Zaman, Turkey
Oct 18 2004

‘Turkey will Enliven Aging Europe’

Kalypso Nicolaidis, a professor at Oxford University and the French
National Administration School, predicts that Turkey would have a
‘Viagra’ effect on Europe in terms of population, economics, and
politics upon Europe. Nicolaidis explained that Turkey’s young and
dynamic population would provide great opportunity to Europe, which
is getting older day by day. Nicolaidis emphasized that Turkey’s
membership would not be the danger to ‘strong Europe’ as the French
imagine.

In a meeting on Turkey held at the French International Research
Center attended by Turkish parliamentarians and French social
scientists, Nicolaidis, EU advisor to Yorgo Papendreu, likened Turkey
to ‘Viagra’. Nicolaidis explained that Turkey would bring dynamism in
political and economic areas in addition to boosting the population.
While the metaphor caused people to laugh at the meeting, the
academician of Greek origin said he would write an article with this
title. In a statement to Zaman, Nicolaidis said, ‘Turkey should focus
on the question, “How will we respond to the prejudices of the
European public?”

Diasporas Produce Prejudice

At a meeting with French parliamentarians and government members last
week in Paris, Aydin Apaydin, the co-chair of the Turkey-European
Union (EU) Mixed Parliamentary Commission disclosed that the work of
the Armenian Diasporas was behind France’s prejudices against Turkey.
Apaydin said that a senator had said: “The Armenian Diaspora has
nourished the French public for years. There is also a campaign that
‘another Diaspora’ will come here as refugees. It is not possible for
the French people to change their views quickly when they have been
nourished with these arguments for years.” Apaydin told Zaman that
French politicians would bring up the alleged Armenian genocide issue
sooner or later.

10.17.2004
Ali Ihsan Aydin
Paris

PINR – The Power and Interest News Report
Oct 18 2004

”Russia’s Slippery Foothold in Abkhazia”

n October 3, presidential elections were held in Abkhazia, a
mini-state on the Black Sea that broke away from Georgia in 1993,
after a war of independence that cost several thousand lives and
created at least a quarter million Georgian refugees (more than half
the region’s population) through ethnic cleansing. The first
contested elections in Abkhazia since it achieved de facto
independence (the mini-state is not recognized by any foreign
government), they were meant to enhance Abkhazia’s international
credibility. Instead, the elections have thrown the mini-state into
political confrontation and temporary paralysis in the wake of a
nearly even split of votes between the two leading candidates —
Moscow-backed Raul Khajimba and businessman Sergei Bagapsh.

With a small population of which ethnic Abkhazians are the third
largest group after Russians and Armenians, and suffering from
economic sanctions and a Georgian blockade, the mini-state has
depended for its existence on Russian economic support and military
protection in the form of “peacekeepers” from the Confederation of
Independent States. The United Nations also monitors the stand-off,
but Russia plays the decisive role in maintaining the status quo,
pending the restart of stalled negotiations between Abkhazia and
Georgia, which seeks support from the Euro-American alliance, which
backs Georgian claims to sovereignty over Abkhazia.

Abkhazia has strategic importance for all of the interests involved
in its fate. Fearing extermination as an ethnic group with its own
territory, the Abkhazians are determined to do anything possible to
preserve their tenuous hold on independence. The pro-Western Georgian
regime of President Mikhail Saakashvili, which must attempt to
satisfy nationalist sentiment, is equally committed to bringing
Abkhazia under Tbilisi’s control and repatriating Georgian refugees.
The Euro-American alliance wants to contain instability in the
Transcaucasus so that oil supplies from the Caspian Sea are secure as
they flow through Georgia, which is at the center of the Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline. The West is also interested in thwarting attempts by Russia
to reassert influence in the Transcaucasus, which it lost after the
fall of the Soviet Union. Russia, in contrast, is using Abkhazia as a
means to gain a foothold in the Transcaucasus and check Euro-American
bids for hegemony in the region.

Within this pattern of conflicting interests, Russia is the only
actor in the position to alter the status quo decisively — Moscow
can choose to deepen its support of Abkhazia, even to the point of
recognizing its independence officially, or it can move toward a
settlement that would restore Georgian sovereignty over the
mini-state in return for a greater share of influence in the
Transcaucasus. From the geostrategic perspective, Abkhazia is a test
of Russian power — all the other actors are locked in their
positions by virtue of their perceived interests relative to the
regional balance of power, whereas the course of action that would
maximize Russian power is an open issue that divides Moscow’s
security establishment.

Russia’s Shaky Foothold

The international status of Abkhazia was determined officially by a
1999 declaration at the Istanbul summit of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed by Russia, the United
States and European powers, that affirmed “strong support for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia” and branded earlier
presidential elections in Abkhazia as “unacceptable and
illegitimate.” Although Moscow has abided by the declaration to the
extent that it has maintained a public stance in favor of a
negotiated settlement that would restore some form of Georgian
sovereignty, its actions on the ground have supported the
mini-state’s independence.

Moscow’s “two-track policy” worked effectively to prolong the status
quo until Georgia’s 2004 “Rose Revolution” that brought Saakashvili’s
pro-Western and nationalist regime to power. Tbilisi’s posture of
calling for a diplomatic settlement that would grant Abkhazia
“generous autonomy” and simultaneously threatening force against the
mini-state if it did not meet Georgian demands has caused rethinking
in Moscow.

It is undisputed that Sukhumi is a client of Moscow. Approximately
three-quarters of Abkhazia’s residents have Russian citizenship and
passports, the mini-state uses the ruble rather than the Georgian
lari as its currency, Russian investments and Russian tourists to its
Black Sea beaches (400,000 in the past year) are essential to its
faltering economy, and Moscow provides pensions to many Abkhazians.
With more than half its population unemployed and endemic crime as a
result, the Sukhumi regime would collapse without Moscow’s economic
support and military presence.

The question for Moscow now is what to do with its preponderant
influence in Abkhazia. That question becomes relevant because
Tbilisi’s tilt toward the West has altered the balance of power in
the Transcaucasus, disadvantaging Russian interests. The more
assertive that Tbilisi becomes, the more pressure Moscow is under to
move Abkhazia out of its state of limbo. The Euro-American alliance,
which wants the conflict resolved diplomatically in Georgia’s favor,
is a restraining influence that forestalls military action by
Tbilisi, but it also emboldens Tbilisi to count on its demands
eventually being met.

Moscow decision makers are, in general, divided into factions that
still hold out for some accommodation with the West and others that
believe that Russia needs to go it alone and rebuild its spheres of
influence wherever possible. The debate is complicated by the
contradiction between Russia’s appeal to its sovereignty in Chechnya
and its de facto opposition to Georgia’s similar claims. The
two-track policy toward Sukhumi is an example of how the broad
division of Russia’s political class on the country’s strategic
doctrine often results in compromises and stalemating positions.
Tbilisi’s pro-Western orientation has provided opportunities for
Moscow hardliners to gain some leverage over their opponents and to
press their “neo-imperialist” vision of Russia’s strategic future.

Evidence of increasing power for Moscow’s hardliners is the opening
up in September of direct rail traffic between Russia and Abkhazia.
The move was met with charges from Tbilisi that Moscow was attempting
to “annex” the mini-state. Moscow replied that Tbilisi’s assertive
position threatened to ignite a general war in the Caucasus. Russian
President Vladimir Putin made it plain that neither economic nor
military pressure would resolve the problem of Abkhazia and blessed
the rail link. Moscow’s stand is that the rail link will improve
trade in the Caucasus, which skirts the sovereignty question.

In addition to weakening the economic blockade of Abkhazia
significantly, Moscow also approved of the presidential elections
there, against the position of the United States and European powers
that they were illegitimate. Successful competitive elections would
have enhanced Sukhumi’s claims to legitimacy, open the way to the
possibility of formal recognition, or at least some associated status
for the mini-state with Russia or with the alliance of Moscow and
Belarus. As it turned out, the elections ended in confusion and
indecision, marking a setback, though not a defeat, for Moscow’s
hardliners.

Abkhazia’s Elections

Abkhazia’s continued close relations with and dependence on Russia
was not an issue in the recent presidential elections. The population
of Abkhazia that remained after the expulsion and flight of its
Georgian majority has been firmly in favor of outright union with
Russia, some kind of formal association with it or regularized
independence under Russian protection. That consensus is rooted in
the preference of the ethnic Russian and Armenian segments of the
population for Russia over Georgia, and most of all, an ethnic Abkhaz
resistance to Georgian rule that is based on historical experience.

Although Georgian and Abkhazian claims are traced by their advocates
through competing histories dating back to the Middle Ages, the
proximate situation triggering the present conflict was the change in
Abkhazia’s status in the Soviet Union under Stalin’s regime in 1931
from an autonomous republic in its own right to an autonomous
republic of Georgia. Under Stalinist rule, Georgians were encouraged
to settle in Abkhazia, and Abkhazian culture, which had only acquired
a written alphabet in the late nineteenth century, was downgraded.
When the Soviet Union broke apart in 1991, Georgian nationalists led
by Zviad Gamsakhurdia took control of the new state, proclaiming a
“Georgia for the Georgians” policy. Fearing ethnic extinction or at
least subjection, the Abkhazians resisted, resulting in the 1992-1993
war of independence, won by Abkhazia with the help of fighters from
related Caucasian peoples — notably the Chechens — and support from
Moscow.

With the Russian-Chechen conflict intensifying, the Chechens tilted
toward Georgia, leaving Abkhazia with only Moscow’s de facto backing.
All five candidates in the recent election pledged loyalty to Moscow,
reflecting the anti-Georgian consensus in the mini-state. Their only
differences, if any, hinged on vague distinctions between the kind
and degree of “independence” that Abkhazia should enjoy.

The election was primarily fought over economic issues, revolving
around the power of different factions in economic institutions. The
two leading candidates represented different factions, with Khajimba
leading the existing power structure and Bagapsh calling for
“reform,” which he promised would not affect existing property
relations. This division, which had less to do with policy than
personnel, made Khajimba the clear favorite, because he had been the
only candidate to be granted a meeting with Putin, including a photo
opportunity. Khajimba, an ex-K.G.B. agent and prime minister of
Abkhazia under the outgoing regime of Vladislav Ardzinba — who had
governed the region from the Soviet era — was seen as Moscow’s man
and he was given campaign support by Moscow political operatives.

Khajimba’s opponent Bagapsh had also been an official in the Soviet
regime and was currently head of the national energy company. He had
formed a coalition of opposition groups, including the following of
Alexander Ankvab, a popular ex-interior minister of Abkhazia, who had
been excluded from candidacy on a technicality.

The election was far closer than analysts expected and was marred by
charges of ballot rigging and intimidation, especially in the Gali
district, which has a large Georgian population, among which are
repatriated refugees. After a week of confusion and a revote in Gali,
which the leading candidates agreed to, although it violated the
mini-state’s constitution, the Central Electoral Commission declared
Bagapsh the winner with 50.08 percent of the vote, triggering the
resignation of three of its members, a suit by Khajimba challenging
the election’s validity and Ardzinba’s refusal to countenance its
results. The fate of the election is now in the hands of Abkhazia’s
Supreme Court.

Analysts attribute Moscow’s failure to have its candidate score a
clear-cut victory to heavy-handed campaign tactics by Khajimba’s
Russian operatives, especially a pop concert on the eve of the
elation, which many voters considered a crude attempt to pander to
them for support. As the situation stands, however, Moscow has not
lost much ground from the election fiasco. Both Bagapsh and Khajimba
remain pro-Moscow and, although each warns that the other is flirting
with civil war, Abkhazian dependence on Russia and unity against
Georgia will probably contain any fratricidal tendencies. At most,
the hardliners in Moscow have lost the aura of legitimacy that they
wanted for the mini-state, and they still even might gain that if the
judicial system successfully resolves the electoral conflict.

Conclusion

In light of Euro-American reluctance to do any more than urge a
negotiated resolution to the Abkhazia problem that asserts Georgian
sovereignty, while refraining from backing that position militarily
or economically, Moscow is free to experiment with a neo-imperialist
policy in the Transcaucasus, attempting to keep Chechnya in Russia
and Georgia out of Abkhazia.

At the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on October 11,
Russian delegate Alexander Fomenko argued that Abkhazia was not
historically part of Georgia, but was a “gift” from Stalin, echoing
the Abkhazian “historical argument” for independence. Moscow’s more
assertive posture toward the West is a sign that it is beginning to
dig in for a protracted confrontation in the Caucasus that will test
its will and the resolve of the West.

Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based
publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide
insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around
the globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and
interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This
report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the
written permission of [email protected]. All comments should be
directed to [email protected].

The Brown and White
Oct 18 2004

Distinguished panel of journalists hold forum
By Megan Schuler
Online News Writer
10/17/2004

The upcoming presidential election is very important to the future of
the world, a panel of journalists said Wednesday.

`The future of world government is at stake,” Sema Emiroglu, a
panelist from Turkey, said. “Kerry would win in a landslide if the
world voted.”

The panelists included five foreign correspondents from their
respective country’s journalism publications. They included Philippe
Coste, from L’Express, a French news magazine; Khaled Dawoud from
Al-Ahram, an Arab paper; Sema Emiroglu, from Milliyet, a Turkish
paper; He Hongze from The People’s Daily, a Chinese newspaper; and
Antonio Pasini from America Oggi, a US-based Italian daily newspaper.

The purpose of the panel discussion was to give audience members a
foreign perspective about the upcoming election and views of Bush’s
policies towards Iraq.

`The outcome of this election will shape the future of the world.
[The Prime Minister of Italy] is putting his political future in
this,’ Pasini said.

Hongze also agreed about the results.

`The number one issue is the Taiwanese, is worrisome, especially the
sale of arms,” Honze said. “The situation is now quite dangerous.
This election affects US/China relations.”

The discussion mainly focused on the war in Iraq.

`’My way or the highway’ attitude caused animosity. Turkey thought
the [Iraq] war was illegal,’ Emiroglu said.

`[The US thought] once we have a stronghold [in the Middle East],
there will be a domino effect, making the region pro-Western,’ said
Coste.

Dawoud said, `[Kerry] said he does not plan to occupy Iraq. [This
administration] is building military bases in Iraq.’

The war threatens possible stability in the region.

`Whatever happens in Iraq affects [Turkey],’ Emiroglu said. `There is
the possibility of civil war. If the Kurdish region becomes
independent, that is a huge threat to Turkey.’

All panelists agreed that world sympathy for the US after 9/11
quickly disappeared after Bush’s policies were started.

`He squandered all the worldwide support after 9/11. [Support]
started to erode with the attack on Iraq,’ Pasini said.

Emiroglu said, `Bush alienated the world, bullied allies, came [to
the Middle East] when it was advantageous. It cost the US
credibility. [The US] created more enemies at a time when they needed
friends.”

`I think people do not hate Bush, they hate his foreign policy,’ said
Hongze.

There was reference to a report that tried to justify the war in Iraq
even though there were no weapons of mass destruction.

Dawoud said, `To try to justify war, a team set out to predict what
Iraq capability would have been in 2008. In 2003, Iraq had 30% of its
1991 power.’

Pasini offered an explanation for the administration pursuing the
Iraq War.

`From Day One, this administration was planning a war with Iraq, and
they finally got an excuse [with 9/11],’ he said.

Coste said that if John Kerry was elected, problems would still
exist.

`John Kerry thought it was okay to commit European allies around him
if he was elected. [We are] afraid of ill-defined pressure,’ he said.

For Turkish-Americans, the recognition of the Armenian genocide is
their main issue.

`Kerry’s pro-Armenian position is important to us,’ said Emiroglu.
Each president has promised to recognize the event, but all have
reneged.

The panel discussion was sponsored by Global Union, International
Relations, Department of Journalism and Communication and Department
of Political Science.

This event happened on Wednesday in Whitaker 303, hours before the
final Presidential debate took place.

Taipei Times, Taiwan
Oct 18 2004

Jerusalem’s Christian’s decry attacks by Jews

RELIGIOUS DISPUTE: Christians say they are being harassed by a few
fanatical Jews — and that the problem is being ignored by religious
leaders

THE OBSERVER , LONDON
Monday, Oct 18, 2004,Page 6

“The problem is the very religious. It’s a question of education.
What must these people be learning to behave like this?”

Bishop Aris Shirvanian of the Armenian church

Jerusalem’s Christian community has demanded that Jewish leaders and
the Israeli government take action against what they claim is growing
harassment of their clergy by religious Jews.

Christians say ultra-Orthodox Jewish students spit at them or at the
ground when they pass. There have also been acts of vandalism against
statues of the Virgin Mary.

The harassment came to a head last week when a Jewish student spat at
Armenian Archbishop Nourhan Manougian and ripped off his crucifix,
whereupon the archbishop slapped him. The police questioned both men.

Mainstream Israeli opinion has been revolted by the revelations of
the abuse of Christian clergy. Avraham Poraz, the interior minister,
condemned the trend of spitting at the cross and those wearing it,
saying it was “intolerable” and that he was “revolted” by it. A
former chief rabbi also voiced his outrage.

All the Christian groups complain of harassment, but the Armenians
bear the brunt. Armenian clergymen said that, when they complained to
the interior minister seven months ago, he told them: “Most Jews have
a big problem with them as well.”

The 3,000-strong community live in the Armenian quarter and many Jews
walk through it on their way from west Jerusalem to the Wailing Wall
or Western Wall.

Father Pakrad Bourjekian, a spokesman for the Armenian church, said
the attack was an extreme example of the harassment they receive
every day. “Every day the fanatical Jews turn their face to the wall
or spit on the ground or at us when they see the crucifix,” he said.

The Christians admit that it is only a minority who carry out the
abuse, but they feel that the issue is being ignored by religious
leaders.

Bishop Aris Shirvanian of the Armenian church said: “The majority are
courteous or indifferent. The problem is the very religious. It’s a
question of education. What must these people be learning to behave
like this?”

The old city of Jerusalem is buzzing with rumors that young Armenians
will take revenge for the attack and the daily indignities suffered
by their priests.

Aris acknowledged that there was a danger of reprisals. “We are
trying to control our young people and we are succeeding. But the
question is that there is no one in the Jewish community trying to
control their fanatics,” he said.

Jerusalem has always been a city of conflict. Even the old Christian
churches — the Armenian, Orthodox, Coptic, Syrian, Ethiopian and
Catholic — are known for their disputes, which regularly result in
brawls.

Daily Iowan , IA
Oct 18 2004

Int’l students watch campaign with interest
By Arna Wilkinson – The Daily Iowan

Ferzan Akalin, a UI graduate student and one-year Iowa City resident,
has been watching the presidential debates and is leaning toward Sen.
John Kerry. She is adamant about voting in her native Turkey, but she
is not able to vote in the United States.

Although they will not cast a ballot, Akalin and other UI
international students are following the presidential race closely,
concerned with how the outcome will affect their countries.

“George Bush didn’t care about cooperating with his allies, and
that’s why he’s getting lots of reactions from other countries and
people,” Akalin said. “The next president should be working harder to
have better relationships with his neighbors.”

Yet, Akalin said, a Turkish newspaper had reported Kerry as
supporting the recognition of genocide against Armenians by Turkey
during World War I. Preceded by decades of conflict between the
Ottoman Empire and Armenians, approximately 1.75 million Armenians in
Turkey were deported by the government, resulting in 600,000 deaths.
Armenians contend it was genocide, a charge the Turkish government
disputes.

“The candidates promise a lot of things for votes, but this should
not be an issue,” Akalin said.

Evans Ochola, a UI graduate student from Kenya who has lived in Iowa
City for four years, said he would not vote in the U.S. elections if
he could, despite an interest in politics.

“I think that voting should be left for citizens – people that are
citizens should vote,” he said. “I would not want to dilute the
process.”

What amazes him most, he said, is the fairness of the debates.

“No one is being taken to jail. Both sides can say what they want
without anyone victimizing them,” he said. “You don’t see that in
most African countries.”

Even with a recent peaceful election in Kenya, Ochola said, he would
welcome presidential debates in his country’s election process,
adding they can indicate candidates’ personalities and intellects.

UI graduate student Prem Ramakrishnan, a four-year U.S. resident,
said everyone in his native India is watching American politics.

“We do follow American politics because our kin are here. If
something goes wrong here, it will affect the others” in India, he
said, adding he was concerned about the fluctuating number of work
permits offered by the U.S. government, along with the war in Iraq.

Ramakrishnan, who watches CNN and reads Indian newspapers, said
American and Indian campaigns are different because of ethnic
diversity in India, where more than 14 different constitutionally
recognized languages are spoken in 28 states and six union
territories.

“I like the [American} system; it looks orderly, I can follow it
easily,” said Ramakrishnan. “The majority of the issues are the same,
but there are difficulties because of different languages and
ethnicities.”

Frontpagemag.com
Oct 18 2004

Islam: A Totalitarian Ideology?
By FrontPage Magazine

Below, Ibn Warraq, the author of Why I am Not a Muslim, argues that
Islam is a totalitarian ideology. A rebuttal follows from Thomas
Haidon, a member of the Board of Advisors and President of the New
Zealand Chapter of the Free Muslim Coalition Against Terrorism — The
Editors.

Islam. A Totalitarian Ideology

By Ibn Warraq

Islam is a totalitarian ideology that aims to control the religious,
social and political life of mankind in all its aspects — the life
of its followers without qualification, and the life of those who
follow the so-called tolerated religions to a degree that prevents
their activities from getting in the way of Islam in any manner. And
I mean Islam. I do not accept some spurious distinction between Islam
and `Islamic fundamentalism’ or `Islamic terrorism.’ The terrorists
who planted bombs in Madrid on March 11, 2004, and those responsible
for the death of approximately 3000 people on September 11, 2001 in
New York, and the Ayatollahs of Iran, were and are all acting
canonically. Their actions reflect the teachings of Islam, whether
found in the Koran, in the acts and teachings of the Prophet
Mohammed, or in Islamic Law that is based upon them.

Islamic Law, the Sharia, is the total collection of theoretical laws
that apply in an ideal Muslim community that has surrendered to the
will of God. According to Muslims, it is based on divine authority
that must be accepted without criticism, doubts and questions. As an
all-embracing system of duties to God, Sharia controls the entire
life of the believer and the Islamic community. An individual living
under Islamic Law is not free to think for himself.

Given the totalitarian nature of Islamic law, Islam does not value
the individual, who has to be sacrificed for the sake of the Islamic
community. Collectivism has a special sanctity under Islam. Under
these conditions, minorities are not tolerated in Islam. Freedom of
opinion and the freedom to change one’s religion, the act of
apostasy, are punishable by death. Under Muslim law, the male
apostate must be put to death, as long as he is an adult, and in full
possession of his faculties. If a pubescent boy apostatizes, he is
imprisoned until he comes of age, when if he persists in rejecting
Islam he must be put to death.

Drunkards and the mentally disturbed are not held responsible for
their apostasy. If a person has acted under compulsion he is not
considered an apostate, his wife is not divorced and his lands are
not forfeited. According to Hanafis and Shia, a woman is imprisoned
until she repents and adopts Islam once more, but according to the
influential Ibn Hanbal, and the Malikis and Shafiites, she is also
put to death. In general, execution must be by the sword, though
there are examples of apostates tortured to death, or strangled,
burnt, drowned, impaled or flayed. The caliph Umar used to tie them
to a post and had lances thrust into their hearts, and the Sultan
Baybars II (1308-09) made torture legal.

The absence of any mention of apostasy in the penal codes of some
contemporary Islamic countries in no way implies that a Muslim is
free to leave his religion. In reality, the lacunae in the penal
codes are filled by Islamic Law, as in the case of Muhammad Taha,
executed for apostasy in the Sudan in 1985, and hundreds of others
have been executed for apostasy in Iran in recent years. In 1998
Ruhollah Rowhani, 52, was hanged for converting to the Baha’i faith
in Iran.

All Islamic human rights schemes such as the 1981 Universal Islamic
Declaration of Human Rights; the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in
Islam (circa 1990), etc., severely restrict and qualify the rights of
individuals, particularly women, and minorities such as non-Muslims
and those such as apostates, unbelievers, and heretics who do not
accept Islamic religious orthodoxy.

As for religious minorities, the relations of Muslims and non-Muslims
were set in a context of a war: jihad. The totalitarian nature of
Islam is nowhere more apparent than in the concept of Jihad, the Holy
War, whose ultimate aim is to conquer the entire world and submit it
to the one true faith, to the law of Allah. To Islam alone has been
granted the truth — there is no possibility of salvation outside it.
It is the sacred duty — an incumbent religious duty established in
the Koran and the Traditions — of all Muslims to bring it to all
humanity. Jihad is a divine institution, enjoined specially for the
purpose of advancing Islam. Muslims must strive, fight and kill in
the name of God:

IX .5-6: “Kill those who join other gods with God wherever you may
find them.”

IX. 29: “Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor
hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His
Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are)
of the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya with willing
submission, and feel themselves subdued.”

IV.76: “Those who believe fight in the cause of God…”

VIII.12: “I will instil terror into the hearts of the Infidels,
strike off their heads then, and strike off from them every
fingertip.”

Mankind is divided into two groups – Muslims and non-Muslims. The
Muslims are members of the Islamic community, the umma, who possess
territories in the Dar ul Islam, the Land of Islam, where the edicts
of Islam are fully promulgated. The non-Muslims are the Harbi, people
of the Dar ul Harb, the Land of Warfare, any country belonging to the
infidels that has not been subdued by Islam but which, nonetheless,
is destined to pass into Islamic jurisdiction either by conversion or
by war (Harb).

All acts of war are permitted in the Dar ul Harb. Once the Dar ul
Harb has been subjugated, the Harbi become prisoners of war. The imam
can do what he likes to them according to the circumstances. Usually
they are sold into slavery, exiled or treated as dhimmis, who are
tolerated as second class subjects, as long as they pay the kharaj, a
kind of land tax, and the jizya, the poll-tax, which had to be paid
individually at a humiliating public ceremony to remind the
non-Muslim minorities that they were inferior to the believers, the
Muslims.

In all litigation between a Muslim and a dhimmi, the validity of the
oath or testimony of the dhimmi is not recognized. In other words,
since a dhimmi was not allowed to give evidence against a Muslim, his
Muslim opponent is always exonerated. No Muslim could be executed
for having committed any crime against a dhimmi. Accusations of
blasphemy against dhimmis were quite frequent and the penalty was
capital punishment. A non-Muslim man may not marry a Muslim woman. I
should emphasize that all these principles are not merely of
historical interest but are indeed still applied against non-Muslims
in modern Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, to name but a few
countries.

Muslims are certain that Islam is not only the whole of God’s truth,
but it is its final expression. Hence Muslims fear and persecute such
post-Islamic religious movements as the Baha’is and the Ahmadis. Here
is Amnesty International on the plight of the Ahmadis [ASA
:33/15.91]: “Ahmadis consider themselves to be Muslims but they are
regarded by orthodox Muslims as heretical because they call the
founder of their movement al-Masih [the Messiah]: this is taken to
imply that Muhammad is not the final seal of the prophets as orthodox
Islam holds, i.e., the Prophet who carried the final message from God
to humanity … As a result of these divergences, Ahmadis have been
subjected to discrimination and persecution in some Islamic
countries. In the mid-1970s, the Saudi Arabia-based World Muslim
League called on Muslim governments worldwide to take action against
Ahmadis. Ahmadis are since then banned in Saudi Arabia.”

But what of putative Islamic tolerance? Those apologists who continue
to perpetuate the myth of Islamic tolerance should contemplate the
following cursory tabulation of jihad depredations: the massacre and
extermination (totalling tens of millions, combined) of the
Zoroastrians in Iran, and the Buddhists and Hindus in India; of the
more than 6000 Jews in Fez, Morocco in 1033, the entire Jewish
community of 4000 in Granada in 1066, of the Jews in Marrakesh in
1232, of the Jews of Tetuan, Morocco in 1790, and of the Jews of
Baghdad in 1828; the jihad genocide of 1.5 million Armenians in
Turkey at the beginning of the 20th Century, and the jihad genocide
of 2 million South Sudanese Christians and Animists at close of the
20th Century, and so on, ad nauseam.

*

Why I am a Muslim

By Thomas Haidon

How should one judge a religion or belief structure? Should we judge
or formulate an opinion of religion based on the history and action
of its adherents? If Islam is to be judged merely by its history, and
the actions of some of its adherents, then Ibn Waraq makes a fair
point. Is there any real question that the Islam being propagated in
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Palestine and throughout much of the Muslim
world is consistent with totalitarianism? I will not quibble or
disagree with the historical facts presented by Ibn Waraq. As Bernard
Lewis has aptly stated “…Islam was born in the full light of
history. Its roots are at surface level, the life of its founder is
as well known to us as those of the Reformers of the sixteenth
history”.

However, Ibn Waraq seems to have a short memory of several periods of
Muslim history where liberalism and humanism flourished. Undoubtedly
however, violence and aggression have played a role (and continue to
do so) throughout periods of Muslim history. But, for Ibn Waraq, that
is the end of the inquiry; there is no room for dialogue or
discussion. Only an absolutist, strict constructionist version of
Islam can prevail. If one had not availed themselves to Ibn Waraq’s
voluminous writings on Islam, one could reasonably come to the
conclusion that the only solution Ibn Waraq’s piece implicitly
suggests is the total rejection of all Muslims and our belief
structure.

For Ibn Waraq defining the source of the “Islamic problem” is a
simple exercise, it is the Qu’ran, Sunnah and the entire Muslim
tradition; (he may be two-thirds right).. But I believe that Ibn
Waraq is wrong, not about the actions or beliefs of a significant
portion of Muslims, but about Islam itself in its pure form the
Qu’ran, and it is for this reason “why I am a Muslim”.

I believe that it is primarily the incorrect interpretation and
applicability of the sources of Islam that form the essence of the
“Islamic problem”, not Islam itself. Unlike Ibn Waraq, I also
believe that there are solutions to this problem, unfortunately for
Ibn Waraq however, these solutions require working within Islam. In
brief, the most significant barrier between Islam and reform is the
perceived duality of the Qu’ran and Sunnah. Most of the issues raised
by Ibn Waraq in his article are compounded by aspects of the Sunnah
(particularly Jihad) or are a result of direct contradiction between
the Qu’ran and Sunnah (apostacy).

If Muslims derived their inspiration exclusively from the Qu’ran, and
formulated a new authoritative moderate and liberal tafsir, terrorism
and extremists would be minimalised. As Daniel Pipes aptly pointed
out in a recent article, Muslims have the opportunity to create a new
slate and turn what Islam has become into a religion consistent with
humanity, liberalism and modernity (as I believe was intended) or
continue the status quo of totalitarianism.

While Ibn Waraq’s frustrations with the Muslim tradition and
contemporary Islam may be understandable, I strongly disagree with
Ibn Waraq on his implicitly overbroad generalisation of all Muslims.
I take ultimate issue with the statement: “I do not accept some
spurious distinction between Islam and “Islamic fundamentalism” or
“Islamic terrorism”. By implication, no distinction need be made
between the terrorists of Al-Queda, Fateh, Hamas and Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi’s Tawhid Group and great number of Muslims who love their
religion and believe in peace and modernity. Such a conclusion is
overbroad and destructive. Nonetheless, at a rudimentary level it is
a perspective that needs to be understood and appreciated by moderate
and peaceful Muslims (who don’t exist according to Mr. Warraq’s
implicit rationale).

Non-Muslims throughout the Western world are bombarded with images of
brutal violence committed by Muslims in virtually all forms of media.
By examining, the current actions of Muslims, Islamic history, and
an incorrect interpretation of classical Islamic sources (which most
Muslims do not understand) it is not difficult to understand a
non-Muslim’s hostility towards Islam.

Ibn Waraq has presented a select list of ayat (not exhaustive) that
seemingly advocate violence against non-Muslims. Unfortunately, what
is missing from Ibn Waraq’s article (as well as in the minds of
Muslim extremists) is an analysis of these ayat in light of the
Qu’ran in its entirety (in fairness to Ibn Waraq he has addressed
this in his more voluminous work). Ayat and Surah cannot be read in
isolation of each other. The ayat presented by Ibn Waraq must be read
against the contradictory verses in the Qu’ran that promote peace
with non-Muslims and the freedom of thought (there are many, and
learned readers will be well familiar with these verses). In Surah
Al-Baqarah, God states:

“Then it is only a part of the Book that ye believe in, and do ye
reject the rest? But what is the reward for those among you who
behave like this but disgrace in this life?- and on the Day of
Judgment they shall be consigned to the most grievous penalty. For
Allah is not unmindful of what ye do”.

This ayat illustrates that some verses cannot be ignored while some
are followed. Thus the verses that Ibn Waraq cites, must be
reconciled with the verses that affirm peace and freedom (2:62 for
example, among others). Another ayat sheds some light on those verses
that are less than absolutely clear:

“He it is who has sent down to thee the Book: In it are verses basic
or fundamental (of established meaning); they are the foundation of
the Book: others are allegorical. But those in whose hearts is
perversity follow the part thereof that is allegorical, seeking
discord, and searching for its hidden meanings, but no one knows its
hidden meanings except Allah. And those who are firmly founded in
knowledge say: “We believe in the Book; the whole of it is from our
Lord” and none will grasp the Message except men of understanding”.

This ayat lends credibility to the argument that an absolutist
following and interpretation of the Qu’ran not only is unrealistic,
but is not God’s will. Many of the ayat dealing with violence towards
non-Muslims are shrouded in allegorical language, including several
which are cited by Ibn Waraq. When, read in conjunction with verses
espousing peace and freedom of thought, which are generally
straightforward (but nonetheless controversial among extremists), it
becomes clear that these verses should prevail, because they form the
backbone of Islam are consistent with the classical notion of charity
in the broader sense. A new tafsir would assist greatly in defining
the scope of those verses (and there are more than several) and
explaining them in the proper context, that during the time of their
revelation Muslims were fighting in a war to establish a presence,
and that these verses when read in light of many others, are not
commandments to kill.

The historical treatment of apostates throughout Muslim history
perhaps demonstrates the most visible inconsistencies between the
Qu’ran, Sunnah and the general Muslim tradition. The Qu’ran,
prescribes no worldly punishment for apostasy, and actually in many
ayat affirms the right of man to believe what he chooses (at his own
peril in terms of the afterlife). I will be happy to mention the
specific verses further in another forum or article, however I am
constrained due to length requirements, but Ibn Waraq is well aware
of them,. Skeikh Ahmed Subhy Mansour, and Dr Hamid
() have written significantly and
exhaustively on this fact.

The real confusion arises because of the application of the Sunnah.
Several ahadith allude to the fact that death is the appropriate
punishment for those who leave Islam. Muslims believe that there is a
duality in Islam of the Quran and Sunnah. Objectively speaking, there
can be no real duality between the two. The Qu’ran (in Islam) is the
undisputed word of God, which is recited today almost exactly as it
was upon revelation. Ahadith arguably are forms of hearsay (what
individuals claim they saw or overheard the prophet said and did).
While aspects of the Sunnah may be valid, is it not inconceivable
that the Caliphates following the death of the Prophet Mohammed
created ahadith to consolidate political power, and use them as tools
to control early Muslims? There is literally an entire “science”
within Islam devoted to determining the validity of ahadith that is
so complex that it confounds many Muslims. This duality has almost
lead to the deification of the Prophet Mohammed among Muslims today.
The essence of Islam is believing in God, and God alone. While the
Qu’ran does command that Muslims should learn from the Mohammed as a
prophet of God, as set forth in the Qu’ran, it does not explicitly
require following of ahadith or Sunnah.

Whether Mr Waraq likes it or not, there is a growing movement of
Muslims (albeit still a significant minority) who genuinely wish to
radically reform Muslim thinking, to make it consistent with peace
and modernity. The Free Muslim Coalition Against Terrorism, and the
Centre for Islamic Pluralism are two such organizations leading this
movement, and are taking steps toward defining the scope and
establishing the framework for comprehensive reform.. I ask that Ibn
Waraq not marginalize us. I ask that he engage in meaningful dialogue
with Muslims who are serious about reform. I look forward to further
elaborating on some of my points in future dialogues with him.

Interfax
Oct 18 2004

Armenian leader, U.S. diplomat favor expanding economic links

Yerevan. (Interfax) – Armenian President Robert Kocharian and U.S.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Laura Kennedy, who is currently
on a visit to Yerevan, agreed on the importance of intensifying the
economic component of bilateral relations, the Armenian presidential
press service told Interfax.

Kocharian thanked the American government for assistance it has
provided to Armenian reform. “We are sure that only with free trade
and free economic relations, and as low level of corruption as
possible can we set up conditions in which our citizens can fully put
their potential into practice,” Kocharian said.

The Armenian president and the U.S. diplomat also discussed regional
issues, in particular, efforts to settle the problem of
Nagorno-Karabakh.

Interfax
Oct 18 2004

Baku publishes black list of Nagorno-Karabakh businesses

Baku. (Interfax-Azerbaijan) – The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry has
published a list of foreign companies that are engaged in what Baku
views as illegal economic activities in Nagorno-Karabakh.

“Certainly, this list is far from being full. An investigation and
information collection is continuing,” Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry
spokesman Metin Mirza told Interfax on Saturday.

The list mainly contains companies developing international telephone
communications in Nagorno-Karabakh, including Daewoo Unitel (South
Korea), Kyivstar (Ukraine), Gruppo Telecom Mobile (Italy), and
Vodafone (Italy-Britain), Mirza said.

The French company Pernod Ricard, which exports grapes from
Nagorno-Karabakh, is also on the list, he said.

Interfax has so far been unable to obtain comments from these
companies.

The republic of Nagorno-Karabakh is a breakaway Azerbaijani territory
populated mostly by ethnic Armenians which has close economic and
military-political ties with Armenia. Azerbaijan is seeking to
restore control over the self-proclaimed republic.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

The Messenger, Georgia
Oct 18 2004

Georgia finds friends in the far North

On October 12-16 President Mikheil Saakashvili visited Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania. These three Baltic, former Soviet countries are
today members of both the EU and NATO and thus represent models for
Georgia, which wants to integrate into the same Western structures.

The leadership of those three countries all promised Saakashvili that
they would support Georgia in this and would lobby for its
integration. Moreover, they will corporate within the framework of
the 3+3 formula, which means that the three Baltic countries will
introduce the experience of regional cooperation to the three South
Caucasus countries.

During the reconstructive (perestroika) period under Soviet President
Gorbachev, the Baltic countries and Georgia were the first four
Soviet republics fighting for independence. The Baltic republics were
the first to respond to the bloody massacre in Tbilisi on April 9,
1989 committed by the Soviet army, while the attack on the Vilnius
television center in January 1990 caused protest demonstrations in
Georgia. The first Soviet republics to declare independence were
Georgia and Lithuania.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, however, the ways of
the Baltic countries and Georgia have been very different. The Baltic
countries achieved their aim with less loss than Georgia, which even
today has many problems that will take years to solve.

President Saakashvili said that Georgia should look to the Baltic
countries for role models: “Our visit to the Baltic countries is very
important, because these countries are the best models for Georgia’s
progress and advance. In the early 1990s, when we declared
independence, Georgia and Estonia had practically equal development
and economic levels, as well as equal social conditions for people.”

“But today the budget of Estonia per capita is 12-13 times that of
Georgia. The minimum pension in Estonia is nearly GEL 240 (in Georgia
it is only GEL 14-18). This fact can show us what can be done in a
freedom-loving country, which seeks to integrate into Europe, reform
and to fight against corruption,” the president said. He added,
however, that Georgia will soon overtake these countries.

Mikheil Saakashvili called his visit to the Baltic countries both
important and successful. With these countries, Georgia has three
lobbyists in NATO and the EU, 24 Saati reports. The Baltic countries
will share their progressive reform experience with Georgia and at
the same time they will help Georgia integrate into NATO and the EU.

But Georgia is not forgetting its regional neighbors. Saakashvili
said that the main aim of the visit is the international 3+3
initiative, which envisages, the presidents of the Georgia and
Lithuania jointly stated, the creation of a new regional cooperation
between the three Caucasus and the three Baltic countries. The same
draft was created between the Baltic and Central European countries,
and now the Baltic countries are passing on their experience.

This is a little different, however, partly because of the opposition
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which necessarily hinders the
development of South Caucasus regional cooperation, and partly
because only Georgia and Azerbaijan want to enter the EU and NATO. As
for Armenia, it is oriented to Russia and as it does not want to
irritate its main strategic partner.

During his visit to the Baltic countries Saakashvili commented on
recent events in Georgia’s conflict zones. He said that the
restoration of Georgia’s jurisdiction in South Ossetia would be
resolved within three months and that, with regard to Abkhazia,
everything would depend on Georgia’s speed of development. “As soon
as we can develop Georgia’s economy and become more open we will have
more chance of reintegrating Abkhazia into Georgia,” Rezonansi quoted
him as saying.

Saakashvili also made a statement directed at Russia, advising Moscow
not to interfere in Abkhazia after the presidential election.
Russia’s “crawling annexation” policy towards Georgia will
necessarily negatively influence relations between the two countries.
“In the 21st century we will not allow anyone to annex our country;
this is simply impossible,” 24 Saati quoted the president as saying.

The Messenger, Georgia
Oct 18 2004

New Armenia-Russia cargo route bypasses Georgia
By M. Alkhazashvili

The closing of the Larsi checkpoint on the Georgian-Russian border
has damaged both Armenia and Georgia, as it has effectively closed
land borders between the two countries and Russia.

The only other land border between Georgia and Russia – the Roki
tunnel which links South and North Ossetia – is currently
inaccessible because Georgia does not allow cargo to enter South
Ossetia.

Larsi was closed on September 3, on the order of Russian President
Putin, following the Beslan tragedy. Although the closure was
explained as a way of preventing further terrorist acts, analysts
believe that it was intended to put pressure on Georgia. Armenia has
been damaged even more, however, and so Moscow is planning to
transport cargo to Armenia via Iran along the Astrakhan-Enzel-Megri
highway.

Larsi checkpoint, which has been reopened twice on a temporary basis,
will now remain permanently closed, except for people who live near
the border.

However, Moscow has decided that the Roki tunnel, which is currently
controlled by the Kokoiti regime, represents no threat and will
remain open. Several days ago, near Ergneti village, Georgian law
enforcers detained two buses coming from Russia to Armenia, which
passed through the Roki tunnel.

According to the newspaper Akhali Taoba, the president’s
representative in Shida Kartli Mikheil Kareli says that the Russian
government’s decision to allow people and cargo to pass through the
Roki tunnel indicates that Russia wants to “enrich” the separatist
government of Tskhinvali.

If the Georgian government permitted it, then the transportation of
both cargo and passengers between Russia and the South Caucasus would
pass through the Roki tunnel, but Kareli says this would allow
Tskhinvali to open new smuggling routes. Akhali Vertsia quotes Kareli
as saying, “the Georgian government will not permit cargo and
passengers to pass through Roki. It is impossible that cargo be
received from territory that is outside Georgia’s control.”

If Russia hoped to open Roki by closing Larsi, this has not worked
out. In the meantime, it was clear that Russia would not blockade its
strategic partner for long, hence the new transportation route.
Russia’s Minister of Telecommunication and Transport Igor Levitin and
Armenia’s Minister of Defense Serzh Raskisian announced the new
Astrakhani (Russia)-Enzeli (Iran)-Megri (Armenia) route after a
meeting held in Yerevan.

Georgian analysts have different opinions about this. Akhali Taoba
cites Sandro Tvalchrelidze as saying that the selection of an
alternative transportation line is connected with Russia’s intention
to bring Iran into its political sphere. In other words Russian,
policy is aimed at securing its geo-strategic interests rather than
being against Georgia.

However, Rezonansi quotes Demur Giorkhelidze as saying that the
alternative transportation line is entirely artificial and is without
doubt against Georgia. He says that the Astrakhan-Enzeli-Megri
transportation line will increase transportation expenses and that
the closing of Larsi will continue to affect Armenia, not least
because this route is very problematic in the winter period because
it crosses mountains in Armenia.