Georgia’s Ombudsman conducted press-conference regarding Tsalka events
On the 11th of March a press conference was conducted in public defender’s
office regarding the incident that took place on the 9th of March as a
result of which Mr. Gevorg Gevorgyan was killed and other ethnic Armenian
citizens of Georgia were injured to various degrees.
According to official data, five suspects were detained by the Police of
Georgia and other suspects are searched for.
The incident provoked a mass protest of ethnic Armenian residents of Javakhk
region, which later grew into violence. The demonstration was dismissed by
special security service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia
based in other regions of Georgia.
The next day after the collision a group of representatives of the Public
Defender of Georgia arrived in Tsalka.
After having preliminarily studied the case the Ombudsman of Georgia Mr.
Sozar Subari stated that the conflict happened based on ‘common’ grounds.
Public defender called to let government officials finish the investigation
of Tsalka events without any pressure or hindrance.
Mr. Karen Elchyan, President of the Armenian Centre of Cooperation of
Georgia, has also come out with a statement. He expressed condolences to the
family of the murder victim and presented the official position of his
organization. He stated that there are two different versions of the
motivation of the crime, and one of the versions, namely the ethnic hatred
motivation, is held by the victims of the crime.
Responding to a journalist’s question regarding Javakhk Armenians’ requests
of autonomy for Javakhk he noted that such requests are entirely lawful and
are based on the principles of federalism and territorial integrity of
state. Residents of the region, he stated, are convinced that granting
Javakhk autonomy would contribute to fulfillment of their obligations and
rights as of citizens of Georgia.
The Armenian Apostolic Church Diocese of Georgia has also commented on the
events in Tsalka. The Assistant to the Head of the Diocese of Armenian
Apostolic Church, Mr. Levon Isakhanyan supported the position of Mr. Karen
Elchyan regarding the existence of two versions of motivation of the crime.
He added that such crimes are consequence of anti-Armenian hysteria,
launched by the means of Georgian mass-media.
On behalf of the Diocese, he called for the appropriate government bodies to
pay sufficient attention to the problems of the Armenian Apostolic Church
Diocese of Georgia, interethnic relations and defending rights of the ethnic
minorities residing in Georgia.
Read Russian version:
© Armenia.Ge
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

KurdishMedia, UK
March 12 2006
Counter indictment: Full translated text of Oran’s defense [II]

3/12/2006 KurdishMedia.com
Read in Ankara at the “Minority Report” trial on 15 Feb. 2006
Baskin Oran, Professor of International Relations, Faculty of
Political Science, Ankara University.
To sum up, Distinguished Judge, the Corsican Island is like a state
within a state.
Alsace-Moselle is also a state within a state. It allows the use of
German, the language of its historical enemy, at the court houses. It
has a multi-legal system. This is unbearable for even the most
tolerant nation-states.
There is no mistake in analogy, but this is just like validating
Arabic language and Syrian Law in Hatay, and Russian language and
Muscovite Law in Kars and Ardahan. This is the kind of country which
the indictment quotes as an example for Turkey.
Seventh Issue
Let us go on.
The Office of the Public Prosecutor makes another assertion in page
5; this page is a very productive one indeed.
This is also completely ideological. It says:
“In the Report there is a new definition and application of minority
other than the one accepted by Lausanne . This would lead to chaos.”
Further, it continues:
“This would also bring about a result which would jeopardize the
unitary structure of the state, integrity of the country, and
indivisible integrity of the nation.”
For the sake of law, I ask: It says it would cause chaos, destroy
integrity. It again mentions an intent, a possibility. What do all
these mean? What kind of criminal law is this?
When one says “It’s cloudy” should we immediately conclude that it
might rain, a lake might emerge, birds might come, and bird flue
develop?
Let us go on. The Office of the Public Prosecutor mentions these
important arguments in only 3.5 lines, but does not elaborate on
them. Of course, it does not prove them by giving examples from our
Report.
Although we published our Report 17 months ago, Turkey has not yet
encountered such hazards. I don’t know what might happen in 17 years.
But I do know that the Prime Minister Erdogan is constantly using the
terminology and method of the Report to keep the Kurds happy: In
Hakkari and elsewhere he said that all the sub-identities be they
Kurdish, non-Muslim, Turk, Circassian etc. should be respected and
that they are under the supra- identity of being a Citizen of Turkey.
What else was there to say? Who in Turkey knew about the notions of
sub and supra identity before our Report?
But let’s continue to elaborate on the arguments of the indictment,
show how incorrect they are and prove them wrong by giving examples
from the Report. Let us show the Office of the Public Prosecutor how
an indictment should not be written.
1) First of all, just where did we propose a new definition of
minority in our Report? Which sentence or which paragraph? There is
no such sentence or paragraph…
Then, how can the Office of the Public Prosecutor see a thing which
does not exist? The reason is that because it wears ideological
eyeglasses it cannot see certain things. In addition, it does not
know the difference between the “existence of minority” which is a
sociological phenomenon and the “status of minority” which is a legal
category.
Distinguished Judge, in our Report we did not say that Lausanne
should not be implemented or should be amended. On the contrary, we
argued that it is not implemented and that it should be. This is
exactly what we wrote in our Report.
We have doubts whether the Office of the Public Prosecutor read the
Report or forgot it because its investigation took exactly 10 months.
2) The Office of the Public Prosecutor wrote that we jeopardize the
“unitary structure of the State and the integrity of the country” in
our Report.
Let me ask the same question again: In which line and with which
words did we do that? If the Office of the Public Prosecutor is
unable to answer this question, it would set forth an unfounded
claim. If an ordinary man had done what the Office of Public
Prosecutor did, s/he would be called a “slanderer.” This is why this
indictment has from the very beginning been nothing but an
Iftira-name (calumniation).
Distinguished judge, we did exactly the contrary:
a) The Report does not want to change the unitary structure of the
State and it does not even include the word “unitary” as this is none
of our business.
In addition, although I don’t want to linger over this subject, I
really don’t know where to start to correct in this indictment. The
indictment uses the word “unitary” in a wrong way and confuses it
with the concept of centralism; furthermore, it also confuses
centralism with the indivisibility. These are completely different
subjects. Let me explain:
The US is not a unitary but a federal State. However it is not
divided at all. Look at Iraq’s current situation; it was not federal
but unitary.
In both federal and unitary State structures, democracy and
dictatorship can be seen. For example, the USSR was a federation but
there was no democracy. Spain is not a federation but a unitary state
but is one of the most tolerant democracies of the world. Last month
Mr. Aguado, No. 2 general of the Spanish Land Forces, attempted to
intervene in democracy; he was sentenced to house arrest first and
then dismissed from his post. He will be retired in March.
b) Further still, I’m bored of telling these, I hope you don’t get
bored of listening to me, our Report does not include either the
words federal or confederal even once. So, what is this all about?
But that’s what the indictment argues.
In the Report, we defended the indivisibility of the State / homeland
because we base our arguments on the discipline of international
relations which argues that if the States of the World are
re-structured according to ethnic and linguistic lines, this will go
on like mitosis division.
Here is what we wrote in the Report word by word: the Report p.3,
subtitle 3: “The indivisible integrity of the State with its
territory is profoundly natural and is an indisputable issue all
around the world.”
Now, what is wrong with this sentence? Which part of our Report
divides the country / homeland? This indictment is a statement of
slander, is it not? Why is it so? What are we doing here? What are we
summoned here for?
3) The Office of the Public Prosecutor mentions the “integrity of the
nation.”
Distinguished Judge, political science rules that State / Homeland is
“undivided” and nation is “united”. Just like independence is an
attribute of the State, just like freedom is an attribute of the
nation. The nation is free, the State is independent.
“Undivided” refers to a whole without any parts and attachments.
There is no nation which is not made up of parts, except maybe for
Iceland, Korea, Portugal, and maybe one more. All nations are made up
of different ethnic and religious groups. Even Japan is not
homogenous.
You cannot render a nation a “whole” by denying the existence of
these groups. On the contrary you just tear it up and put it into
pieces as each part has its own original personality, in other words,
sub-identity. People cannot put up with the denial of their
sub-identity. They rebel. People rebel when you give them a wrong tea
cup; why wouldn’t they rebel when their identities are denied.
These various sub-identities might create “unity” only if there is a
supra identity that embraces all of them and that does not reflect
any particular ethnical – religious identity. That is why if you
reduce nation into “oneness” you destroy the unity. Oneness is enemy
to unity.
No one can write an indictment without knowing these. If you do, the
result is inevitably like this.
4) I am thrilled when I read some parts of the indictment. It’s as if
the Office of the Public Prosecutor’s Office develops new laws and
theories. It says the following – I’m trying to correct the sentence
a little bit:
“As the country has a central / unitary structure physically, people
who live there have also a unitary structure .” It says this for our
Constitution.
The indictment starts writing a “Constitutional Law” book this time.
But a completely wrong one. I don’t know where to start as there are
too many mistakes:
a) Again, it confuses centralism with unitary structure. I’ve given
sufficient information on this issue.
b) Secondly, by writing ” Turkish Republic is a unitary state with
its country and nation” it applies the adjective of unitary to the
nation, which is in fact an attribute of the State.
Distinguished Judge, let me explain this way:
In cases of freedom of expression, your colleagues in Strasbourg
reject any case if defendant State argues and proves that ” national
security of the country” and / or “territorial integrity of the
country” is at stake.
However, when defendant State defends itself by arguing that ”
integrity of the nation is at stake”, plaintiff wins the case and
gets compensation according to Art.10 of the European Convention of
Human Rights.
The reason is the following: When the issue is to limit individual
rights, the notion of the “integrity of nation” is alien to European
countries, although the first two concepts are respected there. Such
a concept cannot be accepted because if it were, there would be no
democracy. In the second half of the 19th century the definition of
democracy was “the will of the majority”, and this definition became
“respect for sub-identities” in the second half of the 20th century.
We are in the 21st century now.
5) This indictment quotes the famous Article 2 of the Spanish
constitution and does it with great imprudence. I don’t know what to
say about it. Let me cite you the said article and explain it:
“The Constitution is built on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish
nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it
recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of all the
nationalities and regions of which it is composed, and solidarity
amongst them all.”
Let me ask the question again: When we discuss whether our Report
constitutes a crime – which should not be discussed due to freedom of
expression – why the Spanish constitution? The indictment at this
point starts writing a “Comparative Politics” textbook this time.
Besides, it would be extremely reasonable if I myself had quoted this
Article, as this 3-line Article completely disproves the arguments of
the Office of the Public Prosecutor but confirms mine in 2 points:
a) Please pay attention: the adjective used for nation is “unity”.
The adjective used for homeland is “indivisible”. Just like I said
two seconds ago, word for word. I don’t understand at all why the
Office of the Public Prosecutor included this Article which in fact
disproves its arguments.
I can’t really believe that the indictment goes on as follows:
“As you can see, the Spanish Constitution, just like the Constitution
of Republic of Turkey, mentions the principle of the indivisibility
of nation.”
Would it be an exaggeration if I said that the Office of the Public
Prosecutor is making fun of us? This is not an indictment but a
statement of mockery.
b) Please pay attention again: After semicolon, Article 2 of the
Spanish Constitution states that the nation is made up of autonomous
nationalities and regions.
What did I say above? I gave a much lighter version of the same
statement: I said that the nation is made up of various ethnical and
religious sub-identities. Some call themselves Turks, some Muslims,
some Kurds, some Alevis, etc. The Spanish Constitution takes a huge
step further and says that the nation is made up of nationalities and
autonomous regions which are guaranteed by the constitution itself.
Heaven forbid, if we had repeated this Article in our Report, in
other words, if we had said that in Turkey the nation should be made
up of autonomous nationalities and regions, what in the world would
happen to us? The answer is very simple indeed: We would be
separatists.
I will return to this point later. But before ending this issue, I
have to show you what kind of Spain is cited by the Prosecution so
that the Indictment is displayed for your eyes [26].
– Art. 2 of the Constitution was saying: “The Spanish nation is
composed of Autonomous Nationalities and Autonomous Communities”.
– Constitutional Article 3/2: “Autonomous Communities can use their
own languages along with Spanish.” What we mean by Spanish here is
the language of the Castilian region.
– Constitutional Article 4/2: “Along with the Spanish flag,
autonomous communities shall be able to hoist their own flags on
their public buildings .”
– Constitutional Article 69/5: ” The Spanish Parliament is composed
of two chambers. Autonomous communities are represented at the Senate
in accordance with proportional representation principle.”
– Constitutional Article 87/2: `Autonomous Communities shall have
their respective assemblies, which -in addition to governing their
own communities- may submit Bills to the Spanish Parliament.”
– Constitutional Article 133/2: `Assemblies of the Autonomous
Communities shall be empowered to levy taxes.”
These autonomous communities have their specific statutes. For
instance let us have a look at the Autonomy Statute of the Basque
Country, dated 1979. [27]
– Article 17: To ensure order in the autonomous territory, there
shall be an autonomous police force. The command of the police forces
shall lie with the Government of the Basque Country. State security
and armed forces are competent in cases with extra- or
supra-Community nature (like entry into and exit from the State,
foreigners, customs, airports, smuggling etc.)
– Article 38/1: “The laws of the Basque Parliament shall be subject
to the control of the Constitutional Tribunal concerning their
compliance with the Constitution only .”
– Article 40: “Basque Country shall have its own autonomous treasury
and budget. In order not to distort the inter-regional balance in
Spain, a portion of the budget shall be transferred to the central
government to meet general expenses .”
***
Now let us come to Spain for the practice concerning mother tongue
and education of mother tongue. I will only cite examples from the
Basque Country and Catalonia:
Basque Country: [28]
Since the 1982 law, 4 models have been implemented in the Basque
Country:
Model A) The curriculum is in Spanish, some subjects are in Basque
(Euskara).
Model B) Spanish and the Basque Language are used 50-50.
Model D) The curriculum is in Basque.
Model X) The curriculum is in Spanish.
In this system, the student can choose any model s/he wants. The most
commonly used two models are models B and D.
Model X appears to be fading away since in certain areas it is
necessary to know the Basque language to find a job. On the other
hand, the number of those who only speak Basque is almost none.
Catalonia: [29]
The Catalan language has been taught at primary schools in the
Autonomous Community of Catalonia since 1978. After 1982, tests on
Catalan language were also included in the university examination.
Since the Language Law of 1983, it is decided that at least one
course will be taught in Catalan.
In Catalonia, Catalan is the official language along with Spanish
(Article 3 of the Autonomy Statute for Catalonia, dated 1979).
The Catalan language – the “own language of Catalonia”- is the
official language of all Generalitat [30], Catalan Territorial
Administration, Local Administration, and all official departments of
the Generalitat. Catalan and Spanish will be used as official
languages by the Administration (Language Law of 1983, article 5).
The documents that will be conveyed by the Generalitat to other
official departments within Catalonia will be in Catalan language.
The documents that will be sent outside of Catalonia will be in
Spanish or -where necessary- in the official language of that
administration (Decree dated 1987 and numbered 254, article 5).
All announcements, minutes and relevant documents that concern the
meetings of local administration departments will be in Catalan, and
no translation will be provided (Law dated 1987 and numbered 8,
article 2).
Judges, public prosecutors, other employees at courts, parties of
court cases and their representatives can use the official language
of the Autonomous Community in writing and verbally. The court
documents drafted in the official language of an autonomous community
are valid without further need for translation into Spanish (Organic
Law dated 1985 and numbered 6, articles 2, 3, and 4).
The names of official places in Catalonia will only be in Catalan,
except for Vall d’Aran (Language Law of 1983, article 12 ).
Catalan is the language of education at all levels. In primary
education, children can choose between Catalan or Spanish, but they
are obliged to learn them both (Language Law 1983, Article 14).
I just finished introducing a summary of the Spanish example given by
the Office of the Public Prosecutor for indivisibility of nation. I
think this summary is sufficient.
Eight Issue:
The Office of the Public Prosecutor on page 7 accuses us of using the
term ” Türkiyeli” (people of/from Turkey, citizen of Turkey) rather
than “Turk” as a supra-identity.
Later it said, “Turk is used to indicate the citizenship and it is
not used in racial context.”
There are so many things here to say but again I don’t know where to
begin. The best would be referring to them one by one:
1) Why is the Office of the Public Prosecutor concerned with the
proposal in our Report to use “Türkiyeli” rather than “Turk” as the
supra-identity? I could not understand this at all. This is not a
crime in Turkey. If it is a crime, then I would like to learn in
which paragraph of which article of which law this is considered a
crime.
The indictment does not refer to these at all. It only alleges that
what we said is wrong. This is what the Office of the Prosecutor
writes in its “Counter-Report.”
If there is freedom of expression in this country, I can propose any
term I like for any concept I like as long as it does not contain an
insult or violence.
Am I interfering with the Office of the Public Prosecutor because it
is not using “Türkiyeli”? Am I filing a criminal complaint against
him with the demand of a 5-year imprisonment?
I’m not, because I believe that one cannot interfere in anyone else’s
freedom of expression – as I keep repeating, as long as it does not
incite to crime or violence or involve an insult — and I won’t allow
anybody to interfere with mine.
I won’t, because I know that this is in line with the laws of the
Republic of Turkey. I’m sure that at the end of this case, the Office
of the Public Prosecutor too, will learn.
2) He claims that in Turkey the term “Turk” is not used in the racial
context.
What is this analysis doing in this indictment? Does an indictment
write theses? A Constitutional Law thesis?
The indictment is saying completely incorrect things. In fact it is
very seldom that one comes across so many wrongs put together in a
single text. We wrote in the Report, and I explained to him in
length, but it must have been in vain:
Leave aside the fact that the term “Turk” is alienating for those who
are not Turks or who do not consider themselves a Turk in this
country. I’m saying one more time clearly, the term “Turk” in this
country is used both as the name of the supra-identity and also as
the name of the dominant ethnic/cultural group.
You can simply open the 24-volume Meydan Larousse Dictionary and
Encyclopaedia, which is the largest dictionary ever published in
Turkey. Volume 19, page 471. Under the term “Türk,” the first
sentence says: ” A person of Turkish race.” As simple as that.
But I don’t think this is a simple thing. If the term “Turk” is not
the name of an ethnic group, then the Public Prosecutor’s Office must
answer the following four questions:
a) What does “Domestic foreigners (Turkish citizens) ” mean? This
term was used in the “Regulation For Protection Against Sabotages”
dated December 28, 1988, as it listed which categories were most
likely to carry out sabotages.
If this did not mean non-Muslim citizens, then what did it mean?
Didn’t the Office of the Prosecutor claim that the term “Turk” was
used for citizenship only?
b) What does “of Turkish origin and of Turkish citizenry” mean? This
term is used to describe the characteristics of the Deputy Principal
to be assigned by the Education Ministry to a foreign or minority
private school, as listed in Article 24/2 of the Law Number 625 still
in force now.
Once you say “of Turkish citizenry ” why do you repeat it by saying
“of Turkish origin”? Did not the indictment claim that the term
“Turk” was used for citizenry only?
c) What does “Turkish citizen with foreign nationality ” mean? This
term was used in the Istanbul Administrative Court Number 2 decision,
dated April 17, 1996. Whom did the court mean when it used this term?
It was our Greek Orthodox citizens.
Didn’t the indictment claim that the term “Turk” was used to indicate
citizenship only? Has anybody in this court room or in entire Turkey
heard of a more weird “legal” term than this? A person is either a
foreigner or a citizen.
d) What does “Foreigners are not permitted to acquire immovable
property in Turkey ” mean? This sentence is from the Court of
Cassation Grand Chamber dated May 8, 1974. Who did the Court of
Cassation have in mind while using it? It used it for the
administrators of the Balikli Greek Orthodox Hospital Foundation
established by our Greek Orthodox citizens.
Didn’t the indictment claim that the term “Turk” is used to indicate
citizenship only?
I’m passing this since there are many more things in the indictment.
3) Again about the supra-identity, the Public Prosecutor’s Office’s
Office gives examples from some countries. It says very interesting
things.
It says, “In Spain, the State calls its citizens Spanish [Ispanyol]
and not ‘from Spain’ [Ispanayali]”.”
Has an ethnic group called “Spanish” been discovered in Spain that I
don’t know about? If the answer is negative, what is the difference
between “Spaniard” and “Spanish” or “from Spain”?
The Office of the Public Prosecutor said, “The State of France calls
its citizens French and not of/from France.”
Sorry, but what is the difference between the two? Or was an ethnic
group called “Frank” that I did not know about was discovered in
France recently?
In fact the Ottomans used to call the citizens of France ” Fransevi”
and this is the very same word with “Fransiz” (French)
He claimed, “The State of England calls its citizens English and not
of/from England .”
Distinguished Judge, this is really one of the peaks of the
indictment. It is such a highlight that it dazzles one’s eyes since
the term “English” used by the Prosecutor’s Office is not used by the
people in England. Since Wales united under one parliament with
England in 1707, the people in England says ” I’m British.” Since 300
years.
I did not call this indictment an Icat-name (invention) for nothing.
I recommend that anyone travelling abroad and stopping by England
never ask a citizen of England on the street “Are you English?”
Because if they do not realize that you are a foreigner who does not
know the land at all, they can make you suffer dearly. Because unless
he belongs to the English ethnic group, this person would harshly
respond: “No, I’m Scottish/Welsh/Irish!” Because for the Irish, Welsh
and Scottish elements of this country, being called an Englishman is
a pure insult and may lead to major incidents.
In this country all sub-identities are united under the British
supra-identity. “English” is a mistaken term that some in Turkey
think is the supra-identity of that country. It is used to indicate
the sub-identity of those who are of English origin only.
Indeed using the sub-identity is not in the interest of the
English-origin people because they are afraid to provoke people of
other sub-identities. Asking a person “Are you English?” in that
country is the same as asking a man on the street in Turkey “Are you
a Kurd, an Alevi?” Indeed it is much worse.
Also in the indictment this country is referred to as England but its
name is the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. If
it had used only Great Britain or only United Kingdom it still would
be acceptable, but England does not work. Don’t listen to those who
are chanting ” England, England” in soccer games. Those are The
Skinheads.
Indeed the most comprehensive encyclopaedia published in Turkey was
AnaBritannica (Encyclopaedia Britannica) and in volume 11, p. 571 it
says the following in the first sentence of the entry “England”: ”
The prominent country of the Great Britain and the United Kingdom of
the Northern Ireland.” The encyclopaedia article continues: ” One
cannot talk about the Constitutional existence of England…. Scotland
and Wales have their own ministries and Northern Ireland is
autonomous in its domestic affairs, England does not have its own
rights or institutions. Official statistics on foreign trade, tax and
defence are part of the statistics of the United Kingdom. The only
institution that is English is the Anglican Church .”
Then how can people, who lack even this encyclopaedic information,
put forward convictions, introduce examples, introduce rules and then
demand 5-year imprisonment for us for writing an academic report?
I’ll not continue since there is a lot more to talk about. Let me
just say the following and thus we will mention something that the
Office of the Public Prosecutor said right among all these wrongs.
His last example is correct. In fact the German state calls its
citizens German ( Alman) and not of/from Germany (Almanyali).
There are two ways to nation-building:
1) French Method
2) German Method
The first one is also called “territorial method” or “Renan method”.
Indeed the term “Turkiyeli” in our Report is a pure reflection of
this method. The second one is the German Method. It is also called
the “Blood Method.”
I don’t know whether explaining this much is enough.
Let me finish this point by saying: The situation in Germany is not
like before anymore. As the number of people from Turkey only has
reached 2.5 million, as the number of minorities and foreigners
increased in Germany, the German State had to dilute the Blood
Method. For example, now not only those born to German parents but
those who were born on German soil (territorial method) can get
citizenship as well.
Here the important question is:
What do we call a Turk who assumes German citizenship by applying or
by being born there? Do we call him a “German Turk?”
Indeed, there cannot be such thing as a Bulgarian Turk but a Turk of
Bulgaria, not a Greek Turk but a Turk of Greece. What kind of a
response would you get if you call, say, a Turk who emigrated from
Bulgaria to Turkey a “Bulgarian Turk?” Indeed these people strongly
protested Fikret Bila, the Ankara representative of daily Milliyet
for using the term “Bulgarian Turk” in his column.
Here, Distinguished Judge, for all these reasons, one cannot say
Turkish Armenian but Armenian of Turkey, not Turkish Greek but Greek
of Turkey, not Turkish Kurd but a Kurd of Turkey.
But Türkiyeli suits just fine. Just like Iranian, Iraqi, Syrian,
Laotian, American, Thai, Austrian, Canadian, Chinese etc.
Yes, Chinese. In China there is no ethnic group called Chinese. The
name of the ethnic group that constitutes 95% of the people is the
“Han” group. “Chinese” is the supra-identity of this country that was
drawn by the territorial method. Just like the term Türkiyeli.
Leaving everything aside, I wonder whether the Office of the
Prosecutor has ever thought of the following:
In case the Greek Parliament said: “If the word Turk is not an ethnic
term, then in our country, too, everybody is Greek because this is
not an ethnic term either.” What if, God forbid, Greece introduces an
“Article 66” [of the Turkish Constitution] to its Constitution and
says: “Everybody who is tied by citizenship to the Greek state is a
Greek”? What will then happen to the 120,000 Western Thrace Muslim
Turks? Are they going to become “Greek”?
More interestingly: When we keep saying: “There is no Kurdish issue
but a Southeast issue,” or, when we tell people who call themselves
Kurds: “No, you are not Kurds, you are Southeasterners (
Güneydogulu)” we think we are saving the country from getting
divided. Then are we dividing the country when we talk on a bigger
scale and use the term ” Türkiyeli”? Is it not very clear that then
and only then we are actually saving the country? What kind of a
double standard is this? What are we doing with logic?
This is all what the Report was about, Distinguished Judge.
***
I earlier said that I would come back to the “intent” issue. I come
now because the Office of the Public Prosecutor invents an intent on
every page. As I repeatedly said before, a jurist cannot question
intent. He has no such authority. In the indictment p. 8, it says:
“While proposing to use the term ‘Turkiyeli’ rather than the term
‘Turkish’ in the Report, indeed it was not noticed that the name of
the country, in other words the name Turkey, has an ethnic
connotation. Was it not noticed or is it too early to make such a
warning yet?”
How can a man of law say such a thing? Making such a warning requires
great courage for two reasons:
1) While saying ” Is it too early to make such a warning yet?” the
Office of the Public Prosecutor openly tries to mean the following:
“The report writers actually wanted to name this country Kurdistan
but since they don’t have the courage to do so now, for the time
being they are satisfied with the term ‘ Türkiyeli.’ When the time
comes, they will suggest Kurdistan as well.”
Should I here remind of the Zanardelli Report again?
This is abuse of duty. No one is allowed to do that. At the end of my
remarks, we will certainly return to this.
2) The second reason may be more interesting. The indictment claims
that the term “Turkiyeli” has an ethnic connotation.
Again we are in the world of symbols, projections, probabilities,
dangers, dangers, dangers. But the only missing thing is criminal law
itself.
Fine, but didn’t the Office of the Public Prosecutor repeatedly say
that the term ” Türk” had no ethnic meaning at all? If the term
“Turk” does not have an ethnic meaning, then “Türkiyeli ” won’t
either. How can a person and a man of law be in such a contradiction
with himself between pages 7 and 8 of the same text?
***
To sum up, we introduced the term “Türkiyeli ” for the sake of this
country. And we did something very good. This is the only concept
that embraces all citizens of the Republic of Turkey without making
any discrimination. We are all Turkiyeli here.
Those who like it will use it, and those who don’t won’t. But one
cannot interfere with those who use it.
Can anybody say something to a person who says “I’m a Turk?” If he
says he is a Turk, that is it.
But what if he does not? What if he cannot? What if he is not a Turk
or considers himself a Turk? What shall we do? Kill him? Or shall we
force him to say that he is a Turk? Let me ask The Public
Prosecutor’s Office, which one should we do? The first one, the
second, which one?
Turk or Turkiyeli. This country will discuss and come to a decision
over time. How can the indictment attempt to restrict our freedom of
expression? From which article of which law does it draw this
authority?
Is the Public Prosecutor’s Office opening a case against us because
it did not or could not open cases against the bullies who tore our
scientific and official Report in front of TV cameras?
***
On this issue the indictment also refers to Ataturk. Fine. In fact I,
too, wanted to come exactly to this. Let me ask the Public
Prosecutor’s Office’s now: Does it think that it was us who
introduced the term ” Turkiyeli” for the first time in Turkey?
Let me inform him: That person was Ataturk. Was the Public
Prosecutor’s Office aware of this? Please listen to the following
articles:
“Article 12: Except for exceptional circumstances in Turkey the
Turkiyelis are free to travel .”
“Article 13: Education is free. Every Turkiyeli is eligible to take
public and private education.”
“Article 14: Schools and all such institutions are subject to
supervision and inspection of the State. The education of the
Turkiyeli must be in unity and order.”
“Article 15: All Turkiyelis are eligible to establish all types of
companies to be involved in commerce, industry and agriculture in
line with laws and regulations. ”
What are these? From where were they taken?
The date was July 1923. This is the first draft Constitution amending
some articles of the 1921 Constitution and mentioning, for the first
time, that the administrative form of the State is a “republic”. In
Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s own handwriting. [31]
If there is separatism in saying “Turkiyeli “, it was first initiated
by Mustafa Kemal. I’m not making a comment; I’m only presenting this
to the attention of the Office of the Public Prosecutor.
Ninth Issue
Let us come to the section in our Report concerning the
Constitutional Court.
I believe the Office of the Public Prosecutor is making injustice to
us when he claims that we presented the Constitutional Court as an
obstacle in front of democracy. We did the same with the Court of
Cassation, the administrative courts and the Council of State as
well. We stated that some decisions by these institutions were
discriminatory and thus were hurting democracy in Turkey. How come
did the Office of the Prosecutor miss these points? Is this not
neglect of duty?
Distinguished Judge, I’m an academician. I can say anything I like
without insulting or inciting to crime or violence. I can make any
criticism I like. This is why I get a salary from the State.
I did not commit a crime. But the indictment here commits 3 crimes:
1) Abuse of duty. Criticizing the Constitutional Court decisions is
not a crime. The Office of the Public Prosecutor attempted to silence
criticism only because it did not suit his ideology. This is a crime.
Also, this is pure dictatorship mentality.
2) Neglect of duty. If these comments were denigrating the
Constitutional Court, then why were they published in the Supreme
Court’s 2003 “Constitutional Law” periodical, pages 61-93? The Office
of the Public Prosecutor should have filed a lawsuit against this
Court also. This is neglect of duty.
3) Denigration of the Constitutional Court. My remarks, which were
interpreted as denigrating the judicial organs of the State, were
quotes that I took from the paper that I read in the presence of the
President and members of the Constitutional Court on April 25th,
2003, at the symposium organized to the honor of the 41 st
anniversary of the Court.
Now the Office of the Public Prosecutor seems to say, “You,
Constitutional Court. This person humiliated you. You are not even
aware of it. What kind of carelessness is this? I’m immediately
saving your honor and filing a lawsuit.”
So the Constitutional Court did not get the message but only the
Public Prosecutor’s Office did? So the Constitutional Court was
unable to make a complaint all these years? Is the Public
Prosecutor’s Office acting as a caretaker of the Court?
Tenth Issue
Distinguished Judge, finally let me say why I call this
pseudo-indictment an Itiraf-name (document of confession).
1) The Office of the Public Prosecutor says at the end (p.10): “This
text has great similarities with the provisions on minorities of the
Sèvres Treaty that put our country under occupation. In the face of
such a resemblance, one should not find it strange that one falls for
the Sevres paranoia. ”
The last sentence is the climax of the indictment: ” In the face of
such a resemblance, one should not find it strange that one falls for
the Sevres paranoia.” This is an unbelievable sentence Distinguished
Judge. This is a sentence that would tremendously ridicule not only
the Public Prosecutor’s Office, but anybody in Turkey. The Office of
the Public Prosecutor, also reflecting the general atmosphere of the
entire indictment, finds itself close to the Sevres paranoia!
Of course this is up to him. I personally would not want to say, not
even think of, such a thing. The indictment does so.
2) On the other hand, the indictment accuses our Report of resembling
the minority provisions of the Sèvres Treaty.
Let me repeat. Even if for a moment this should be the case, why
would this be a matter for the indictment? The Sèvres Treaty was made
in 1920 and was buried in history in 1923. Even if there might be
resembling sentences with such historical text, why does this bother
the Office of the Public Prosecutor? Who says this is a crime?
But this is such a case that I won’t drop it here with only this
much. Here there is an invention again. I’m asking the Public
Prosecutor’s Office: Which sentence of the Report resembles which
provision of the Sèvres Treaty on minorities? I want him it cite one
single article. One single article.
It cannot. If it could, it would have already done so in the
indictment.
Then there are only two possibilities:
1) The Public Prosecutor’s Office read the Sèvres Treaty’s articles
on minorities but could not find any resemblances to our Report. That
was why he did not cite any articles.
2) The Public Prosecutor’s Office was so much affected by the Sèvres
Paranoia environment that it did not have the courage to read the
Treaty, but, since the Report was lso very repellent, the Office
thought it would be similar to the scary Sevres Treaty, therefore the
Office found it correct to simply claim that one “resembles” the
other.
I’m leaving it up to the esteemed court to decide which possibility
is stronger. But let me draw the attention of the esteemed court to
the fact that the Office kept repeating such void allegations
throughout the indictment.
It claimed that the Report resembled Sevres but the indictment is
mute when we ask which sentences resembled which articles.
It claimed that the Report introduces a new minority definition but
the indictment remains mute when we ask in which sentence this was
proposed.
It is claimed that the Report was endangering the unitary structure
and integrity of the country but the indictment remains mute when we
ask in which sentence this was implied.
It is claimed that the Report was committing a crime by introducing
the term ” Turkiyeli” rather than “Türk” as the supra-identity, but
when we ask which article of which law makes this a crime, the
indictment remains mute.
It is claimed that the Report was denigrating the Constitutional
Court but when we asked in which sentence and with what word have we
done so, the indictment remains mute.
It is claimed that the Report was inciting animosity and hatred among
people but when we ask with which sentence we did that, the
indictment remains mute.
We are all tired now. I will not give any more examples.
Because of all this, this is not an indictment but a
pseudo-indictment. This style of indictment in our country was left
behind back in the military coup periods.
***
For all these reasons, Distinguished Judge, this pseudo-indictment
reminded me of great novelist Yasar Kemal’s “Akcasaz’in Agalari”
series. It reminded me of what Mr. Dervis said in the “Demirciler
Carsisi Cinayeti” (Murder in the Ironsmith Market) story.
Dervis Bey had Akkoyunlu Mustafa Bey’s brother killed. Mustafa Bey is
a feudal lord in Cukurova (Cilicia) just like himself. In response,
Mustafa Bey should have Dervis Bey himself killed because the latter
has no brother.
Since Dervis Bey never leaves his house, Mustafa Bey can not get him
killed. So instead, he gets somebody burn the heap of grain of one of
Dervis Bey’s laborers.
Upon this incident Dervis Bey says, “You are not going to starve.
Everybody will be paid for his damages. I’m not complaining about
this. My complaint is that I did not deserve such a rival. I feel
sorry for this.”
I do not feel sorry for all the time that I could have devoted to my
students and to my wife. I feel sorry that such an indictment was
written against me. I think that I’m qualified to be subject to a
better indictment. I believe that I deserve better than a document
which tries to undermine a scientific thesis but which puts itself in
a worse situation in every step.
I believe that I deserve a better indictment than this indictment,
which invents both the action and the law, and later wants me to be
prosecuted according to those inventions.
If the criminal theory has lost its fundamental basis so much in this
country, and if the elements of crime have been hurt so much, then
I’m afraid there is nobody who can do anything and there is no place
left to take refuge.
But I cannot accept that there is none left. There must be some, and
this counter-indictment should be a proof of that.
***
So that no other indictment attempts to do something similar again, I
demand that the Office of the Public Prosecutor be punished in a way
it deserves. I want to list the crimes he committed in this
indictment and I want to file the following criminal complaint
against it:
With this indictment many articles of laws were violated by ignoring
the rule of law that respects human rights as stipulated in
Constitutional Article 2 and in line with the principles of a
democratic state.
1) Academic freedom and autonomy as described in the Constitution and
in Art.15/3 of the 1966 UN International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights were violated and the interests of the
State were undermined.
2) The lawsuit filed violated the freedom of expression which is
under the guarantee of the Constitution and of the European
Convention.
3) The TPC was violated by the indictment because it attempted to
make analogies and also because it questioned the “intent”.
4) The court was denigrated because of a very carelessly prepared
file.
5) Europe, the main objective of the Republic of Turkey has been
portrayed as an enemy. This indictment and this case will be used as
a major obstacle to prevent Turkey’s entry into the EU. From this
angle too the basic interests of the State of Turkey were hurt.
6) The indictment was written with the logic of Millet-i Hakime
(Dominating Nation). It divides the nation in two and tries to
revitalize the basic order of the Ottoman Empire that collapsed.
7) The indictment abused its duty by putting forward alternative
ideological theses known to be ultra-nationalist.
8) The indictment neglected its duty by not filing in certain
lawsuits against us.
9) The indictment denigrated the Constitutional Court, a judiciary
organ of the State.
10) By stating that the term “Turkiyeli” incited people to hatred and
animosity and that it is a divisive term, the indictment insulted
M.K. Ataturk who first used it in four separate articles in the first
draft Constitution in July 1923.
11) By attacking the freedom of expression the indictment attempted
to eliminate the democratic State based on that freedom.
12) The indictment committed the crime of separatism by dividing the
nation into basic (Muslim) and secondary (non-Muslim) elements.
[1] “3.Some State parties which claim that they do not discriminate
on ethnic, linguistic or religious grounds, claim in an unfair manner
that there are no minorities in their country because of this very
reason ” and “5.2 The existence of an ethnic, religious or linguistic
minority in a given State party does not depend upon a decision by
that State party but requires to be established by objective criteria
“. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment
no.23: The Rights of minorities (Art.27), 08/04/94.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, General Comment no.23 (
(Symbol)/fb7fb12c2fb8b b21c12563ed004df111?Opendocument).
Also see: “2. It appears from the periodic reports submitted to the
Committee under article 9 of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and from other
information received by the Committee, that a number of States
parties recognize the presence on their territory of some national or
ethnic groups or indigenous peoples, while disregarding others.
Certain criteria should be uniformly applied to all groups, in
particular the number of persons concerned, and their being of a
race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin different from the
majority or from other groups within the population “, Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Recommendation no.24:
reporting of persons belonging to different races, national/ethnic
groups, or indigenous peoples ( Art.1): 27/08/99. Gen.Rec.No.24.
(General Comments)
((Symbol)/9ce4 cbfde77a452a8025684a0055a2d0?Opendocument)
I thank my friend Professor Patrick Thornberry for his valuable
assistance.
[2] Bilal Eryilmaz, Osmanli Devletinde Millet Sistemi (The Millet
System In the Ottoman Empire), Istanbul, Agaç Yayincilik, March 1992,
p.13.
[3] Indictment dated 23.10.1971, no.1971/160 (1971/130); Merit No:
1971/144 (1971/33-30), Decree No: 1971/100. See. DDKO Dava Dosyasi-1
(DDKO Case File-1)-, Ankara, Komal Yayinlari, 1975, p.22.
[4] ibid, p.24
[5] See the following three books for this information on the
Lausanne Treaty: Türk Dis Politikasi Kurtulus Savasindan Bugüne
Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar ((Turkish Foreign Policy – Facts,
Documents, Comments since the War of Independence), Ed. B.Oran, Vol.
I, 10 th edition, Istanbul, Iletisim Publications, 2005, pp.225-231;
B.Oran, Türkiye’de Azinliklar – kavramlar, teori, Lozan, iç mevzuat,
içtihat, uygulama (Minorities in Turkey – concepts, theory, Lausanne,
domestic legislation, jurisprudence, implementation) , 3rd edition,
Istanbul, Iletisim Publications, 2004, pp.61-80; B.Oran, Küresellesme
ve Azinliklar (Globalization and Minorities), 4th Edition, Ankara,
Imaj Publications, 2001, pp.152-162.
[6] Sami Selçuk, Özlenen Hukuk / Yasanan Hukuk (Desirable Law,
Existing Law), Ankara, Yeni Türkiye Yayinlari, 2002, s.206, dn.15.
[7] D élégation G énérale à la langue française et aux langues de
France, Le Corpus juridique des langues de France, Etude r éalisée
par Violaine Eyss éric, Paris, Avril 2005, s.67.
[8] Les langues de France: un patrimoine mé connu, une réalit é
vivante , web site of French Ministry of Culture and Communication :
ce_presentation.htm
[9] ossier=45
[10] Corpus…, s.18.
[11] Corpus…, s.68.
[12] Interview with Assoc. Prof. Samim Akgönül at Max Bloch
University in Strasbourg, January 10, 2006.
[13] Corpus…, s.71.
[14] Corpus…, s.71 ve 79.
[15] Le Monde , 04.10.2005.
[16] tml #3.1
[17] Corpus…, s.18.
[18] tml #3.1
[19] Les langues de France: un patrimoine mé connu, une ré alité
vivante, web site of French Ministry of Culture and Communication:
france/lgfrance_presentation.htm
[20] Jean-Luc Valens, “Le maintien d’un droit local en
Alsace-Moselle”, Quand la France se nomme diversité , Partie 2,
Problè mes politiques et sociaux, no.909, Février 2005, s.46-47.
[21] Interview with S.Akgönül .
[22] For further information on legal minority privileges in
Alsace-Moselle see Le Guide du Droit local: le droit applicable en
Alsace et en Moselle de A à Z, Paris, Publications de l’Institut du
Droit Local/Ecomica, 2002. For further information on minority rights
in France see Norbert Rouland, Stephane Pierre-Caps, Jacques
Poumarede, Droit des minorité s et des peuples autochtones, Paris,
Presses Universitaires de France, 1966, p.307-345 .
[23] For references for minority privileges in Corsica see: Le Statut
particulier de la Corse,
P=COstatut ; Collectivité
Territoriale de Corse,
p;id2=47 ; Pré sentation du
statut de la Collectivité Territoriale de Corse,
atut_CTC_FR.html ; Vie
Publique.FR – Découverte des institutions, La Corse,
ssements/approf_083.htm
; La collectivit é territoriale de Corse,
P=COloi91legis .
[24] ;l an=fr
[25]
[26] I thank my assistant Elçin Aktoprak for the fundamental
information she provided concerning Spain ( European Minorities and
Turkey her Ph.D thesis in writing). Also see:
tm ;
12/en/contenidos/informacion/concierto_economico/e n_467/concierto_i.html
; Pedro Ibarra ve Igor Ahedo, “The Political Systems Of The Basque
Country: Is A Non-Polarized Scenario Possible In The Future?”,
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 20, 2004, p. 355-386.
[27]
/en/contenidos/informacion/estatuto_guernica/en_45 5/adjuntos/estatu_i.pdf
[28] Estibaliz Amorrortu, “Bilingual Education in the Basque Country:
Achievements and Challenges after Four Decades of Acquisition
Planning”,
[29] Jude Webber ve Miguel Strubell i Trueta, “The Catalan Language:
Progress Towards Normalisation”, The Anglo-Catalan Society Occasional
Publications, 1991.
sop/07The_Catalan_language/pdf/issue07.pdf
[30] “Generalitat” is a concept representing the administration of
Catalonia in general. It is used to cover the parliament, the
president and the whole government. For this structure, see
.htm
[31] Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ilk Anayasa Taslagi (First Constitutional
Draft of the Republic of Turkey), Istanbul Boyut Yayin Grubu, Ekim
1998. This draft was discovered by Can Dündar’s team as they were
conducting a research at the Cankaya Palace Library for a documentary
film; it was conveyed to me by my “accomplice” professor Ibrahim
Kaboglu.)

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Kenya Times, Kenya
March 12 2006
Ndingi wants Raila’s allegation probed
By Agathat King’oo
CATHOLIC Archbishop Ndingi mwana a’ Nzeki has called for
investigations into the alleged presence of mercenaries in the
country.
Speaking yesterday after a service at the Holy Family Basilica,
Nairobi, Ndingi termed allegations by Langata Member of Parliament
Raila Odinga as serious adding Kenya’s security is at stake.
Raila first made these claims early this month when he said Russian
mercenaries were used to raid The Standard Media Group and were also
assigned to assassinate some opposition leaders.
`These are very serious allegations and Raila should be questioned to
establish the presence of any mercenaries. How did they get into the
country? Who brought them and why? And are Kenyans safe?’ he queried.
By Sunday police detailed to investigate the claims had not
questioned any of the suspects despite circulation of copies of
Armenian passports of two men.
The Criminal Investigations Department (CID) only confirmed seeing
the said documents in the media last Friday.
The travel documents indicated that the two men arrived in the
country early this year from Dubai, but have also visited Kenya in
the past on unknown missions. Ndingi said there is a possibility that
Raila’s claims are true and called on the government to investigate
the issue and make the findings to Kenyans.
`Kenyans are entitled to know the truth about these claims. After all
it is their security that is at stake,’ he said. Ndingi further
called upon Kenyans to rally behind the new team that President Mwai
Kibaki appointment recently to look into constitutional review
process.
He said he has confidence in the team led by Ambassador Bethuel
Kiplagat arguing that the chairman is an honest and courageous man.
` If I have been called a traitor by members of the Orange Democratic
Movement (ODM) because I support the Kiplagat team then so be it,’ he
said.

oikotimes.org, Greece
March 12 2006
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Armenia: Azerbaijan protests to Eurovision organizers; dispute over
Andre’s birth place

Fotis Konstantopoulos reporting from Athens (Greece)
The Ministry of Culture and Tourism of Azerbaijan sent a protest
letter to the organizers of the Eurovision musical competition to be
held in Athens on indication of “Republic of Nagorno Karabakh” as
birthplace of Andre representing Armenia in his biography placed in
the official Internet page of Eurovision. APA was told by the
press-service of the Ministry.
The Ministry declared that this fact can be valued as disrespect and
diversion against territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and can be
understood as support by the organizers of the competition to
Armenian aggressor policy against Azerbaijan: “We hope that the
organizers of the Eurovision musical competition will eliminate this
misunderstanding in a shortest period and territorial integrity of
Azerbaijan recognized by world’s states will be respected”.

Zaman, Turkey
March 12 2006
Kurdish Conference Marked with Controversy over Zana
By Erkan Acar, Cagri Cobanoglu, Serbest Ozden, Istanbul
Published: Sunday, March 12, 2006
zaman.com
A panel discussion on the Kurdish issue in Turkey was hosted amid
hot and strange opinions on the Dolapdere campus of Bilgi University
in cooperation with the Helsinki Citizens Assembly and the Empathy
Group.
Described by some as the Southwest issue, and described by others as
the Kurdish problem, participants struggled to find a common ground
to share. There was hot debate between Ahmet Turk, the former deputy
of the defunct Democratic Party (DEP), and Umit Firat, one of the
organizers of the conference during the second session titled
`Organizations and Experiences’ that took place in the morning. Mr.
Turk criticized Umit’s interview with Hurriyet, a Turkish daily, that
contained angry statements over the refusal to invite those who chose
violence to the conference: `Not long before the conference began,
discussions began over Leyla Zana being refused an invitation to this
conference.’ Firat responded by refuting Hurriyet’s news report. Sefa
Kaplan, a Hurriyet reporter, who interviewed Mr. Firat, and who also
attended the conference, claimed he had evidence to confirm the news
article was true.
Sertac Bucak, the founder and former president of the International
Center for Human Rights of the Kurds, pressed the terror organization
PKK, the Kurdish Worker’s Party, for disarmament during the first
session titled `The Evolution of Kurdish Issue and its Historical
Background’ when he said: `Armed resistance fits well in with the
policies of status quo in Turkey. The last three days of bombings,
like those in Van, are a clear indication of what I just said now.
However, anyone who acknowledges the existence of the Kurdish issue
should not be claimed a separatist.’ When Ali Bayramoglu, a
journalist, asked about the allegations that the Kurds committed the
murder of a massive number of Armenians, sociologist Ismail Besikci
responded by saying: `The Intelligence Service contained many Kurdish
people. Freed from the prison, promised possession, the Kurds were
coaxed by the then government into participating in the Armenian
genocide. The Kurds then did not act on their own free will. In the
killing of many Kurds such as Musa Anter, the Kurds were again used
to trigger violence.’
Professor Ahmet Insal argued during the session on nationalism that
nationalism is an exclusionist discourse when he said `nationalism is
impossible to integrate with peace.” Mumtaz’er Turkone, professor at
Gazi University, and a Zaman columnist, argued in response that the
Turkish nationalism is not propelled by the Turks. `Perhaps the Kurds
contributed more to the Turkish nationalism than the Turks did,’ said
Turkone, `It is the Macedonians and Circassians who founded the
Republic and they created the nationalism in order to protect the
state. Ziya Gokalp, the author of The Basics of Turkish Nationalism,
was also of Kurdish origin.’
On their way to Bilgi University, the participants were protested by
Artist Bedri Baykam and members of the Patriotic Movement, a radical
right-wing movement in Turkey.

Civil Georgia, Georgia
March 12 2006
New Opposition Party Holds Inaugural Assembly
The political party of ex-Foreign Minister Salome Zourabichvili –
`Georgia’s Way’ held its inaugural assembly on March 12. MP Gia
Tortladze became the chairman of the party’s political council. MP
Tortladze is a member of the Democratic Front parliamentary faction,
which also unites MPs from opposition Republican and Conservative
parties.
Addressing up to 2000 supporters gathered in the Philharmonic Hall in
Tbilisi Salome Zourabichvili said that currently the country faces
two major threats: return back to pre-Rose Revolution period and, as
she put it `revolutionism.’
`We do not need any more revolutions… Democracy will celebrate and I
will be very happy if the government change will occur through free
and fair elections,’ Zourabichvili said.
She also said there are signs that promises of Rose Revolutions have
been forgotten by the authorities. `We see a `a team of
neo-Shevardnadzists’ in the Parliament,’ Zourabichvili said referring
to the ruling National Movement party.
The leader of Georgia’s Way also criticized the Interior Ministry for
a high-handed tactics and a failure to protect `personal security’ of
ordinary citizens.
`Culture has always been a pillar of [Georgia] and not the police, or
any other structures as claimed by some politicians,’ Zourabichvili
said referring to the statements made by influential parliamentarians
from the ruling party who described the Interior Ministry and
Minister Vano Merabishvili as a `pillar of stability’ in Georgia.
Zourabichvili also said that Georgia needs `the strong army.’ `But
not because we should go into war,’ she added.
She also said that we should respect each citizen of Georgia. `We
forget the meaning of this word: citizen. Yesterday I head all day
through while listening [news] about Tsalka incident: Armenians,
Armenians. Who are they? They are Georgian citizens and the problem
is that the citizens are protected neither in Tsalka, nor in
Tbilisi,’ Zourabichvili said.

Cyprus Mail, Cyprus
March 12 2006
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`Minorities should be made to do the army’
By Jacqueline Theodoulou
MINORITY religious groups of Armenians, Latins and Maronites, should
be made to join the National Guard like everyone else, Ombudswoman
Eliana Nicolaou has ruled.
Nicolaou, who is also head of the Authority against Racism and
Discrimination, acted after a group of Greek Cypriots requested that
she investigate whether the fact that these minority groups were not
made to do military service constituted a form of unfair treatment
and discrimination.
The Ombudswoman’s report ruled in favour of the plaintiffs and was
sent on to the Defence Ministry, with the request that the
appropriate regulations be made and discrimination against Greek
Cypriot youths in favour of the minority groups be lifted.
But Maronite House Antonis Hadjiroussos described Nicolaou’s report
as `superficial and lacking in depth’, and said the matter would be
discussed with representatives from other minority groups.
`We have never refused to join the army. It was the government that
decided that Maronites were not obliged to join the army. I don’t
know why the Ombudswoman is now describing this as discrimination.
`We will discuss the matter with Nicolaou and the other minorities
and will then decide how to react.’
According to Dr Vahakn Atamian, Armenian House Representative, the
groups are planning to meet President Tassos Papadopoulos and discuss
the matter.
`After that, we will see how we will proceed,’ Atamian said
yesterday.
Following a recommendation by the National Guard, almost no members
of the above minorities have served in the National Guard since the
1960s. And due to the small number of their communities’ members,
only a few dozens of Armenian, Maronite and Latin 18-year-olds avoid
the call-up every year.
The Defence Ministry is examining Nicolaou’s report and will be
giving an official response soon.

Regnum, Russia –
March 12 2006
Taleh Ziyadov: What is next in the Karabakh Peace Process?
In Paris last month, another round of negotiations between Armenia
and Azerbaijan attempting to resolve the eighteen years old Karabakh
conflict ended with no results. The OSCE Minsk group mediators from
France, Russia and the United States watched quietly as Armenia’s
President Robert Kocharyan and Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev
tried and failed to agree on a framework document, which was supposed
to be the foundation for future talks.
The so-called Prague peace progress, which has been going on for more
than two years, has reached its climax in Paris. The talks revealed
that in the view of today’s political realities and the situation on
the ground in the South Caucasus, Armenia and Azerbaijan are not
ready to sign any agreements in 2006. It suddenly became clear when
the two presidents failed to reconcile the issues of security,
self-determination and territorial integrity.
Once again the negotiations collapsed. But this time they also buried
along all hopes for a peaceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict in
the near future. This has left many western officials, regional
experts and ordinary citizens alike anxiously guessing about what is
next in the Karabakh peace process.
As cynical as it may seem, the Karabakh peace process does not have a
bright future. Out of many possible development scenarios, there are
three main courses of action: a status quo, a new war or a solution
within the framework of territorial integrity. Although the last
option holds the key to a long-term peace in the region, in the
absence of international pressure the first two choices are bound to
overweight the third one.
A status quo option is the most likely alternative between now and
2008 – a year when both countries will have their next presidential
elections. This does not mean, however, that political, economic and
military processes will go smoothly in Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Armenia has already threatened that in case the negotiations fail,
Yerevan may recognize a self-declared and unrecognized
Nagorno-Karabakh republic. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, repeated
that if the peace process is unsuccessful, Baku will use all possible
means, including the military option, to restore the territorial
integrity of the country.
Moreover, during this temporary status quo period, Armenia will be
further isolated from regional energy and transportation projects and
Azerbaijan will triple or quadruple its military budget thanks to
money from the country’s energy exports.
The growing economic and military strength will make Azerbaijan even
more reluctant to consent to solutions that are on the table today.
The increasing self-confidence and loud demands of anxious refugees
and internally displaced will compel the future Azerbaijani
governments to take increasingly drastic actions to settle the
conflict by force. Then it will be not a question of `whether or
not’, but rather `when’ a new war is likely to begin.
Yet, neither a prolonged status quo nor a new war will settle the
Karabakh conflict permanently. Instead, a peace and prosperity for
Armenians and Azerbaijanis will come out of the optimal proposal – a
solution that will guarantee the security and self-governance rights
of Armenian and Azerbaijani ethnic communities of Karabakh without
breaking up the internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan.
The security of Armenians in Karabakh has been the major concern of
Yerevan. Armenia wants to make sure that Armenians in the region will
be safe and secure after the pullout of all Armenian troops from
Azerbaijan. This genuine concern, however, becomes hypocritical and
damaging when President Kocharyan continues to reject solutions that
incorporate options that guarantee the security of Karabakh Armenians
within the framework of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.
If President Kocharyan is sincere in his statements, he should work
constructively to find an optimum, not maximum, solution. President
Aliyev has already stated that he is open to all proposals that do
not jeopardize Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.
In fact, the resolution model for the Aland Islands – predominantly
Swedish province of Finland – that was recently circulated in the
Armenian and Azerbaijani media, could constitute a good framework for
addressing concerns of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia could
obtain exclusive rights for security of Karabakh Armenians and
resolve the issue of the region’s final status without delay, while
Azerbaijan will preserve its territorial integrity and return its
extensive IDP population back to their homes.
This year might be the last time when Armenians and Azerbaijanis will
have a real chance to settle their disputes peacefully. A lack of
international attention and pressure, a rapidly vanishing mutual
trust between two nations, and further delays in the peace process
will inevitable strengthen the hands of those who advocate a military
solution for the conflict. This could lead to unanticipated actions
that would bring more misfortune to both nations and the whole South
Caucasus region.
Taleh Ziyadov holds a Master’s degree from the School of Foreign
Service at Georgetown University. He specializes in energy, security
and geopolitical issues in the Caspian region and Eurasia.
From: Baghdasarian

EurasiaNet, NY
March 11 2006
SOUTH CAUCASUS: SLOW PROGRESS ON PLANS FOR CLOSER EU TIES
Ahto Lobjakas 3/11/06
A EurasiaNet Partner Post from RFE/RL
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Officials from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia were in Brussels in
recent days for another round of talks on “action plans” for closer
EU links. Although it is now a year since the European Commission
first proposed the “action plans,” there is no end in sight to the
process. EU officials say the talks have proven complex. It also
appears Azerbaijan must overcome a spat with Cyprus over its ties to
Northern Cyprus before the “action plans” can be formally approved by
the EU.
The Commission tabled its proposals for the “action plans” for the
three South Caucasus countries in March, 2005. The plans detail the
assistance the EU will offer Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan over the
next few years.
All three countries are keen to pursue closer ties with the EU. Yet
their second round of talks with the EU this week did not prove
conclusive.
European Commission spokeswoman Emma Udwin told RFE/RL that the EU is
moving as quickly as possible.
“We are hoping to be able to conclude consultations on the action
plans for all three countries of the South Caucasus as rapidly as
possible, and consultations up to this point have gone very well,”
Udwin said. “We’ve just completed the second round — the first was
held just before Christmas — and we are making very good progress.
We are narrowing down the number of topics that still have to be
tackled.”
However, Udwin said a third round of talks will be needed. Commission
sources say these may take place in the second half of May.
Commission officials refuse to elaborate on the details of the talks,
saying it could have a negative impact.
Udwin said there was no political motive behind this extension of the
“action plan” talks, and no technical difficulties holding things up.
“There is no delay as such; we started a little later than some had
hoped, but the consultations, now they are under way, are going
extremely well,” she said. “It’s important to understand that the
action plans that we’re talking about cover a very wide range of
policy areas and each of the difficult chapters has to be tackled and
they have a number of very precise points within them.”
Georgia’s Many Goals
Georgia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Valeri Chechelashvili told
journalists in Brussels two days after his round of talks on March 7
that there is agreement with the EU on about three-quarters of the
contents of the “action plan.” He said the round of talks in May
could prove to be the last.
Chechelasvili said Georgia would like the “action plan” to contain a
reference to the prospect of free trade with the EU. He said Georgia
is preparing to unilaterally give up trade restrictions for the
entire world, but understands that the EU is not keen to tackle the
issue within the framework of the present talks. Georgia would also
like the EU to ease its visa regime, having itself unilaterally
lifted its visa requirements for EU citizens.
EU sources have told RFE/RL, however, that the bulk of Georgia’s
diplomatic energy is currently focused on securing greater EU
involvement in conflict resolution — something the “action plans” do
not encompass beyond a reference to the EU’s readiness to assist with
postconflict rehabilitation.
The Georgian minister for conflict resolution, Georgi Khaidrava, was
also in Brussels in recent days. According to diplomats, he was
lobbying EU member states to join the Joint Control Commission —
which is tasked with monitoring the situation in the South Ossetian
conflict zone and is comprised of Georgia, the breakaway republic of
South Ossetia, Russia, and the Russian republic of North Ossetia —
to contribute peacekeepers for the breakaway republic of South
Ossetia, and to agree to set up a border monitoring mission.
Azerbaijan-Cyprus Spat Delaying Matters?
The EU itself is at the point of dispatching a formal reply to an
earlier letter from the Georgian government for assistance.
Armenia’s main sticking point in the “action plan” talks appears to
be the future of the Medzamor nuclear plant. Yerevan is keen to
secure more financial EU support for the decommissioning of the plant
and securing alternative energy supplies.
Azerbaijan’s main problem regarding the negotiations is with Cyprus.
The EU member state has, in the course of the past year, put the
brakes on EU-South Caucasus progress over Baku’s apparent willingness
to pursue ties with Northern Cyprus. The internationally unrecognized
government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus relies on
backing from Turkey. Ankara is also a close ally of Baku.
EU officials say Azerbaijan has only allowed one commercial flight to
take place in violation of the policy of isolation followed by the EU
with regard to Northern Cyprus, but refuses to commit itself
unequivocally to ruling out any further flights. Similarly, Baku
refuses to take steps to close down a cultural exchange center in
Northern Cyprus, which it says is operated privately.
The Azerbaijani-Cypriot spat may partly account for why the EU is
content to put off the conclusion of the talks on the “action plans”
by a few more months.
EU officials say that Cyprus is likely to prevent the South Caucasus
action plans from coming into effect unless Azerbaijan clearly
renounces links to Northern Cyprus.

Azad Hye, United Arab Emirates
March 12 2006
UAE Armenians > 25th anniversary celebration in Abu Dhabi
Azad-Hye, Dubai, 13 March 2006: The Armenian Community School of Abu
Dhabi celebrated its 25th Anniversary on Friday, March 10, 2006. The
function took place at `The Club’ in Abu Dhabi and the hall was
packed to capacity with students, teachers, former students, parents
and friends – some of them from Sharjah and Dubai – who had come to
participate in this memorable event (about 180 attendants
altogether).
The function was held under the auspices of the Catholicosal Vicar of
Kuwait and the Arabian Gulf Countries, His Eminence Archbishop Gorun
Babian, who had come from Kuwait especially for this occasion.
Present also were His Excellency Dr. Arshak Poladian, Ambassador of
the Republic of Armenia, Mr. Marat Melikian, 3rd Secretary and Head
of the Consular Office, members of the Armenian Community Council of
Abu Dhabi, the Executive Council, members of the Community Council of
the Northern Emirates, the principal of the Ohannessian School of
Sharjah.
The first part of the program consisted of an exhibition of pictures,
posters and handicraft prepared by the students of the school
especially for this occasion. There was a 25th Anniversary
commemorative book which was a compilation of two and half decades of
school activities and achievements (you can download a complete copy
or selected parts of the book from the links provided below). Mugs
and caps displaying the 25th anniversary logo, designed by Mr. Raffi
Simonian, were on sale for a nominal fee.
Upon the arrival of the guests of honor, Archbishop Babian and
Ambassador Poladian, the program got under way. After the Hymn of the
Republic of Armenia, sung by the audience, the principal of 23 years,
Mrs. Tamar Der-Ohannessian delivered the opening speech, highlighting
the major role the weekly school plays in the Armenian Community of
Abu Dhabi. There was a slide show prepared by Mr. Berge Ohannessian,
one of the former students of the school, which delighted all those
present, at the same time conveying a feeling of nostalgia, as
everyone recognized themselves and their children throughout the past
years. Copy of the slide show was distributed with the commemorative
book.
The school children sang and recited in a very well rehearsed manner.
Ambassador Poladian took the podium to express his heartfelt
appreciation and delight on this occasion, praising the devotion and
hard work of both teachers and students. Then, he invited Archbishop
Babian to present him with the passport of the Republic of Armenia,
as a token of recognition of his services in Iran and GCC countries
(Babian has been the Prelate of Isfahan for more than two decades
before moving to Kuwait).
The keynote speaker of the day was Archbishop Babian himself, who
first addressed the children delighting them with his easygoing
manner, encouraging them to answer his questions regarding how much
they loved the Armenian school, the Armenian language and their
fatherland, Armenia. Then, on a more serious note, he expressed his
appreciation and gratitude to the teachers for their devotion,
perseverance and patience in the great effort of teaching the mother
tongue and history, culture and religion to the new generation.
The names of all the teachers who had taught and still did at the
school were read, and all those present came forward to receive a red
rose from the Armenian Community Council.
Two teachers, Mrs. Arous Ohannessian and Mrs. Tamar Der-Ohannessian
(the principal of the school), were presented with beautiful framed
plates etched with the school 25th Anniversary logo for their work of
over 23 years at the school.
The ceremony was concluded with a large celebration cake brought to
the front to loud cheers and singing from the audience. This was
followed with the ceremonial cutting. Souvenir pictures were taken.
A sumptuous reception followed the ceremony where everyone had the
chance to sample great food and conversation.
It was indeed an appropriate tribute to 25 years of achievement.

The event as announced in our Events Calendar:
sp?evid=48
Website of the School:

(You are invited to post your comment in the Guestbook and read the
comments of graduates and friends of the School)
The 25th anniversary commemorative book – online version:
Complete version (7.51 MB):
sary-book.pdf
We have divided the book into four sections to help you to download
each section separately, if you wish to do so:
Preface (1.23 MB)
Phot o gallery – Part I (2.31 MB)
-1.pdf
Photo gallery – Part II (2.22 MB)
-2.pdf)
Index (2.45 MB):
The contents of the above commemorative book:
Page 1: Logo.
Pages 3-5: Brief history of the school (Armenian and English).
Pages 6-8: Messages of Archbishops Gorun Babian and Oshagan Choloyan.
Page 9: Message of Mrs. Tamar Der-Ohannessian, Principal of the
School.
Page 10: Message of the founding Principal Sona Badalian.
Page 11: Co-founder Mrs. Ashkhen Arzoumanian tells the story of
opening the School.
Page 12: Alice Ohannessian a graduate of the School interviews
another graduate Alenoush Shahmirzayan-Seraidarian, on the occasion
of having the later’s daughter registered as second generation
student in the school.
Page 13: `My Story’, Lena Derohannessian, daughter of the Principal
of the School and a graduate herself, remembers what school meant and
continues to mean for her.
Page 14: `I am an Armenian’, by Shaghig Toukhmanian Festekjian.
Page 15: `My first little Armenia’, by Sareen Sanossian.
Page 16: List of locations where the Armenian school held its classes
since 1981.
Page 17: Meeting of the graduates in Abu Dhabi, on 3rd February 2006.
Pages 19-45: About 130 photos covering school years 1981-2006.
Pages 46-49: Visitors of the school such as Historian Nikolai
Hovhannissian (1986), Catholicos Aram I (1988), Poet Razmig Tavoyan
(1992), Poetess Silva Gaboudigian (1996), Poet Kevork Emin (1998),
Professor Architect Varaztad Haroutounian, Minister Vartan Oskanian
(1999) and Bishop Nareg Alaemezian (2001).
Pages 50-58: Complete list of students and teachers during the last
25 years.
Page 59: Gratitude page for those who contributed to the success of
the Armenian Community School of Abu Dhabi during the past 25 years.
Pages 60-62: Press clips.
Pages 63-64: Pamphlets of graduation ceremonies.
The publication of the book has been made possible by Leon and Tamar
Der-Ohannessian