Feb 20 2024

Feb 20 2024

What do the absence of French observers at Azerbaijan's February 7 presidential election, a group denouncing "French colonialism" and an online campaign targeting the 2024 Paris Olympics have in common? They are three facets of a new offensive strategy adopted by Azerbaijani diplomacy towards France. FRANCE 24 investigated this shift with the Forbidden Stories consortium and other media outlets as part of "The Baku Connection" project.

Azerbaijan’s February 7 presidential election, which handed President Ilham Aliyev an unsurprising and unopposed victory with 92% of the vote and a fifth term in office, provided the backdrop for the latest illustration of deteriorating Franco-Azerbaijani relations.

For the first time in at least a decade, there were no French elected representatives or independent observers on the team of international observers monitoring the vote. As Aliyev tightens his grip on power and the country’s electoral system, there were fewer West European nationals on the international monitoring team. But a few German, Austrian, Spanish and Italian nationals did make it on the observer mission.

The absence of a French presence on the observer team is the result of a disaccord between France and Azerbaijan. French parliamentarians who have visited the former Soviet republic in the past as election observers no longer want to hear about it. "When you have a president who systematically gets elected with over 80% of the vote, I wouldn’t call that free and fair elections," said Claude Kern, senator from France’s eastern Bas-Rhin region, who was part of the French delegation for the 2018 presidential election.

Even the Association of Friends of Azerbaijan at the National Assembly, France’s lower house of parliament, has experienced an exodus of almost all its members in recent months.

Azerbaijan also appears to have closed the door on the few independent French nationals wishing to observe the presidential election on the ground. This was the case with journalist Jean-Michel Brun, who contributes to the websites, “Musulmans de France” and “Gazette du Caucase”, two portals with a very pro-Azerbaijani slant.

His candidacy was rejected by Azerbaijani authorities, without explanation, a few days before the election. "Relations with Azerbaijan are so rotten at the moment that they may have decided not to invite any French people," said Brun. When contacted by FRANCE 24 and Forbidden Stories, Azerbaijani authorities did not respond to the reasons for the absence of French observers.

The election observer issue is part of a wider context of escalating bilateral tensions. The month of December was marked by a particularly sharp deterioration: a Frenchman was arrested in Baku and accused of espionage, Azerbaijan then expelled two French diplomats, Paris promptly responded, declaring two Azerbaijani embassy officials persona non grata. The diplomatic tit-for-tat was accompanied by acerbic statements from both sides.

For French nationals in Azerbaijan, the message was clear. "French authorities made us understand that we had to be careful because we could be expelled overnight," confided a Frenchman living in Azerbaijan who did not wish to be named. Despite the strained ties between Paris and Baku, the Frenchman said he was quite satisfied with living conditions in Azerbaijan. When contacted, the French embassy in Azerbaijan did not respond to FRANCE 24 and Forbidden Stories.

The rapid and overt diplomatic deterioration between Azerbaijan and France is a new low, according to experts. “It’s the first time we see this kind of development against a European country, a Western country,” said Altay Goyushov, a political scientist at the Baku Research Institute, an independent Azerbaijani research center. “This is a completely new development, when a French citizen is arrested on spying charges, it’s never happened before,” he noted, adding that Azerbaijani authorities have mostly used “these kind of tactics” against the domestic opposition and the media in the past.

Historically, it hasn't always been this way. France, like other European countries, has long been the target of what has come to be called "caviar diplomacy". It’s a term employed by experts and journalists for over a decade to describe oil-rich Azerbaijan’s particularly lavish and distinctive lobbying strategy, which includes costly official trips for foreign politicians and influencers, and providing expensive gifts and funds for projects such as the renovation of churches. The payback, documented in several news reports, includes soft-power wins for Azerbaijan by securing its influence in Europe’s political and media worlds.

In the past, France held a special place for Baku’s political elites. France is a member of the OSCE Minsk Group, which also includes the US and Russia. Since the early 2000s, Paris has attempted to play a key role, within the Minsk Group, to try to find a diplomatic solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

France was therefore considered an important European power in Baku, one worth wooing and trying to keep on side. For Azerbaijan, this is particularly important since Baku has long believed the Armenian community in France to be very influential in French power circles, a position echoed by several pro-Azerbaijan figures interviewed by FRANCE 24 and the Forbidden Stories consortium.

The September 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, which resulted in Azerbaijan reclaiming a third of the disputed enclave, marked the beginning of the bilateral break. Two years later, in an interview with France 2 TV station, French President Emmanuel Macron declared that France "will never abandon the Armenians".

The French president’s avowal was viewed as a diplomatic slap by Baku. "It was very frustrating for Ilham Aliyev, who wants to be able to impose his demands on a weak Armenia, which is not the case if Yerevan thinks it can count on French support," noted Goyushov.

This French support began to take shape after French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna’s October 2023 visit to Armenia when she announced that "France has given its agreement to the conclusion of future contracts with Armenia which will enable the delivery of military equipment to Armenia so that it can ensure its defence". The announcement sparked disapproval from Aliyev, who accused France of "preparing the ground [for] new wars".

Azerbaijan then began a diplomatic shift that increasingly resembled a 180-degree turn.

The tone was first set by a song performed on public television and soberly titled, "Emmanuel". Broadcast a week after Macron's France 2 interview, the lyrics featured criticisms levelled at the French president – accusing him of "betraying his promises", for instance – while children punctuated each verse, singing "Emmanuel" in chorus.

It was a very public display of Azerbaijan’s new disaffection for France. Official accusations – such as the one frequently adopted by  Elchin Amirbayov, the Azerbaijani president's special representative for the normalisation of relations with Armenia, accusing France of “undermining the peace efforts” with Armenia – represent just the tip of the iceberg of Baku’s new diplomatic turn. The submerged component includes a number of initiatives aimed at denigrating France.

In November 2023, a video highly critical of the organisation of the 2024 Paris Olympics emerged, sparking a media stir in France. According to VIGINUM, the French government agency for the defence against foreign digital interference, it was an influence campaign linked to "an actor close to Azerbaijan".

In its technical report, seen by FRANCE 24 and Forbidden Stories, VIGINUM concluded that the operation, amplified by fake sites and accounts on social media, is "likely to harm the fundamental interests of the nation".

On another, parallel track, Azerbaijan is promoting the claims of a new structure called the "Baku Initiative Group". Its members, independence fighters from French overseas territories and regions such as French Guiana, Martinique, New Caledonia and Guadeloupe, have been denouncing France's "colonisation” and “neocolonialism”, and have been calling for “decolonisation”.

"At the last Non-Aligned Movement conference [chaired by Azerbaijan] in July 2023 in Baku, we wanted to take stock of the situation in the territories still under French domination, and decided to form the Baku Initiative Group," explained Jean-Jacob Bicep, president of the People’s Union for the Liberation of Guadeloupe, a far-left political party in the French overseas region. "The aim is to make the world aware of France's colonial policy," added another representative who asked to remain anonymous.

These pro-independence activists have already been able to make their case against what they call "French colonialism" before the UN on two occasions: first at a conference in September at the UN’s New York headquarters, then at its Geneva office in December. Both events were organised by the Baku Initiative Group.

What does this have to do with Azerbaijan? It's not just a coincidence that Azerbaijan held the rotating presidency of the Non-Aligned Group at just the right time. The executive director of these “anti-French colonialism” gatherings is Azerbaijani Abbas Abbassov, who has long worked for Azerbaijan's State Oil Fund. 

In addition, a July 2023 roundtable in Baku titled, “Towards the Complete Elimination of Colonialism” was organised by the AIR Center, one of Azerbaijan’s leading think tanks, whose chairman, Farid Shafiyev, is Azerbaijan’s former ambassador to the Czech Republic.

The Baku roundtable ended with an agreement on the establishment of “the Baku Initiative Group against French colonialism”, according to an AIR Center statement. When contacted, the think tank did not respond to questions from FRANCE 24 and Forbidden Stories.

The group of French nationals who have attended the Baku Initiative Group meetings includes well-known figures in the pro-Azerbaijani camp, such as journalist Yannick Urrien. "It was Hikmet Hajiyev who asked me to come to a conference of the group in Baku in October 2023," explained Urrien.

Hikmet Hajiyev is a well-known figure in Azerbaijan power circles: he is the foreign policy advisor to Azerbaijan’s president and a close associate of President Aliyev. "He is the mastermind behind the smear campaigns against other countries, including France," explained Emmanuel Dupuy, president of the Institute for Prospective and Security in Europe (IPSE) and a former advisor to Azerbaijan for around six years.

Aliyev himself used a speech at a decolonisation conference in Baku in November to deliver a scathing broadside against France. In his address, the Azerbaijani president referred to France more than 20 times, accusing Paris of “inflicting conflict” in the Caucasus and committing "most of the bloody crimes in the colonial history of humanity".

Some of the French participants in Baku’s decolonisation conferences deny being instrumentalised or prefer to ignore the issue. "It's none of my business. We seize every opportunity to achieve our goal, and all France has to do is settle its own problems with Azerbaijan," said Bicep, the leader of the far-left People’s Union for the Liberation of Guadeloupe.

Another participant, who asked to remain anonymous, admits that the creation of the Baku Initiative Group came at the best possible time for Azerbaijan, which "doesn't really have any chemistry with France at the moment". It’s probably a way of asking the French government "to put its own house in order before criticising what others are doing [in Nagorno-Karabakh]", he added.

Azerbaijan has also proved to be creative in increasing the resonance of these pro-independence demands on social media. On Twitter, they are relayed by anonymous Azerbaijanis and influential personalities, such as AIR Center director Farid Shafiyev.

Since October, the Azerbaijani parliament has even hosted a support group for the people of Corsica, the French Mediterranean island which has had a tumultuous relationship with mainland France since it became French in the 18^th century. A communiqué published in early February by the people of Corsica support group set up by Azerbaijan’s parliament denounced "the Macron Dictatorship". ().

In December, Azerbaijan was accused of sending journalists "known for their proximity to Azerbaijani intelligence services" to cover French Defence Minister Sébastien Lecornu’s trip to New Caledonia, a French archipelago in the Pacific. Their mission was to write articles “with an anti-France angle", said radio station Europe 1, which broke the story.

The creation of the Baku Initiative Group and the media hype surrounding the issue of anti-colonialism are "a monumental mistake", according to Dupuy. The former advisor to Azerbaijan asserted that this strategy has "no chance" of moving France one iota on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, while scuttling relations between the two countries. It’s an opinion he says he shares with his contacts in Azerbaijan.

But it's not surprising that Baku is resorting to this kind of tactic, explained Goyushov of the Baku Research Institute. With its internet disinformation operations and anti-West rhetoric harking back to the colonial era, Azerbaijan is taking a leaf out of the Kremlin playbook for winning friends and gaining influence in Africa.

“You have to take into account one thing: Azerbaijan was a part of the Soviet Union,” said Goyushov. Aliyev’s father, Heydar Aliyev, who was Azerbaijan’s president for a decade before his son took over the office, was a former KGB official – like Russian President Vladimir Putin. “Of course they are still almost the same,” added the political scientist. “They are copying each other in many ways. Their rhetoric against the West uses the same methods against their opponents, employs the same tactics on social media.”

But Goyushov doesn't expect the Azerbaijani offensive to succeed. Firstly, because Azerbaijan does not have the same resources as Russia to deploy large-scale operations, such as Russia's Doppelgänger disinformation campaign, which has been spreading false information in several European countries since 2022.

Secondly, Azerbaijan "is much more economically dependent on Western countries than Russia", noted Goyushov. Aliyev, he believes, does not have the luxury of getting permanently upset with a power like France.

"It's quite similar to what happened in 2013 with Germany," explained Goyushov. Back then, Germany criticised the infringements of religious freedom in Azerbaijan, a country with a Muslim majority. In the lead-up to a presidential election in Azerbaijan, "there were numerous attacks on Germany for about two years", noted Goyushov.

But then the anti-German attacks abruptly stopped. The reason, according to Goyushov, is that these smear campaigns serve mainly internal political purposes. "In an authoritarian regime, you sometimes need to find a common enemy that allows the country to unite around the leader," he explained. Perhaps COP 29, the 2024 climate conference to be held in Azerbaijan in November, will be an opportunity for the authorities to redress the diplomatic balance with the West, and France in particular.

Eloïse Layan (Forbidden Stories) contributed to this report.

This article has been translated from the original in French.

 

Feb 21 2024

Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, EU export flows have been increasingly reoriented towards other economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. This reorientation has boosted associated trade and transport services, cut competition for native exports to Russia, and awakened previously dormant investment in the region.

Since March 2022, EU trade sanctions have nearly halved the bloc's goods exports to Russia and Belarus. Over the same period, the share of EU exports captured by the rest of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA, excluding Ukraine) has grown from 0.8% to 1.2%, worth around €25 billion of additional goods flowing to the region.

The likelihood of a negotiated settlement to the Russia-Ukraine war remains low over the short term, pointing to a prolonged conflict and trade sanctions. The trade diversion and influx of economic activity will have a longer-lasting impact beyond the current war. Previously dormant investment in infrastructure, IT, and production is awakening. Any improvements in infrastructure and/or local production boost longer-term growth potential. The governments must walk a thin line between reaping the added economic benefits of maintaining connections with Russia and the rest of the world while avoiding secondary sanctions.

Kyrgyzstan

Diverted trade has had a relatively large impact on the small Kyrgyz economy, driving increases in trade and transportation services and buoying investment in the country. Kyrgyz national bank data reflects the uptick of imports from Europe as well as a rise from Georgia. Exports to Russia also jumped in 2022 and 2023 compared to previous years.

The new trade activity passing through Kyrgyzstan is adding prominently to local economic growth. We estimate diverted trade provided a 4% net positive boost to 2022 overall nominal GDP. The additional activity contributed to an increase in the value added to GDP from the transportation and storage service sector and in the value added to GDP from wholesale and retail trade.

Kyrgyz authorities, looking to seize upon the opportunity that the new trade affords, are pushing forward with efforts to build out the Chinese-Kyrgyz-Uzbek rail line to increase its connections and, eventually, reach new trade markets. This would likely further boost Kyrgyzstan's position as a transit point of trade into Russia, while simultaneously offering Kyrgyzstan new export markets, reducing trade dependence on Russia. Financing and planning for the project remains unclear with no set timetable in place.

Armenia

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, and the ensuing Russian economic troubles, Armenia's economic growth trajectory has dramatically decoupled from that of Russia for the first time in nearly three decades. The previous pattern of recession spilling over into Armenia from Russia is no longer the case. As Russian real GDP fell into contraction in 2022, Armenian real GDP growth peaked at 12.1%, and is likely to have expanded at an annual average rate of 8.9% in 2023. Increased exports helped Armenia narrow but not close its trade gap with Russia.

The key structural change has been the 95% increase in the number of registered IT companies. Since early 2022, according to Armenia's Ministry of Economy, over 2,000 IT firms and around 70,000 IT professionals have moved to Armenia from Russia. Apart from the inward migration of small businesses, several large Western firms have also located in Armenia. This influx of businesses has increased imports from the EU and US of communication and knowledge intensive goods, sanctioned for export to Russia, but not for Armenia's expanding IT sector. That said, in 2022 at least one company and a Russian subsidiary operating in Armenia were included in the US sanctions list.

Although the rerouting of trade in non-sanctioned goods presents new opportunities for Armenia, this may be short-lived as diplomatic acrimony between Russia and Armenia deepens. The diplomatic fallout with Russia risks undercutting the bilateral goods trade and tightening Armenian authorities' control over potential sanctions evasion. We expect minimum negative impact on the services and, especially, the IT sector, key benefactors of the structural shifts in Armenian economy.

Kazakhstan

In Kazakhstan, the impact on an already large energy economy is limited, even as the sheer volume of new trade flowing through the country is larger than through its peers. As the country with the greatest direct trade links to Russia, new transport and trade services are growing. An alternative east-west trade corridor is also emerging.

The Bureau of National Statistics is noting the uptick in foreign trade from Europe and to Russia. Imports from the EU increased to 4.9% of total Kazakh imports in January-September 2023 — up from less than 3% as of 2021. Russian imports were largely unchanged, resulting in higher overall imports to the country. The official Kazakh statistical bureau also registers an uptick of shipments to Russia, but only marginally. It is important to note that this data reflects officially registered trade only, and that unregistered trade is also likely. Kazakh authorities have repeatedly committed to cracking down on the trade of sanctioned goods with Russia.

The added trade has had a notable effect on the Kazakh transport and storage sector. In January-September 2023, the Bureau of National Statistics reported a 3.2% year-over-year increase in total freight traffic. Because the country exports so much energy via pipelines, however, the headline figure obscures a reported 10.4% year-over-year increase in road freight in the first three quarters of 2023. Higher imports from the EU and steady exports to Russia did result in a narrowing of the Kazakh trade surplus in 2023.

Georgia

Georgia's trade turnover with Russia has increased since the start of the Ukraine war. Although the two countries have not had diplomatic ties since the 2008 war, Georgia has refused to join Western sanctions against Russia. Georgian officials have said that the US$1 billion annual bilateral trade with Russia is critical for Georgia's economic stability and is insignificant to Russia.

Georgia's real GDP has been posting robust growth since the start of the war, up by 10.1% in 2022 and estimated to have expanded by 7.8% in 2023. The economic boost has come by way of inflow of capital, skilled labor, and increased trade both in goods and services. Georgia is not part of the Russia-led Customs Union, but its geographic proximity to Russia has given the country a notable role in the rerouted trade, including for goods movement from Armenia and Turkey to Russia.

Georgia has emerged as a key destination for Russian business, including for the IT sector. In 2022, 15,000 Russian companies were registered in Georgia, marking a 16-fold increase from the previous year. Much like in the case of Armenia, this influx of business has also boosted imports of capital goods, especially from the EU.

Tensions over the sanctions' implementation has a direct impact on Georgia's relation with the IMF. The latter has already suspended its US$289 million stand-by arrangement with Georgia, and has signaled that its resumption will also depend on full adherence to the sanctions regime. Rerouting of non-sanctioned goods through Georgia and the country's robust services exports are likely to remain in place in the coming years, providing an important growth impulse to the economy.

https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/mi/research-analysis/economic-implications-of-trade-rerouting-since-ukraine-war.html

Feb 21 2024

Imagine this: You're at the airport, bags packed, passport in hand, ready to board a flight back home. But instead of a boarding pass, you're handed a notice of detention. This nightmarish scenario became a stark reality for Kamil Zeynalli, a prominent Azerbaijani fitness trainer, at Moscow's Domodedovo airport. The incident, stemming from an international warrant issued by Armenia, has thrust Zeynalli into an unexpected spotlight, weaving a complex narrative of geopolitical tensions, personal liberty, and the unforeseen risks faced by individuals caught in the crossfire of international disputes.

As Zeynalli prepared to return to Baku, his journey took an abrupt and bewildering detour. Moscow police, acting on an international request from Armenia, detained him. Through a video shared on his Instagram account, Zeynalli detailed the surreal experience, revealing to his followers that he was now on an internationally wanted list. This news was not only a shock to Zeynalli but also to his vast following, igniting a flurry of concern and speculation across social media platforms.

Zeynalli's situation quickly evolved into a legal imbroglio. The Azerbaijani embassy in Russia has been closely monitoring the situation, highlighting the complex interplay of international law and diplomatic relations. The possibility of extradition to Armenia, as mentioned by the police, adds a layer of severity to Zeynalli's predicament. The intricacies of extradition processes, especially within the context of the historically tense relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan, underscore the precarious position individuals like Zeynalli can find themselves in, through no fault of their own.

The detention of Kamil Zeynalli has transcended personal misfortune, becoming a symbol of larger geopolitical tensions. His case has garnered international attention, raising pertinent questions about the safety and freedom of individuals navigating the invisible lines drawn by international politics. The response from Zeynalli's online community, a blend of support and outrage, mirrors the broader concerns surrounding the incident. As the situation unfolds, it serves as a stark reminder of the unpredictable impact of international disputes on ordinary lives.

In an era where global mobility is often taken for granted, incidents like these starkly remind us of the fragile nature of this freedom. Zeynalli's ordeal at Domodedovo airport is more than an isolated incident; it's a narrative that challenges us to reflect on the complexities of international law, the power of state actions, and the human stories caught in between. As the world watches and waits for the resolution of Zeynalli's case, one thing is clear: the lines between personal liberty and international politics are as blurred as ever.

https://bnnbreaking.com/international-affairs/azerbaijani-fitness-trainer-detained-in-moscow-on-armenias-request-a-tense-international-incident

Ukrainian News

Feb 21 2024

The head of the government of Armenia, which after 2022 became the fourth largest exporter to the russian federation of semiconductors and other dual-use goods for the needs of war, called the Ukrainian people "friendly" in his speech.

But is it so?

Yerevan strongly creates the impression of reorientation towards the West. However, during the two years of the war between the russian federation and Ukraine, it served as one of the Kremlin's main logistical hubs for circumventing sanctions. In 2022, the GDP of tiny Armenia, with a population of 3 million, grew by an unprecedented 14.2%.

The Deputy Minister of Finance of Armenia, Vahan Sirunyan, admitted that in the first nine months of 2023, the export of goods from Armenia to the russian federation increased by 85%, of which 80% is re-export. Emphasizing the exponential growth of Armenia's foreign trade turnover after the start of the war in Ukraine by 69%, the analytical center Jamestown Foundation (United States) also warned about the re-export of sanctioned goods from Armenia to the russian federation. And the director of the Department of Sanctions Coordination of the U.S. Department of State, Jim O'Brien, stated directly that Washington considers Armenia to be one of the countries that help the russian federation to circumvent sanctions.

In 2024, the problem continues to be talked about, but this does not prevent Armenia from supplying sanctioned goods to its belligerent neighbor with impunity. Robin Brooks, director of the Institute of International Finance and former Goldman Sachs strategist, published detailed data: "Armenia's exports to the russian federation increased by 430% compared to the period before the invasion, which means re-exports of EU and Chinese goods to russia."

Armenia is important as a transit hub because Putin can no longer rely on almost anyone else in this matter, except for it. In May last year, France's Forbes called Armenia "a major channel for sanctions evasion" as restrictions on supplies through Turkiye and Central Asia tightened. In the summer of 2022, Ankara promised the United States not to allow the circumvention of sanctions against the russian federation on the territory of Turkiye. Subsequently, Turkish financial organizations began to cease cooperation with russian ones en masse.

Ironically, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) announced the allocation of USD 15 million to Yerevan. The statement emphasizes that these funds are aimed at "reducing Armenia's economic dependence on the russian federation."

feb 21 2024

Armenia is ideally positioned to offer India an alternative sea trade route, especially with Europe, Narek Mkrtchyan, Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, Republic of Armenia said on February 21 at an event on the sidelines of Raisina Dialogue 2024.

"The Armenian government is committed to forming partnerships in major regional and global projects like North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), the Gulf Black sea transport, and the transit corridor and the Chabahar port development, which is a collaborative effort between India and Iran," the minister said.

He added that this offer assumes significance at a time when many nations, including India, are looking for alternative sea routes to trade with Europe and the West given the spate of attacks on commercial vessels passing through the Red Sea.

Back in March 2023, Armenia proposed a Persian Gulf-Black Sea corridor to connect Indian traders with Russia and Europe.

This was reportedly suggested to link the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea to facilitate trade between India, Russia, and Europe, which would serve as an alternative trade corridor that will operate alongside the INSTC to establish a trade link between Mumbai and Bandarabas Seaport in Iran and then proceed to Armenia and further on to Europe or Russia.

The Armenian minister also pitched for collaborating with India on Artificial Intelligence (AI) through a global coalition where ministers of labour and social protection can consult and trigger investments for AI.

"There is potential to collaborate on AI for social good to address sectors like healthcare, agriculture, environmental conservation planning. We could also potentially establish a global AI innovation platform to facilitate the sharing of Solutions and Research," he added.

https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/armenia-ideally-positioned-to-offer-india-alternative-trade-route-with-europe-minister-12324951.html

Feb 21 2024

Armenia's capital Yerevan has seen surging numbers of labor migrants from India over the past year and a half. 

This as the city's demography and economy have already been reshaped by the influx of Russians fleeing the consequences of Moscow's invasion of Ukraine.

It's a novel and ironic situation for a traditionally ethnically homogenous country whose economy relies to a large extent on its own citizens going abroad as labor migrants. 

Armenia began to attract labor migrants from India in 2018, when its economy began demonstrating dynamic growth and local businesses began to have trouble finding workers. The economy needed cheap labor. 

Thousands of Indians in Armenia's economy

The number of Indians in Armenia, whose population is just under three million, has grown steadily since then. In 2018 there were a few thousand Indian citizens residing in the country but now that figure is between 20,000 and 30,000, then-Economy Minister Vahan Kerobyan reported last November. 

The figures of the State Statistics Committee (Armstat) differ slightly. Armstat says that in 2023 a total of 54,582 Indian citizens entered the country, of whom 34,687 are considered "tourists." That's considerable growth over the numbers for 2022, when 21,591 Indians entered Armenia, 18,194 of them "tourists." 

But the tourist designation has little meaning and it's hard to distinguish between tourists and labor migrants, largely because many of the latter group never register to seek residency or the formal right to work. In fact, the number of Indian citizens granted residency between 2018 and 2023 has not changed sharply, ranging between one and two thousand annually.

Economists say all this makes it clear that most Indians in Armenia are engaged in the shadow economy.

The former economy minister effectively acknowledged this reality in his remarks last November, noting that tourist flows from India are actually not that high.

Two factors attracting Indian migrants to Armenia

Indians, like other labor migrants, migrate with one goal in mind – to find work and send money back home to their families. Armenia's rapid economic growth in the past few years has made it an attractive destination. 

Over the past few years, Armenia's GDP per capita has nearly doubled in dollar terms. According to the International Monetary Fund, that indicator rose from just over $4,200 in 2018 to over $8,200 in 2023. It's now the highest GDP per capita among the South Caucasus countries. India's GDP per capita, meanwhile, is around $2,800. 

Armenian economist Armen Ktoyan believes that the influx of Indian migrants to Armenia has two main causes: higher wages than back home and the strengthening of the national currency, the dram, in relation to the dollar over the past year and a half. 

"It's precisely these factors that have triggered the influx of labor migrants from India, and this is important in terms of stimulating economic growth. Businesses in spheres such as construction, agriculture and services hire them and save money by doing so. And this in turn lowers the cost price of their products," Ktoyan told Eurasianet. 

Many labor migrants from India are willing to do low-skilled jobs in Armenia due in part to their lack of knowledge of the state language. 

"The delivery sphere suits best. You don't need to know Armenian to work as a courier. You have the delivery address, you make the delivery, and that's it," 27-year-old Suraj, from India, told Eurasianet. 

Suraj has been working as a courier in Armenia for several months. Like hundreds of other Indian citizens, he came to Armenia to make money. He lives together with friends in a rented apartment on the outskirts of Yerevan. So far, he's content with his work. He makes enough to live in Armenia and send $150-200 home each month. 

"I've got everything strictly budgeted. I spend about $120 a month on food in Yerevan, I pay a little less than that in rent, I pay about $200 per month to rent the motorcycle I use for the deliveries. And the rest I send home to my family," Suraj said, adding that this sum is enough to cover living expenses for his five-member family in India for a month. 

Some Indians have stayed longer, gained some grasp of the language and are able to find more profitable work, such as driving a taxi. 

Thirty-four-year-old Ajit has lived in Armenia for two years. He says he came to work in construction. He worked in this field for a few months, building high-rise apartment buildings, then he and some friends did farm work, then he decided to drive a taxi. 

"I was learning Armenian in parallel. I learned the rules of the road and ultimately I was able to work as a taxi driver," said Ajit, who came to Armenia in the footsteps of his cousin, who had come and was able to send money home. 

Indians change the labor market

The sudden appearance of large numbers of Indian workers has changed the Armenian labor market, eliciting mixed reactions from locals. Some worry that Indians are taking their jobs because they're willing to work for less. Others, particularly members of the business community, are distinctly positive. 

"I wouldn't say that the Indians are taking jobs away from locals. As a rule, they work in fields where there is not enough labor. I hire Indians not because I want to pay them less. Sometimes I pay them more than locals since they're good workers. They don't ask many questions, they work, they don't laze about," a local businessman producing canned goods and non-alcoholic drinks told Eurasianet. 

The businessman, who requested anonymity, added that the Indian migrants are creating "healthy competition" on the market. "It's becoming clear to local workers that businesses have an alternative, and this spurs them to be more productive," he said. 

The influx of migrants to Armenia is taking place against a backdrop of strengthening relations between Yerevan and New Delhi. 

According to Indian media reports - which have not been refuted by Armenian officials – in the past year and a half Armenia has signed contracts with India on the purchase of hundreds of millions of dollars of weapons, becoming, according to Armenian officials, the biggest buyer of Indian military hardware in the world.

These growing strategic ties have given India the image of a friendly country in the eyes of Armenian society. For the most part, this positive feeling is extended to the Indian migrants themselves, though there have been occasional manifestations of xenophobic aggression. 

"Indians as labor migrants is a new phenomenon for Armenia. Twenty or thirty thousand people is a large number for our country, so it's been hard for some people in Armenia to comprehend what's going on. People are adapting to each other and in this process there might be some misunderstanding, incomprehension. But I don't see any discrimination against Indians in Armenia, let alone discrimination on a large scale," social anthropologist Aghasi Tadevosyan told Eurasianet. 

Many Indians in Armenia have no plans to stay over the long term. For some, it's a jumping-off point, a place where they can get an economic footing, get residency, get a Schengen visa and move on to Europe. 

Feb 21 2024

Feb 21 2024

At the heart of Kurtulmuş's visit is his participation in the 14th Plenary Session of the Asian Parliamentary Assembly. This gathering is not merely a routine diplomatic engagement; it is a testament to the collective desire of Asian nations to foster dialogue, understanding, and cooperation. Kurtulmuş's presence in Baku underscores Türkiye's role as a pivotal player in regional politics, especially at a time when Azerbaijan is navigating the delicate process of peace treaty proposals with Armenia. The significance of this assembly, therefore, cannot be overstated, as it represents a convergence of efforts aimed at securing a stable and prosperous future for the region.

The backdrop of Kurtulmuş's visit is painted with the hopeful yet challenging process of peace negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Recent developments have seen Azerbaijan submit a new set of proposals concerning a peace treaty to Armenia, marking another step in the arduous journey towards reconciliation. This initiative, mirrored by Armenia's earlier submission of its proposals to Azerbaijan, signifies a mutual acknowledgment of the necessity for dialogue and compromise. The forthcoming meeting between the foreign ministers of the two nations is eagerly anticipated, as it promises to be a critical juncture in the quest for a lasting peace.

The diplomatic arena surrounding the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process is further enriched by expressions of international support. Notably, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia's congratulatory message to President Ilham Aliyev following his election victory underscores the global interest in Azerbaijan's stability and prosperity. Such gestures of goodwill are pivotal, as they contribute to an environment conducive to peace negotiations. Moreover, the scheduled court hearing for the individual responsible for a terrorist act against Azerbaijan's Embassy in Iran serves as a reminder of the challenges that lie on the path to peace. It highlights the importance of justice and accountability as foundational elements of lasting reconciliation.

As the sun sets on Baku, the visit of Numan Kurtulmuş concludes, but the journey towards peace continues. The complexities of the Azerbaijan-Armenia relationship, fraught with historical grievances and contemporary challenges, require patience, understanding, and unwavering commitment. The events unfolding in Baku and beyond are more than diplomatic formalities; they are the building blocks of a future where peace is not just an aspiration but a reality. The road ahead is long and uncertain, but the resolve of those dedicated to forging a path to peace remains steadfast. In the heart of the South Caucasus, hope endures, illuminated by the prospect of dialogue, reconciliation, and a shared future.

https://bnnbreaking.com/politics/paths-to-peace-numan-kurtulmu%C5%9Fs-visit-to-baku-amidst-azerbaijan-armenia-treaty-talks

WION, India

Feb 21 2024