Pravda, Russia
Aug 16 2005
Russian storm troopers: myth or reality?
08/16/2005 12:54
Referring to 50 thousand skinheads, it is just a phantom
Moscow Bureau for Human Rights made a report, which said that “there
are about 15 thousand adult fighters and up to 50 thousand teenage
skinheads under arms of Russian nationalistic organizations” and “these
groups are already responsible for several terrorist acts and riots.”
Sixty-five thousand fighters is a whole army. Hitler had about ten
times less storm troopers in 1933 not to mention a handful of Russian
Bolsheviks in 1917. If such an army existed for real in Russia it
would have occupied Moscow long time ago and solved the national
question. It is obvious that such an organization that forms armed
groups and organizes operations would not be left unnoticed. In
fact there is no such army or regiment or battalion of skinheads in
Russia. This conclusion can be drawn from the report itself.
To advance a slogan is one thing, but to support it with facts
is absolutely different. It is not clear what was meant by the
terrorist acts in the report. There was no incident mentioned in
the report, which can be regarded as such. There are some examples:
several buildings where Gypsies lived were burnt in the Novosibirsk
region, a so-called “Che Guevara squad” smashed several cars, which
presumably belonged to drug dealers in Yaroslavl, Cossacks sacked
local Armenians’ houses near Novorossiysk. Three Polish people were
beaten in Moscow. There is more: “nationalists in the Komi Republic
threatened with massacre to several scientists and human rights
activists, whom they accused of espionage for the US.”
Those are certainly crimes. However, it is a lame argument to prove
the existence of 65-thousand-strong army. Human rights activists
themselves almost admit that they made up this figure. In fact, it is
hardly possible to count the number of armed nationalists. Suppose,
that 15 thousand were deduced by simple calculation of members of
seven nationalistic parties and movements – Russian National Unity,
Brown Season and others. However, it was nationalists themselves, who
counted their members. It is obvious that they did so in order to show
off. It is unclear why the human rights advocates believe them though.
Referring to 50 thousand skinheads, it is just a phantom. The report
clearly states: “there is no unified skinheads organization in Russia,
they are scattered in small groups.” It continues with “their number
is estimated at 10 thousand to 50 thousand people.” The second figure
is meant to impress, of course. It is stated in the beginning of
the report, but afterwards it is admitted that the figure cannot be
proved. A gap of 40 thousand is too much. It is impossible to count all
the people who belong to these bands and gangs (not the troops). How
can you differentiate between mere street thugs and devoted skinheads?
Moscow Bureau for Human Rights statements that 10 people were killed
by skinheads and more than 200 were beaten in the first half of 2005
can be proved neither by facts nor by testimonies. Seems like the
responsibility for any crime can be shifted on skinheads.
It would be wrong to deny that that there is enough scum in Russia
who loathe Caucasians, Gypsies, Chinese, Jews and who are ready to
beat and even kill foreigners. But there is such a scum in every
society. They must be fought. And they are fought in fact! The human
rights activists said, “During the first half of 2005 there were 6
trials. As a result 21 extremists were sentenced to 4-19 years in
prison for committing grave crimes on the ground of national hatred.”
Those are the real figures.
Igor Dmitriev

Deputy FM cites ‘great chances’ for progress in peace talks
Assa-Irada, Azerbaijan
Aug 16 2005
Baku, August 15, AssA-Irada — Liberation of Azerbaijan’s seven
districts around Upper Garabagh will be discussed at the meetings
of Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers and presidents, Deputy
Foreign Minister Araz Azimov told journalists on Monday.
Azimov said that there are great chances for positive results in the
talks on the settlement of the Upper Garabagh conflict, but said that
much depends on Armenia’s readiness to take one more step toward a
peace agreement.
The Deputy Foreign Minister said that issues relating to the return
of Azerbaijani refugees home, rehabilitation of communications in the
occupied districts and determination of the status of Azerbaijani
and Armenian population of Upper Garabagh will be discussed
at the meetings. “It is impossible to free all occupied regions
simultaneously. Liberation of Upper Garabagh may be discussed only
after the seven districts around it are freed.”
The OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs stated during their last visits to the
region that the positions of the conflicting sides have drawn closer
due to mutual compromises.
Azimov seemingly confirmed that the Azerbaijani side has made
compromises. However, he chose not to mention the details, as
elaborating on the compromises may impede peace talks.*
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Representative of notorious youth movement released
Assa-Irada, Azerbaijan
Aug 16 2005
Baku, August 15, AssA-Irada — Representative of the notorious Yeni
Fikir (New Thought) youth movement, who accompanied chairman Ruslan
Bashirli charged with plotting with Armenian intelligence to stage
a coup in Azerbaijan, has been released from custody, Prosecutor
General Zakir Garalov told journalists on Monday.
Alimuradov, who acted as an interpreter for Bashirli during a visit
to Tbilisi, Georgia, where the latter had a conversation with two
Armenian secret service agents, reported to the law enforcement about
the meeting.
Garalov said that a person, who notifies law-enforcement bodies about
the crime he knows, is not imprisoned. He noted that Yeni Fikir has
not been officially registered by the government.
The Prosecutor General expressed disappointment with the statements
issued by the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan (PFPA) after the
incident. The PFPA chairman Ali Karimli known to maintain close ties
with the movement, said following the incident that Bashirli bears
‘moral’ but not ‘criminal responsibility’ for the developments.
“Why are the PFPA members so anxious about Bashirli – the Yeni Fikir
movement was not set up within the party”, said Garalov. The movement’s
sources of funding will be made public in the near future, he added.*

Darchinyan wants flyweight world domination
SecondsOut
Aug 16 2005
“Raging Bull” Vic Darchinyan
By Paul Upham: IBF/IBO flyweight world champion Vic Darchinyan
defends his titles against Colombian Jair Jimenez on August 24 at the
Sydney Entertainment Centre in Australia. It is another step towards
what the “Raging Bull” truly believes will be his crowning one day,
as undisputed world champion.
“I am starting a collection. I want all the world titles at
flyweight,” Darchinyan 23-0 (18) told SecondsOut.
Against Jimenez, the 29 year-old will be making the second defence of
his IBF title that he won by stopping long-reigning former world
champion Irene Pacheco last December in the USA. In his next fight,
Darchinyan added the IBO title around his waist with an 8th round TKO
stoppage of South African Mzukisi Sikali on March 27. “I was not
happy because I made some mistakes, but he was a smart boxer,”
Darchinyan said of his 18th career knockout.
The southpaw takes awesome power and a fierce determination into the
ring with him. He came to Australia for the first time in 2000 to
represent his home nation of Armenia at the Sydney Olympic Games.
While he did not win a medal, he impressed trainer Jeff Fenech to the
point where he arranged for him to stay full time and join his Team
Fenech stable. The three-time world champion and Hall of Famer was
very impressed with what he saw. A dynamic power puncher in the
lighter weight classes who possessed a steely resolve to totally
dominate his opponents from the opening bell.
Upon turning professional, Darchinyan set himself a goal of winning a
world title within four years. Only a hurricane in Florida, which
postponed his fight with Pacheco, saw him miss the target by only six
weeks.
Next Wednesday night Darchinyan faces 26 year-old Jimenez 22-4-1
(16). “He is a strong fighter and a good puncher. I will win,” says
Darchinyan. “He is a tough guy, but I have been training hard and I
will knock him out. This will be a good fight for the fans to see. I
am getting focused for each fight. I will be ready.”
Darchinyan believes he can beat anyone in the world at flyweight or
junior bantamweight, but it is not a cocky over-confidence. The other
members of Team Fenech marvel as Darchinyan talks about future
opponents and nonchalantly says, “Yes, I fight him. I beat him,” with
not a hint of arrogance. With the power he possesses in either hand,
he believes that if he catches you just once, you will fall.
For those who are not familiar with Darchinyan’s lethal power in the
ring, there is a body pad hanging on the side of the Team Fenech
gymnasium in Marrickville, Sydney with the hand written inscription –
“Everyone must wear a body protector when sparring Vic.”
“Vic just goes into the ring on a mission to destroy his opponent
whether it is in sparring or a fight,” says Team Fenech co-trainer
Billy Hussein.
To become undisputed flyweight world champion, Darchinyan has WBA
champion Lorenzo Parra, WBC champion Pongsaklek Wonjongkam and WBO
champion Omar Narvaez in his sights.
“I want the fight with Parra soon,” he says. “I have seen him fight
and he is a very good and smart fighter. He moves very well. But I
know I can beat him.”
Darchinyan was ringside when fellow Team Fenech member Hussein
Hussein lost a tough twelve round decision to Wonjongkam in Bangkok
in November 2003.
“Yes, I have seen him up close,” he said. “I will beat him.”
Because of the politics and monetary demands in boxing, it is not
always possible to arrange unification bouts between world
title-holders. Darchinyan is not concerned though and believes that
he will just keep calling out for the fights to be made.
“If I can get the fight with Parra next and win the WBA title, I will
fight in the USA with three world title belts,” he explained. “I will
put the pressure on Wonjongkam and Narvaez. If there is enough money
on the table for them, I think they will come to fight me. I just
have to keep pushing for the fights. We have not had an undisputed
champion at flyweight for a long time. I want to be the first with
all the belts.”
Having flyweights the quality of Darchinyan and 29 year-old Hussein
working together in the same gym has no doubt helped both of their
careers. Hussein rematches WBC No.1 Jorge Arce on the Diego
Corrales-Jose Castillo card on October 8 in Las Vegas. A win by
Hussein will see him get a rematch with Wonjongkam. If he were to
become WBC champion, what would Darchinyan do then? Could he fight
his team mate and friend?
“Maybe he will win the WBC title and I will be happy for him to win,”
smiled Darchinyan. “We will see what happens. I told Hussy that he
can beat Arce. He will fight smarter this time and he will win. If I
can, I want to be there in Las Vegas for that fight.”
Now an Australian citizen, Darchinyan calls himself an “Armenian
Aussie” and is gathering quite a following in his adopted country.
“Each day I am becoming more popular,” he said. “Everywhere I go
people are recognising me and telling me how much they enjoy my
fights.”
But while he loves living in Australia, there is no place like
Darchinyan’s native home. After the fight with Jimenez, he will
travel back to Armenia for the first time as world champion for a
three-week holiday. “It is going to be beautiful going to Armenia,”
he said. “The fans there have been waiting for me to celebrate.”
Paul Upham
Contributing Editor

Fuel Cell Works
Aug 16 2005
H2 ECOnomy’s New Products Address Fuel Cell Educational Needs
Publication Date:16-August-2005
06:30 AM US Eastern Timezone
Source:FuelCellWorks
Yerevan, Armenia — H2 ECCOnomy is introducing their new
FC-StarterSet~Y and FC- EduSet~Y fuel cell educational sets. Daily
references in the news about the rising price of oil, new fuel cell
powered autos speeding along California’s Hydrogen Highway and
concerns over future sources of energy is driving further
developments of fuel cells. As this power generating technology
becomes more and more prevalent, an increasing demand for people
knowledgeable in fuel cells will increase. Therefore teaching the
fundamentals of fuel cells in schools, colleges and universities is
essential. H2 ECOnomy creates products to address these needs.
Designed for middle schools and high schools, the FC-StarterSet~Y is a
simple to operate fuel cell powered lamp, requiring only oxygen and
hydrogen. Once these two gases are supplied, the lamp can be turned
on and off with the flick of a switch. The open system design is an
excellent tool for explaining the components of a fuel cell and
present its operational parameters. H2 ECOnomy also plans to
introduce soon the air/hydrogen version of the FC-StarterSet~Y. It
will be furnished with a small air pump for oxidant (air) supply and
be able to get hydrogen fuel from most school electrolyzers.
The FC-EduSet~Y is a teaching tool that provides educators with a
flexible yet powerful gas control system and load bank for 10 – 100 W
air or oxygen-hydrogen fuel cells. It was designed to fit into the
curriculum of advanced high school programs through college level
courses covering proton exchange membrane fuel cell theory and
practice. Experiments are included that lead students through the
basics of fuel cell operation; varying gas flow rates, pressures and
load on the fuel cell and plotting the corresponding polarization
curves. The FC-EduSet~Y will operate with H2 ECOnomy’s fuel cells,
the new EcoFC-AM~Y and ProFC?AM~Y, as well as the EcoFC~Y and ProFC~Y,
previously known as CozyFC~Y and CoolFC~Y, respectively. It will also
operate with most 10 – 100 W air or oxygen-hydrogen fuel cells.
H2 ECOnomy is a vibrant research company leading the way to energy
resources for the 21st century. Located in the beautiful Ararat
valley, H2 ECOnomy was established in 2000 with the goal of
developing energy resources and investigating fuel cell technologies.
H2 ECOnomy has grown to become a productive research and development
company. Our expertise encompasses conductive composite materials,
catalyst chemistry, polymer chemistry, electronic design, embedded
systems and system integration. Knowledge in these fields has led to
the creation of fuel cells for the educational and demonstration
markets, sold worldwide through distributors in the US, Europe and
Asia. Additionally, our capabilities have been acknowledged by the
receipt of a two-year US Department of Energy Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention grant and a contract to install a
groundbreaking combination – photovoltaic powered electrolyzer and
fuel cell system at the American University of Armenia.
CONTACT:Vahe Odabashian
H2 ECOnomy, CJSC2/2 Shrjanayin Street
Yerevan 374068
Armenia
Tel: (+374 1) 774 607
Fax: (+374 1) 777 182
[email protected]

Poetry reading paves the way for film’s journey into dreams, misery of teens tried as adults
By Jane Ganahl
San Francisco Chronicle, CA
Aug 16 2005
Joie Barnhart of the Richmond District is here because her friend
said it would be a cool way to spend a Thursday evening in San
Francisco. No age limit at CELLspace gallery, so a 16-year-old is
welcome. Besides, says the dark-haired, black-eyelinered youth, as
she puts her purse down next to her folding chair, “I like to write
poetry, and I hear there are some good poets who are going to read.
And there is a movie.”
What kind of movie? She smiles. “I’m not sure.”
The documentary in question is “Juvies,” a grim look at what happens
to teenage offenders when they are sucked into the adult prison
system. This will not be an evening of “Must Love Dogs” jocularity.
Organizer Stephen Elliott is milling around the audience, looking
worried. One of the four writers scheduled to do a reading has not
arrived, and the event is past its 7 p.m. start time. He approaches
his friend Dave Eggers and says, “Do you think you might be able to
read if he doesn’t show?”
Eggers starts to grimace, but just then Marc Bamuthi Joseph is seen
in the doorway of the cavernous performance space. Relieved, Elliott
hurries off to greet him. Elliott is one of those rare writers who is
equally at home behind a keyboard or a podium. The Bay Area author
and journalist had a banner year in 2004; his novel, the ironically
titled “Happy Baby,” was named one of the best books of the year by
the Village Voice (among others) and garnered him both a Commonwealth
Club medal and a finalist spot in the New York Library’s Young Lions
Award (which was won, coincidentally, by his local friend, Andrew
Sean Greer).
But if literature inspires him, his own history drives him. Having
spent much of his childhood in foster homes as a ward of the state,
Elliott has become a writer-activist. For political causes, yes
(including last year’s presidential race, which led to his nonfiction
work, “Looking Forward to It: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the American Electoral Process”), but mostly for the cause of
youth behind bars.
“I’d been researching an article about Proposition 21,” he tells the
capacity audience from the stage. “And learned that it’s a terrible,
terrible proposition. It passed in California in 2000, mandating that
children be tried as adults.”
A smattering of boos from the audience. Joie shifts in her seat.
“I’m talking about kids who vandalize … who break a window, ending
up in adult prison.”
Elliott then reads a section of the story he wrote, focusing on one
young offender, Alonso, who ends up in solitary confinement, just
hoping to die, while still in his teens.
He is followed in readings by Kirya Traber, a stunningly confident
young woman who took first place, with her team, at the recent
International Youth Poetry Slam. Her poem, about a boy she loved who
fought the law, is both poignant and harrowing. Newly acclaimed
writer (and sometime SFGate.com columnist) Beth Lisick (now on the
New York Times extended best-seller list for her “Everybody Into the
Pool”) heightens the mood by reading an unintentionally hilarious
press release from HBO about the show “Entourage” and its own version
of the “Boston T” (as in shirt) party.
And slam champion Marc Bamuthi Joseph is his usual tornado of
activity, in and out of the audience, accompanying his own poetry
with wildly inventive dance movements that make him look alternately
like a flapping bird and a turtle. He finishes his set with a solemn
pronouncement: “How much money does it take to educate a child? Seven
thousand dollars. How much money does it cost to incarcerate a child?
Ninety thousand dollars.”
Elliott retakes the stage to introduce Leslie Neale, director of
“Juvies. ” “I’m humbled by the many voices onstage tonight,” she
says, brushing aside long blond hair. “I know that it …” she trails
off, as if fighting tears, “it would make the kids very happy.”
She introduces the film by noting that it was “damn near impossible
to photograph kids in detention.” But somehow she managed, with the
cooperation of authorities, to put cameras not only in her own hands,
but those of the detainees.
Narrated by actor (and former juvie) Mark Wahlberg, who also
executive produced, “Juvies” has circled the country on tour to
campuses and theaters. (Information on getting a copy of the film can
be found at juvies.net.) And the film has the audience gasping from
the get-go.
It focuses first on Michael Duc Ta, who goes by Duc. At age 16, he
was arrested when gunfire erupted from a car he was driving. Although
no one was injured, and he had no prior arrests, Duc was put into the
adult prison system and sentenced to 35 years to life.
When Duc is interviewed by his friends, he breaks down in tears,
talking about having been beaten by his father throughout his
childhood. When Duc’s parents are interviewed, his father admits to
the beatings — one of which was so severe it led to his own arrest.
Duc’s mother weeps uncontrollably.
Asked what he would like people to know about him, Duc thinks, then
responds: “I’m not such a bad guy after all. I’m not a lost cause.”
And it’s only the beginning. One girl already has a baby from whom
she is separated; her own mother is schizophrenic and her father is
in the state pen. Another girl, just 14 and the daughter of Armenian
immigrants, is also probably in for life for a gang shooting.
Joie and her friend cover their mouths with their hands while they
watch; others in the audience sniff audibly.
After the documentary is over, Neale takes the stage again and asks
if there are questions. What happened to Duc? Everyone wants to know.
“Due to grassroots efforts, 25 years have been taken off his
sentence,” Neale smiles. “That’s still 11 years to life, so there’s a
good chance he might not make it out.”
And, she says, there is still much to be done. “These kids changed my
life,” she says. “I hope you’re moved to do something. Anything.”
When Joie tiptoes out, she smiles and breathes, “Wow. Intense!”
From: Baghdasarian

PRESS RELEASE
Catholicosate of Cilicia
Communication and Information Department
Contact: V.Rev.Fr. Krikor Chiftjian, Communications Officer
Tel: (04) 410001, 410003
Fax: (04) 419724
E- mail: [email protected]
Web:
PO Box 70 317
Antelias-Lebanon
Armenian version:
THE CATHOLICOSATE OF CILICIA PARTICIPATES IN THE
WSCF CONFERENCE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
Antelias, Lebanon – The World Students’ Christian Forum’s (WSCF)
intra-regional conference on international women’s planning took
place on 34-31 July in Manila, the Philippines. The main theme of the
conference was “violence against women: the role of men and women in
today’s society.”
Young females from the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Europe and America
participated in the conference. Carla Khijoian from the Armenian
Church’s University Students’ Association, which enjoys the support
and patronage of the Catholicosate of Cilicia, represented the Middle
East during the conference.
Khijoian delivered a lecture entitled “Violence against women: The
family and community experience in the Middle East.”
The participants visited the poor neighborhoods of Manila and
several of the country’s women’s organizations and unions, meeting
with physically and psychologically violated and tortured women and
consoling them.
At the end of the conference, the participants adopted an international
plan to neutralize the crimes and violence committed against women
in the world.
##
The Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia is one of the two Catholicosates
of the Armenian Orthodox Church. For detailed information about the
Ecumenical activities of the Cilician Catholicosate, you may refer
to the web page of the Catholicosate, The
Cilician Catholicosate, the administrative center of the church is
located in Antelias, Lebanon.

Armenia posts budget surplus of 0.7% of GDP in H1
Interfax
Aug 16 2005
YEREVAN. Aug 16 (Interfax) – Armenia posted a budget surplus of 5.144
billion dram, or 0.7% of GDP, in the first half of 2005, the National
Statistics Service told Interfax.
Revenue was 160.252 billion dram, or 22.7% of GDP, and that was 26.4%
more than in the first half of 2004.
Tax revenue came to 132.597 billion dram, or 18.8% of GDP, a 21.1%
year-on-year increase.
Budget spending during the period totaled 155.108 billion dram, or 22%
of GDP, up 28.4% year-on-year.
The official exchange rate was 457.47 dram/$1 on August 16. [AM ASIA
EUROPE EEU EMRG MCE ECI RES] rm

An Analysis of the Cyprus Conflict with a Psyhoanalytical Approach (I)
By Sezai OZCELIK
Journal of Turkish Weekly
Aug 16 2005
Summary: This study will focus on the psychoanalytical concepts and
theories to explain the borders and barriers among the social groups
and states. The concepts of the minor differences, externalization,
projection, chosen trauma and glories, dehumanization, victimization,
and ethnic identity were used to analyze the historical, psychological
and political barriers between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. In conflýct,
it~Rs necessary to deal with historical and psychological barriers
to achieve lasting and perpetual peace and political solution like
the Annan Plan.
Key Words: , Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, psychoanalysis,
minor differences, externalization, chosen trauma and glories,
ethnic identity.
An Analysis of the Conflict with a Psyhoanalytical Approach:
Psychological, Historical and Political Barriers Between Turkish And
Greek Cypriots (*)
1. INTRODUCTION
This work examines the psychological, historical and political
barriers between Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the context of the
psycho-historical point of view. Although the creation and maintenance
of the borders between the ethnic groups have been explained by the
realist theories, peace research introduces a new perspective how the
border were created and maintained. It examines the issue of barriers
between the ethnic groups through ~Spsychological lens.~T
In this paper, I will mainly analyze the sources of the borders
by applying the psychoanalytical theories into the historical and
political events. The basic concepts, narcissism of minor differences,
suitable target of externalization, projection, chosen traumas and
glories, dehumanization, the egoism of victimization, the need for
the enemies and allies, and the ethnic identity formation, are the
product of the Vamik Volkan~Rs psychodynamic approach.
The case of the conflict presents a good laboratory conditions to
apply these concepts into the real life conflict. First, I will
briefly describe the history of the conflict. Then I will examine
the historical and political sources of the barriers between the
Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The following section, I will examine
the psychoanalytical approach of the border issues between the two
communities.
1.1. Brief Information Cyprus is strategically located in the eastern
part of the Mediterranean Sea and the third largest island in the
Mediterranean Sea , after Sicily and Sardia. These three geographic
characteristics -location, size, and the fact that it is an island-
have been an important factor in the ethnic conflict in . The island
is about 42 miles (65 kilometers) south of Turkey, 64 miles (103 km)
of Syria, 240 miles (386 km) of the north of Egypt and the Suez Canal,
and 500 miles (800 km) of south-east of the Greek mainland.[1] It
has an area of 3,572 square miles (9, 851 square kilometers) and the
island is divided between the Greek Cypriot South and the Turkish
Cypriot North[2]. According to the census of 1960, the population
of the island was about 77 percent Greeks, 18.3 percent Turks and
4.7 percent other ethnic groups, such as Maronites, Armenians,
and Latins.[3] Today, the population of the South is estimated to
be 629,500 (1998). According to the 1996 census in the North, the
population there is 200,587, constituting just over 24 percent of the
total population of the island.[4] The Greek Cypriots are Orthodox
Christians and speak Greek. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots
are in Muslim faith and speak Turkish.
2. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT Because of its strategic position on
the main routes between Europe and Asia , has been the focus of
the political conflict and the cultural interaction. was colonized
in about the thirteenth century BC by settlers from the Aegean and
Greek colonists. Despite many invasions and periods of foreign rule,
Greek language and culture became dominant. During the Medieval
period, has been held by the Western powers. In 1571, the island was
conquered by the Ottoman Turks. Under the Ottoman rule, the Greek
and Turkish populations have lived relatively peacefully in which
they have collaborated to protest against the Ottoman rule when it
was accused of excessive taxation.[5]
In 1878, leased from the Ottoman Empire to be used as a base from
which to protect the Ottoman Empire against the ambitions of . In 1914,
the island was annexed by on the outbreak of war with the Ottoman
Empire . After became a ~SCrown Colony~T of in 1925, the Greek Cypriots
began their long and intense struggle against British rule to achieve
the part of the Megali Idea (Great Idea): Enosis (unification with
).[6] During the early period of British administration (1878-1925),
the two ethnic communities lived in relative functional harmony
with physical intermixing and social tolerance but without cultural
integration (Fisher, 1992: 2). Between 1925 and 1960 conflict can
be defined like this: the Greek Cypriots agitating for Enosis, the
Turkish Cypriots opposing the movement, and the British Government
replying in the negative to the Enosis demands.[7]
In 1950, Makarios, who would later become the first president of the
Republic of Cyprus, was elected Archbishop. Under the auspice of
the Greek Orthodox Church, an island-wide plebiscite called for an
overwhelming support for Enosis (% 96).[8] With the establishment of
the EOKA (Ethnici Organosis Kyprion Agoniston-National Organization
of Cypriot Combatants), an underground guerrilla organization,
the Greek self-determination campaign began in 1955.[9] Because of
their strategic interests in the Middle East , the British resisted
self-determination and Enosis. The British eventually concluded that
their interests could best be served by retaining the sovereignty
of their military bases on the island and by achieving a political
settlement that would satisfy the interests of the majority Greek
community on the island while protecting the interests of the
minority Turkish community.[10] Prior to 1955, and Turkish Cypriots
never actively involved in the politics of . However, the immediate
danger of Enosis forced them to reexamine their interests in . In
particular, expressed its concern about the future of a Turkish
minority under the majority of the Greek Cypriot rule. Moreover, had
strategic concern about the extension of Greek territory under ~Sits
nose~T. As a result, the Turkish Cypriots aligned themselves with the
British, adopted taksim (partition) as a counter to Enosis and formed
a paramilitary organization (TMT-Turkish Resistance Organization)
to defend their interests.[11]
After the intense and violent intercommunal fighting and
the anti-British struggle by the Greek Cypriots, a solution was
negotiated by, and and resulted in the London and Zurich Accords in
1959 and 1960. The accords prohibited Enosis and taksim and introduced
bi-communal / federal solution for the island. , and had a right to
intervene, unilaterally or together, in order to restore the state
of affairs in the island. The constitution of was designed by three
powers. The president would be a Greek Cypriot and the vice-president
a Turkish Cypriot. There would be a Council of Ministers (7 Greeks,
3 Turks) and a House of Representatives (70 percent Greek, 30 percent
Turkish) elected by a universal suffrage for a term of five years. The
Republic of Cyprus was eventually come into existence on 16 August
1960, with Makarios its first president.
During the end of the 1963, the intercommunal violence caused an
imminent threat for the stability of the island. Nicosia (Lefkoþe),
the capital of the Republic, became a battleground and physical
segregation of the two communities intensified. Between 1963 and
1974, the Turkish Cypriots were forced to live in enclaves on their
own in overcrowded slum conditions. They have lived in 5 percent
of the island~Rs territory and 25,000 Turkish Cypriots have become
refugees. Meanwhile, the UN Security Council decided to send a
peacekeeping force. A buffer zone marked by the ~SGreen Line~T was
drawn between the conflicting groups. Since March 1964, the United
Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has deployed to prevent a recurrence
of fighting and to contribute the maintenance of law and order and
the restoration of normalcy to the island.
The history of the island took a dramatic turn when the
Greek-sponsored coup engineered against the President of Cyprus,
Makarios in July 1974. Because of the fear of Enosis, decided to
intervene unilaterally and seized 37 percent of the island. was
divided into northern (Turkish) and southern (Greek) section by the
~SAttila Line~T, running from through Nicosia (Lefkoþe) to Famagusta
(Gazimagusa). The Turkish intervention caused huge personal and social
tragedies. Approximately, 180,000 Cypriot Greeks became refugees,
fleeing to the south and abandoning their possessions behind. There
was also 6,000 dead and 1615 missing person on the Greek side.[12]
After the coup and war of 1974, the efforts of peaceful resolution
of the conflict have been increased at the intercommunal
level as talks and negotiations between the leaders of the two
communities. Between 1974-1990, the major third-party has been the UN
Secretaries-General. They have attempted to mediate the intercommunal
talks: Denktash-Makarios (1975-1977), Denktash-Kyprianu (1977-1988),
Denktash-Vasiliu (1988-1993), and now Denktash-Klerides. With the
end of the Cold War, the and the European Union began to play more
important role in the negotiation process.
Both sides see the political reconciliation and the solution of
the conflict differently. The Turkish Cypriot community demands the
recognition of its separate political status, which culminated in the
establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern in 1983. On the other
side, the Greek Cypriot community sees the solution of the problem only
in the context of a bi-communal solution that allowed for the ~Sthree
freedoms~T: freedom of settlement, freedom of property ownership,
and freedom of movement. The removal of Turkish forces from island was
another Greek Cypriot precondition for settlement. Furthermore, other
issues had to be dealt with such as the question of Turkish settlers
on the island, international guarantees to replace the 1960 Treaty
of Guarantee, economic reconstruction, exploitation of resources, and
development of infrastructure on a joint rather than unitary basis.[13]
In 1993, the United Nations initiated a new attempt to obtain
agreement that produced the confidence-building measures (CBMs). CBMs
essentially involved the opening of Nicosia (Lefkose) International
Airport (closed since 1974) and the permission of the Greek Cypriots
to reoccupy Varosha/Maras lost in 1974. They failed miserably.
In 1997, the UN tried to bring the two sides together in two meetings,
one in New York, the other in . The question of the sovereignty of
the North became a crucial issue. Recent developments have made the
dispute more difficult to solve. First, the decision by the European
Union to open the membership negotiations with the South stopped the
UN sponsored negotiations that just began after the quake in . Second,
the establishment of a Joint Defense Doctrine between and the South
has alerted about the strategic importance of the island.
The conflict can be analyzed three different levels. At one level,
conflict is an inter-communal conflict that began as a colonial
struggle against British rule. At another level, it is a regional
conflict because of the relationship between and over territory and
resources in the eastern Mediterranean as well as their relationships
with the two communities in the island. For , is mainly as strategic
matter. Because of its great proximity to , could be dangerous for
if in enemy hands. seems as a huge aircraft carrier that threatens
the most of the Turkish main cities and industrial areas. Moreover,
the historical animosity between and was another important factor. For
Greeks, was historically Greek and the part of the Hellenic world. The
Turks represent the chosen traumas such as the lost of Constantinople,
the destruction of the Byzantine Empire and the eviction of the
Greeks from Anatolia after the First World War. Furthermore, it is
an international conflict that involves superpower politics, the
international and regional organizations (the United Nations and the
European Union). At systemic level, the conflict in became entangled in
the politics of the Cold War. The conflict between and over and other
areas were a potential source of weakness on NATO~Rs southern flank.
3. THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BARRIERS
The Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots have been divided along
linguistic, ethnic, cultural, and religious lines. The Greek Cypriots
speak Greek and identify with the Greek nation, Greek culture and
the heritage of classical and the Byzantine Empire. They put more
emphasis on ~Sthe chosen traumas and glories~T of the Greek nation.
Almost all of them are members of the Orthodox Church, which is
has had a great place on politics, education, and cultural arena of
the Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots speak
Turkish and identify with the Turkish nation, Turkish culture, and
the heritage of the Ottoman Empire. Virtually all of them are Muslims
of the Sunni sect.
One of the historical-structural barriers between two communities is
the Ottoman millet[14] administrative system on the basis of religion
and ethnicity. According to this system, each religious ethnic
group was treated as a distinct entity. They had a right on their
administrative issues and they were carried out with the help of the
various religious institutions. After the conquest of by the Ottoman
Empire in 1571, the autonomy of the Orthodox Church was confirmed and
the archbishop was recognized as the religious and political leader of
the Greek Cypriot community. As a result, the church became a symbol of
political and ethnic unity for the Greek Cypriots and it helped them
preserve their religious, ethnic, cultural and political identity. On
the other hand, the millet system contributed to the polarization of
ethnicity. When the British took control over , the millet system was
not completely abolished. Although a modern bureaucratic administration
was established and two communities have introduced some modern
concepts and processes to create a common identity-Cypriot identity,
they still retained control over matters of religion, education,
cultural, personal status, and communal institutions.
Another historical/structural factor is the two ethnic group~Rs
conflicting views about the political past and future of the
island. The Greek side perceived the past history of island embedded in
its chosen trauma and glories. Throughout the British period, Enosis
(union of with ) has been the most persistent and rigid goal of the
Greek Cypriots. It can be interpreted as part of a wider Panhellenic
movement of Megali Idea (Great Idea) which aimed at reconstruction
of the Byzantine Empire. The Greeks~R inability mourn over the lost
of Byzantine Empire and the transfer of this past trauma from one
generation to next, combined with the irredentist nationalism of
the nineteenth century, found its expression in the term of Enosis
on Cyprus. The Megali Idea was result in one major war between and
in 1920-23 and the defeat of the in Asia Minor. Also, it created
the exchange of the population which includes 1 million Greeks and
650,000 Turks. This mass migration also reinforced the perception
of enemy image and the egoism of victimization. On the Turkish side,
the idea of taksim (partition of into Greek and Turkish sections) was
introduced by and as a counter force to Enosis. Both movements were
supported by and respectively. The conflicting goals of Enosis and
taksim led to a political polarization between the two ethnic groups.
The British colonial policy that was based on ~Sdivide and rule~T
maintained and reinforced the ethnic, administrative, and political
separation inherited from the Ottoman period. Unfortunately, the
British administration made no effort to create a unifying Cypriot
identity and political culture. The two communities were treated as
separate groups for administrative purposes and antagonism between
them was stirred. The maintenance of a psychological and administrative
gap between the two ethnic groups was instrumental in securing British
control over .
The political barrier of the conflict was based on in fact the London
and Zurich accords and the constitution. The agreements were signed on
the behalf of the Cypriot people by , and . Also, the constitution that
was the part of the accords was never submitted to a referendum and it
was imposed by foreign powers. From the beginning, the independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the island were limited
by the station of military forces and the right to interfere its
domestic affairs.
The ethnic dualism was institutionalized in all sectors of public
life. A political framework conducive to ethnic separation was
established. Although the Enosis and partition of the island was
prohibited by the constitution, the alternative system did not promote
integrative politics that cut across the political boundaries. This
~Sparalysis state~T reinforced and preserved the past practice of the
ethnic and political cleavages through institutionalization. Public
institutions that may help to build a common identity and bureaucratic
class promoted the ethnic interests. As a result, the system
paralyzed most vital organs and functions essential for a state and
a society. For example, the disproportional partition of the public
service, the police, and the army, veto right in the government
matters, and separate majority vote in the parliament intensified
the ethnic controversies.
Physically, they lived in separate villages and in separate quarters of
towns. In his study on the political geography of , Richard Patrick
has provided statistical evidence that indicates a substantial
decline in the number of mixed villages containing both the Greek
and Turks from 1881 to 1931.[15] After 1931, the decrease of mixed
settlement became even more eminent, reflecting at the very least
the preference of people of both communities to live in areas where
there was ethnic kinship. According to the 1960 census, there were
114 mixed villages out of a total of 634 (395 were entirely Greek
and 121 entirely Turkish.).[16]
During the intercommunal conflicts in 1963, both communities accepted a
truce that arranged a cease-fire line, now known as the ~Sgreen line~T,
patrolled by British forces. With the deployment of the United Nations
Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), this line became permanent borders between
two communities. After 1974 intervention, a new border was formed in
which both sides were physically separated from each other up until
now. Interestingly, this line is called as the ~SAttila Line~T that
reminds both sides different chosen traumas and glories. For Greeks,
Attila was a barbarian who invaded Rome and destroyed the Roman
civilization that was the continuation of the Hellenistic culture. On
the other hand, Attila is represented glory times for Turkic-Mongol
period for Turks. From outside, they seem similar to in some extent,
but still they still have ~Sminor differences.~T
The segregation of education that inherited from the Ottoman millet
system and the British colonial era has reinforced and sustained the
ethnic cleavage. During the British rule, the two communities had
separate schools which were controlled by their respective religious
institutions. In this period, Orthodox priests and Muslim clergies were
also schoolteachers. Moreover, they virtually established dependent
relations in educational area to their motherlands. The curricula and
textbooks used in Cypriot elementary and high schools were mostly
imported from the two mainlands. As a result, they have focused on
their religious, national, ethnic heritage and values and imported
the long history of Greek-Turkish rivalry into the island.
Because of the lack of the college and universities, both communities~R
youths have gone other institutions in , , and other countries. This
situation has created a lack communal interaction in educational and
intellectual fields and reinforced one-sided ~Sethnic way~T of thinking
among the two communities. For example, the first university in both
sides of the island was established in 1992. The University of Cyprus
has educated the Greek Cypriots since its establishment. The result
was a growing gap in perceptions, attitudes, and conflict behaviors
held by the two communities about each other.
The two communities also had their own newspapers and other
publications which have mostly produced a media war between two
sides. The local press in the island together with imported items
from and emphasizes Greek-Turkish antagonism and enhances mutual
fears and stereotypical perceptions.
The above factors- church dominance, millet system, fragmented ethnic
education, antagonistic national loyalties, political polarization
and the British policy of ~Qdivide and rule~R- contributed to the
preservation of the ethnic identity of the two Cypriot communities
and the generation of a political schism between them. Four centuries
of geographic proximity and physical intermixing did not produce
inter-communal co-existence and common Cypriot identity as a counter
force the dividing effects of religious, administrative, educational,
social, psychological, and cultural differences.
4. PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS
Psychologically and socially, the two ethnic groups remained largely
divided. The first psychological barrier is the issue of the lack
of the common Cypriot identity and the emphasis of Turkish and
Greek identity. Although both communities have lived on the same
island for over 400 years, they have maintained their Turkishness
and Greekness. When the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960,
there was no Cypriot nation other than two different communities
or nations. After the independence, the two communities continued
celebrating the national holidays of and which were mostly directed
against each other. Moreover, the official flag of appeared only
at certain places, such as Makarios~R presidential palace. On other
places and occasions, the Greek and Turkish national anthems and flags
were used during these celebrations. Up until now, has on national
anthem of its own. When the Cypriot Turks raised the red-and-white
flag of and the Cypriot Greeks displayed the blue-and-white one of ,
both communities reinforced their sense of separateness and their
loyalties to and . As a result, there has been no sign of common
political culture and mass legitimacy for the new state-Cyprus.
Describing the attitudes of the Cypriot toward the official Cypriot
flag, Vamik Volkan, a professor of psychiatry with Turkish Cypriot,
also wrote:
“When my artist brother-in-law was asked to design a flag for the
newly-constituted Republic of Cyprus, he was told that he could
use white, which appears both the Greek and Turkish flags, but that
he had to avoid using red, which appears on the Turkish flag, and
blue, which is used on the Greek flag. Accordingly, he used yellow
with some green, these relating to no country in question. This
yellow-green-and-white banner is still the official flag of . When
the Republic was established, however, Cypriot Turks raised the
red-and-white flag of , and the Greeks flaunted the blue-and-white
one of . The official yellow-green-white one appeared only at certain
locations, such as Makarios~R presidential palace-as an ornament. The
story of a Cypriot flag, designed for an imaginary Cypriot nation,
and the population~Rs response to it, indicates that Realpolitik found
no echo in the psyche of either Cypriot Turk or Cypriot Greek.~T[17]
The second dimension of psychological barrier can be explained by
psychoanalytical approach. This approach focuses on the issue of chosen
traumas and glories, the egoism of victimization, narcissism of minor
differences, the suitable target of externalization, enemy images,
and the ethnic group formation.
Psychodynamic approach rests on in part on the application of
psychoanalytic defense mechanisms, including externalization,
projection, and identification that individuals are used them
to protect themselves from perceived psychological danger.[18]
Externalization and projection are ways of getting rid of unpleasant
self-images, feeling states, thoughts, and impulses which cannot
integrate with the image of the self by attributing them to the
external world. In other words, they involve transferring and
projecting unconscious and unacceptable impulses, thoughts, and
characteristics into an outgroup so that the individual can maintain
an acceptable and cohesive sense of self.[19] Identification is an
unconscious process by which one assimilates the images of another
with oneself. In conflict situation, the ethnic group to which one
belongs is differentiated itself from other groups.
According to Volkan, the border between two ethnic groups reveals
rituals that occur between their members. Erecting a psychological
border between the two ethnic groups that prevents each group~Rs
externalizations and projections from back to in-group is one ritual.
Without a psychological border, each ethnic group would become a
replica of the other. In that situation, the externalization and
projections needed to provide cohesion for group identity would
be unstable. Sometimes these invisible borders are made manifest
in attention to physical borders. When neighbor groups are not in
conflict, physical borders are flexible and large groups reduce their
investment in them. For example, crossing border between and the is
little more than a formality since no threat is involved in moving
from one large group~Rs territory to the other~Rs. Under conflict
situations, however, physical borders serve a double duty: they
provide practical physical protection, and they are ~Spsychologized~T
to represent a symbolic thick skin that protects large groups from
being contaminated.[20]
–Boundary_(ID_37IBmQAd/cwU/TH/zStBkQ)–

PRESS RELEASE
Catholicosate of Cilicia
Communication and Information Department
Contact: V.Rev.Fr. Krikor Chiftjian, Communications Officer
Tel: (04) 410001, 410003
Fax: (04) 419724
E- mail: [email protected]
Web:
PO Box 70 317
Antelias-Lebanon
Armenian version:
A YOUTH PILGRIMAGE TO BIKFAYA
Antelias, Lebanon – The youth department of the Catholicosate of
Cilicia organized a march-pilgrimage to Bikfaya on August 12 on the
occasion of St. Asdvadzadzine’s Day.
75 participants of different ages started the pilgrimage from the St.
Gregory the Illuminator Cathedral in Antelias at 6:45. A police car
provided by the municipality of Bourj Hammoud, scouts from the HMEM
Jedeide branch and an ambulance provided by the Armenian Red Cross
of Lebanon accompanied the marchers.
The marchers attended the youth concert performed by Lebanese Armenian
musician Guy Manoukian in Bikfaya. The young pilgrims then visited
His Holiness Aram I, kissed his right hand and received his blessings.
The director of the youth department of the Catholicosate of Cilicia,
Fr Keghart Kusbekian accompanied the young pilgrims during their march.
##
The Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia is one of the two Catholicosates
of the Armenian Orthodox Church. For detailed information about the
youth activities of the Cilician Catholicosate, you may refer to the
web page of the Catholicosate, The Cilician
Catholicosate, the administrative center of the church is located in
Antelias, Lebanon.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress