CZECH PRESIDENT: WHO WILL BENEFIT FROM TURKISH RECOGNITION OF ARMENIAN ‘GENOCIDE’?
ABHaber, Belgium
March 14 2006
Czech President Vaclav Klaus stressed on Sunday that stirring up and
bring the past events back to the agenda of the international community
is useless, saying, “Who will benefit from Turkish recognition of
the Armenian ‘genocide’?”
Speaking to German daily Der Spiegel, Klaus questioned the necessity of
facing the past, saying, “The past is the past. Nowadays the European
Parliament is urging Turkey to recognize the Armenian genocide
claims. Who will benefit from this recognition? Russian President
Vladimir Putin apologized for the suppression of the Prague spring
reform process by harsh methods in 1968, saying that his country takes
moral responsibility for the events of 1968. This was a gesture for the
Czech Republic but I don’t think that we have to discuss with Putin
the things a former Soviet leader did to us. In other words Putin is
not the inheritor of Leonid Brezhnev and I am not the inheritor of
the communist regime that took power in 1948 in my country.”
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

TURKISH DIASPORA FORMS NEW PLATFORMS AGAINST ARMENIAN GENOCIDE CLAIMS
ABHaber, Belgium
March 14 2006
The Turkish diaspora is stepping up efforts to rescind recognition of
Armenian genocide claims and to win support against its proponents
ahead of April 24, the date Armenians say is the anniversary of the
so-called genocide.
While Turkish associations in France joined forces under an umbrella
committee to overturn the 2001 French law recognizing the Armenian
genocide claims, the Workers’ Party (IP) gathered over the weekend
in Istanbul to outline plans for the Talat Pasha Movement, which
will include a mass rally in Berlin on Saturday to denounce the
Armenian claims.
The Turkish groups’ decision to put forward a unified response to
French recognition of Armenian genocide claims came during a meeting on
Sunday with the participation of representatives from 10 associations
under the leadership of the Anatolian Culture Center and the Kemalist
Thought Association.
Besides starting an initiative to bring about the repeal of a the
French law that recognizes the Armenian genocide, the umbrella
committee decided to launch an initiative to give concrete answers
“based on historic realities to foreign claims that aim at damaging
Turkish independence.” They also decided to conduct programs to
inform and inspire Turkish society against Armenian claims and to
inform French society about the realities of the issue.
Representatives of Turkish associations in France stressed at the
meeting that they are not against the existence of Armenians but aim
at making the historic realities supported by documents an issue of
discussion for French citizens.
Turkish associations also stated they will give priority to the
publishing of a book in French. They also announced that they will
gather again next month to view strategies and activities that will
be followed during the campaigns.
At a press conference last week, the groups organizing the committee
meeting demanded that the French Parliament’s recognition of the
alleged genocide in 2001 be reversed, saying that judging history
was up to historians not lawmakers, making reference to an earlier
statement by French President Jacques Chirac.
As part of the activities to overturn Armenian claims, the organizers
of the Talat Pasha Movement met over the weekend in Istanbul to
finalize preparations to launch the movement in Berlin beginning
on Saturday.
A mass demonstration aimed at denouncing Armenian genocide claims, to
be held in Berlin under the slogan “Take your flag and come to Berlin,”
has caused tension between Turkey and Germany. Flyers announcing the
movement read, “If Western capitals don’t want to be burned like Paris,
unjust treatment towards Turkey must end.”
IP leader Dogu Perincek and former Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(TRNC) President Rauf Denktas will lead the planned demonstration
with the participation of many representatives from Turkish political
parties and European non-governmental organizations (NGOs) within the
framework of the Talat Pasha Movement. The main aim of the group is to
put pressure on the German Parliament to remove official recognition
of the Armenian genocide claims. The movement also aims to attract
some 5 million supporters, including some 1,000 from Turkey.
Denktas is expected to lay flowers at the place in Berlin where
Talat Pasha was assassinated on March 15, 1921 by an Armenian, and
an assembly will gather in a memorial for Talat Pasha on Sunday.
In an effort to hamper these efforts, the German Embassy in Ankara
turned down yesterday visa applications for some who might be intending
to participate in the demonstration.
The same group last year also held a demonstration to mark the
82nd anniversary of the Treaty of Lausanne. At that demonstration
Perincek lashed out at a decision by Switzerland to punish those who
deny the Armenian genocide claims, saying, “The Armenian genocide is
an international lie,” after which the prosecutor from Winterthur
opened an investigation into Perincek and the incident turned into
a diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Switzerland.
?id=2375

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
_________________________________________ ____________________
RFE/RL Iran Report
Vol. 9, No. 8, 8 March 2006
A Review of Developments in Iran Prepared by the Regional Specialists
of RFE/RL’s Newsline Team
******************************************** ****************
* FORMER NUCLEAR NEGOTIATOR REMAINS COMMITTED ON NATIONAL AMBITIONS
* NUCLEAR GODFATHER, LEGISLATORS CALLS FOR TALKS WITH U.S.
* U.S.-IRAN POLICY ENTERS DELICATE PHASE AS IAEA MEETING LOOMS
* RUSSIA-IRAN NUCLEAR TALKS FAIL TO YIELD RESULTS
* NUCLEAR TALKS IN VIENNA UNPRODUCTIVE
* MOSCOW EAGER TO SEE BUSHEHR NUCLEAR-PLANT COMPLETION
* CONSENSUS THAT RUSSIA AND THE WEST ARE NOT IRAN’S FRIENDS
* TEHRAN ASSESSES IAEA REPORT POSITIVELY
* MORE BOMBINGS IN SOUTHWESTERN IRAN
* SOUTHWEST IRAN BOMBERS DEATH EXECUTED
* TRAVEL BAN FOR IRANIAN KURDISH ACTIVISTS
* LEGISLATORS DISPUTE NEED FOR CRISIS BUDGET
* FEMALE SOCCER FANS FRUSTRATED
* SUSPECTED JIHADIST SAYS HE RECEIVED SUPPORT IN IRAN FOR HIS BID TO
ENTER AFGHANISTAN
* IRAN CHOOSES DATE FOR INTIFADA CONFERENCE
* ISRAEL TO BLOCK IRANIAN FUNDING FOR PALESTINIANS
* GEORGIAN PRESIDENT DENIES PRICE FOR IRANIAN GAS WAS EXORBITANT
*************************************** *********************
FORMER NUCLEAR NEGOTIATOR REMAINS COMMITTED ON NATIONAL AMBITIONS. In
an unusually revealing speech to state officials, Hassan Rohani —
formerly Iran’s top nuclear negotiator and secretary of the
Supreme National Security Council for 16 years — has spoken about
every aspect of the country’s nuclear negotiations. His
revelations — including concerns of referral to the UN Security
Council and skepticism about Russia’s intentions — were recently
published in “Rahbord,” the journal of the Strategic Research Center
affiliated with the country’s Expediency Council. This speech
does not mark a change in Iran’s stance or in Rohani’s, but
it is highly significant ahead of the 6 March meeting of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors.
Defending Iran’s ‘Rights’
Rohani, who now serves on the Supreme National Security
Council as a representative of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,
complained during a 2 March speech in Yazd that Iran does not have
nuclear weapons but is subject to international pressure, the Islamic
Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported. Pakistan, North Korea, India,
and Israel, he continued, do have nuclear weapons but are left alone.
Rohani went on to say that Iran’s stance on the nuclear issue is
decided by the state’s top officials, and it does not vary on the
basis of changes in the executive branch. Rohani made the same point
in an earlier speech, “Sharq” reported on 20 February, saying,
“Iran’s general policies do not change with new governments.”
Nonetheless, Rohani has been critical of President Mahmud
Ahmadinejad’s foreign-policy team and its diplomatic efforts —
as have other Iranian political figures. There may be more to this
than concern about Iran’s international standing. Rohani’s
negative assessment could be attributed to political rivalries with
younger hardliners associated with Ahmadinejad — Rohani is more of a
centrist and is close to Expediency Council Chairman Ayatollah
Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and another member of the council,
former president Hojatoleslam Mohammad Khatami.
The Problem With Secrecy
Rohani described every aspect of the nuclear negotiations in
a speech to the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council that was
subsequently reproduced in the 30 September 2005 issue of “Rahbord.”
A date for the speech is not provided, but it clearly preceded the
August inauguration of Ahmadinejad because it refers to Rohani as the
“secretary” of the Supreme National Security Council and it refers to
Khatami as the president.
Iran began work on mastering the nuclear fuel cycle in
1987-1988, Rohani said, but efforts to purchase technology from the
Soviet Union and China were unsuccessful. Iran, therefore, turned to
the black market for its needs. What Iran did not realize, Rohani
continued, was that some of the second-hand equipment it purchased
was highly contaminated — meaning it had traces of uranium that was
70-80 percent enriched. Rohani explained that enrichment in excess of
25 percent has a potential weapons-related application. The IAEA
suspects Iran purchased some enriched uranium from the former Soviet
Union, he added, because tests found that this was the source of the
contamination.
Information was sometimes withheld from the IAEA, Rohani
said, but this differs from lying. “No, we have not lied. In all
cases, we have told them the truth. But in some cases, we may not
have disclosed information in a timely manner.”
In the summer of 2003, the Islamic Republic recognized the
need to “present a complete picture” of its early nuclear activities
in order to avoid being reported to the Security Council. Failure to
do so could be interpreted as a lack of cooperation. Furthermore,
Rohani said, the nuclear watchdog had secured information about the
Iranian program from many sources, such as Russia and China. In one
case a student’s dissertation contained information about
previously undisclosed nuclear tests, while in another case a
scholar’s paper was published in an international journal.
Libyan information about the nuclear black market, in
general, and P2 centrifuges, specifically, also shed light on Iranian
activities. This specific information undermined European confidence
in Iran’s trustworthiness.
Dealing With Europe
In 1999-2000, Rohani said, Tehran decided to upgrade the
nuclear program and granted the country’s Atomic Energy
Organization “a freer hand with new credits and a more liberal
spending procedure, new facilities, and special regulations,” which
allowed it to bypass “bureaucratic and regulatory labyrinths.” In
July an August 2002, he continued, questions arose over the nature of
the nuclear program and whether the country was in violation of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). At that point it was decided
that nuclear issues must be addressed at a higher level in the
Iranian government — the Supreme National Security Council got
involved for the first time.
After the September 2003 meeting of the IAEA, Rohani
continued, there was real concern that Iran would be referred to the
Security Council. When the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and
Great Britain came to Tehran the next month, they promised to resist
American pressure for a Security Council referral if Tehran was
completely forthcoming on its nuclear program. It was at that time
that Iran agreed to comply with the Additional Protocol of the NPT
and suspend some of its nuclear activities, but Rohani added that the
“system” — in other words, top officials of the regime — had
already decided to do this.
“Of course, all the agreements that we made with the
Europeans were agreements that the system had embraced beforehand,”
Rohani told his audience. “That is to say, even if we did not reach
an agreement with the Europeans, we still would have unilaterally
declared that we would sign the Additional Protocol…. Decisions had
been made beforehand that we would unilaterally take those steps even
in the absence of an agreement with the three [European] countries.
Nevertheless, we made a deal. The deal was for us to take those steps
in exchange for some commitments by the Europeans.”
Another suspension agreement was concluded in Brussels in
February 2004. Over time, Rohani said, according to “Rahbord,” the
Europeans concluded that Iran only agreed to suspend activities where
it no longer had technical problems. He acknowledged that the Isfahan
Uranium Conversion facility was completed in the interim, and yellow
cake can be converted into uranium hexafluoride and uranium
tetrafluoride there. He added, “As far as technology is concerned, we
are in better shape than we were last year.” Iran is able to
manufacture more parts and assemble equipment, and some 350
centrifuges were built between September 2003 and the date of his
speech.
Diplomatic Difficulties
The expansion of the European Union and the addition of
mostly pro-American countries to its membership presents Iran with a
more difficult situation, Rohani said in his 2005 speech. “When it
comes to the fuel cycle, the Europeans are as determined to see us
not have it as the United States,” he added. As for all the European
incentives and offers to Iran, he said, they are of “no immediate
benefit to us” and they “take a long time to conclude.”
Russia is no better, he continued, because it says Iran’s
desire to have the fuel cycle does not build confidence. Russia’s
view is, he said, that “the insistence on having the fuel cycle in
and of itself undermines trust.” The Russians have concerns about
Iran that are not shared by China, Rohani said, and this makes the
Chinese a bit easier to work with.
Iran’s nuclear negotiations are the most serious in its
history, Rohani said. “So far, we have been successful,” he said. “We
also have reached a good technical level.” Addressing the involvement
of China, Russia, South Africa, and the Non-Aligned Movement in the
diplomatic process, he added, “Our political situation today is also
better than it was a year ago.”
It is almost nine months since Rohani made that speech. He is
unlikely to repeat that positive assessment today — less than one
month after the IAEA Governing Board voted to report Iran to the
Security Council. (Bill Samii)
NUCLEAR GODFATHER, LEGISLATORS CALLS FOR TALKS WITH U.S. Akbar
Etemad, founder of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization and the
agency’s first chief, announced recently that the Russian
uranium-enrichment proposal will not resolve the Iranian nuclear
standoff, Mehr News Agency reported on 24 February. He recommended
direct talks with the United States as a solution.
Kazem Jalali, rapporteur of the legislature’s National
Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said in the 2 March “Aftab-i
Yazd” that Iran might as well eliminate the intermediaries and
negotiate directly with the U.S. He explained that both the Europeans
and the Russian appear to be acting in line with U.S. desires, and
furthermore, they are taking advantage of the lack of alternatives to
improve their negotiating position. He said such talks would be
feasible if the U.S. accepts the principle of Iran using nuclear
technology peacefully, but added that the U.S. seems to take a
completely politicized stance on all issues.
Urumiyeh legislator Javad Jahangirzadeh told “Aftab-i Yazd”
that Iran has already made clear the circumstance under which it will
talk to the U.S., but it is unrealistic to expect the U.S. to change
its behavior. Jahangirzadeh said he does not foresee a rift between
Washington and the Europeans, and the involvement of Moscow and
Peking has not helped.
Isfahan representative Hassan Kamran was less enthusiastic
about talks with the U.S., telling “Aftab-i Yazd” that those who
suggest this should submit their resignations. (Bill Samii)
U.S.-IRAN POLICY ENTERS DELICATE PHASE AS IAEA MEETING LOOMS. The
Board of Governors of the UN’s International Atomic Energy
Agency, or IAEA, will meet in Vienna on 6 March and could decide
whether to report Iran to the Security Council for possible sanctions
for resuming its suspected nuclear weapons program. Britain, France
and Germany — known as the EU-3 — have been negotiating with Iran
for more than a year in hopes of persuading it to end the program.
The United States, meanwhile, is playing a secondary role in the
talks, but at the same time, U.S. President George W. Bush says he
has not ruled out the possible use of military force to confront
Iran’s suspected nuclear ambitions.
To Joseph Cirincione, there is — or at least should be — a
single, path in dealing with Iran’s nuclear program: go through
the United Nations.
It appears that the EU-3 and the United States have begun
following that path, according to Cirincione, the director of the
Nonproliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, a Washington policy research center.
Cirincione tells RFE/RL that there are three steps in how the
UN may act. The first is to wait at least a month after the
IAEA’s 4 February decision before the Security Council takes any
action at all. Cirincione says he doesn’t expect such action
before mid-March.
At this point, Cirincione says, the Security Council probably
will simply repeat the IAEA’s statement that Iran should end all
uranium enrichment. He says if Iran ignores that, the pressure on
Tehran will increase.
Finally, Cirincione says, the Council might impose what he
called “targeted sanctions aimed at the Iranian leadership.” He says
they would include banning some travel and restricting access to some
international bank accounts.
But Cirincione says imposing even such mild sanctions would
have to be considered very carefully because of the close political
and economic ties that Iran has with Russia and China — two Security
Council members with veto power over any council resolution: “That
step is going to be the most controversial. That’s why everybody
[the United States and the EU-3] wants to proceed slowly to make sure
that the Security Council stays united on this, and that Russia and
China are comfortable with each step being taken.”
One possibility that Cirincione rejects is military action,
despite the U.S. insistence that such an option remains viable:
“There is no good military option here. While it’s possible to
just blow up something in Iran, this would have almost no support by
[from] any other country in the world with the possible exception of
Israel, and would provoke a huge backlash in the Muslim world, rally
the Iranian public around what is otherwise an unpopular government,
and jeopardize the already fragile U.S. position in Iraq. The U.S.
really has no choice but to go with the kind of patient diplomacy
that they’ve sketched out over the past few months and that has a
chance of working.”
But another weapons expert disagrees. He is David Albright,
who served as a weapons inspector in Iraq during the 1990s and now is
the president of the Institute for Science and International
Security, another Washington think tank.
Albright tells RFE/RL that he believes the United States is
seriously considering military action, even though he agrees with
Cirincione that any attack on Iran would be politically and
diplomatically disastrous for the Bush administration.
Meanwhile, Albright says, the EU-3 don’t want that kind
of help from the United States, but instead something more positive.
He says the Europeans believe a military strike would only be a
replay of the Iraq war: “There’s a general expectation that’s
growing [among the EU-3 governments] that the U.S. needs to put on
the table what it is Iran needs to do so that the military option is
not on the table. And some in the administration say, ‘No, no,
the military option’s on the table until this regime disappears,
and we have democracy.’ Which is essentially what they did in
Iraq. [The Americans argued that] whatever happened didn’t matter
because Saddam was still in power.”
Albright contrasts the negotiations with Iran with the
six-party talks on North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons
program, which have yielded some progress. Besides the two Koreas,
these talks include China, Japan, Russia, and the United States.
Albright points out that in the Korea negotiations, the Bush
administration had a clear policy strategy. With Iran, however, he
says, it appears Washington has no real strategy yet, and that could
lead to the exact opposite of what the United States and the EU-3
want: “If you’re going into a crisis, I mean, there are key
questions, [such as] under what conditions would Iran be offered a
security guarantee? Bush offered it to North Korea, under certain
conditions. What are they for Iran, except ‘regime change’?
But that’s not a policy. Iran looks at that and says, ‘Boy,
we’d better get nuclear weapons.'”
There has been some question about how the IAEA may present
its case against Iran to the UN. On 4 February the agency chose to
“report” Iran to the Security Council. Some have suggested it may
strengthen the complaint by “referring” Iran to the Council.
Both Cirincione and Albright say there is no practical
difference between the two terms. But Albright notes that the Russian
government — which recently has been negotiating a possible
uranium-enrichment deal with Tehran — seems to see a distinction.
Albright says the Russians may see a “referral” as having
more legal weight than mere “reporting.” He says “referral” might be
perceived as giving the Security Council more authority to take
harsher measures against Iran, including authorizing military action.
But he says such UN authorization is highly unlikely under the
current circumstances.
Both Albright and Cirincione agree that whatever the fine
distinctions, if the IAEA were to take action, it would be to
“report” Iran to the Security Council, thus forestalling complaints
from Russia. (Andrew Tully)
RUSSIA-IRAN NUCLEAR TALKS FAIL TO YIELD RESULTS. Russian Atomic
Energy Agency chief Sergei Kiriyenko arrived in Iran on 24 February
to discuss Moscow’s proposal that Iranian uranium for use in Iran
be enriched on Russian soil, and when he left two days later no
progress appeared to have been made. In the interim, however, Iranian
officials feigned interest in the Russian proposal, with Deputy
Foreign Minister Mahdi Mostafavi saying on 24 February that the
proposal is close to being completed, Mehr News Agency reported.
After meeting with Iranian Atomic Energy Agency Organization
chief Gholamreza Aqazadeh-Khoi on 25 January, Kiriyenko said, “No
progress has been made on our offer to transfer Iran’s uranium
enrichment to Russia but negotiations are continuing,” the Iranian
Labor News Agency (ILNA) reported.
Kiriyenko told a 26 February news conference in Bushehr that
the two sides agreed to continue their nuclear talks in Moscow in the
coming days, Interfax reported. According to a 26 February report on
the website of the British daily “The Independent,” however, Iran has
effectively scuppered the deal by putting a precondition that
probably calls for enrichment on Iranian soil.
Sergei Kiriyenko said on 27 February after returning to
Moscow from Iran that the central issues regarding the Iranian
nuclear program have yet to be clarified, the “Financial Times”
reported. He noted that “a lot of work still needs to be done, and we
have agreed that the talks will continue in Moscow in the very near
future,” international media reported. He added that “the talks are
not simple, they are complicated, but I would like to repeat that I
am confident that a diplomatic solution is possible.” The
London-based daily quoted unnamed European diplomats as saying that
any agreement that Kiriyenko might have reached with his hosts is
likely to be technical or minor in nature. The paper added that the
question of Iran’s demand to enrich uranium on its own territory
remains unresolved.
Regardless of the outcome of negotiations in Moscow, Foreign
Minister Manuchehr Mottaki said in Tokyo on 28 February, Iran will
not stop its current uranium-enrichment activities, Kyodo World
Service reported. Moreover, he said, Iran intends to commence
full-scale enrichment activities eventually. In the short term, he
continued, Iran could settle on a compromise that might result in the
enrichment of Iranian uranium on Russian territory. The country’s
“final target,” he said, is uranium enrichment in Iran. Mottaki said
the Russian deal must be specific about where and how long it will
take. The suggestion that Iran suspend enrichment activities for 10
years is “too long,” he said. Mottaki insisted in a speech to
Iranians living in Japan that Iranians see enrichment as a right,
IRNA reported, and that the country’s officials will not
compromise on this issue.
The secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali
Larijani, his deputy Ali Husseinitash, and Atomic Energy Organization
head Aqazadeh-Khoi arrived in Moscow on 1 March.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak said later
that day that the five hours of nuclear discussions with the visiting
Iranian officials were “constructive and earnest,” but some issues
await resolution, Interfax reported. Larijani said the discussions
will continue and emphasized that Iran will not forgo enriching
uranium on its own territory, even if it does agree to the proposal
that it use uranium enriched in Russia. “I want to say that the
enrichment process is the sovereign right of any state,” he said.
“States with a peaceful nuclear program must not be deprived of this
right.”
Larijani said in Moscow on March 2 that the United States
wants to block a possible Russian-Iranian deal on uranium enrichment,
international news agencies reported. He argued that U.S. insistence
on referring Iran to the UN Security Council for possible punitive
sanctions is hindering an agreement.
The latest round of talks between Iran and Russia on a
proposal to enrich Iran’s uranium on Russian soil ended earlier
that day without any visible breakthrough. There was no date given
for the next round. (Bill Samii, Patrick Moore)
NUCLEAR TALKS IN VIENNA UNPRODUCTIVE. Ali Larijani, secretary of
Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, and foreign ministers
and top diplomats from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom met in
Vienna on 3 March to discuss the escalating crisis over the
country’s nuclear program, news agencies reported. The meeting
comes at the Iranians’ request, AFP reported on 2 March, with
Larijani saying that he wants to meet with the Europeans ahead of the
6 March International Atomic Energy Agency meeting.
The meeting failed to achieve anything after two hours of
talks, Reuters reported. The European officials and EU foreign policy
chief Javier Solana said the Iranians did not offer any new ideas,
adding that the European side repeated its position that Iran stop
uranium enrichment and related activities. The Europeans were not
completely dismissive, however. The British Foreign Office’s John
Sawers told Reuters, “We heard a new tone. It was more constructive.
But there wasn’t the essential move of substance we were looking
for.”
Larijani and an Iranian team were in Moscow on 1 and 2 March
to discuss a Russian proposal that might have resolved the impasse
over uranium enrichment. The Gazeta.ru website reported on 2 March
that the Moscow talks “ended in failure.” Iranian state radio
reported on 2 March that the Moscow talks failed because Moscow’s
“insistence” on reiterating the Western stance. “During the talks,
the Russians were strongly under the influence of the American
policy,” state radio reported. This alleged attachment to U.S.
policy, the radio report concluded, undermines Russian policy in the
Middle East and no country will take Russia seriously in the future.
(Bill Samii)
MOSCOW EAGER TO SEE BUSHEHR NUCLEAR-PLANT COMPLETION. Russian Atomic
Energy Agency chief Kiriyenko said on 25 February that his country is
keen to see the Bushehr nuclear power plant completed as soon as
possible, ITAR-TASS reported, and he sees no political factors
blocking this objective. Kiriyenko and his Iranian counterpart
Aqazadeh visited the Bushehr facility on 26 February, ITAR-TASS
reported. An anonymous source told the Russian news agency that
although Russia is eager to finish the project this year, as planned,
there are technical difficulties. He cited wiring as an example,
saying 2,000 kilometers of it needs to be laid, but only 200
kilometers can be laid each month and they only started in January.
The Russian added that safety will not be ignored in order to hurry
completion. Aqazadeh said at a press conference in Bushehr that
documents for the construction of two new 1,000-megawatt power plants
will be ready in one month, Islamic Republic of Iran News Network
reported. These will be built in Bushehr, too, he said. (Bill Samii)
CONSENSUS THAT RUSSIA AND THE WEST ARE NOT IRAN’S FRIENDS. In
responding to Western allegations that Iran may be seeking nuclear
weapons, Iranian politicians have revealed their mostly negative
perspectives of the West. Qualities they most frequently associate
with liberal democracies are falsehood, double standards, and a
colonial instinct or desire to dominate. Their disenchantment has
come to include Russia, often seen as a more benign international
partner, but which has recently moved closer to Western positions on
Iran’s nuclear dossier. This distrust suggests that continued
negotiations on the nuclear issue could be a pointless process, at
worst or, at best, suggests that a negotiated solution will require a
very delicate diplomatic touch.
Western Condescension
Officials often tell Western states not to talk down to Iran
or make threats. President Mahmud Ahmadinejad — speaking in Bushehr,
Iran on 1 February – said the Western “discourse belongs to the
Middle Ages,” the Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA) reported,
referring to an age of hierarchies.
Iran insists its nuclear dossier is a matter of international
“law,” technicalities, and “rights.” It sees persistent Western
suspicions as motivated by hostility and opposition to the progress
of developing states. That hostility is clear to officials who claim
intermittently that fear of defeat is the only reason the West has
not attacked Iran. Army chief Ataollah Salehi said in Bushehr on 17
February that if the enemy “thought it might defeat us,” it would
have initiated an attack in the Persian Gulf, “Aftab-i Yazd”
reported.
Western states “do not want Iran to be independent,”
Prosecutor-General Qorban-Ali Dori-Najafabadi said on 3 February, and
they are “taking vindictive decisions against us,” ISNA reported.
Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, a leading conservative cleric, told a Tehran
congregation on 17 February that Western threats and even violence
could not deter Iran’s bid to have nuclear energy.
He accused the West of backing Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in
his war against Iran in the 1980s, saying the war “ended to our
advantage and you were disgraced, and everyone in the world found out
how criminal you are.” What “world is this,” he asked, when “they
tell us you cannot do research?”
Legislator Jalal Yahyazadeh said on 12 February that “the
states pressuring us today are trying to form a nuclear OPEC” — a
cartel controlling fuel supplies — ILNA reported. They want “the
right to access energy only for themselves, so that when fossil fuels
are finished they can attain their colonial aims.” Nonaligned members
of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) board of
governors that voted on 4 February to report Iran’s dossier to
the UN Security Council “should know,” he said, that Western states
“will one day turn on them.”
Singling Out Straw
Great Britain is a prominent villain in the historical
imagination of Iranians and a symbol of foreign treachery. Legislator
Heshmatollah Falahat-Pisheh said on 12 February that the history of
recent Iran-EU talks shows that British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw
has taken the “most divergent positions…and actually every time he
has adopted a moderate stance, we have seen harsh and aggressive
conduct,” ILNA reported. Straw’s conduct, he said, should “not
cause any optimism in our foreign policy.” Iran gave up talking to
the EU when it realized it was just killing time, he said.
Deceit and falsehood recur as perceived Western traits.
Legislator Alaedin Borujerdi said on television on 3 February that
the West has stirred up such a “scandal” over Iran’s program as
to lead “our friends” to suspect Iran really does intend to make
nuclear bombs.
Conservative politician Hamid Reza Taraqi said on 17 February
that clearly the best foreign policy for Iran is to rely on itself,
not on Eastern or Western states, as “it has been proven that neither
can be relied on or trusted…. One should pay greater attention to
states that have proven their true independence [against] global
arrogance and imperialist policies,” Mehr reported.
Little Confidence In Russia
More recently, there has been a growing skepticism toward
Russia, a state more frequently immune to insults by Iran’s
nomenklatura. Russia has had generally good relations with
postrevolutionary Iran. This may be for a persistent left-wing or
radical streak in Iran’s polity, born as it was of a mass
revolution, and which is perceptible in the cordial relations it
enjoys with such other states as China, North Korea, Cuba, and, most
recently, Venezuela. But the skeptical remarks indicate a growing
acceptance that essential interests — not values or loyalties —
move interstate relations. This is increasingly clear to Iranians
after negative votes at the IAEA, which Russia has joined or not
opposed.
Lawmaker Mohammad Reza Mirtajedini said on 14 February that
Russia “only follows its interests,” as shown by its vote to report
Iran to the Security Council, Mehr reported. Its proposal for joint
Iran-Russian uranium enrichment in Russia, as a safeguard measure,
“is not sincere,” legislator Javad Sadunzadeh told Mehr on 17
February. Heshmatollah Falahat-Pisheh said on 18 February that the
Russians “know better than anyone” that Iran’s program is “clean”
but are trying “by mediation to gain concessions and consolidate
their own position,” Mehr reported. “Russia does not have the
necessary goodwill and authority, and one should not rely
strategically on [its] proposal,” he said. Legislator Javad
Jahangirzadeh observed the same day that Iranians’ historical
memory of Russia is “full” of bitterness, Mehr reported. Its
enrichment proposal, he said, is “more disgraceful than the
Turkmenchai and Gulistan” treaties that forced Persia to cede Russia
its Caucasus territories in the early 19th century.
The proposal violates Iran’s sovereignty, legislator
Javad Jahangirzadeh said on 19 February. “The age of humiliating
collaboration with old colonial powers is over…Asia is implementing
America’s views with its own hand,” he told ILNA. Reformist
deputy Nureddin Pirmoazen told ISNA the same day that the Russians
have a “dual role” and “a thousand faces to serve their own
interests.” History “has shown the Russians cannot be trusted,” he
said.
Reformists Advocate Wit
Reformist politicians on the sidelines of power agree that
Iran has nuclear rights, but say these are better served with wit and
diligence, not provocation. Former President Mohammad Khatami said on
15 February that Western states are “undoubtedly” unfair, “because
there are three nuclear powers in the region and Israel has nuclear
bombs, but they are pressuring Iran. This
discrimination…is…generally the result of American pressure.”
But he urged Iran to use “good sense” here. Former legislator
Mohammad Kianush-Rad told ISNA on 15 February that “radical”
positions, presumably by Iranian statesmen, are fuelling “tensions
and spreading distrust” toward Iran. Liberal former minister
Ezzatollah Sahabi urged “patience” and “confidence-building” in
negotiations on 15 February, ISNA reported, while former
parliamentary speaker Mehdi Karrubi told ISNA on 12 February that “we
must…defend our rights…by remaining respectful to others.”
There is an uneasy mixture of realism and idealism in the
discourse of Iranian officialdom. In contrast to alleged Western
double-talk, Iran invokes the truth, the law, science, progress, and
justice when speaking of its nuclear program. And yet it is obliged
to sit and talk to states it believes have no morals or principles.
It may be that to resolve such discrepancies, the Islamic Republic
has practically enshrined the idea of “expediency:” a short-term
compromise — an apparent bending of principles — to serve higher,
immutable ideals. A sense of expediency is the realism of a state its
partisans believe is working God’s purpose on earth. This outlook
is illustrated in reported remarks by a former conservative deputy
foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Larijani, who said a few years back
that Iranian negotiators would, if state interests demand it, go to
the depths of hell to negotiate with the devil.
So as the state speaks of absolutes and of “red lines” over
enrichment, its negotiators may — now and in coming months — expect
to reach an acceptable compromise not unlike the half-way price
Iranians agree to pay after haggling in a market. (Vahid Sepehri)
TEHRAN ASSESSES IAEA REPORT POSITIVELY. An anonymous member of
Iran’s nuclear negotiating team said on 27 February that Tehran
expects a positive report from International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) Director-General Muhammad el-Baradei, IRNA reported.
The IAEA report says that Tehran has been less than
cooperative and that the agency is not ready to conclude that
undeclared nuclear activities are not taking place in Iran. “It is
regrettable and a matter of concern that the…uncertainties related
to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear program have not been
clarified after three years of intensive agency verifications.” The
report also says that Iran plans to build 3,000 centrifuges and is
setting up “process tanks and an autoclave” to feed gas into the
centrifuges, a process that would enable Iran to go beyond
small-scale uranium enrichment. The report said Iran plans to start
installing the centrifuges in the last three months of 2006. The
report calls for Iran to resume its suspension of enrichment and
reprocessing activities, to halt plans to build a heavy-water
reactor, and to immediately ratify the Additional Protocol of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which is intended to strengthen
safeguards against the development of nuclear weapons.
Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki said on 28 February in
Tokyo that the IAEA report emphasizes the peaceful nature of
Iran’s nuclear program, AFP reported. About half the report,
Mottaki continued, calls for Iranian assurances that the peaceful
nature of the program will not change.
Hojatoleslam Hassan Rohani, the supreme leader’s
representative at the Supreme National Security Council, said at a
March 1 meeting of clerics in Yazd that Iran is facing pressure over
the nuclear issue because the international community wants to hinder
the country’s development and independence, ISNA reported. “The
pressures forced on us are all because the enemies fear the region
and Islam,” he said. “Our sin is that we confess that God has created
us intelligent and that we want to stand on our own feet.” Rohani
said Iran has cooperated with inspectors from the IAEA, answering all
their questions and making all facilities accessible.
Contrary to Rohani’s assertion, the February 27 IAEA
report on Iran suggests Iran’s cooperation has been
underwhelming. It concludes by saying that even after “three years of
intensive agency verification,” uncertainties about the nature and
scope of the nuclear program remain. Elsewhere in the report there
are references to the quest for further clarification on topics, as
well as instances where Iran “declined to provide” information,
declined to make people available, and “declined to discuss” some
subjects. (Bill Samii)
MORE BOMBINGS IN SOUTHWESTERN IRAN. A series of bombs struck the
southwestern province of Khuzestan on 27 February, Iranian news
agencies reported. IRNA reported two bombings, in Abadan and Dezful.
In both cases, the bombs were placed in the restrooms of government
offices. Fars News Agency reported a third, in Molashieh, near the
city of Ahvaz. There are conflicting reports on casualties. Abadan
parliamentarian Abdullah Kabi said that the incident in Abadan
injured one person, ISNA reported. IRNA reported that four people
were wounded in the attacks. However, IRNA also quoted Interior
Minister Hojatoleslam Mustafa Purmohammadi as saying on 27 February
that the blasts did not cause any casualties.
Purmohammadi said the bombers were connected with the persons
behind deadly bombings in Ahvaz in January, and he cited claims by
the Ministry of Intelligence and Security that foreign governments
were linked to those bombings. Abadan legislator Kabi said the United
States and Britain are involved, ISNA reported. There have been a
number of violent incidents in the province since spring 2005.
According to the British Ahwazi Friendship Society, local prisons are
“overflowing” due to a crackdown on local opposition activists and
tribal leaders.
Minister of Intelligence and Security Hojatoleslam
Gholam-Hussein Mohseni-Ejei announced on 1 March that more than 10
people have been arrested in the last week in connection with bomb
explosions in Ahvaz, IRNA and state television reported. Mohseni-Ejei
added that Iran’s foreign enemies hired the bombers, and seized
documents indicate that they received logistical support from abroad.
(Bill Samii)
SOUTHWEST IRAN BOMBERS DEATH EXECUTED. Two men, Ali Afravi and Mehdi
Navaseri, were executed in the southwestern city of Ahvaz on the
morning of March 2 for their involvement in fatal October bombings
there, Fars News Agency reported. Khuzestan Province Deputy
Governor-General Mohsen Farokhinejad said on March 1 that the
executions are to be carried out in public in the same place —
Salman Farsi Avenue — where their bombs went off, provincial
television reported. Farokhinejad added that the other five people
involved with the bombings will be imprisoned.
Khuzestan television also reported on March 1 that “a
documentary film showing parts of [the bombers’] confessions”
will be broadcast that evening. That 30-minute program showed nine
men confessing, saying they were in touch with Iranians in Canada and
Britain who instructed them to create insecurity. One of the bombers,
Awdah Afravi, said he was told that a man like Abu Mus’ab
al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, was being sought, but he
did not know who that is.
Ahvaz governor-general Amir Hayat Moqaddam ANNOUNCED said on
28 February that two people involved in recent bombings in the city
will be executed in the next few days, Fars News Agency reported.
Judiciary official Hojatoleslam Raisi announced the same day that the
Supreme Court has confirmed the bombers will be hanged, ISNA
reported. Mehran Rafii, a provincial public affairs official, said on
20 February that state television will show all seven bombers by the
end of the week, Mehr News Agency reported, but that has yet to
happen. The Ahvaz public prosecutor, Iraj Amirkhani, said
investigations into bombings carried out in the city in June and
October 2005 are continuing, ISNA reported on 28 February. (Bill
Samii)
TRAVEL BAN FOR IRANIAN KURDISH ACTIVISTS. A Revolutionary Court in
the northwestern Iranian city of Sanandaj has imposed travel bans on
three Kurdish activists, Radio Farda reported on 28 February. The
three are the journalist Jalal Qavami and two civil rights activists,
Said Saedi and Roya Tolui. The authorities had previously held Qavami
for 65 days for his alleged involvement in unrest in July 2005 that
followed the shooting by security forces of a young Kurd named
Shavaneh Qaderi (“RFE/RL Iran Report,” 23 August 2005). Qavami’s
attorney, Nemat Ahmadi, told Radio Farda that he objects to the
travel ban. (Bill Samii)
LEGISLATORS DISPUTE NEED FOR CRISIS BUDGET. Soon after President
Mahmud Ahmadinejad submitted his budget in mid-January for the coming
year (21 March 2006-20 March 2007), some Iranian legislators called
for the creation of a “shadow budget” that could be used if
international concern over the nuclear issue and referral to the UN
Security Council led to the imposition of economic sanctions. The
Plan and Budget Organization has started to draw up a “shadow
budget,” “Etemad” reported on 25 February, but not all legislators
cited in the newspaper believe it is necessary. They said the
modifications already made to the draft budget are sufficient, and
they added that the budget’s excessive reliance on oil revenues
is a bigger concern. Reformist legislator Iraj Nadimi said talk about
a shadow budget reflects the executive branch’s serious
preparation for an economic crisis. Another parliamentarian, Adel
Azar, warned that creating a shadow budget would have a psychological
impact and could create the impression of a crisis.
The legislators began debating the budget on 1 March, and
they approved its general outlines on 2 March, IRNA reported. 161
legislators voted in favor, 31 voted against, and seven abstained.
The amount of spending in this budget surpasses the amount in the
previous year’s, “Sharq” reported on 2 March, because the
priority is to get money to the public and to create jobs. The
administration’s priority, the article continued, is that the
masses and its allies must be contented and satisfied. The article
went on to warn that the budget will fail to satisfy people and will
actually contribute to inflation and worsen the current situation.
(Bill Samii)
FEMALE SOCCER FANS FRUSTRATED. Iran beat Costa Rica 3-2 in a 1 March
soccer match, but a group of ticket-holding female fans did not get
to see the game, Radio Farda reported. One of the young ladies told
Radio Farda that a Tehran Province official told the women that they
would be transported to the match on special buses. Indeed, the
official swore to God and the Prophet that they would be taken there.
But when the bus got underway, she continued, it took them to another
part of the city. The game was over by the time the women made their
way to the stadium. One of the women told Radio Farda that they now
realize that they are second class citizens in Iran. Adnkronos
International reported () reported that security forces
prevented the women who had gotten there earlier from entering the
grounds. (Bill Samii)
SUSPECTED JIHADIST SAYS HE RECEIVED SUPPORT IN IRAN FOR HIS BID TO
ENTER AFGHANISTAN. A Moroccan national identified only by the
initials “B.A.” has reportedly told Moroccan investigators that he
received funds from Iranian officials for his attempt to cross into
Afghanistan, the Casablanca daily “Al-Sabah” reported on 27 February.
B.A., who is suspected of having links with a Moroccan organization
called Al-Tawhid wa’l Jihad, was deported from Syria to Morocco
where he is awaiting trial on criminal and terrorism charges. B.A.
has said that after the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the
United States he traveled to Iran in order to cross into Afghanistan,
where he had hoped to join Al-Qaeda terrorists. However, in
compliance with an order by Osama bin Laden that foreign fighters
should return to their home countries, he tried to go back to Morocco
through Syria, where he was arrested and deported to Morocco. B.A.
claims that during his stay in Iran he received $1,000 from Iranian
officials managing a guest house in Mashhad for volunteers intending
to cross into Afghanistan. (Amin Tarzi)
IRAN CHOOSES DATE FOR INTIFADA CONFERENCE. Hojatoleslam Ali-Akbar
Mohtashami-Pur, secretary-general of the International Conference to
Support the Palestinian Uprising (Intifada) series, confirmed on 27
February that the next conference will be held on 14-16 April, Mehr
News Agency reported. Tehran hosted the conference in 2001 and 2002.
He also said, according to IRNA, that Iran will provide financial
support for the Palestinian Authority. The United States and Israel
have asserted, since Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary
elections in late January, that they will not fund a Hamas-led
government until the organization renounces the use of violence and
recognizes Israel’s right to exist. (Bill Samii)
ISRAEL TO BLOCK IRANIAN FUNDING FOR PALESTINIANS. An unnamed Israeli
“senior diplomatic official” said Israel will block the Iranian
provision of money to a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority, “The
Jerusalem Post” reported on March 1. The day before, Hamas political
bureau chief Khalid Mish’al was quoted by the London-based Arabic
daily “Dar al-Hiyat” as saying that Iran has agreed to provide the
Palestinian Authority with $250 million. Another Hamas official, Musa
Abu Marzuk, denied this, saying Iran promised “to support the
Palestinian people in general, without specifying the kind or amount
of support,” “The Jerusalem Post” reported on February 28. Hamas
spokesman Sami Abu-Zuhri confirmed on February 28 that Iran will
provide financial assistance, Jiji Web news Service reported,
although he would not confirm Mish’al’s claim. Mish’al
reportedly secured a pledge of financial assistance to the
Palestinian Authority during his February 22 visit to Tehran (“RFE/RL
Newsline,” February 23, 2006). The United States and Israel have made
clear, since the Hamas election victory in late January, that they
will not fund a Hamas-led government until the organization renounces
the use of violence and recognizes Israel’s right to exist. (Bill
Samii)
GEORGIAN PRESIDENT DENIES PRICE FOR IRANIAN GAS WAS EXORBITANT.
Mikheil Saakashvili has denied in an interview with Ekho Moskvy that
Georgia paid $250 per 1,000 cubic meters for the gas it imported from
Iran in late January while gas supplies from Russia were temporarily
disrupted after the main Russia-Georgia gas pipeline was blown up,
Caucasus Press reported on 28 February. Georgian Energy Minister Nika
Gilauri and Economic Development Minister Irakli Chogovadze both
declined on 1 February to specify the exact price paid for the
Iranian gas; they and other government ministers ignored a subsequent
request from parliament to clarify the issue, “Akhali taoba” reported
on 17 February. Saakashvili said in his Russian radio interview that
the price was lower than the $110 Tbilisi previously paid for Russian
gas. (Liz Fuller)
***************************************** ****************
Copyright (c) 2006. RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.
The “RFE/RL Iran Report” is a weekly prepared by A. William Samii on
the basis of materials from RFE/RL broadcast services, RFE/RL
Newsline, and other news services. It is distributed every Monday.
Direct comments to A. William Samii at [email protected].
For information on reprints, see:
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Back issues are online at

ARMENIAN PARTY ATTACHES IMPORTANCE TO RAMIL SAFAROV’S CONVICTION AS CRIMINAL
Noyan Tapan
Armenians Today
Mar 14 2006
YEREVAN, MARCH 14, NOYAN TAPAN – ARMENIANS TODAY. The most important is
that Azeri Officer Ramil Safarov who has killed RA Armed Forces Officer
Gurgen Margarian with an axe in Budapest be convicted as a criminal who
can kill only sleeping people. RA Defence Ministry representative Hayk
Demoyan declared this at the March 14 press conference. The Armenian
party considers unprobable the criminal’s extradition to Azerbaijan. RA
Defence Ministry representative expressed satisfaction that against the
efforts of the Azerbaijani party, the process wasn’t politicized and
Hungarian judge Andrash Vashkuti is very professional and unbiassed.
The aggrieved party representatives mentioned the fourth expert
conclusion made public at the 6th court sitting held on March 7,
which recognized R.Safarov’s emotional manifestations within the
limits of the norm and the defendant was recognized sane. According
to the press conference participants, the fact that the defendant
was telling his biography very fluently was the evidence that he just
learnt the text by heart. He told about his friends, his fiancee but
said nothing about his family that experienced stress. Only after
the corresponding question Safarov said that his parents, his brother
suffer from stress. However, the court found out that Safarov’s brother
is ill from birth, so, there can be no stress in this case. The second
expert persisting on R.Safarov’s limited consciousness again wasn’t
able to ground his conclusion at the sitting.
The court rejected a number of petitions of the Azerbaijani party,
including the petition on ensuring second Azeri officer Anar Aliyev’s
participation, as well as giving time to the second expert for getting
ready for the questions.
On April 4, the court will hear Ramil Safarov’s final speech, as well
as those of prosecuting and defendant parties and the court decision
will be pronounced on April 13.
Hayk Demoyan called on not to make public the statements of those
who gain points at the expense of the human tragedy. In response
to the clarifying question, if RA Defence Ministry representative’s
appeal is connected with Chairman of the Progressive Party of Armenia
Tigran Urikhanian, H.Demoyan said that there is a “direct connection”
and added that he doubts the mental capabilities of such persons.
To recap, Urikhanian, in particular, had declared that he is ready
to pay 120 thousand USD to the revenger who will kill Ramil Safarov.

ARMENIA SET TO SIGN $235 MIL PACT WITH MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE
By M. Alkhazashvili
The Messenger, Georgia
March 14 2006
Agreement To Focus On Irrigation And Rural Roads.
By the end of 2006, Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Vardan
Oskanian and the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice will sign
an agreement to allot USD 235.65 million from the U.S. Millennium
Challenge program.
The agreement, known as a compact, will distribute funds over a
5-year period for economic growth programs in Armenia. In a press
release announcing the Millennium Challenge Board of Directors’
approval of the agreement, the U.S. government corporation said,
“The Armenia Compact is focused on one goal: the reduction of rural
poverty through a sustainable increase in the economic performance
of the agricultural sector.”
Out of the total sum USD 146 million is allocated for restoration
and modernizing irrigation systems. Another USD 67 million spent
to rehabilitate “Lifeline roads” that connect villages to larger
communities and market places. Approximately USD 5 million will be
used for monitoring and evaluation and another USD 17.8 million for
other administration, regnum.ru reports.
As part of the project, Armenia is designating its rural roads as
its Lifeline network. The Millennium Challenge assistance is to
rehabilitate one-third of this network, approximately 943 kilometers.
The organizers expect this will provide reliable transport routes to
85 villages and cover 45 percent of the country’s rural area.
The Armenian government has shouldered the responsibility of
restoring the rest of the country’s rural road system during the
current compact’s 5-year lifespan. The government expects to utilize
state resources, financing from Kirk Kirkoryan’s Linsy Foundation
and other institutional credits.
Currently over one million Armenians live in rural areas and are
dependent on semi-subsistence agriculture. Millennium Challenge in
Washington reports rural poverty remains high at 41 percent in 2004.
“Farmers are operating on small plots of land and are constrained
by poor roads, inadequate irrigation, and an under-developed market
economy,” the corporation states.
The American side reports the program will directly impact
approximately 750,000 people, or 75 percent of the rural population,
and is expected to reduce the rural poverty rate and boost annual
incomes.
In autumn 2005, Georgia signed a compact worth USD 295.3 million
with Millennium Challenge. Other countries with signed compacts
include Madagascar, Honduras, Cape Verde, and Nicaragua. On March 2,
the Millennium Challenge Corporation signed a five-year USD 65.69
million compact with Vanuatu. One February 22, the corporation signed
a five-year approximately USD 307 million compact with the Government
of the Republic of Benin.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

CSTO SECRETARY GENERAL VISITS ARMENIA
Gazeta.KZ, Kazakhstan
March 14 2006
Kazakhstan today
MOSCOW. Nikolai Bordyuzha, CSTO Secretary General, will inform Robert
Kocharyan, President of Armenia, about preparations for the CSTO
Council spring session, Collective Security Treaty Organisation has
advised Kazakhstan Today.
“This is a scheduled visit, during which I will meet the President
of Armenia, as well as the Secretary of the National Security Council
under the President of Armenia, FM, and Defence Minister. It is planned
that the situation in the CSTO responsibility area and in the Caucasus
in particular, as well as preparations for the CSTO Council spring
session will be discussed,” – Mr. Bordyuzha said before departing
for Yerevan.
“Today there are a lot of issues concerning the organisation that must
be discussed with the Armenian government, especially in relation
with plans of the CSTO development, its transformation into a
multifunctional international structure.”
Mr. Bordyuzha plans to visit Kazakhstan in the third decade of May.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
_________________________________________ ____________________
RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly
Vol. 6, No. 6, 10 March 2006
A Weekly Review of News and Analysis of Russian Politics.
*************************************** *********************
HEADLINES:
* NEW BILL ON NATIONAL IDENTITY GENERATING PROTESTS
* RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS HEATING UP
* A YEAR AFTER MASKHADOV’S DEATH, CONFLICT’S END
STILL DISTANT
****************************************** ******************
CIVIL SOCIETY
NEW BILL ON NATIONAL IDENTITY GENERATING PROTESTS. An attempt by
Russia’s State Duma to define Russian national identity has run
into trouble with the country’s Muslims and national minorities.
The driving force behind a new bill on national identity was
President Vladimir Putin himself, who has argued that Russians and
Russia need to have a better sense of who they are. But when the bill
was sent out for discussion last month by Russia’s republican and
regional parliamentary assemblies, it ran into a storm of protest.
Deputies in Tatarstan, which has a large Muslim population, say
it’s an attempt to strengthen and formalize the dominant role of
Russians in the state and therefore runs counter to the constitution.
The idea of defining a concept of Russian national identity
is almost as old as Russia itself — and just as elusive. Yet Russian
leaders cannot, it seems, resist the temptation to try. In
post-Soviet times, Boris Yeltsin made his contribution through the
new constitution of the Russian Federation and the start of a debate
on the Russian national idea.
Grigory Yavlinsky, the leader of the opposition Yabloko
party, has appealed for a break from the imperial past. The Russian
national idea, he says, should be based on respect. But such modest
ambitions are not in keeping with President Putin’s vision of a
muscular new Russia pumped up by petrol and gas.
The problem is easily enough defined: how to create a sense
of shared identity in a country divided by race, language, religion
and, increasingly, class and wealth? How to give a sense of purpose
to a new state that is still only just emerging from the ashes of the
Soviet Union?
Putin’s answer is taking the shape of a bill on the
fundamentals of state national policy, which sees its main aim as
strengthening the formation of a united multicultural society. Few,
it seems, have any problem with that.
Where some do have a problem, though, is with the
“consolidating role” assigned by the bill to the Russian people
(“Russkii narod”) in “providing the unity of the country and
strengthening the vertical of power.” Perhaps they sense an echo of
the guiding role assigned the Russian people in the Soviet Union?
The proposed legislation has stirred up a hornets’ nest
of protest in the predominantly-Muslim republic of Tatarstan, which
has grown used to a considerable measure of autonomy in the years
since the Soviet collapse. On March 3, its State Council Committee on
Culture, Science, Education, and National Affairs flatly rejected the
bill. Foat Galimullin, a deputy in the republican parliament,
discussed this issue with RFE/RL’s Tatar-Bashkir Service.
“We have already survived that unrealistic experiment to
create a Soviet nation during the era of the USSR,” Galimullin said.
“And now, once more, we have plans to create the Russian nation. I
consider this law provocative in principle and I think that it should
be for sure rejected.”
Indus Tahirov, another deputy in Tatarstan’s parliament,
said the bill was at odds with the federal constitution, which
emphasizes the multiethnic nature of the Russian people (Rossiskii
narod).
“The bill cannot be accepted in its present form, first of
all because it is not in accordance with the norms of international
law, secondly because it contradicts the Constitution of the Russian
Federation, and thirdly because it does not strengthen mutual
understanding among the peoples of the country because of the
articles, which especially stand out concerning the Russian language
and the Russian people.”
Tahirov and other deputies have taken particular issue with
the provisions of the bill on the Russian language. Tufan Minnullin
points out that a demand contained in the bill that every citizen
should know the Russian language is at odds with the federal
constitution. What does “know” mean, he asks, and what is the
punishment to be for not knowing?
“This is a very insidious law. It gives the impression of
defending the Russian people, but in essence it is directed against
the Russian people. It appears to compliment the Russian people but
actually it sets the Russian people up against all the other peoples.
Then there is that terrible article where it states that citizens of
the Russian Federation are obliged to know the Russian language. What
does it mean: “obliged”? If they have to imprison me, what will they
do?”
It is not just Russia’s religious and ethnic minorities
who are alarmed. Russia’s Public Chamber — set up last year as a
sort of collective ombudsman to monitor the work of parliament, as
well as federal and regional bodies — was dismissive, with one
member suggesting the bill looked liked scraps torn at random from
someone’s dissertation.
The chamber has set up its own committee to examine the bill,
which will report back in three months. Valery Tishkov is the head of
its Commission on Tolerance and Freedom of Conscience and a leading
expert on ethnicity and nationalism. He told RFE/RL’s Russian
Service that he sees no place for a “consolidating role” for the
Russian people in the modern Russian state.
“We should be talking not just about the multicultural,
complex composition of the Russian people, but also about its unity.
It is impossible to create one people out of 100 peoples. We should
not be talking about how to make one nation out of 100, but about the
recognition — recognition not formation — of our genuinely existing
unity, while at the same time preserving all our traditions.”
The fact that this legislation is already running into
trouble suggests how much Russia may be changing. At the heart of the
debate over the new legislation lies the Kremlin’s fear over
Russia’s demographic future. Russia is a multiethnic country,
whose large Muslim population is growing as fast as the ethnic
Russian population is shrinking. The country’s national and
religious minorities are becoming increasingly aware of their growing
weight and importance in society. The Russian national idea may never
be quite the same again. (Robert Parsons)
FOREIGN POLICY
RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS HEATING UP. While European policymakers
cautiously watched the recent Ukrainian-Russian gas conflict,
debating among themselves if Russia was a reliable supplier of
energy, policymakers in the Kremlin were busy preparing for an even
greater role in the world energy market. Their attention, however,
was concentrated not on gas or oil, but on preparing the
country’s nuclear power industry for its future role.
Russian federal authorities are considering creating a
state-controlled company, one that would embrace all enterprises
operating in the nuclear sector.
In an article on March 7, “The Moscow Times” reported that
Viktor Opekunov, chairman of the State Duma subcommittee for nuclear
energy, said the industry restructuring “would involve
‘privatizing’ all of Russia’s nuclear enterprises — in
other words, incorporating them into joint-stock companies — with
the state becoming their only shareholder.”
“The Moscow Times” identified the main components of
Russia’s nuclear industry as Rosatomenergo, which runs all power
stations; Tvel, which owns a controlling interest in Russia’s key
nuclear fuel-manufacturing enterprises; Atomstroieksport, which
builds nuclear power stations abroad; and Tekhnabeksport, the export
arm trading in nuclear machinery and fuel.
All four groups are currently supervised by Rosatom,
Russia’s federal atomic energy agency, led by former Prime
Minister Sergei Kiriyenko. And all would continue to operate under
the new umbrella organization proposed by Russian federal
authorities.
The nuclear power industry in Russia continues to play an
ever-increasing role in Russia’s energy balance and is destined
to play an even more significant one in the future. Russia’s
energy strategy for 2020, adopted in 2003, forecasts that by 2020
nuclear power is expected to increase its share to 25 percent of
Russian electricity generation, up from 16 percent in 2004, as the
share from hydrocarbon-fired generators drops.
Russian policy is to gradually phase out the use of coal, oil
and gas to fire electricity generators. According to a December 2005
study by the Uranium Information Center in Australia, “Rosatom’s
long-term strategy up to 2050 involves moving to inherently safe
nuclear plants using fast reactors with a closed fuel cycle and MOX
fuel.”
MOX, mixed oxide fuel, is a process of using plutonium left
in spent reactor fuel and from nuclear warheads to generate energy.
It is essentially a recycling process and is used in some 30 nuclear
reactors in Europe.
MOX is not the only answer to reactor fuel. The Executive
Intelligence Review reported on 10 February that “on January 25,
Nikolai Sevastyanov, head of the Energia Russian Space Company,
outlined an ambitious plan to obtain fuel for the next type of
nuclear power: thermonuclear fusion. He said Russia should mine
helium-3 (which is rare on Earth) on the moon.”
Presently, Russia has 31 operating reactors, which generate
about 147 billion kilowatt-hours per year. Six new reactors are under
construction and 16 more are planned. According to the U.S. Energy
Information Administration, Russia’s nuclear power facilities are
aging. “Fifty percent of the country’s 31 nuclear reactors use
the RBMK design employed in Ukraine’s ill-fated Chernobyl plant.
The working life of a reactor is considered to be 30 years: nine of
Russia’s plants are between 26 and 30 years old, and six are
between 21 and 25 years old” the EIA reports.
Thermal power (oil, natural gas, and coal-fired) currently
accounts for roughly 63 percent of Russia’s electricity
generation, followed by hydropower (21 percent) and nuclear (16
percent).
Russia’s future role as an international nuclear power
leader, a concept which the current leadership is promoting, is
ambitious and far-ranging.
In February, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that
Russia would like to reestablish the former Soviet nuclear energy
bloc in Eurasia. Speaking at the St. Petersburg summit of the
Eurasian Economic Community (EES), in early February, Putin said
Russia was “firmly determined” to widen its cooperation with the EES,
and that a priority would be collaboration in the “peaceful uses of
nuclear energy.”
Rosatom announced plans to rejuvenate the Russian nuclear
industry, mainly through cooperation with Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and
other countries which once were part of the Soviet nuclear power
space.
On January 20, Putin met with Kiriyenko, who stressed that
nuclear power will need to receive an increase in government funding.
“We need to build two nuclear reactors per year, beginning in 2011 or
2012,” Kiriyenko was quoted by Interfax that day. In order to raise
the needed funds for such a project, Rosatom will become a joint
stock company, but will remain under government control. Kiriyenko
also stated that he intends to build 60 atomic reactors abroad.
How feasible Kiriyenko’s plans are is difficult to judge
in light of the fact that there have been substantial delays in the
construction of the six reactors presently being built. Only two or
three are expected to meet startup target dates due to funding
problems.
The other problem facing the nuclear program is the rapid
depletion of uranium in Russia. At present, Russia produces some
2,900 tons of uranium, but deposits are rapidly dwindling.
Uzbekistan, which has an extensive reserve of uranium ore,
was brought into the emerging nuclear partnership during the EEC
summit and Putin announced that the Uzbeks would provide Russia with
“additional long-term possibilities for the building of a stable
nuclear fuel energy base,” “The Moscow Times” reported on 8 February.
Russia has also expressed interest in becoming a hub for
supplying nuclear fuel and services for existing reactors in former
Soviet bloc countries in Central Europe. During his recent trip to
Hungary and the Czech Republic, Vladimir Putin stressed that Russia
will take part in bids to upgrade existing nuclear reactors such as
the Czech plant in Dukovany and the Hungarian Paksi Atomeromu plant
which supplies 40 percent of Hungary’s power needs.
The Arms Control Association reported in November 2000 that
Russia and India signed a secret memorandum of understanding on
October 4, 2000 to pursue future “cooperation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy.” The memorandum was one of several agreements,
including a declaration of strategic partnership, signed during
Putin’s October 2000 visit to New Delhi.
In an apparent move to counteract this agreement, the U.S.
signed an agreement in Delhi in March of this year to supply India
with fuel and nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
The very day when U.S. President George W. Bush signed the
pact with India, Putin told a press conference in Prague that Russia
would fight any restrictions placed on its atomic energy operations
in Europe.
“Unfortunately, we are facing certain restrictions, attempts
to limit our operations in nuclear energy and in power engineering on
the European market,” Interfax quoted Putin as saying on March 1. “We
are not dramatizing this, but we will strive for equality.”
Unlike its gas, Russia does not possess a near monopoly on
nuclear fuel in the region and will face stiff competition on the
European market from France. How this might affect Russia-France
relations is uncertain. In the case of the former Soviet republics
and Central Europe, the Russians certainly do enjoy a nuclear
advantage and could use it as they presently use gas, as a lever to
achieve their political goals. (Roman Kupchinsky)
CHECHNYA
A YEAR AFTER MASKHADOV’S DEATH, CONFLICT’S END STILL DISTANT.
On March 8, 2005, Russian media reported the death, in circumstances
that remain unclear, of Aslan Maskhadov, the former Soviet army
colonel who headed the Chechen resistance forces during the 1994-96
war and was subsequently elected Chechen president in January 1997.
Maskhadov’s death has not only made a peaceful negotiated
settlement of the ongoing conflict within Chechnya even more remote;
it has accelerated the expansion of the Chechens’ conflict
against Moscow into other regions of the North Caucasus.
On January 14, just weeks before he was killed, Maskhadov
unilaterally proclaimed a one-month cease-fire, ordering the
resistance forces subordinate to him to suspend all offensive
military operations.
That order, according to Maskhadov spokesman Umar Khanbiev,
was intended as a “gesture of goodwill,” and to demonstrate that the
Chechen resistance was subordinate to Maskhadov as supreme commander.
At the same time, Maskhadov again invited Moscow to begin
negotiations on ending the conflict, focusing on the two key issues
of security guarantees for the Chechen people and a Chechen
commitment to respect Russia’s interests in the North Caucasus.
In his last interview with RFE/RL’s North Caucasus
Service, just weeks before his death, Maskhadov said he believed
Russian President Vladimir Putin was totally unaware of the real
state of affairs in Chechnya.
“I’m deeply convinced that Putin is far from reality
about what is really going on in Chechnya today,” Maskhadov said. “It
is common practice for the army to report what their chief wants to
hear from them. Such practices probably exist in Russia’s
security services too.”
Maskhadov went on to suggest that that all could change if he
and the Russian president could meet face-to-face. Such a meeting, he
posited, could serve as a true foundation for change.
“We have been suggesting that a 30-minute, fair, face-to-face
dialogue should be enough to stop this war, to explain to the
president of the Russian Federation what the Chechen people really
want — I’m sure he doesn’t even know that — and also to
hear from Putin personally what he wants, what Russia wants in
Chechnya,” said Maskhadov.
He added: “If we are able to open the eyes of our opponents,
the Russian leaders, peace can be established.”
But Russian officials publicly dismissed that offer of peace
talks as pointless. Presidential envoy to the Southern Federal
District Dmitry Kozak said it was “irrelevant,” as Maskhadov “lost
control over the situation in Chechnya long ago,” according to
Interfax on February 3, 2005.
State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Konstantin
Kosachyov told journalists in Moscow on February 10, 2005 that
negotiations with Maskhadov are “yesterday’s option,” adding that
Maskhadov had been given the chance after the signing in August 1996
of the Khasavyurt peace accord to restore order, but lost control of
the situation. “It is senseless to try to reach another agreement
with a man who has already failed,” Kosachyov said.
Unconfirmed reports suggest, however, that the Russian
authorities may have seized upon Maskhadov’s peace overture as a
means to get rid of him. Maskhadov’s successor Abdul-Khalim
Sadulayev claimed in an address to the Chechen people in autumn 2005
that Maskhadov was “lured” into talks and deliberately killed.
In its first issue for 2006, “Novoe vremya” quoted a lawyer
for one of the four close associates of Maskhadov who were
apprehended at the time of his death and who went on trial last fall
as likewise saying that the Russian leadership agreed to
Maskhadov’s proposal and even gave guarantees of his safety to
Tim Guldimann, the Swiss diplomat who in 1995-1996 headed the
Organization for Security and Cooperation and Europe (OSCE) Mission
in Grozny.
Maskhadov then declared the unilateral cease-fire and moved
from Avtury to Tolstoi-Yurt — the village north of Grozny where he
was killed — in readiness for those talks. “Novoe vremya” cited
Maskhadov’s unnamed arrested associate as reportedly testifying
that Russian security services succeeded in hunting down Maskhadov
and killing him by means of intercepted mobile-phone calls and text
messages to Guldimann.
But those reports have never been confirmed, and Guldimann
has declined to comment to RFE/RL’s North Caucasus Service on his
involvement. Whatever the chain of circumstances that culminated in
Maskhadov’s death, it removed the last potential negotiating
partner on the Chechen side with both a claim to legitimacy (Russia
recognized his election in 1997 as fair and legitimate, as did OSCE
monitors) and authority with the resistance.
Sadulayev, whom senior resistance figures acknowledged as
president within days of Maskhadov’s death, had been named deputy
president and Maskhadov’s designated successor at an extended
session of the State Defense Committee in July-August 2002, but that
decision was not made public at the time.
Over the past year, Sadulayev, operating in tandem with
veteran field commander Shamil Basayev, has taken steps to extend the
field of hostilities from Chechnya across the North Caucasus. True,
Chechen militants had struck outside Chechnya even earlier, in the
Moscow theater hostage-taking in October 2002, the raids on multiple
Interior Ministry targets in Ingushetia in June 2004, and the Beslan
school hostage-taking in September 2004. But Maskhadov had disclaimed
any responsibility for, and voiced his condemnation of, those acts of
terrorism, and at least through 2003 he repeatedly impressed on his
troops the need to abide strictly by the Geneva Conventions and to
refrain from attacking any Russian targets outside Chechnya.
But in his last interview with RFE/RL’s North Caucasus
Service, Maskhadov signaled his retreat from that self-imposed
limitation, saying that he had given orders to establish additional
military sectors in Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Daghestan.
Sadulayev took that process even further. On May 2, he issued
a series of decrees formally dividing the western “front” into no
fewer than seven sectors (Ingushetia, North Ossetia,
Kabardino-Balkaria, Stavropol Krai, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Adygeya
and Krasnodar) and naming commanders of those sectors. He likewise
named new commanders of the eastern front as a whole and of four of
its sectors (Gudermes, Argun, Kurchaloi and Grozny), according to
chechenpress.org on May 16, 2005.
While the Chechen resistance has continued to wage
hit-and-run attacks on Russian troops, it has carried out only one
major operation since Maskhadov’s death, in Nalchik, capital of
the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic, in October 2005. Basayev
subsequently claimed to have played a key role in the “operational
planning” of that attack, but it was apparently launched prematurely
after local police and security personnel tracked down one of the
militant detachments that was to take part. The militants, many of
them reportedly young and with only rudimentary military training,
sustained proportionally heavier losses than those in the Ingushetia
raids the previous year.
The apparent waning in military activity on the part of the
resistance within Chechnya is likely to bolster the arguments of
those senior officials in Moscow who believe that it is expedient to
continue to rely on a dwindling number of Interior Ministry troops,
many of them ethnic Chechens, to marginalize and then quash the
resistance. (There are now only some 36,000-38,000 federal troops in
Chechnya, pro-Moscow Chechen administration head Alu Alkhanov said on
February 28. That compares with approximately 80,000 one year ago.)
By the same token, Sadulayev’s recent affirmations of his
commitment to building an Islamic state in Chechnya and to waging a
national-liberation struggle to “decolonize” the North Caucasus
effectively preclude any attempt by Moscow to seek compromise and
common ground. Sadulayev declared in November 2005 that the Chechen
side will not propose further peace talks, but continue fighting
“until the Caucasus is freed from the boot of the Russian occupiers.”
There thus seems little chance of ending a conflict that, as
Maskhadov repeatedly pointed out, “cannot be resolved by force.” (Liz
Fuller)
************************************ *********************
Copyright (c) 2006. RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.
The “RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly” is prepared
on the basis of a variety of sources. It is distributed every
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EU for Close Energy Cooperation with South Caucasus
09.03.2006 21:31 GMT+04:00
PanARMENIAN.Net
Energy security matters should be more in focus of our latest talks in
Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, EU
Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy
(ENP) Benita Ferrero-Waldner said when addressing Swedish Institute of
International Relations. Benita Ferrero-Waldner said «we should attain
close energy cooperation with our partners in Eastern Europe, South
Caucasus and the Mediterranean region.» «Energy was an important ENP
component from the first days. However, occurrences between Russia,
Ukraine and Moldova at the beginning of the year were a peculiar
«alarm», which reminded that energy security issues should be more in
focus of our political agenda,» the EU Commissioner said.

Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE)

March 10 2006

OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs urge Armenia and Azerbaijan to prepare
their respective publics “for peace, not for war”

/noticias.info/ WASHINGTON, D.C., 9 March 2006 – The three Co-Chairs
of the OSCE Minsk Group, which deals with the conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh, have issued a statement regretting the lack of
forward movement in the recent negotiations and calling upon Armenia
and Azerbaijan to “work vigorously” to achieve a result in 2006.
Their statement reads:
“The Co-Chairs of the OSCE’s Minsk Group, Ambassadors Yuri Merzlyakov
of Russia, Steven Mann of the United States, and Bernard Fassier of
France, joined by Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, the Personal
Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, met in Washington on 7
and 8 March to discuss the latest developments regarding the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and to assess the future direction of
mediation efforts.
The Co-Chairs reviewed the discussions that took place in Rambouillet
on 10 and 11 February and expressed again their gratitude to the
President of the French Republic for making that meeting between
President Robert Kocharian and President Ilham Aliyev possible.
Assessing the current state of affairs in the region, the Co-Chairs
reaffirmed their belief that a great deal of progress has been
achieved in the past year and a half. They regret that the process
has not moved forward in recent weeks though, despite ample
opportunity to do so. They urged both parties to build on the basic
principles for a future settlement that have already been developed
in order to achieve an agreement in 2006. Referring to their joint
statement at the OSCE Permanent Council on 2 March, the Co-Chairs
continue to believe that objective conditions make 2006 a highly
favourable year for substantial progress, and they call upon the
Governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan to work vigorously to achieve
this result. The Co-Chairs further call upon the Government of each
country to take steps with their publics to prepare them for peace,
and not for war.
The Co-Chairs will decide on their next trip to the region after
further assessment of the readiness of the parties. Their next
meeting is planned for 20 March in Istanbul.”
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Civil Georgia, Georgia
March 10 2006
One Dies in Clash, Rising Tensions in Multiethnic Tsalka
A clash which resulted into death of one and injury of at least one
local resident in multiethnic town of Tsalka in Kvemo Kartli region
on March 9, triggered protest of local ethnic Armenians.
Police said that five suspects have already been arrested. But
protesters in Tsalka demanded lynching of suspects on March 10.
`The Interior Ministry will never allow actions of this kind,’ the
Georgian Interior Ministry stated on March 10.
The Interior Ministry said that only one local was injured, but
according to the ethnic minority advocacy group Multinational Georgia
four ethnic Armenians were wounded as a result of an attack.
According to this non-governmental organization about 500 residents
of Tsalka were demanding at the rally outside the local police
station on March 10 an immediate investigation and prosecution of
those who are guilty of this crime. The protest rally was `brutally
dispersed’ by the police, according to the Multinational Georgia.
Clashes between the locals erupt sporadically in recent years in
Tsalka district with population of 20 000. Ethnic Armenians comprise
57% of population, according to the Georgian department of
statistics. 4,500 ethnic Greeks, 2,500 ethnic Georgians and up to
2,000 Azerbaijanis also live there.