, training, vocational education, joint production and partnership festivals.
The Armenian National Cinema Center is represented in the European Film Market at the 74th Berlin International Film Festival.
11:12,
YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 21, ARMENPRESS. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his wife Anna Hakobyan have left for France on a two-day visit.
Government officials and Members of Parliament are included in the delegation, the Prime Minister's Office said.
The Armenian Prime Minister will have a meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron on February 21. Later on the same day, Prime Minister Pashinyan, together with his wife Anna Hakobyan, alongside French President Emmanuel Macron and his wife Brigitte Macron, will attend the pantheonization ceremony of WWII hero, Resistance fighter Missak Manouchian and his wife Mélinée.
Pashinyan will also have meetings with Prime Minister Gabriel Attal, President of the Senate Gérard Larcher and Paris Mayor Anne Hidalgo.
Missak Manouchian, an Armenian poet and fighter in World War II, will enter the French Pantheon mausoleum and join an elite group of France's revered historical figures, French President Emmanuel Macron announced in 2023.
Known as being "pantheonized," the rare tribute is reserved for those who have played an important role in the country's history.
He led a small group of foreign Resistance fighters against the Nazi occupation, carrying out attacks on German forces and acts of sabotage in Nazi-occupied France in 1943. Macron said in 2023 that Manouchian "embodies the universal values" of France and "carries a part of our greatness."
In 1944, the group, which included a number of Jews, was put out of action when 23 of its members were rounded up and sentenced to death by a German military court. Manouchian was shot by the Nazis on February 21, 1944. By entering the Pantheon, Manouchian will become the first foreign Resistance fighter to be awarded the honour. Manouchian will enter the Pantheon alongside his wife Mélinée, who survived him by 45 years and is buried alongside him at the Ivry-sur-Seine cemetery.
Macron paid tribute to Manouchian's "bravery" and "quiet heroism" in a statement back in 2023, as well as to other foreign Resistance fighters.
Manouchian arrived in France in 1925 after surviving the Armenian Genocide.
12:51,
YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 21, ARMENPRESS. Azeri national Kamil Zeynalli, who has been arrested by Russian police in Moscow, is wanted by Armenia, police confirmed to Armenpress.
Zeynalli is on Armenia’s interstate wanted list, Ministry of Internal Affairs spokesperson Narek Sargsyan told Armenpress. He did not elaborate. “The mentioned individual is on the interstate wanted list on a murder charge,” he said.
Zeynalli, who is apparently a former Azeri serviceman, claimed on social media that Russian police told him that he has been arrested pursuant to an international arrest warrant issued by Armenia. The Azeri national is scheduled to make a court appearance in Moscow on February 21, according to the reports. Zeynalli claims that he could be extradited to Armenia.
He was placed under arrest at the Domodedovo airport and then booked at a police station.
The general prosecution of Armenia, however, told Armenpress that they don’t have any official information about Zeynalli’s arrest in Moscow.
According to unconfirmed media reports, Kamil Zeynalli is suspected of war crimes committed during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war when he fought from the Azeri side against Armenian forces, particularly of killing and beheading an elderly civilian hostage. According to the media reports Zeynalli is a recipient of Azeri medals for his military service. According to the reports, the man is now a 'blogger' and a ‘fitness trainer’.
In 2023, Kazakhstan purchased 35.1 thousand tons of milk and dairy products from Belarus, amounting to a total of $98.7 million, reflecting a 9.2% reduction in supplies.
It was previously reported that milk production volumes in 2023 increased by 3% in all EAEU countries except Armenia.
By PanARMENIAN
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that he and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev have agreed that the sides will remain faithful to agreements they have reached.
Pashinyan made the remarks at a meeting with representatives of the Armenian community in Munich and neighboring regions.
During the meeting, the Prime Minister weighed in on the results of the meetings and discussions held within the framework of the Munich Security Conference, as well as the meeting with the President of Azerbaijan with the participation of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.
Pashinyan answered a number of questions, which were related to the challenges facing Armenia, the steps to overcome them and other topics.
Pashinyan’s three-day working visit to Munich has ended.
https://www.eurasiareview.com/20022024-pashinyan-says-armenia-azerbaijan-agree-to-remain-faithful-to-agreements/
This article was first published on OC Media. An edited version is republished here under a content partnership agreement.
Hundreds of protesters gathered in Armenia and Georgia following the news that Alexey Navalny, 47, well-known Russian opposition figure and Putin’s long term critic died in prison under suspicious circumstances on February 16, 2024.
In December 2020, Navalany was poisoned with what was later confirmed by German doctors to be a military-grade nerve agent from the Novichok family of chemical weapons. The opposition politician survived the poisoning and, after receiving treatment in Germany, decided to return to Russia, despite knowing he would be arrested if not on the spot, then at a later time. On January 17, 2021, Navalny was arrested after landing at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo airport. At the time of his death, he was serving a 19-year prison sentence in a maximum-security prison north of the Arctic Circle, nicknamed the “Polar Wolf” prison and notorious for its ill-reputation over the treatment of prisoners serving time there.
As such, when the Russian Penitentiary Service announced Navalny’s death, claiming the opposition politician died of thromboembolism or a dislodged blood cot, questions over the actual cause of death and Kremlin’s involvement in it spread quickly.
That his family and team have not been able to retrieve the body of Navalny puts authorities under the spotlight over suspicions that they are trying to cover up the real reason behind his death. According to Kira Yarmysh, Navalny’s spokesperson:
In a separate interview with TV Rain, Yarmush said: “There’s no doubt that this murder was planned. We don’t currently have any information except for the colony’s official confirmation of his death.”
When Navalny’s mother showed up at the morgue on February 19, she and the team of lawyers accompanying her were prevented from seeing Navalny’s body:
Alexey’s mother and his lawyers arrived at the morgue early in the morning. They were not allowed to go in. One of the lawyers was literally pushed out. When the staff was asked if Alexey’s body was there, they did not answer
— Kira Yarmysh (@Kira_Yarmysh)
On February 20, Yarmush wrote, “The investigators told the lawyers and Alexey’s mother that they would not give them the body. The body will be under some sort of ‘chemical examination’ for another 14 days.”
Meanwhile, scores of Russians continue to express their grief at home, even at the cost of being arrested.
At the time of writing this story, at least 396 people have been detained at events across 39 Russian cities since Navalny’s death, according to the Russian human rights group OVD-Info.
For Russians living abroad, including in Armenia and Georgia, it has been easier to demonstrate their anger.
In the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, as well as in the city of Batumi and in Armenia’s capital, Yerevan, Russians chanted Navalny’s name, anti-war and anti-Putin slogans.
“I’m angry; I’m mostly angry, then sad,” one demonstrator named Nikolay told the news outlet OC Media, adding that he was grateful that in Armenia, he was able to express his feelings openly.
“We expected it, but the feelings are still anger, rage, grief,” said another demonstrator, Mikhail Yershov.
In Tbilisi, a demonstration was held outside the Russian Interests Section at the Swiss Embassy. Georgia severed diplomatic relations with Russia after the 2008 August War. Navalny was among many Russians who supported the invasion at the time, however he publicly apologized for it five years later.
Memorial to Alexei Navalny in Tbilisi near the Russian Interests Section at the Swiss Embassy. People have been coming for the third day to lay flowers in memory of the politician after the news of Navalny’s death in the colony. Activists assembled an installation in the shape of a heart made of flowersç Video: TV Rain
One protester who asked to remain anonymous told OC Media that Navalny’s death came as a shock to her.
“What brought me [here]? It’s shock because everything has its limits […] he was killed, like Boris Nemtsov,” she said, adding she was worried for the fate of other political prisoners in Russia.
Boris Nemtsov was a liberal politician and ardent critic of Vladimir Putin who was gunned down in the street near the Kremlin in Moscow in 2015.
Despite the growing rift between Armenia and Russia, Armenian authorities have so far remained silent, as have those in Azerbaijan.
In Azerbaijan, there was just one memorial reported:
Hüseyn Javid was a renowned Azerbaijani poet and playwright of the early 20th century who was a victim of Stalin’s repressions in 1937, and who died in Siberia as a result.
On February 20, ambassadors of the United Kingdom and the United States also paid tribute to Navalny by the same statue:
In Georgia, President Salome Zourabichvili was quick to speak out, calling Navalny’s death a “tragedy for all democracy and human rights defenders.”
Mamuka Mdinaradze, the ruling Georgian Dream party’s parliamentary leader, said Navalny was Putin’s latest victim when asked a question by a journalist before moving to complain about Georgia’s own politics, including the opposition United Nation Movement’s time in power before 2012, when prisoner deaths weren’t unheard of.
The speaker of parliament, Shalva Papuashvili, preferred not to comment when asked a similar question.
Opposition leaders in Georgia were more outspoken.
The United National Movement, in a statement, praised Navalny for returning back to Russia “to fight against Putin’s dictatorship and murderous regime” despite the danger to his life.
The party’s founder and Georgia’s former president, Mikheil Saakashvili, who is currently serving a prison sentence for abuse of power, wrote, “Navalny is gone. Am I the next one on Putin’s death row?”
The leader of the opposition Droa Party, Elene Khoshtaria, wrote on X that “Navalny’s death was a testament to the true, brutal, callous nature of Russia and Putin.”
Giorgi Gakharia, former Prime Minister and now leader of the For Georgia party, expressed condolences to Navalny’s family and friends on X, adding the opposition politician’s death was “a poignant symbol of Russia’s enduring modernized totalitarianism.”
https://globalvoices.org/2024/02/20/anger-and-grief-as-russians-in-armenia-and-georgia-mourn-navalnys-death/
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met in Munich on February 17 with the mediation of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.
According to Azerbaijan's APA news agency, Scholz left the room at some point and the meeting continued in bilateral format.
Afterwards, the sides expressed satisfaction with the meeting but offered few specifics on a way forward.
It was the first meeting between the two leaders since last July, though they did have a brief encounter at a CIS summit in December.
One of the main reasons for their failure to meet has been disagreement over who should mediate, particularly since Azerbaijan's seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh in September and the exodus of the region's Armenian population.
Armenia has favored mediation by the EU and U.S. while Azerbaijan first expressed preference for authoritarian regional powers Russia and Turkey, and then began rejecting all outside mediation.
The sides have met in bilateral format several times, however, to discuss border delimitation in November and agree a prisoner exchange in December.
Armenia has not explicitly rejected bilateral talks on a comprehensive peace deal, though its preference for Western mediation is evident as it seeks closer ties with the EU and U.S. and attempts to move away from its traditional strategic partner Russia.
The Aliyev-Pashinyan-Scholz meeting took place just four days after Azerbaijan killed four Armenian soldiers in what it called a "revenge operation" for the wounding of an Azerbaijani serviceman.
And the previous day, February 16, Pashinyan had said that his government's "analysis" showed that Azerbaijan was preparing for a full-scale war.
After the meeting, on February 18, Pashinyan said the two countries' foreign ministers would meet soon for peace talks. It is not clear whether or not any mediators will be present.
Aliyev, meanwhile, called his meeting with Pashinyan "constructive and useful." He declared that there is "de facto peace in the region" and expressed readiness to sign a peace treaty.
At the same time, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry in a February 18 statement reiterated Baku's demand that Armenia revise its constitution and other laws to remove all reference to Nagorno-Karabakh.
Following the Munich meeting, Olaf Scholz stated that the sides agreed to resolve their differences "without violence." No details about any specific agreements were made public. The meeting took place within the framework of the Munich Security Conference. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Aliyev and Pashinyan separately, expressing support for the peace process.
While the two countries' leaders maintain that the main principles of the peace treaty have been agreed, the sides voice disagreement over almost all of the parts of the deal, including the opening of the transport links and border delimitation/demarcation.
The mentioned principles include Armenia and Azerbaijan recognizing each other's territorial integrity, with the latest USSR and Almaty declaration maps being used for the demarcation of the borders and opening of the regional infrastructure based on the respective country's legislation and jurisdiction. Baku, however, demands a corridor through Armenia connecting mainland Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan to be controlled by Russian border troops and without Armenian customs or border checks.
The most significant escalation across the Armenia-Azerbaijan border since the September 2023 military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan occurred on the morning of Feb. 13, leading to the death of four Armenian soldiers. The violence came just days after Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev was reelected with more than 90% of the vote in the country’s “boringest” election ever. The lingering uncertainty over Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations and the continuing threat of renewed violence demands US attention and a coherent policy towards the South Caucasus.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 brought the post-Soviet space back to the forefront of US foreign and security policy. To counter Moscow, the US and its allies imposed sanctions against Russia coupled with military and economic support to Ukraine. As part of the broader strategy of harming Russia’s influence, the US has focused its attention on other areas of the former Soviet space such as Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Moldova. The South Caucasus is a uniquely situated geostrategic region nestled between Russia, Iran, and Turkey — and thus a growingly coveted transit hub connecting Europe, Asia, Russia, and the Middle East.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus has been a region of several ethnopolitical conflicts — Abkhazia, Nagorno–Karabakh, and South Ossetia. Russia mediated ceasefire agreements in all three regions in the early 1990s, and they began to be described as “frozen” and “protracted” conflicts.
In its efforts to decrease post-Soviet Russian influence, the US helped to facilitate the creation of the Azerbaijan–Georgia–Turkey strategic partnership and supported the launch of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil and Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum gas pipelines, which transported Azerbaijani oil and gas to international markets circumventing both Russia and Iran. The US also supported the launch of the “Southern Gas Corridor,” a project to bring additional Azerbaijani gas to Europe.
At the same time, Armenia established a military alliance with Russia, hosted a Russian military base and border troops, and eventually joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).
Beginning in the mid-2010s, the regional security architecture of the South Caucasus entered a phase of transformation. The key driver was Turkey’s policy to achieve strategic autonomy and become an independent regional power. Russia viewed this approach as an opportunity to weaken Turkey-US and Turkey-NATO ties. The subsequent and evolving Russia–Turkey partnership has impacted the regional security architecture of the South Caucasus, and continues doing so to this day.
Another factor of the changing regional dynamics was the growing military strength of Azerbaijan due to the rainfall of oil and gas money.
These factors, coupled with the lack of strategic thinking of successive governments of Armenia, which failed to understand the changing nature of regional geopolitics, paved the way for the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War that Azerbaijan launched. The defeat in that war significantly weakened Armenia’s position and transformed the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic into a nonviable entity under Russian protection while increasing Turkey’s influence in Azerbaijan and making Baku a de facto regional hegemon.
The South Caucasus is a uniquely situated geostrategic region nestled between Russia, Iran, and Turkey — and thus a growingly coveted transit hub connecting Europe, Asia, Russia, and the Middle East.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has limited its ability to allocate the necessary resources to the South Caucasus and increased the importance of Azerbaijan and Turkey for Moscow. Russia uses Azerbaijan for direct land access to Iran and to South East Asia, while both Azerbaijan and Turkey support Russia in circumventing Western sanctions. While Armenia recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan in October 2022, hoping that it would pave the way for normalization with Azerbaijan and then Turkey, Russia proved unwilling or unable to protect Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijani military attacks contrary to the general understanding of the Russian peacekeepers’ mission following the Nov. 9, 2020 Trilateral Statement. However, after a 10-month blockade by Azerbaijan cutting the civilians from the outside world, and despite orders by the International Court of Justice to reopen the Lachin corridor connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, Baku — with Russian peacekeepers acting as bystanders — used this strategic opening for a military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023 thereby forcing over 100,000 Armenians to leave the area. Furthermore, the CSTO and Russia failed to meet Yerevan’s security expectations when Azerbaijan launched multiple assaults on Armenia proper throughout 2021-2022.
In current circumstances, Russia understands that it lacks the resources to control the region alone and believes that the tangible way to secure its role in the South Caucasus is to coordinate its policy with the other regional powers — Turkey and Iran. The launch of the 3+2 platform (Russia, Turkey, Iran, Armenia, Azerbaijan) serves this goal.
After closing “the Nagorno-Karabakh chapter by force,” Baku disengaged from Brussels- and Washington-facilitated platforms of Armenia–Azerbaijan negotiations, instead insisting on bilateral talks. On Dec. 7, 2023, Yerevan and Baku reached a limited bilateral agreement that included the exchange of some POWs. On Jan. 31, 2024, the Armenia-Azerbaijan commission on delimitation and demarcation met on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border and more bilateral negotiations are anticipated. However, according to the Armenian minister of foreign affairs, there are certain setbacks by Azerbaijan in negotiations.
Since February 2022, the US appears to have concentrated its efforts on reducing Russia’s influence and presence in the South Caucasus through the pursuit of a peace agreement between Yerevan and Baku facilitated by Brussels and Washington. As Armenia serves as Russia’s primary power base in the region, it seemed that the quickest way to decrease the latter’s influence was to support Yerevan in moving away from Moscow. On the premise that Armenia initially chose Russia as an ally to counter Azerbaijan and Turkey, the Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Turkey normalization processes appeared the most efficient way to encourage Armenia’s foreign policy shift and to “take some distance,” as one NATO representative phrased it, from Russia.
The potential decoupling of Armenia from Russia was likely one of the driving factors for Washington’s active involvement in the negotiation process in 2022-2023, including the organization of two Ministers of Foreign Affairs summits in Washington in May and June 2023. Following this logic, the US should continue to increase its efforts to facilitate a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan this year at any cost, hoping that it will pave the way for Armenia to substantially decrease its reliance on Russia.
However, the decrease of Russian influence in the region and the weakening of the Armenia–Russia alliance are not ends in and of themselves. The strategic interest of the US has been to have a stable South Caucasus, that can serve as a transit for energy and cargo flows between Asia and Europe, circumventing Russian and Iranian territory. However, efforts aimed at encouraging Armenia’s drift away from Russia contradicts this goal. Any legal steps by Yerevan to move away from Russia (withdrawing from the CSTO or EAEU, or ending the deployment of the Russian military base or border troops in Armenia) will trigger a harsh response from Russia, which would likely destabilize the region and move it further away from Western prospects.
If this were to happen, Russia may use a variety of coercive measures against Armenia, including economic pressure on Armenia’s strategic sectors under its control and even seeking to trigger new Azerbaijani military attacks. Azerbaijan and Turkey may exploit the Russia-Armenia confrontation by seeking the establishment of an extraterritorial land corridor between Azerbaijan and Turkey via Armenia by force. This itself may trigger a tough Iranian response, which views any additional increase in Turkey’s role in the region with great suspicion. The destabilization of Armenia, and potential military flare ups will destabilize the region as a whole.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijan puts more demands on Armenia to reach the peace deal. President Aliyev, elaborating on his earlier comments from 2021, recently stated that by “changing Armenia’s constitution and other documents, peace could be achieved.”
This is a continuation of Azerbaijan’s policy, backed by the threat of use (or real use) of force, that pushes Yerevan to pursue appeasement with the hopes of securing an elusive peace treaty. However, an appeasement policy towards Azerbaijan only encourages Baku to put forward additional demands to Armenia, making the signature of the peace deal less and less likely. At the end of the day, in face of growing Azerbaijan’s assertiveness and limited diplomatic efforts from the West, Armenia may be forced to look to Russia (again) and Iran as hard power deterrent factors.
Given these uncomfortable realities, the US should reevaluate its objectives in the South Caucasus and the role of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict in achieving them. This by no means suggests that Washington should forego its engagement in the region or its expanding relations with Armenia.
Still, it does mean that the US must recognize that a policy that encourages Armenia to move away from Russia through the blind pursuit of peace with Azerbaijan and normalization with Turkey by any means is likely to provoke further instability in the South Caucasus.
Alas, Armenia cannot rely on Washington in the event of a worst case scenario: The US has already made clear in Georgia and Ukraine it is not willing to risk American lives for the territorial integrity or security of these former Soviet states. Instead, the US would be better served by supporting Armenia as it seeks to diversify its foreign and security policy without antagonizing Russia and appeasing Azerbaijan. The US also should pressure Azerbaijan to prevent new attacks against Armenia and make more efforts to convince Turkey to restart the normalization process with Armenia without preconditions. This policy will also reap dividends for Washington and its allies.
Benyamin Poghosyan is a senior research fellow at the APRI Armenia. His research focuses primarily on Armenian foreign policy and the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. Prior to joining APRI, in 2010-2019, he was a deputy director and director of the Armenian MOD think tank – Institute for National Strategic Studies. He holds a PhD degree in history from Armenian National Academy of Sciences. Artin DerSimonian is a junior research fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. His research focuses primarily on Russian foreign policy and the South Caucasus. He holds a master’s degree in Russian, East European, and Eurasian studies from the University of Glasgow.
https://inkstickmedia.com/why-the-us-needs-stability-in-the-south-caucasus/
The South Caucasus is not just a political minefield; some areas are literally littered with unexploded munitions. The UK-US landmine clearance charity, HALO, tries to help, says the organization’s CEO, retired British army General James Cowan.
It was a deadly accident in the rugged Caucasus mountain region south of Russia.
After September’s lightning incursions by the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan into the contested territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, over 100,000 Karabakhi Armenians were fleeing their homes towards the safety of neighboring Armenia.
There was only one road out and that was now packed with vehicles – a traffic jam from hell. Among those in the bumper-to-bumper queue were nearly 100 employees of the HALO Trust, the landmine clearance charity I head, and who were fleeing with their families.
As the traffic jam out of Nagorno-Karabakh shuddered once again to a halt, a woman traveling in an SUV got out of the back door to get some air.
Behind the car was a truck. Its driver stepped out of his cab. Somehow, his handbrake disengaged, and the truck rolled forward. The woman was crushed and died.
Also in the car were the woman’s husband, a senior HALO deminer, and their two children. Our colleague had to put his children in another car and drive the dead body of his wife into Armenia.
Stories of loss and tragedy were all too common as a whole population fled, with reports of hundreds dead or injured following an explosion at a fuel depot near the largest city, Stepanakert. Most of the people in the huge column of vehicles were also hungry and exhausted. For almost a year, Nagorno-Karabakh had been blockaded. Grocery shops had empty shelves and a lack of fuel meant vital farm machinery was idle; crops were rotting in the fields. People had to queue for many hours to get the simplest of things such as bread.
HALO has been working in Nagorno-Karabakh since 2000. Our main job was to clear landmines in the fertile soil which once grew grain, or boasted pomegranate orchards. These areas where tanks and armored personnel carriers had done their deadly work were littered with mines.
We also made roads and schools safe so teachers could explain the dangers of unexploded munitions to the next generation. Over a two-decade period, HALO cleared deadly mines and other ordnance from over 300 square kilometers of land (that’s about the size of 30,000 Premier League soccer pitches) across Nagorno-Karabakh.
Our work aimed to restore some normality and make life safe and enjoyable for everyone. It’s not really normal to worry about exploding munitions when you go for a walk or play games.
The conflict had simmered for decades after the end of the first war in 1994 but Azerbaijan resumed full-scale hostilities in September 2020, with a surprise air and land attack. We immediately focused our efforts on clearing the most populous areas of deadly munitions, including Stepanakert.
But since September’s exodus of its Armenian population, all of HALO’s work in Nagorno-Karabakh has now been stopped. Our staff and their families, along with the over 100,000 people living there, have left. As a result of the deteriorated security situation, they have all been effectively deprived of their right to their land and their homes.
Armenia is a poor country and remains extremely dependent on Russia for trade and energy supplies, although it has maintained good relations with the West as well.
As I write, it’s unclear whether the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh will be able to return to their homes. At the moment, it doesn’t look promising. Instead, they are likely to settle in the State of their ethnic kin and perhaps hope that one day things will change. Either way, they and the Armenian government will need considerable Western aid to ease their transition.
The death of my colleague’s wife was bad enough — two other HALO employees were also killed around the same time in the fuel depot explosion. But over 100,000 other people have also lost their homes and their land. In the words of a senior HALO staffer who worked in Nagorno-Karabakh;
“They have left their lives behind. They have lost their past, and maybe their future as well.”
Major General James Cowan left the British Army to join the HALO Trust as its chief executive in 2015. The landmine clearance charity was founded in 1988 in Afghanistan and achieved global prominence when Princess Diana visited its operations in Angola. Under James’s leadership HALO has increased its global workforce by a third to some 11,000 people and expanded from operations in 17 countries to 29. The organization’s work has saved the lives and limbs of more than two million people.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
https://cepa.org/article/the-plight-of-nagorno-karabakh/
Bank of Georgia has reached an agreement to acquire Ameriabank, one of the largest banks in Armenia, for $303.6 million.
Bank of Georgia Group, which is listed on the London Stock Exchange, announced its proposed acquisition of 90% of the Armenian bank on Monday. The agreement would allow the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to retain its 10% share in the bank.
The acquisition still requires approval by regulators, including the Central Bank of Armenia.
Founded in 1992, Ameriabank is one of Armenia’s largest banks, ranking seventh on the list of highest tax-paying companies in the country in 2023, at around ֏26 billion ($64 million) annually. The bank is partially owned by the former State Minister of Nagorno-Karabakh, Ruben Vardanyan.
In their announcement on Monday, Bank of Georgia Group said they intended to change their name to mark ‘a new chapter’ once they closed the Ameriabank deal.
On Monday, Ameriabank stated that it would operate as a standalone entity within the group ‘under its own brand name and current leadership in place, committed to Ameriabank’s adopted strategic goals, values, mission, and vision’.
‘Ameriabank views this transaction with the group as one of the well-reasoned options for its long-term growth’, says the statement.
A controversial acquisition
The sale has raised eyebrows in Armenia, with some speculating it could be going ahead without the approval of shareholder Ruben Vardanyan.
Amriabank’s website lists him as holding a significant stake in Imast Group, which owns 49% of the bank.
Vardanyan, an Armenian–Russian billionaire, served briefly as Nagorno-Karabakh’s State Minister in 2022 and 2023. He has been in prison in Azerbaijan since Nagorno-Karabakh’s surrender in September last year.
In a since-deleted Facebook post on Monday, Mesrop Arakelyan, a political ally of Vardanyan, claimed the billionaire had ‘nothing to do with the possible sale of the bank’.
Others even speculated that Azerbaijan could have influenced Vardanyan to sell his shares. Hetq’s editor-in-chief, Edik Baghdasaryan, questioned whether Vardanyan was aware of the deal or if Yerevan had looked into potential Azerbaijani involvement.
‘The largest shareholder of Ameriabank is Ruben Vardanyan. Since 27 September 2023, he has been in prison in Baku. Obviously, he is not aware of this deal. Has the government tried to find out whether Aliyev is forcing Vardanyan to sell the bank?’, he asked.
Neither Ameriabank nor Armenia’s Central Bank confirmed whether Vardanyan had consented to the sale of his shares in the bank when asked by the Armenian investigative outlet Hetq.
Others have expressed concern over what they said was a significant presence of Turkish and Azerbaijani capital in Georgia. Such concerns were dismissed by Armenian economist Haykaz Fanyan, who pointed out that as a listed company, Azerbaijani and Turkish citizens could own shares in the Bank of Georgia Group, but this would not pose a security risk and that such shareholders would not have access to personal data held by the company.