The Standard
September 25, 2004
FIT FOR A KING
by Graham Lees
If Thomas Leonowens hadn’t inconveniently died on the Malaysian
island of Penang, Hollywood could never have made the film musical
classic The King and I starring Yul Brynner and Deborah Kerr.
It was Leonowens’ untimely death in 1859 which forced his
impoverished young widow, Anna, to pack her bags and her two children
and head north to Bangkok to become governess to the King of Siam’s
82 children. The rest is Hollywood _ but not, by the way, Thai _
history, resurrected most recently in 1999’s less memorable remake
Anna and the King.
In the 19th century, Penang was a fashionable place to be for a
young, adventurous couple of the British empire like the Leonowens,
who moved to the island’s capital Georgetown from India.
The world has changed enormously since those times, but perhaps more
than most places once painted red on the British imperial map,
Georgetown has retained an exotic, cosmopolitan flavour found in the
town’s rich mix of architecture and even richer cuisine.
In many respects, it’s reminiscent of Singapore in its more
swashbuckling days, before both the streets and local vice were swept
clean.
The port town was named after Britain’s 18th-century King George III,
who helped lose the 13 colonies of America but gained this tiny
substitute when Captain Francis Light went looking for a safe port
for East India Company shipping between India and China. Light
induced the local sultan with offers of money and protection to hand
over Penang in 1786.
Such was the opportunist entrepreneurial entourage that followed in
the British wake in those days that Light was able to write in his
log a few months later: Our inhabitants increase very fast. They are
already disputing the ground, everyone building as fast as he can.”
Light had a knack of inducing people. He filled a ship’s cannon with
gold coins and fired them into the waterfront jungle to encourage
rapid land clearing.
Penang was the first British acquisition east of India and it quickly
became the new home of Hainan and Hokkien Chinese, Bengalis, Tamils,
Pathans, Armenian Jews and remnants of Portuguese and Dutch
communities abandoning Siam in the wake of a devastating war with
Burma.
That exotic melting pot is still reflected in Georgetown today, home
to some of the richest mix of street food in East Asia, and a
pot-pourri of religious and colonial architecture which has survived
the buffeting of economic slumps and war.
Light’s original street layout, named after notable Englishmen of the
day, such as Buckingham, Pitt, Hutton, Greenall and Farquhar, is
still much in evidence, although one or two late 20th-century
multi-storey blocks poke into the sky.
Trishaw driver Harun, my two-hour pedalling guide, insists that the
only significant change he has noticed in 30 years of cycling around
Georgetown is the introduction of a one-way road system. It is more
work for the legs, sir,” the 51-year-old ethnic Tamil says with a
wry smile.
A leisurely tour with the wiry Harun, or one of his dozens of
pith-helmeted colleagues, takes in many of the sights and smells of
the town _ from the esplanade’s Victorian City Hall, which looks more
like a grand hotel on the seafront of England’s Brighton resort, to
the bubbling curry pots of Little India. There is the simple
white-painted St George’s Church on Bishop Street, built in 1818;
mosques, Sikh, Hindu and Buddhist temples _ notably the Chaiya
Mangkalaram with its large reclining gold Buddha _ and the Chinese
shophouse at 120 Armenian Street where Dr Sun Yat Sen is said by
local historians to have lodged and plotted his 1911 revolution in
China. He certainly did a lot of plotting around Southeast Asia.
The Anglican cemetery on Jalan Sultan Ahmad Shah street is the last
resting place of Captain Light and Thomas Leonowens, whose gravestone
describes him as an army officer struck down by sunstroke.
Penang also was a favourite stopping off place for later characters
of the British empire, notably authors Rudyard Kipling and Somerset
Maugham and the entertainer Noel Coward. They all stayed at the
waterfront Eastern and Oriental Hotel, which in its heyday was said
to be the British empire’s best hotel east of the Suez Canal. It
boasted the world’s longest seafront garden lawn which stretched 280
metres.
After a sad period of decline and closure the hotel has now re-opened
following a US $ 16 million (HK$ 124.8 million) renovation. The E&O,
as it’s known, was founded by the Sarkies brothers, the Armenian
family who also created Singapore’s Raffles Hotel and The Strand in
Rangoon before losing their shirts in the Great Depression of the
1930s.
Today, the E&O is again a match for Raffles _ among other luxuries it
boasts a personal butler service for guests _ but is now owned by the
Malaysian property company Eastern & Oriental Berhad.
The street hawker life that disappeared 25 years ago in Singapore is
still alive and well here. Few trishaw drivers manage to steer
through the street food stall congestion of Chinatown and the silk
shops of Little India without a passenger stop.
By accident rather than design, probably the greatest asset the
British left behind in Georgetown is not the English language, still
spoken widely, nor the architectural edifices of imperial power, but
the exotically diverse cuisine. It’s no exaggeration to say that at
any one time half of Georgetown seems to be cooking for the other
half. The added delight for everyone, residents and visitors, is that
only a stone’s throw separates the street woks of Chinatown from the
Malay and ethnic Indian and Thai cooking pots. Cooks here have rubbed
shoulders for more than 150 years, leading to a kind of fusion
cuisine known as nyonya or nonya. It’s primarily a mix of Chinese and
Malay ingredients and methods. Nyonya cuisine is linked to the old
Portuguese-British colony of Malacca in southern Malaysia, where it’s
influenced by Indonesian cooking, and Penang where it’s influenced by
Thai ingredients.
A classic example is Penang laksa: a thick sweet-and-sour fish soup
with rice noodles, tamarind, onion, chilli, cucumber and pineapple.
Another Georgetown culinary delight is mamak, an adaptation of
southern Indian Muslim dishes which include the pancake-like murtabak
stuffed with mutton, vegetables and plenty of spices.
And the garlic or onion naan breads cooked to order before your eyes
at Kasim Mustapfa’s on Chula Street are the freshest I’ve tasted
anywhere. Much of this exquisite dining is in the much lived-in old
quarter of Georgetown, with its narrow streets of single-storey
houses.
The Malaysian government in Kuala Lumpur likes to promote Penang as
Silicon Island” because of the concentration of international high
technology industries on the southeast coast, but Georgetown has one
of the biggest concentrations of pre-1945 buildings in the region _
the result of a quirky rent control law which had the effect of
deterring property owners from redevelopment binges. The law was
abolished recently and now the city authorities are scrambling to
secure long-term protection by acquiring United Nations World
Heritage Site status.
If the heat of the town becomes oppressive in the early afternoon,
instead of retreating into hotel air-conditioning you can still do
what generations of sahibs and memsahibs did _ head for the cool of
the nearby hills. The peak of Penang Hill, 800 metres high, is
reached by a funicular railway built in 1924. Macaque monkeys swing
from trees alongside the track.
The British began building their weekend bungalows up the hill in
1800, and Penang historians insist that this was the first hill
station” of the British empire _ the cooler mountain retreats common
later in India among the colonial elite.
Much of the interior of the 24-kilometre long island remains
undeveloped, but the northern coast has several large beach resorts,
notably Batu Ferringhi, 18 kilometres from Georgetown. But a beach is
a beach wherever the sea washes up, whereas Penang’s capital is
unique.
Source: The Standard.

IRNA, Iran
Sept 21 2004
Azeri president believes Karabakh conflict hampers peace in region
Baku, Sept 21, Itar-Tass/ACSNA/IRNA — Azerbaijani President Ilkham
Aliyev believes that the Karabakh conflict `is creating huge to peace
and stability in the region`.
Aliyev made statement in Baku on Tuesday receiving Filip Dimitrov,
the special envoy of the OSCE chairman in office for Azerbaijan and
Armenia.
The president stressed the permanency of his country`s stance on
the issue of the problem settlement.
“It should be settled based on the principles of inviolability of
borders and territorial integrity of states,” said the Azerbaijani
president pointing out, “It will be impossible to settle the Karabakh
conflict with any other approach.”
Ilkham Aliyev is positive that the problem settling will result in
the establishment of calm, security and acceleration of economic
development in the region.
The Azerbaijani president expressed regret that the activity of
the OSCE Minsk Group on Nagorno-Karabakh that is performing mediator
functions in the conflict settlement has so far yielded no positive
results.

Thursday, September 23, 2004
**********************************
DISAGREEMENT – ARMENIAN STYLE.
THE LANGUAGE OF PROPAGANDA.
FOUR RULES WITHOUT EXCEPTIONS.
***********************************************
There is a type of reader who disagrees with me long before he has read the first word of the first line. Such a reader is a critic only in the sense that a cobra is a critic of a mongoose and vice versa. Some cases in point follow.
*
“You don’t always mention your sources. Is it because you have none to back up your ridiculous assertions and theories?”
More often than not my sources are anonymous readers like yourself whom I sometimes identify as Jack S. Avanakian.
*
“None of your explanations makes sense to me. Why do you insist on wasting your time and ours?”
Perhaps you would like to share your wisdom with us, and if you have none to spare, perhaps you would care to mention another writer we could all read with profit. I hate to think I am the only game in town. Surely, our people deserve better than that.
*
To the gentle reader who tells me, “Haven’t you got anything better to do than produce a steady flow of waste matter every day?” I can only say: What’s a major intellect like you reading a minor scribbler like me?
*
It has been the destiny of Armenian writers to live among foreigners who don’t give a damn about Armenian literature, and Armenians who care more about the false certainties of propaganda and less about the honest uncertainties of literature.
*
Power can speak only one language, that of propaganda. This is true of political as well as religious power. And propaganda and truth are as mutually exclusive as fire and water.
*
My source about the above assertion: life in three different countries – the first predominantly Orthodox (Greece); the second Catholic (Italy) and the third Protestant (Canada) all claiming to have a monopoly on truth, and when asked for proof, all pleading faith, the way cold-blooded murderers plead insanity.
*
All rules have exceptions, except the following four:
Where there are laws, they will be broken.
Where there are principles, they will be corrupted.
Where there is an ideological movement, it will be confiscated by power-hungry cynical manipulators whose number one concern will be number one.
And (I owe the following to Toynbee): Where there are chosen people, they will have been chosen by no one but themselves.
#
Friday, September 24, 2004
********************************
WARNING.
ENFER DE MERDE.
THE LESSONS OF HISTORY.
PUNDITS & DUPES.
ON INFALLIBILITY.
************************************
In order not to be misunderstood, one must express the same thought in different ways, and the more ways, the narrower the gap open to misinterpretation.
*
What I am about to say you may have heard or read before. Feel free not to read what follows.
*
The world is an enfer de merde or a cesspool of conflicting interests and belief systems because, (one) only historians learn from history; (two) they invariably draw contradictory lessons; (three) they don’t have the power to put into practice what they have learned; and (four) if they had the power, the world would be in a worst mess.
*
We are all authorities on at least one subject: what’s good for us, and more often than not, we are dead wrong.
*
Where there is disagreement, either one or, more often than not, both sides are wrong, because any dupe can say, “my side is right,” and have a counterpart in the opposition who says the same thing.
*
If we agree that what we don’t know far exceeds what we know, or “of the gods we know nothing” (Socrates), or “we cannot answer the most important questions” (Chekhov), it follows, to assume being consistently right or infallible must be just about the surest symptom of being consistently wrong. This must be true not only of Muslims who speak in the name of Allah, but also of Catholics who speak in the name of the Pope, or partisans who speak in the name of the Party, or dupes who at one time or another spoke in the name of Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, Saddam, and countless others who pretended to know better.
*
If millions, perhaps even billions, have been wrong in the past, who among us will dare to pretend to be right or to know better?
#
Saturday, September 25, 2004
***********************************
FROM AN AFRICAN NOVEL.
MORE ON WRITERS AND COMMISSARS.
ON ARMENIAN IDENTITY.
THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE.
OUR PANCHOONIE RACKET.
GOD, OUR FATHER.
************************************************
From a contemporary African novel: “as ugly and dirty as a hyena’s anus.”
*
No one and nothing can be as contemptible as a writer in an environment dominated by commissars of culture. Which is why I prefer to identify myself as a concerned citizen. And if, on occasion, I have committed the unforgivable blunder of calling myself a writer, it has been only in the sense of one who uses the written word as a means of communication – as in “the writer of this memo.”
*
If you chart the family tree of a commissar of culture, you are sure to find at least two hangmen, three cold-blooded murderers, several career criminals, and a minimum of a dozen jailbirds.
*
In a non-democratic environment one cannot speak of the voice of the people (“vox populi”) which has been identified in the past with the voice of god (“vox dei”). One can speak only of the voice of an elite or a power structure, which is more akin to the voice of the Devil. And now, consider the fact that throughout our millennial history we have at no time experienced democratic rule. Even in democratic environments like the United States, France and Canada, we are dominated by non-representative cliques that are as representative as exclusive clubs. As for the so-called democracy in Armenia today: it is as representative as a criminal gang or a mafia.
*
An Armenian born and raised in the United States will share more in common with his fellow Americans than with an Armenian born and raised in the USSR. Most Armenians today might as well be foreigners to one another. But whereas the laws of the land promote solidarity in America (which is also populated by foreigners), the absence of similar laws or values in our case moves us in opposite directions, namely, mutual mistrust, alienation, and assimilation.
*
The only time an Armenian will speak of brotherhood is when he goes into the business of raising funds, which I like to call our “Panchoonie racket.”
*
I am willing to concede that even if god doesn’t exist, we should live as though he did, otherwise we may end up slaughtering one another. But man, it seems, is so predisposed to slaughter that he will slaughter even in the name of a merciful and compassion god.
*
The aim of propaganda, it has been said, is to deceive your friends, not your enemies. Imagine, if you can, a Turk falling for our chauvinist crapola….
*
After being verbally abused by our commissars and partisans (but I repeat myself) I can truly testify to the fact that an Armenian’s tongue can be “sharper than a Turk’s yataghan” (Zarian) and uglier than a hyena’s anus.
#

Turkish Daily News
Sept 24 2004
Foreign Minister Gul Meets His Armenian Counterpart
ANKARA – Turkish Daily News 24/09/2004 17:36
Talking about the solution process, Oskanyan interpreted the goal of
a recent meeting of foreign ministers in Prague was to arrange talks
between the two countries’ presidents
Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanyan told a news conference in
Yerevan they have never lost hope of normalizing relations with
Turkey, the Anatolia news agency reported.
Oskanyan said he would meet Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul on
the sidelines of the ongoing United Nations General Assembly meetings
in New York. “Our expectations from this meeting will be the same
again: to gain a positive development for furthering relations,”
Oskanyan was quoted as saying.
Talking about the solution process, Oskanyan interpreted the goal of
a recent meeting of foreign ministers in Prague was to arrange talks
between the two countries’ presidents. Oskanyan said the Armenian and
Azeri presidents, Robert Kocharyan and Ilkham Aliyev, could not reach
a new understanding in their meeting in Astana on Sept. 15. “Contrary
to expectations, neither president gave their foreign ministries any
orders to begin the second stage that is far closer to a settlement
of the problem,” Oskanyan said.
On the other hand, Armenian President Kocharyan also made a statement
in Yerevan about the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Kocharyan said the
Armenian directorship in Nagorno Karabakh was legal and all related
parts, including the Armenian directorship, should be able to attend
the negotiations for finding a solution to the conflict.
Nagorno-Karabakh is a 13-year-old dispute, which has dragged on since
a 1994 cease-fire ended fighting that killed more than 30,000 people
and drove a million from their homes. Azerbaijan refuses to negotiate
directly with the Karabakh Armenians and Turkey refuses to establish
diplomatic relations with Armenia. Turkey closed its gate with
Armenia and severed its diplomatic ties a decade ago, in protest of
Armenia’s occupation of the Azeri territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Foreign ministers of Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan held a trilateral
meeting earlier this year to discuss a “phased approach” under which
Armenia would gradually withdraw from the occupied Azeri territories
and Ankara would normalize its ties, in phases, with Yerevan in
return. But no concrete progress has yet been achieved.

PRESS RELEASE
The National Citizens’ Initiative
75 Yerznkian Street
Yerevan 375033, Armenia
Tel.: (+374 – 1) 27.16.00, 27.00.03
Fax: (+374 – 1) 52.48.46
E-mail: [email protected]
Website:
September 24, 2004
National Citizens’ Initiative Examines 13 Years of Armenian Independence
Yerevan–The National Citizens’ Initiative (NCI) today convened a
specialized policy roundtable on “The 13 Years of Armenia’s Independence:
Have We Really Learned to be Independent?” On the occasion of the thirteenth
anniversary of the Republic’s independence, the meeting brought together
policy makers, public figures, academic circles, and representatives of the
mass media and NGO communities to highlight Armenia’s sovereign track record
and the challenges of transitional democracy, to reassess the bitter and
sweet of the independence era, and to analyze whether the nation has drawn
relevant lessons from the past on the road to true independence.
Hovsep Khurshudian, diaspora and economic affairs analyst of the Armenian
Center for National and International Studies (ACNIS), greeted the audience
with opening remarks. “Independence is the greatest value, without which it
is impossible to view a country’s future. However, the country should be run
so that independence really serves the people’s well-being, is fully grasped
and valued by the mainstream, and becomes a source of their pride,”
Khurshudian said.
“From Whom Must the Fatherland be Saved?” was the topical focus of Artsrun
Pepanian, a leading analyst for AR television, and based on his book of the
same title. Against the background of Armenia’s historical experience he
presented an analytical model to explain the current situation in Armenia.
According to it, “the factors of the national and the transitional phase”
are two circumstances that have had a negative impact on societal processes.
The adverse manifestations of the Armenian people’s demeanor as
circumscribed by its very history, on the one hand, and the complications
and vices brought about by the change of regime, on the other, continue to
impede Armenia’s state-building efforts and the regulation of its public
life. “The English tragedy was repeated in Armenia: a minority endowed with
authority over society came to possess the domain of public property,
whereas the traditionally obedient majority was unable to withstand those
wild elements,” he maintained, claiming that widespread public
disappointment, if allowed to continue, might arouse mass frustration. In
this case, Pepanian concluded, the strata of society will gradually stop
bearing new ideas.
Law professor Hrair Tovmasian of the Heritage Party detailed “The Legal
Heritage of Contemporary Armenia and the Challenge of Nation Building.”
Owing to a near-permanent absence of statehood, the Armenian people never
found itself at the source of legal values, and thus could not become the
real carrier of such values. “The legal basis for the country’s governance
was always imposed on us from outside, because we have always lacked the
potential for creating legal thought, both centuries ago and currently,” he
said. In the legal instruments imported from foreign sources, as a rule all
individual rights and liberties except for religious freedoms were brought
to a bare minimum. As a result, Tovmasian asserted, the Armenian individual
has had to bypass the law, which in the course of centuries has led
behaviorally to legal nihilism.
The remainder of the session was devoted to exchanges of views and policy
recommendations among the public figures and policy specialists in
attendance. Noteworthy were interventions by MP Grigor Haroutiunian of the
People’s Party of Armenia; Vigen Khachatrian of the Liberal Democratic
Party; Vardan Khachatrian, theology professor at Yerevan State University;
former minister of state Hrach Hakobian; Alexander Butaev and Albert
Baghdasarian of the National Democratic Union; Aramazd Zakarian of the
Republic Party; Edward Antinian of the Liberal Progressive Party; Petros
Makeyan of the Democratic Fatherland Party; Shant Haroutiunian of Armenia’s
Tseghakron Party; Tamar Gevorgian of the United Labor Party; and many
others.
The participants attached particular importance to the formation of a
dignified and law-based civil society, the creation of favorable conditions
for the harmonious development of the “independence generation,” the
overcoming of consequences of the clan system and Soviet remains, and by all
means the consolidation of national-state foundations and enhancement of the
people’s welfare.
The National Citizens’ Initiative is a public non-profit association founded
in 2001 by former minister of foreign affairs Raffi K. Hovannisian, his
colleagues, and fellow citizens with the purpose of realizing the rule of
law and overall improvements in the state of the state, society, and public
institutions. The National Citizens’ Initiative is guided by a Coordinating
Council, which includes individual citizens and representatives of various
public, scientific, and educational establishments. Five commissions on Law
and State Administration, Socioeconomic Issues, Foreign Policy, Spiritual
and Cultural Challenges, and the Youth constitute the vehicles for the
Initiative’s work and outreach.
For further information, please call (3741) 27-16-00 or 27-00-03; fax (3741)
52-48-46; e-mail [email protected]; or visit

FREEDOM HOUSE
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2004
ARMENIA
Political Rights: 4
Civil Liberties: 4
Status: Partly Free
GNI per capita: $790
Population: 3,200,000
Life Expectancy: 72
Religious Groups: Armenian Apostolic (94 percent),other Christian (4
percent), Yezidi (2 percent)
Ethnic Groups: Armenian (93 percent), Azeri (3 percent),Russian (2 percent),
other [including Kurd] (2 percent)
Capital: Yerevan
Trend Arrow: Armenia received a downward trend arrow for the holding of
presidential and parliamentary polls that failed to meet international
standards for democratic elections, and for the arrest and detention of
large numbers of opposition supporters.
Ten Year Ratings Timeline [OMMITTED]
Overview
The political scene in Armenia was dominated for much of 2003 by
developments surrounding the February-March presidential election and the
May parliamentary vote, both of which were condemned by international
election observers for failing to meet democratic standards. President
Robert Kocharian was reelected in a controversial second-round runoff,
taking office despite mass street demonstrations against the election
results and the detention of hundreds of opposition supporters.
Pro-presidential parties gained a majority in parliament and formed a
three-party coalition government following legislative elections. The final
verdict in the trial of those accused in the October 1999 shootings in
parliament had not been reached by November 30, while the brother of a key
opposition leader was convicted in a murder case allegedly linked to the
parliament killings. Meanwhile, ties with Russia were further strengthened
during the year as Moscow extended its control over Armenia’s energy sector.
Following a brief period of independence from 1918 to 1920, part of the
predominantly Christian Transcaucasus republic of Armenia became a Soviet
republic in 1922, while the western portion was ceded to Turkey. Armenia
declared its independence from the Soviet Union in September 1991.
The banning of nine political parties prior to the 1995 parliamentary
elections ensured the dominance of President Levon Ter Petrosian’s ruling
Armenian National Movement’s (ANM) coalition. In February 1998, Petrosian
stepped down following the resignation of key officials in protest over his
gradualist approach to solving the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the
disputed Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan. Prime Minister Robert Kocharian,
the former president of Nagorno-Karabakh, was elected president in March
with the support of the previously banned Armenian Revolutionary
Federation-Dashnaktsutiun.
Parliamentary elections in May 1999 resulted in an overwhelming victory for
the Unity bloc, a new alliance of Defense Minister Vazgen Sarkisian’s
Republican Party and former Soviet Armenian leader Karen Demirchian’s
People’s Party, which campaigned on a populist platform of greater state
involvement in the economy and increased social spending. In June, Sarkisian
was named prime minister and Demirchian became speaker of parliament.
Kocharian’s relationship with Sarkisian and Demirchian was marked by power
struggles and policy differences.
The country was plunged into a political crisis on October 27, when five
gunmen stormed the parliament building and assassinated Sarkisian,
Demirchian, and several other senior government officials. The leader of the
gunmen, Nairi Hunanian, maintained that he and the other assailants had
acted alone in an attempt to incite a popular revolt against the government.
Meanwhile, allegations that Kocharian or members of his inner circle had
orchestrated the shootings prompted opposition calls for the president to
resign. However, because of an apparent lack of evidence, prosecutors did
not press charges against Kocharian, who gradually consolidated his power
over the following year. In May 2000, Kocharian named Republican Party
leader Andranik Markarian as prime minister, replacing Vazgen Sarkisian’s
younger brother, Aram, who had served in the position for only five months
following the parliament shootings.
The trial of the five gunmen, plus eight others charged with complicity in
the parliament shootings, began in February 2001 and finally ended on
November 14, 2003. A final verdict had not been reached by the end of
November. More than four years after the massacre, many in the country
continue to believe that the gunmen were acting on orders from others and
accuse the authorities of a high-level coverup about the identity of the
masterminds of the attacks.
Despite earlier pledges by much of the perennially divided opposition to
field a joint candidate in the February 19, 2003, presidential election in
order to improve its chances of defeating Kocharian, several parties
eventually decided to nominate their own candidates. Among the nine
challengers in the presidential poll, Kocharian officially received 49.48
percent of the vote, followed by Stepan Demirchian, son of the late Karen
Demirchian, with 28.22 percent. Since no candidate received the 50 percent
plus 1 vote necessary for a first-round victory, a second-round vote was
schedule for March 5 between the top two finishers. According to
international election observers, including the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the election fell short of international
standards for democratic elections, with the voting, counting, and
tabulation processes showing serious irregularities. Other problems noted
included media bias in favor of the incumbent and political imbalances in
the election commissions.
During the days that followed, thousands rallied in the largest peaceful
demonstrations in Yerevan in years to protest alleged election falsification
and show support for Stepan Demirchian. According to a highly critical Human
Rights Watch report, police used controversial Soviet-era legislation to
arrest hundreds of opposition supporters. More than 100 were sentenced in
closed-door trials to two weeks in prison on charges of hooliganism and
participating in unsanctioned demonstrations.
In the March 5 second-round runoff, Kocharian was reelected with 67.44
percent of the vote, while Demirchian received 32.56 percent. International
observers echoed many of the same criticisms as those expressed regarding
the first-round vote. The next two months saw further mass protests against
the final results of the election and more arrests and detentions reported.
The Constitutional Court rejected appeals by opposition leaders to
invalidate the election results, although it did propose holding a
“referendum of confidence” in Kocharian within the next year to allay
widespread doubts about the validity of the election returns. Kocharian
promptly replied that he would not comply with the proposal.
The political atmosphere remained tense leading up to the May 25
parliamentary poll. Several hundred candidates were registered to compete
for the 56 singlemandate seats, while 17 parties and 4 electoral blocs
contested the 75 seats to be distributed under the proportional
representation system. The pro-presidential Republican Party, Orinats Yerkir
(Country of Law), and Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Dashnaktsutiun
secured 40, 19, and 11 seats, respectively. The Artarutiun (Justice) bloc,
which was formed in March and is comprised of more than a dozen opposition
parties, came in third place with a total of 15 seats. Thus, deputies
backing Kocharian, including a number of independent candidates who broadly
support the president, secured a majority in parliament. For the first time,
the Communist Party failed to pass the 5 percent threshold required to gain
seats under the proportional system. The OSCE and Council of Europe noted
improvements in the freedom and fairness of the campaign and media coverage
when compared with the earlier presidential poll. However, they concluded
that the election still fell short of international standards for democratic
elections, particularly with regard to the counting and tabulation of votes.
Artarutiun refused to recognize the validity of the election returns; a
formal appeal of the results was subsequently rejected by the Constitutional
Court.
A concurrent referendum on a package of constitutional amendments,
representing a wide range of issues and nearly 80 percent of the
constitution’s articles, was rejected by voters. The amendments reportedly
were not widely publicized or well understood by most of the electorate.
Although some of the proposed changes were originally intended to curb some
of the disproportionate powers of the presidency in relation to other
branches of government, opposition parties had argued that the amendments
would actually increase them. Other amendments included abolishing a ban on
dual citizenship, allowing noncitizens to vote in local elections, and
granting foreigners the right to own land in Armenia.
On June 11, the Republican Party, Orinats Yerkir, and the Armenian
Revolutionary Federation-Dashnaktsutiun agreed to form a coalition
government despite disagreements over some substantive policy issues and the
distribution of government posts among the three parties. Andranik Markarian
remained prime minister, while Orinats Yerkir chairman Artur Baghdasarian
was named speaker of parliament. The following day, Artarutiun and another
opposition party elected to parliament, the National Unity Party, boycotted
the opening session of parliament to protest the results of the
parliamentary election; they finally ended the boycott in early September.
In a politically sensational case, Armen Sarkisian, the brother of former
prime ministers Aram and Vazgen, was convicted on November 18 of ordering
the December 28, 2002, murder of Tigran Naghdalian, the head of Armenian
Public Television and Radio. Sarkisian was sentenced to 15 years in prison,
as was the trigger man, John Harutiunian, while another 11 defendants
received prison sentences of 7 to 12 years. The prosecution had argued that
Sarkisian had ordered the murder in revenge because he believed that
Naghdalian was somehow involved in the October 1999 parliament shootings, in
which his brother Vazgen had been killed. However, some opposition members
maintained that the case was a politically motivated campaign against
Armen’s brother, Aram, a vocal critic of Kocharian’s leadership. They also
believed that the murder was part of a government cover-up to prevent
Naghdalian from testifying in the ongoing trial over the parliament
shootings; Naghdalian had been in the control room of his television station
when the shootings, which were recorded on videocassettes, occurred. Critics
of the verdict questioned the validity of the evidence in the case against
him; in August, Harutiunian retracted pretrial testimony that Armen had
ordered the murder, contending that he had signed his original testimony
under duress.
Relations with Russia, which counts Armenia as its closest ally in the
Caucasus, continued to be strengthened during the year. In exchange for a
write-off of its considerable debts to Moscow, Yerevan agreed to transfer
key state-owned assets to Moscow, including six hydroelectric power plants.
In September, Armenia ratified an agreement to transfer financial control of
the Medzamor nuclear power plant to Russia. These deals will provide Moscow,
with its already substantial military interests in Armenia, with additional
political and economic leverage over Yerevan.
Despite ongoing international pressure to resolve the long-standing
NagornoKarabakh conflict, little progress was made during the year on
reaching a breakthrough. Sporadic exchanges of fire along the ceasefire line
continued, but did not escalate into full-scale fighting. At the same time,
neither Kocharian nor Azerbaijan’s president Heydar Aliev appeared willing
to risk the domestic political consequences of making major public
concessions over the disputed territory, particularly during a presidential
election year in both countries.
Political Rights and Civil Liberties
Armenians cannot change their government democratically. The 1995 and 1999
parliamentary and 1996 presidential elections were characterized by serious
irregularities. The most recent presidential and parliamentary polls, in
February-March and May 2003, respectively, were strongly criticized by
international election monitors, who cited widespread fraud particularly in
the presidential vote. The 1995 constitution provides for a weak legislature
and a strong, directly elected president who appoints the prime minister.
Most parties in Armenia are dominated by specific government officials or
other powerful figures, suffer from significant internal dissent and
division, or are weak and ineffective. President Robert Kocharian formally
belongs to no political party, but instead relies on the support of a number
of both large and small political groups, including the Republican Party of
Prime Minister Adranik Markarian. Bribery and nepotism are reportedly quite
common among government bureaucrats. In November 2003, the government
approved a long-awaited anticorruption program that had been drafted with
the support of the World Bank.
There are some limits on freedom of the press, and self-censorship among
journalists is common, particularly in reporting on Nagorno-Karabakh,
national security, or corruption issues. While most newspapers are privately
owned, the majority operate with limited resources and consequently are
dependent on economic and political interest groups for their survival.
There are a number of private television stations, and most radio stations
are privately owned. In April 2003, journalist Mger Galechian was assaulted
in his office by a group of assailants and was hospitalized with head
injuries. Galechian was a correspondent for the opposition newspaper Chorrod
Iskhanutyun, known for being strongly critical of the government. As of
November 30, parliament had not yet adopted the final version of a
controversial draft media law. International organizations and media
watchdogs criticized provisions, including one requiring media organizations
to reveal their sources of funding and another permitting the courts to
compel journalists to disclose their sources to protect the public interest.
Meanwhile, the criminal code makes libel an offense punishable by up to
three years in prison, while insulting a public official could lead to two
year’s imprisonment.
On April 3, 2002, the independent television station A1+ lost its license
after the national television and radio broadcasting commission granted a
tender for its broadcasting frequency to an entertainment channel.
Journalists and opposition politicians criticized the closure of A1+, which
had a reputation for objective reporting, as a politically motivated
decision to control media coverage in the run-up to the 2003 presidential
and parliamentary elections. Following the decision, thousands of people
demonstrated in a number of weekly protests over the station’s closure and
to demand President Kocharian’s resignation. In 2003, additional bids by A1+
for a broadcast frequency were rejected.
Freedom of religion is somewhat respected. The Armenian Apostolic Church,
to which 90 percent of Armenians formally belong, enjoys a privileged status
and has advocated for restrictions on nontraditional denominations. While 50
religious groups are officially registered, the Jehovah’s Witnesses have
been denied registration repeatedly because of the group’s strong opposition
to compulsory military service; 23 members are in prison for practicing
conscientious objection.Draft legislation providing for alternative military
service was pending in parliament as of November 2003. The law’s adoption is
likely to clear the way for the registration of the Jehovah’s Witnesses.
In general, the government does not restrict academic freedom. In September
2002, the Ministry of Education ordered the compulsory display of the
portraits of Kocharian and the head of the Armenian Apostolic Church in
secondary schools. The history of the Apostolic Church is a required school
subject.
The government generally respects freedom of assembly and association,
although the registration requirements for nongovernmental associations are
cumbersome and time-consuming. According to a report by Human Rights Watch,
the authorities abused administrative detention regulations to intimidate
and punish peaceful demonstrators and political activists following the
February 2003 presidential election. More than 100 activists were sentenced
to up to 15 days in prison for attending or engaging in acts of hooliganism
at rallies that the authorities said were unauthorized, the report stated.
The authorities arrested some individuals who were not protest organizers,
even though only leaders–and not mere participants-of unauthorized rallies
may be penalized under the country’s code of administrative offenses. After
major international organizations, including the OSCE and Council of Europe,
condemned the crackdowns, the authorities began to release some of the
arrested at the beginning of March. While the constitution enshrines the
right to form and join trade unions, in practice, labor organizations are
weak and relatively inactive.
The judiciary, which is subject to political pressure from the executive
branch, is characterized by widespread violations of due process. Police
frequently make arbitrary arrests without warrants, beat detainees during
arrest and interrogation, and use torture to extract confessions. A Human
Rights Watch report concluded that police denied access to legal counsel to
those opposition supporters who were given short prison terms for
participating in unauthorized rallies after the 2003 presidential vote. The
accused were sentenced in closed trials and denied the opportunity to
present evidence or lodge formal appeals. In April, the Constitutional Court
declared that these and other related arrests were unlawful. However, the
Council of Justice, a judicial oversight body headed by Kocharian, rejected
the Court’s recommendation to investigate the mass arrests and the conduct
of those judges who had issued the detention sentences.
In September 2003, parliament voted to abolish the death penalty in all
cases by ratifying Protocol 6 of the Council of Europe’s Convention on the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Although the abolition
of capital punishment was a major obligation of Armenia’s membership in the
Council of Europe, the government had delayed ratifying Protocol 6 largely
because of widespread support for the use of the death penalty against the
suspects in the October 1999 parliament shootings. In November, Kocharian
signed amendments to a new criminal code denying parole to those sentenced
to life imprisonment for grave crimes, including terrorist acts and
assassinations of public figures. The amendments were regarded as a
guarantee that those on trial for the parliament shootings would never be
released from prison.
Although members of the country’s tiny ethnic minority population rarely
report cases of overt discrimination, they have complained about
difficulties receiving education in their native languages.
Freedom of travel and residence is largely respected. However, registering
changes in residency is sometimes complicated by the need to negotiate with
an inefficient or corrupt government bureaucracy. While citizens have the
right to own private property and establish businesses, an inefficient and
often corrupt court system and unfair business competition hinder
operations. Key industries remain in the hands of oligarchs and influential
clans who received preferential treatment in the early stages of
privatization.
Domestic violence and trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of
prostitution are believed to be serious problems. In June 2003, the U.S.
State Department issued a report that cited Armenia as among those countries
making significant efforts to comply with minimum requirements for
eliminating trafficking. Traditional societal norms tend to limit women’s
professional opportunities to more low-skilled jobs.
—
tm

FREEDOM HOUSE:
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2004
AZERBAIJAN
Political Rights: 6
Civil Liberties: 5
Status: Not Free
GNI per capita: $710
Population: 8,200,000
Life Expectancy: 72
Religious Groups: Muslim (93 percent), RussianOrthodox (3 percent), Armenian
Orthodox (2 percent),other (2 percent)
Ethnic Groups: Azeri (90 percent), Dagestani (3 percent),Russian (3
percent), Armenian (2 percent), other (2 percent)
Capital: Baku
Ratings Change: Azerbaijan’s status declined from Partly Free to Not Free
due to the holding of seriously flawed presidential elections in October and
a subsequent government crackdown on opposition supporters.
Ten Year Ratings Timeline [OMMITTED]
Overview
The October 15, 2003 presidential election marked the end of an era in
Azerbaijan, as the ailing President Heydar Aliev, who had long dominated the
country’s political life, withdrew from the race less than two weeks before
the vote. His son, Ilham, who was widely regarded as his father’s preferred
successor, was voted head of state in an election marred by systematic and
widespread fraud. The results of the poll sparked public protests and a
violent police crackdown, followed by the detention of hundreds of
opposition supporters.
After having been controlled by the Ottoman Empire since the seventeenth
century, Azerbaijan entered the Soviet Union in 1922 as part of the
Transcaucasian Soviet Federal Republic, becoming a separate Soviet republic
in 1936. Following a referendum in 1991, Azerbaijan declared independence
from the disintegrating Soviet Union.
In June 1992, Abulfaz Elchibey, leader of the nationalist opposition
Azerbaijan Popular Front, was elected president in a generally free and fair
vote. A military coup one year later ousted him from power and installed the
former first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, Heydar Aliev, in
his place. In the October 1993 presidential elections, Aliev reportedly
received almost 99 percent of the vote. Azerbaijan’s first post-Soviet
parliamentary elections, held in November 1995, saw five leading opposition
parties and some 600 independent candidates barred from the vote in which
Aliev’s Yeni Azerbaijan Party (YAP) won the most seats. In October 1998,
Aliev was chosen president with more than 70 percent of the vote in an
election characterized by serious irregularities.
In a widely expected outcome, the ruling YAP captured the majority of seats
in the November 2000 parliamentary election. The Azerbaijan Popular Front
and the Communist Party came in a distant second and third, respectively.
International monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe cited mass electoral fraud,
including the stuffing of ballot boxes and a strong pro-government bias in
state-run media. Despite widespread criticism of the elections, the Council
of Europe approved Azerbaijan’s application for membership just days after
the vote, a decision widely criticized by international human rights groups.
An August 2002 national referendum led to the adoption of a series of
constitutional amendments, some of which critics charged would further
strengthen the ruling party’s grip on power. One particularly controversial
amendment stipulates that the prime minister becomes president if the head
of state resigns or is incapacitated. Critics charged that the aging and
ailing Aliev would appoint his son, Ilham, prime minister in order to
engineer a transfer of power. Opposition groups and the OSCE charged that
the referendum was marred by fraud, including ballot-box stuffing,
intimidation of election monitors and officials, and inflated voter-turnout
figures of nearly 90 percent.
Throughout 2002, a number of demonstrations were held to demand various
political and economic changes, including Aliev’s resignation. In June, an
unarmed protestor was shot and killed by police in the town of Nardaran, the
first time that such a tragedy had occurred since Azerbaijan’s independence
more than a decade ago. The government blamed the riots on radical Islamic
groups, although residents insisted that the authorities used these
accusations as a pretext to repress dissent. In April 2003, 15 individuals
arrested in Nardaran in 2002 were found guilty of fomenting the unrest and
given prison terms or suspended sentences; during the year, the four
defendants who had been imprisoned were pardoned and released.
In the months preceding the October 15, 2003 presidential elections, the
political atmosphere was marked by uncertainty over Aliev’s declining health
and its ramifications for his reelection bid. The 80-year old Aliev, who had
a history of heart trouble, collapsed during a live television broadcast in
April and left Azerbaijan that summer to receive medical treatment in Turkey
and the United States. At the same time, government officials continued to
deny that his health problems were serious, and he remained the official YAP
candidate for the presidential election.
Heydar Aliev’s son, Ilham, was officially nominated as a presidential
candidate in June by a group of residents from the autonomous exclave of
Nakhichevan, the home territory of the Aliev family. He was appointed prime
minister in August, but took a leave of absence from his post just days
after being appointed so that he could legally run for president (the
election code prohibits a serving prime minister from running for
president). On October 2, the elder Aliev withdrew his candidacy in favor of
his son’s.
Final figures released by the Central Election Commission showed Ilham Aliev
defeating seven challengers with nearly 77 percent of the vote. His closest
rival, opposition Musavat Party leader Isa Gambar, received only 14 percent
of the vote, while six other candidates received less than 4 percent each.
According to OSCE observers, the election was marred by widespread fraud and
failed to meet international standards for democratic elections. Among the
irregularities noted were partisan election commissions favoring the
governing party and its supporters; the failure of authorities to adequately
implement a new electoral code; the use of flawed procedures to deny
registration to several potential candidates; serious flaws in the counting
and tabulation of votes; limitations on election observation by domestic
civic groups; and biased media coverage favoring Ilham Aliev.
Meanwhile, the authorities’ obstruction of many opposition rallies and the
beating and arrest of hundreds of opposition activists overshadowed much of
the campaign and election period. After violent clashes between security
forces and demonstrators in Baku on October 15 and 16, in which at least one
person was reportedly killed and several hundred were injured, the
authorities unleashed a crackdown against the opposition in which more than
600 people were detained. Among those arrested were opposition party leaders
and supporters who had not been directly involved in the preceding days’
violence, along with many election officials who refused to certify
fraudulent election results.
In a region of the world wracked by years of instability, the ramifications
of Ilham’s victory are being watched closely by both domestic and
international observers. A post-election challenge for Ilham, who is
described as lacking his father’s commanding presence, will be consolidating
his power base among the ruling elite. At the same time, Aliev is expected
to continue many of his father’s economic policies, including supporting the
lucrative Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, a key energy project for the West.
A lasting settlement for the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, over
which Armenia and Azerbaijan fought in the early 1990s, remained elusive
during the year. The region, which is formally part of Azerbaijan, is now
predominantly ethnic Armenian and effectively under Armenian control.
Several violations of the 1994 ceasefire occurred during the summer of 2003,
although they did not erupt into full-scale fighting.
Political Rights and Civil Liberties
Citizens of Azerbaijan cannot change their government democratically. The
country’s constitution provides for a strong presidency, and in practice
parliament exercises little independence from the executive branch. The
1993, 1998, and 2003 presidential and 1995 and 2000 parliamentary elections
were considered neither free nor fair by international observers. Amendments
to the constitution, adopted in a 2002 referendum, included a provision
replacing the proportional-representation system, under which one-fifth of
the members of parliament were elected, with single-mandate constituency
races, under which the remaining four-fifths of parliament were already
chosen. Opposition parties argued that the proportional system was the only
way for them to participate in elections, since most lack nationwide
organizations.
More than 40 political parties are registered. However, most opposition
parties are weak and are based on personalities rather than political
platforms, and they have been unable to unite in lasting alliances to
challenge the government. Hundreds of opposition activists and leaders were
detained by police in the weeks surrounding the October 2003 presidential
election.
Corruption is endemic throughout Azerbaijani society, with government
officials rarely held accountable for engaging in corrupt practices.
Transparency International’s 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked
Azerbaijan 124 out of 133 countries surveyed.
Although the constitution guarantees freedom of speech and the press,
journalists who publish articles critical of the president or other
prominent state officials are routinely harassed and prosecuted, and
self-censorship is common. State-owned newspapers and broadcast media
reflect the position of the government. Independent and opposition papers
struggle financially in the face of low circulation, limited advertising
revenues, and heavy fines or imprisonment of their staff. In March, 400
delegates from some 170 print media outlets gathered to establish a press
council to address ongoing pressures faced by the country’s media. However,
an alliance of six other publications boycotted the meeting over concerns
that the selection of members to the council had not been conducted
transparently. Libel is a criminal offense. In early 2003, Elmar Huseynov,
editor-in-chief of the independent Monitor magazine, was convicted of libel
in connection with an article he wrote about the prevalence of corruption in
Azerbaijan, including comparisons of the government with the Sicilian mafia.
Huseynov has been targeted with legal harassment for several years over his
criticisms of government policies.
During the run-up and aftermath of the 2003 presidential election,
journalists suffered increased intimidation and attacks, including physical
assaults while reporting on political opposition rallies. Other restrictions
on the nonstate media included editorial interference and lawsuits for
criticizing government officials. Rauf Arifoglu, editor of the opposition
Yeni Musavat newspaper, was arrested for allegedly organizing public
demonstrations on October 16 and sentenced to three months in prison; he
remained in detention as of November 30.
The government restricts some religious activities of members of
“nontraditional” minority religious groups through burdensome registration
requirements and interference in the import and distribution of printed
religious materials. Islam, Russian Orthodoxy, and Judaism are considered
traditional religions, and their members can generally worship freely.
Some faculty members and students reportedly were pressured to support
governing-party candidates in the 2003 presidential election and were
instructed to attend pro-government events, according to an OSCE report. A
number of teachers were allegedly targeted for reduced work hours or
dismissal in connection with their membership in opposition political
parties, according to the 2003 U.S. State Department human rights report.
Security services are believed to monitor some telephone conversations and
Internet traffic, particularly of prominent political and business figures,
according to the U.S. State Department report.
The government frequently restricts freedom of assembly, particularly for
political parties critical of the government. Although a number of political
demonstrations took place without incident during the weeks surrounding the
2003 presidential election, local authorities frequently obstructed
opposition rallies and beat and arbitrarily arrested many participants of
unauthorized protests. Police assaulted dozens of party leaders,
journalists, and others at a peaceful campaign event on September 21 in
Baku. On the eve of the election, security forces attacked peaceful
protestors who had gathered in front of the headquarters of the opposition
Musavat Party. The following day, several thousand people gathered at an
unsanctioned rally at Azadliq Square in Baku to protest preliminary election
figures. After some of the participants began beating security officers and
damaging government buildings, police and military troops used excessive
force to disperse the demonstrators, killing at least one person and
injuring several hundred others. As of November 30, the government had not
arrested any law enforcement officials or announced the findings of an
investigation in connection with the violent disturbances.
Registration with the Ministry of Justice is required for a nongovernmental
organization (NGO) to function as a legal entity, and the registration
process has been described as cumbersome and nontransparent. Amendments
adopted in 2003 to NGO laws further complicated requirements for registering
grants. In 2003, several leading human rights defenders, including Eldar
Zeynalov, the chair of the Human Rights Center of Azerbaijan, were subjected
to harassment and intimidation believed to be state-sanctioned. Although the
law permits the formation of trade unions and the right to strike, the
majority of trade unions remain closely affiliated with the government, and
most major industries are state-owned. There is no effective collective
bargaining system between unions and management representatives.
The judiciary is subservient to the executive branch and is corrupt and
inefficient. Arbitrary arrest and detention are common, particularly for
members of the political opposition. Detainees are often held for long
periods before trial, and their access to lawyers is restricted. Police
abuse of suspects during arrest and interrogation reportedly remains
commonplace, with torture sometimes used to extract confessions. According
to a report by Human Rights Watch, law enforcement officials tortured many
of those detained in the post-October 2003 election crackdowns against the
political opposition. The group also documented many more cases of police
beatings during the 2003 presidential campaign than during the 2000
parliamentary election campaign. Local human rights groups maintain that
more than 100 political prisoners are held in detention throughout the
country. Prison conditions are reportedly harsh and even life-threatening,
with many inmates suffering from overcrowding and inadequate medical care.
Some members of ethnic minority groups, including the small Armenian
population, have complained of discrimination in areas including education,
employment, and housing. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Azeris who fled the
war in NagornoKarabakh have been prevented by the Armenian government from
returning to their homes and remain in Azerbaijan, often living in appalling
conditions.
Significant parts of the economy are in the hands of a corrupt elite, which
severely limits equality of opportunity. Supporters of the political
opposition face job discrimination, demotion, or dismissal. In 2003, Human
Rights Watch documented more than 100 cases in which opposition supporters
or their relatives were fired from their jobs because of their opposition
activities. Traditional societal norms and poor economic conditions restrict
women’s professional roles; there are 12 women in the country’s 125-seat
parliament. Domestic violence is a problem, and there are no laws regarding
spousal abuse. Azerbaijan is a country of origin and a transit point for the
trafficking of women for prostitution.
—
n.htm

FREEDOM HOUSE:
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2004
GEORGIA
Political Rights: 4
Civil Liberties: 4
Status: Partly Free
GNI per capita: $590
Population: 4,700,000
Life Expectancy: 77
Religious Groups: Georgian Orthodox (65 percent), Muslim (11 percent),
Russian Orthodox (10 percent), Armenian Apostilic (8 percent), other (6
percent)
Ethnic Groups: Georgian (70 percent), Armenian (8 percent),Russian (6
percent), Azeri (6 percent), Ossetian (3 percent),Abkhaz (2 percent), other
(5 percent)
Capital: Tbilisi
Ten Year Ratings Timeline [OMMITTED]
Overview
After a decade as president, Eduard Shevardnadze stepped down in 2003 in the
face of a popular uprising against his rule. Widespread reports of serious
fraud during the November parliamentary election provoked three weeks of
mass, peaceful protests that culminated in the storming of the parliament
building during the legislature’s opening session. The dramatic
confrontation led to the resignation of Shevardnadze the following day, the
cancellation of the proportional component of the parliamentary election,
and the scheduling of new presidential elections for January 4, 2004.
Meanwhile, relations with Russia continued to be marked by tensions, while a
final settlement to the protracted conflicts in the separatist regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained elusive.
Absorbed by Russia in the early nineteenth century, Georgia gained its
independence in 1918. In 1922, it entered the U.S.S.R. as a component of the
Transcaucasian Federated Soviet Republic, becoming a separate union republic
in 1936. An attempt by the region of South Ossetia in 1990 to declare
independence from Georgia and join Russia’s North Ossetia sparked a war
between rebels and Georgian forces. Although a ceasefire was signed in June
1992, the territory’s final political status remains unresolved.
Following a national referendum in April 1991, Georgia declared its
independence from the Soviet Union, which then collapsed in December.
Nationalist leader and former dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia was elected
president in May. The next year, he was overthrown by opposition forces and
replaced with former Georgian Communist Party head and Soviet foreign
minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Parliamentary elections held in 1992 resulted
in more than 30 parties and blocs gaining seats, although none secured a
clear majority.
In 1993, Georgia experienced the violent secession of the long-simmering
Abkhazia region and armed insurrection by Gamsakhurdia loyalists. Although
Shevardnadze blamed Russia for arming and encouraging Abkhazian separatists,
he legalized the presence of 19,000 Russian troops in Georgia in exchange
for Russian support against Gamsakhurdia, who was defeated and reportedly
committed suicide. In early 1994, Georgia and Abkhazia signed an agreement
in Moscow that called for a ceasefire, the stationing of Commonwealth of
Independent States troops under Russian command along the Abkhazian border,
and the return of refugees under UN supervision. In parliamentary elections
in November and December 1995, the Shevardnadze-founded Citizens’ Union of
Georgia (CUG) captured the most seats, while Shevardnadze was elected with
77 percent of the vote in a concurrent presidential poll.
The ruling CUG repeated its victory four years later, in the October 1999
parliamentary election. Election observers from the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) concluded that despite some
irregularities, the vote was generally fair. In the April 2000 presidential
poll, Shevardnadze easily won a second five-year term with a reported 81
percent of the vote. While Shevardnadze’s win was widely anticipated, the
large margin of his victory led to accusations of electoral fraud. Election
monitors noted numerous and serious irregularities, including the stuffing
of ballot boxes, inflated voter turnout figures, and a strong
pro-Shevardnadze bias in the state media.
Following the parliamentary elections, various competing factions developed
within the CUG, which had dominated Georgian politics for much of the 1990s.
Shevardnadze himself faced growing opposition from prominent members,
including then speaker of parliament Zurab Zhvania and then Justice Minister
Mikhail Saakashvili, who criticized the president’s failure to contain
widespread corruption throughout the country. While Shevardnadze resigned as
CUG chairman in September 2001, Saakashvili left the CUG to form his own
party, the National Movement, and a formal party split was ratified in May
2002. Local elections held in June saw the CUG lose its long-standing
dominance to several rival parties, including the New Rights Party, which
was formed by many prominent businessmen, the National Movement, and the
Labor Party. Subsequently, Saakashvili was named to the influential post of
chairman of the Tbilisi City Council.
With Shevardnadze legally required to step down after his second consecutive
full term in office, the November 2, 2003 parliamentary election was watched
closely as a prelude to the 2005 presidential vote that would determine his
successor. According to official Central Election Commission (CEC) results,
the For New Georgia pro-presidential coalition–led by Shevardnadze and
composed of the CUG, Socialist Party, National Democratic Party (NDP), and
Great Silk Road movement–received 21 percent of the vote. The Union of
Democratic Revival (UGR), a party led by Aslan Abashidze, the leader of the
republic of Ajaria, won almost 19 percent of the vote. Saakashvili’s
National Movement came in a close third with 18 percent, followed by the
Labor Party with 12 percent. The only other two parties to pass the 7
percent threshold to enter parliament were the opposition
Burjanadze-Democrats alliance formed by Zhvania and Speaker of Parliament
Nino Burjanadaze, which captured almost 9 percent of the vote, and the New
Rights, which secured 7 percent.
A domestic monitoring organization, the International Society for Fair
Elections and Democracy (ISFED), conducted a parallel vote tabulation,
concluding that the National Movement had won the election with nearly 27
percent of the vote, with For New Georgia placing second with about 19
percent. Monitors from the OSCE reported that the elections fell short of a
number of international standards for democratic elections. Among the
violations noted were ballot-box stuffing, inaccurate voter lists, biased
media coverage, harassment of some domestic election monitors, and pressure
on public employees to support pro-government candidates.
Over the next three weeks, major opposition party leaders, including
Saakashvili, Zhvania, and Burjanadze, launched a series of mass public
protests against widespread reports of serious electoral fraud. The
demonstrations, which received extensive coverage by the popular independent
television station Rustavi-2, were a culmination of years of deep discontent
over widespread poverty, separatist conflicts, and corruption during
Shevardnadze’s long tenure in office. A November 9 meeting between
Shevardnadze and the opposition failed to resolve the situation. The
political crisis climaxed on November 22, when a large group of protestors
led by Saakashvili burst into the parliament chamber where Shevardnadze was
addressing the legislature’s opening session. Saakashvili declared “the
velvet revolution has taken place in Georgia,” while he and his followers
distributed flowers throughout the chamber. A startled Shevardnadze, who was
quickly led out of the building by bodyguards, called the revolt a coup
d’etat and declared a state of emergency. However, the country’s military
and police refused to back Shevardnadze against the demonstrators, and no
serious incidents of violence were reported.
Russia’s foreign minister was dispatched to Georgia to mediate between
Shevardnadze and the opposition, while U.S. government officials worked
behind the scenes to ensure a peaceful transfer of power. Georgia’s
stability was regarded as crucial for both Moscow and Washington, which have
key–and often competing–strategic and economic interests in the region.
After receiving assurances for his personal safety, Shevardnadze announced
his resignation the following day, and Burjanadze was named interim
president. The Supreme Court cancelled the results of the election under the
proportional, party-list system (but not the results the single-mandate
races). Snap presidential elections were scheduled for January 4, 2004, with
Saakashvili widely considered to be the favorite for president. As of
November 30, the date of new parliamentary elections had not yet been
approved. Observers view the upcoming polls as an important test of whether
the authorities will be willing to hold democratic elections and can restore
public confidence in the country’s election process.
Georgia’s relations with Russia, which had become especially tense during
2002 over charges that Georgia was harboring Chechen rebels in its lawless
Pankisi Gorge region bordering Russia, continued to be strained in 2003. In
March, parliament ratified a bilateral security pact with the United States,
drawing angry reactions from the Russian parliament already concerned by a
U.S. antiterrorist training program for the Georgian military initiated the
previous year. Tbilisi and Moscow continued to disagree over a timetable for
the withdrawal of Russian troops from two military bases in Georgia, with
Russia insisting that it needs about a decade to do so. In May, the appeals
chamber of Georgia’s Supreme Court ruled against extraditing three Chechens
to Russia, a decision that further irritated the Kremlin. At the same time,
Russia made inroads into Georgia’s energy sector when Georgia signed a
25-year deal with the Russian energy company Gazprom in July, and Russia’s
Unified Energy Systems (UES) purchased a majority of Tbilisi’s electricity
distribution network, Telasi, in August from the U.S. energy firm AES.
Long-standing demands of greater local autonomy continued unresolved
throughout the year. A final agreement to the protracted conflict in
Abkhazia remains elusive, as leaders in Tbilisi and Sukhumi, the capital of
Abkhazia, continued to disagree on key issues, including the territory’s
final political status. While the Georgian government has stated its
willingness to grant the territory broad autonomy, Abkhazia’s leadership
continues to insist on full independence. South Ossetia has maintained de
facto independence from Tbilisi since 1992. In the southwestern region of
Ajaria, Aslan Abashidze exercises almost complete control over the
territory, which has retained considerable autonomy since 1991.
Political Rights and Civil Liberties
The November 2003 parliamentary elections fell short of international
standards for democratic elections. No voting took place in the separatist
territory of Abkhazia and parts of South Ossetia, which remained largely
outside central government control. Subsequent opposition-led mass public
protests resulted in the cancellation of the results of the poll under the
proportional, party-list system (but not the results the singlemandate
races), the resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze, and the scheduling
of fresh presidential elections for January 4, 2004. As of November 30, the
date of new legislative elections had not been decided. Most political
parties tend to be more centered around specific individuals than detailed
policy platforms.
Although the government initiated a high-profile anticorruption campaign in
2000, corruption remains endemic throughout all levels of Georgian society.
The prevalence of corruption undermined the credibility of Shevardnadze’s
government and is an obstacle to foreign investment. In its 2003 Corruption
Perceptions Index, Transparency International ranked Georgia 124 out of 133
countries surveyed.
While the country’s independent press often publishes discerning and
critical political analyses, economic difficulties limit the circulation of
most newspapers, particularly outside the capital. Independent newspapers
and television stations face some harassment by the authorities, and
journalists in government-controlled media frequently practice
self-censorship. In March, several men forced the independent Dzveli Kalaki
radio station off the air when they knocked its rooftop antenna to the
ground. The station is known for its willingness to report on politically
sensitive issues, including corruption. In July, a former police officer was
sentenced to 13 years in prison for the 2001 murder of journalist Georgy
Sanaya. Many of Sanaya’s family members and former colleagues maintain that
his killing was politically motivated and that those who masterminded his
murder remain unpunished. The independent television station Rustavi-2,
which for years faced harassment and politically motivated tax audits for
investigative reporting on issues including government corruption, broadcast
reports of voter fraud in the November 2003 election and the subsequent
protests that led to Shevardnadze’s resignation. Libel laws inhibit
investigative journalism; the Rustavi-2 investigative program “60 Minutes”
lost two separate politically motivated libel cases in 2003. In June,
parliament ratified an amendment to the criminal code imposing longer jail
sentences for slandering government officials. Although the government does
not limit Internet access, widespread poverty limits its availability to
much of the population.
Although the government does not restrict academic freedom, the quality of
the country’s educational system has been compromised by endemic corruption.
Students frequently pay bribes to receive high marks or pass entrance
examinations.
Freedom of religion is respected for the country’s largely Georgian Orthodox
population and some minority religious groups traditional to the country,
including Muslims and Jews. However, members of nontraditional religious
minority groups, including Baptists, Pentecostals, and Jehovah’s Witnesses,
face harassment and intimidation by law enforcement officials and certain
Georgian Orthodox Church extremists. Over the years, police have failed to
respond to repeated attacks by followers of defrocked Georgian Orthodox
priest Father Basili Mkalavishvili against Jehovah’s Witnesses and members
of other faiths. The attacks have included burning religious material,
breaking up religious gatherings, and beating parishioners. The Georgian
Orthodox Church and the government signed an agreement in October 2002
giving the Church a more privileged status than other religions, although it
stopped short of naming the Church as the official church of Georgia.
The authorities generally respect freedom of association and assembly. A
series of opposition-led demonstrations in November against election fraud
proceeded without incident. However, on November 19, a peaceful opposition
demonstration was violently attacked by pro-government supporters in the
southern Bolnisi district while police did not intervene. Other instances of
violence occurred during earlier opposition demonstrations in September in
Bolnisi and in October in the republic of Ajaria. Nongovernmental
organizations, including human rights groups, are able to register and
operate without arbitrary restrictions.
The constitution and Law on Trade Unions allow workers to organize and
prohibit anti-union discrimination. The Amalgamated Trade Unions of Georgia
(ATUG), the successor to the union that existed during the Soviet period, is
the principal trade union confederation. It is not affiliated with and
receives no funding from the government. The ATUG has reported cases of
workers being warned by management not to organize unions, and some workers
have been threatened for engaging in union activities. Collective bargaining
practices, though legally permitted, are not widespread.
The judiciary is not fully independent, with courts influenced by pressure
from the executive branch. The payment of bribes to judges, whose salaries
remain inadequate, is reportedly common. In 2003, Shevardnadze openly
pressured the judiciary, including in August when he called on the
Constitutional Court to consult with the government before making important
decisions. Police reportedly beat prisoners and detainees to extract
confessions and fabricate or plant evidence on suspects. Kidnapping for
ransom occurs frequently throughout the country, with senior law enforcement
officials allegedly involved. In June, three UN hostages were freed after
having spent five days in captivity in the Kodori Gorge area located between
Abkhazia and Georgia proper. Prison inmates suffer from overcrowding and
inadequate sanitation, food, and medical care.
The government generally respects the rights of ethnic minorities in
nonconflict areas of the country. Freedom of residence and the freedom to
travel to and from the country is generally respected. However, Georgia
continues to face serious refugee problems stemming from the long-standing
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as from the war in the
neighboring Russian republic of Chechnya, with repatriation efforts
proceeding slowly.
The country’s economy continued to suffer from problems including high rates
of unemployment, sporadic payment of government pensions, energy shortages,
and widespread corruption.
Sexual harassment and discrimination in the workplace are problems that are
rarely investigated. Social taboos limit the reporting and punishment of
rape and spousal abuse, and the trafficking of women abroad for prostitution
remains a problem. In June, parliament approved amendments to the criminal
code making human trafficking a criminal offense punishable by 5 to 10 years
in prison, or up to 12 years for a repeat conviction.
—
tm

FREEDOM HOUSE:
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2004
Armenia / Azerbaijan
NAGORNO-KARABAKH
Political Rights: 5
Civil Liberties: 5
Status: Partly Free
Population: 150,000
Religious Groups: Armenian Apostolic Church (majority)
Ethnic Groups: Armenian (95 percent), other (5 percent)
Ten Year Ratings Timeline [OMMITTED]
Overview
Internationally mediated efforts to find a political settlement to the
protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict made little progress in 2003. With
presidential elections scheduled for both Armenia and Azerbaijan during the
year, neither country’s leadership appeared willing to risk a public
backlash by agreeing to compromises over the disputed territory’s status.
Meanwhile, a mounting number of cease-fire violations led to concerns over a
possible threat of renewed larger-scale confrontations.
The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, a territory largely populated by
ethnic Armenians inside the former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan, was
established in 1923. In February 1988, Nagorno-Karabakh’s regional
legislature adopted a resolution calling for union with Armenia. The
announcement triggered the first mass violence related to the conflict with
attacks against Armenians in the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait several days
later.
Successive battles and counteroffensives were fought over the next several
years between various Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Nagorno-Karabakh forces. At
its inaugural session in January 1992, Nagorno-Karabakh’s new legislature
adopted a declaration of independence, which was not recognized by the
international community. By the time a Russian-brokered cease-fire was
signed in May 1994, Karabakh Armenians, assisted by Armenia, had captured
essentially the entire territory, as well as six Azerbaijani districts
surrounding the enclave. Nearly all ethnic Azeris had fled or been forced
out of the enclave and its surrounding areas, and the fighting had resulted
in thousands of casualties and an estimated one million refugees.
In December 1994, the head of Nagorno-Karabakh’s state defense committee,
Robert Kocharian, was selected by the territory’s parliament for the newly
established post of president. Parliamentary elections were held in April
and May 1995, and Kocharian defeated two other candidates in a popular vote
for president in November of the following year.
In September 1997, Foreign Minister Arkady Ghukasian was elected to replace
Kocharian, who had been named prime minister of Armenia in March of that
year. In the territory’s June 2000 parliamentary vote, 123 candidates
representing five parties competed for the assembly’s 33 seats. The ruling
Democratic Union Artsakh (ZhAM), which supported Ghukasian, enjoyed a slim
victory, winning 13 seats. The Related Territories Reports 643 Armenian
Revolutionary Federation – Dashnaktsutiun won 9 seats, the Armenakan Party
captured 1 seat, and formally independent candidates, most of whom supported
Ghukasian, won 10. International observers described the electoral campaign
and voting process as calm and largely transparent, although problems were
noted with the accuracy of some voter lists.
In February 2001, former Defense Minister Samvel Babayan was found guilty of
organizing a March 2000 assassination attempt against Ghukasian and
sentenced to 14 years in prison. His supporters insisted that the arrest was
politically motivated, as Babayan had been involved in a power struggle with
Ghukasian. Others, however, welcomed the arrest and conviction of Babayan,
who had been accused of corruption and reportedly wielded considerable
political and economic power in the territory.
Ghukasian was reelected to a second term as president on August 11, 2002,
with 89 percent of the vote. His closest challenger, former parliament
speaker Artur Tovmasian, received just 8 percent. Voter turnout was close to
75 percent. Observers from countries including the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France reported no serious violations. While a number of
domestic and international nongovernmental organizations concluded that the
elections marked a further step in Nagorno-Karabakh’s democratization, they
did voice some criticisms, including the limited access for the opposition
to state-controlled media. Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry described the
election as a violation of international norms, insisting that a legitimate
vote could be held only after a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
With both Armenia’s president, Robert Kocharian, and Azerbaijan’s president,
Heydar Aliev, poised to seek reelection in 2003 – and the domestic political
risk associated with either leader’s making significant public concessions
over the territory during a campaign year – few observers expected any
breakthroughs in the conflict during 2003. An upsurge in shooting incidents
along the ceasefire line in the summer, which both Armenian and Azerbaijani
officials accused the other side of instigating, fueled concerns of a
further and more widespread escalation of violence. Meanwhile, speculation
grew over the impact of Aliev’s failing health and the October election of
his son, Ilham, to succeed him as president on prospects for a negotiated
settlement to the conflict.
Despite continued high-level discussions in the framework of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Minsk Group – which
was established a decade earlier to facilitate dialogue on a political
settlement on Nagorno-Karabakh’s status – a resolution of the long-standing
dispute remained elusive at year’s end. While Yerevan insists that
Nagorno-Karabakh should be left outside Azeri jurisdiction, Baku maintains
that the territory may be granted broad autonomy while remaining a
constituent part of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan also has refused to negotiate
with Ghukasian, who has demanded direct representation in the peace process.
Political Rights and Civil Liberties
A self-declared republic, Nagorno-Karabakh has enjoyed de facto
independence from Azerbaijan since 1994 while retaining close political,
economic, and military ties with Armenia. Parliamentary elections in 1995
and 2000 were regarded as generally free and fair, as were the 1996 and
1997 presidential votes. However, the elections were considered invalid by
most of the international community that does not recognize 644 Freedom in
the World – 2004 Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence. Nagorno-Karabakh’s
electoral law calls for a single-mandate system to be used in
parliamentary elections; lawmakers have rejected the opposition’s demands
for the inclusion of party-based lists.
The territory officially remains under martial law, which imposes
restrictions on civil liberties, including media censorship and the banning
of public demonstrations. However, the authorities maintain that these
provisions have not been enforced since 1995, a year after the cease-fire
was signed.
The government controls many of the territory’s broadcast media outlets, and
most journalists practice self-censorship, particularly on subjects dealing
with policies related to Azerbaijan and the peace process. Some observers
maintain that the government used the attempted murder of President Arkady
Ghukasian in 2000 as a pretext to intensify attacks against its critics.
The registration of religious groups is required under Nagorno-Karabakh’s
1997 law on religion. The Armenian Apostolic Church, which is the territory’
s predominant religion, is the only faith registered with the state.
According to Forum 18, a religious-freedom watchdog group based in Norway,
members of various minority faiths, including Pentecostals, Adventists,
Baptists, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, have faced restrictions on their
activities. In 2003, a local Baptist was beaten, was threatened with
mind-altering drugs, and had threats made against his wife by law
enforcement officials for distributing religious literature on the street,
Forum 18 reported; authorities denied that any threats were made against
him.
Freedom of assembly and association is limited, although political parties
and unions are allowed to organize.
The judiciary, which is not independent in practice, is influenced by the
executive branch and powerful political and clan forces. Former defense
minister Samvel Babayan alleged that he had been physically assaulted during
his interrogation and detention as a suspect in the failed assassination
attempt against President Ghukasian in March 2000. The presiding judge in
the case announced that the subsequent guilty verdict against Babayan was
based on pretrial testimony in which Babayan confessed to the charges,
although he later retracted his admission of guilt, claiming that it had
been obtained under duress. The republic’s government announced that it had
replaced the death penalty with life imprisonment as of August 1, 2003.
The majority of those who fled the fighting continue to live in squalid
conditions in refugee camps in Azerbaijan, while international aid
organizations are reducing direct assistance to the refugees. Landmine
explosions continue to result in casualties each year, with children and
teenagers among the most vulnerable groups. According to the International
Committee of the Red Cross, at least 50,000 anti-personnel mines were laid
during the war, although in many cases, records of minefield locations were
never created or were lost. The HALO Trust, a British nongovernmental
organization, is the major de-mining group operating in the territory.
Nagorno-Karabakh’s fragile peace has failed to bring significant improvement
to the economy, particularly in the countryside, and pensioners are
particularly hard hit. Widespread corruption, a lack of substantive economic
reforms, and the control of major economic activity by powerful elites limit
equality of opportunity for most residents.
—
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

A1 Plus | 18:27:27 | 24-09-2004 | Social |
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE APPROPRIATED
One of international organisations has sent 650 tons wheat seeds as
assistance to the republic’s six regions stricken by frost in 2002 and 2003.
It became known recently that 2,100 kg of that amount were distributed
wrongly.
Journalists without borders organisation discussed that incident Friday.
The thing is that Lyudvig Khlghatyan, the headman of Armavir region’s
Dimitrov village, pocketed the aid using his levers.
A suit was filed against him. Villagers say wrongdoer Khlghatyan is backed
by more senior officials. In particular, territorial regulation an
industrial infrastructures minister Hovik Abrahamyan had been named very
often in this connection.
Assyrians make the village population’s 30 percent. That’s why the villagers
view the incident as ethnic minorities’ rights discrimination. The minister’
s deputy Gagik Aslanyan says his chief can’t tolerate persons like Hovik
Abrahamyan.
He promised that things will be put right.
Armenian PM’s adviser on ethnic minorities issues Hranush Kharatyan says
minority tinge will help to solve the problem. If the village was completely
Armenian, there would be less chances for solving the issue through court.