TEMPLE MOUNT – NOT LISTED IN THE LAND REGISTRY
By Nadav Shragai
Ha’aretz, Israel
July 6 2006
Tel Aviv architect Tuvia Sagiv, an amateur but well-known researcher
of the history of the Temple Mount, no doubt did not imagine that
his influence would go as far as the Oval Office of the president
of the United States. However, according to Dr. Shmuel Berkovits,
an attorney who has written a new book about the holy places, Sagiv
is the source for former president Bill Clinton?s proposal to divide
sovereignty over the Temple Mount vertically, from top to bottom. At
the end of December 2000, Clinton proposed that the Palestinians get
the sovereignty over the level of the mosques while the Jews make do
with sovereignty over the depths of the mount, the Western Wall and
the Holy of Holies.
Sagiv combed the Temple Mount with radar equipment and infra-red
cameras that were operated from helicopters flying above and alongside
the site. Relying on these tests, he claimed that the Temple had lain
at a depth of 16 meters below the water fountain between Al-Aqsa Mosque
and the Dome of the Rock, and that what is known as the Western Wall
is not the western wall of the temple but rather part of the wall
that was built by the Emperor Adrianus around the Roman shrine that
he built on the Temple Mount after the conquest of Jerusalem and its
destruction in the second century. Sagiv proposed breaking open a
giant gate in the Western Wall through which Jews could go to reach
the level of the Temple, under the level of mosques.
Sagiv’s revolutionary approach is not in keeping with accepted
scholarly opinions. Most of the important archaeologists and rabbis
to this day believe that the Holy of Holies is not situated deep
under the ground but rather at ground level as we know it at present,
exactly at the spot where the rock is located in the Dome of the Rock.
Berkovits, in his new book, “How Dreadful is This Place,” recounts
the history of Sagiv’s theory, which was submitted more than 10
years ago to Ariel Sharon when he was still an opposition member of
the Knesset. At that time, Sagiv proposed to Sharon that it would
be possible to solve the problems of Jews and Moslems praying on
the Temple Mount by dividing the use of the site lengthwise rather
than breadthwise. Some time later, the U.S. Embassy asked Sagiv to
furnish them with an expository copy of his proposal, and in this
way the idea made its way into the hands of Clinton.
In any event, Berkovits is of the opinion that even if Sagiv’s idea
were more acceptable, the Palestinians would never agree to Israeli
sovereignty over the depths of the mount, both because of their
historic fear that the Jews would undermine the foundations of the
mosques and knock them down to rebuild the Temple, and because of
their anxiety lest the Jews dig there and find the remnants of the
Temple, proof that it existed on the Temple Mount, contrary to the
Palestinians’ claims about this.
“No holy buildings”
Holy sites are more or less Berkovits’ profession. He is a
world-renowned expert in the field, and he has been doing research
for 25 years, as well as teaching and consulting on these topics. He
is a member of the Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies, serves
as an adviser to the Armenian Christian community, to the Museum of
Tolerance and the Diaspora Yeshiva. His doctoral thesis was put at
the disposal of the Israeli team at the Camp David peace talks with
Egypt in 1978 as the central reference document about the holy sites.
His previous book, “The Wars over the Holy Places,” won first prize
in 2001, in the field of Israeli security, from the Jaffee Center
for Strategic Studies.
Academics and experts in international law will find a great
deal of interest in the analyses and the legal innovations in his
new book which deals with sanctity, politics and law in the holy
places in Jerusalem and in Israel in general. He even received an
enthusiastic foreword from the former president of the supreme court,
Meir Shamgar. (The two sit together on the committee for prevention of
the destruction of antiquities on the Temple Mount). But the general
public will be more interested in those holy cows that Berkovits is
not afraid to slaughter, and not always with academic caution.
The most obvious example is his attitude toward the affair of the
burning of the synagogues at Gush Katif. Berkovits states: “The
Israeli government and the Israel Defense Forces are keeping secret
the information, as if it was a military secret, that before the IDF
withdrew from the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria, the army chaplaincy
removed the sanctity of all the synagogues and religious study centers
in the Gaza Strip so that the buildings which the Palestinians looted,
burned and destroyed in the settlements that were evacuated were no
longer synagogues but merely regular buildings.”
Berkovits says he posed a question to the army chaplaincy on this
matter but received an evasive answer, and the military chaplains
were prepared only informally to tell him of these developments.
In his book, Berkovits cites, for the first time, the full halakhic
ruling written by Chief Rabbi Yona Metzger in which he gives the
details of the required halakhic procedure to remove a synagogue’s
sanctity. The most substantive stage of this procedure comes when
there is an act of sale, and the central role is supposed to be that of
the chief chaplain of the IDF. In his halakhic opinion, Rabbi Metzger
sats the state must assign its rights according to the property laws
to the army chief rabbi, and he is the one who must later carry
out the sale to the state treasury. At the time of expropriation,
Metzger instructed, the state must make a legal commitment to give
something in return for the buildings whose sanctity has been removed,
and for buildings that serve for other religious purposes (such as
ritual baths). This commitment, he says, will serve as a payment for
the sale “and will lead to the implementation of the removal of the
sanctity.” Berkovits also refers to another, albeit less painful,
sham, presented to the Israeli public in 2001 : the negotiations in
Taba between representatives from Israel and from the Palestinian
Authority, which devoted a great deal of time then to the status of
Jerusalem’s Old City and the Temple Mount. The foreign minister at
the time, Shlomo Ben-Ami, and Yossi Beilin, declared that there had
been progress in all the issues and stated that we had never been so
close as then to signing a peace agreement. The person who revealed
that this was a bluff was none other than Ben-Ami himself. The book
quotes him as saying: “It was a week before the elections and this
is a legitimate act. It would have been stupid not to take advantage
of it.” The former prime minister, Ehud Barak, also refers to this
display as “groundless.”
Berkovits also does not hesitate to apparently contradict earlier
publications about the Taba talks, such as that of Dr. Menahem Klein
in his book “Shattering a Taboo.”
Klein wrote in this book that, at the Taba talks, “Israel agreed
to place the neighborhoods close to the Old City (such as Silwan,
a-Tur, Ras el-Amud, and Sheikh Jarrah) under Palestinian sovereignty,
and that the Palestinians agreed that neighborhoods like Gilo, East
Talpiot, French Hill and Ramot would be part of Israel.” Berkovits’
book, “How Dreadful is This Place'” offers a different version,
that of attorney Gilad Sher, who headed the Israeli negotiating team
to the talks. Sher contends that the sides did not really conduct
negotiations and did not arrive at any real agreement on that at all.
All the same, Berkovits points out that the very fact that the Israeli
side agreed to the Clinton document (although with reservations)
gives the impression as if there was some type of agreement.
The big denial
The book devotes space to the great show of denial the Muslims have
initiated in the past few years about everything to do with the
existence in the past of the Jewish Temple on the Temple Mount, and
it brings examples to illustrate that this is not how things were in
the past. A guide to the Temple Mount, put out by the Supreme Muslim
Council in 1924, states explicitly that “the identity of the Temple
Mount as the site of the holy shrine of Solomon is beyond any kind
of doubt.” Berkovits’ book also quotes texts from the Palestinian
historian Aref al-Aref (1892-1973). Al-Aref was the partner of the
Grand Mufti Haj Amin el-Husseini in the leadership of the Palestinian
National Movement at the beginning of the Mandatory period, and in
his book, “A Detailed History of Jerusalem,” he writes: “The Wailing
Wall is the exterior wall of the temple that was reconstructed by
Herod … and the Jews visit there frequently and, on particular,
on Tisha B’Av [the anniversary of the destruction of the Temple]. And
when they visit the wall, they remember the glorious and unforgettable
history and they begin to weep.”
Berkovits returns to a finding he mentioned in the past and makes it
more concrete – about claims that the Western Wall is holy to Islam
because that is where Mohammed tied his winged horse, Al-Burak. Until
the middle of the 19th century, various places in the Harm el-Sharif
[as the Muslims call the Temple Mount] compound were mentioned as
the place to which he tied his horse, sometimes the eastern wall,
sometimes the southern wall, but never the Western wall. Berkovits
assumes that the Muslims’ eventual decision to choose the Western wall
was a reaction to the fact that, at the beginning of the 19th century,
the Jews started to bring chairs, tables and Torah scrolls with them
when they came to pray in the plaza in front of the Western wall. He
also cites a long list of proofs of the existence of the Temple on the
Temple Mount. Among the interesting details, and the lesser known ones,
on this list are two Greek inscriptions from the Second Temple period
that were found in the vicinity of the Lions’ Gate that prohibit the
entry of foreigners beyond the barrier that surrounds the Temple,
and threaten trespassers with the penalty of death in the following
language: “A foreign person shall not enter inside the partition that
surrounds the Temple or to the court that surrounds it, and whoever
is caught will pay with his life and his fate is death.”
Incidentally, a photograph of the inscriptions appears in the complete
guide to the Temple Mount archaeological excavations that was published
a few years ago by Dr. Eilat Mazar, and they are mentioned in the
description of the Temple by Josephus in his book “The Jewish War.”
Berkovits, in his book, proposes a series of changes in Israeli
legislation relating to holy sites, following the author’s discovery
that there is no definition of the term “holy place.” It also points to
a hitherto unknown fact that could have far-reaching implications in
the argument over the High Court of Justice’s right to hear petitions
about implementing the right of Jews to pray on the Temple Mount: In
the most famous case on this subject, known as “the High Court ruling
on nationalist groups,” the High Court ruled that Israeli courts do
not have the authority to discuss whether the right to prayer can
be implemented at holy sites altogether, and at the Temple Mount in
particular. With this in mind, all the petitions dealing with the
implementation of the Jews’ right to pray at the Temple Mount over
some 30 years have been rejected. But in a different case, known as
“the High Court ruling on women at the Wall,” the High Court ruled
that it has the authority to discuss the right to pray at the Western
Wall, and in this ruling it effectively overturned its own ruling in
the case on the nationalist groups.
In the last chapter, a fascinating issue is examined. It transpires
that the Temple Mount and most of the Western Wall are not registered
in any way in the Israel Land Registry (“Tabu”) and the issue of who
their earthly owners are, has not yet been decided. At the same time,
and contrary to what is generally thought to be true, Israel has
constantly refrained from expropriating the Western Wall so that this
will not be interpreted as a relinquishment of the other walls of the
Temple. One part of the Western Wall was expropriated and registered
in the Land Registry as property owned by the State of Israel. The area
in question is between the southwestern corner of the Western Wall and
as far as the “Makhama” building [deep beneath which lie the tunnels
from the Second Temple period], along the entire height of the wall.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

THE MOSKOVSKY KOMSOMOLETS: GUILTY OF A-320 CRASH SHOULD BE SOUGHT FOR ON LAND
PanARMENIAN.Net
06.07.2006 14:31 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ A month after the catastrophe of the passenger
plane of Armavia Air Company, which resulted in death of 133 people,
officials did not announce the cause of the tragedy. All unofficial
versions are lead to one – pilots’ fault, the Moskovsky Komsomolets
writes. However, decoding of flight recorders evidence that those
guilty in death of people should be sought for on land. Three weeks
have passed since A-320 airborne recorders were decoded in France
and the data was submitted to the Inter-State Aviation Committee.
The latter has not provided an official explanation of the causes
of the catastrophe up to now, while the analysis by MK experts shows
the human factor is not the only cause. In the opinion of test pilot
Alexander Akimenkov, the A-320 crew merely lacked altitude.
“There are no suicides among pilots and if the crew dies, taking away
hundreds of passengers with them, those guilty should be sought among
those living on land,” Akimenkov said.
The flight and the air crash of A-320 will be soon modeled in France,
based on the decoded data of the flight recorders. To that end sound
and technical parameters will be compared. According to specialists,
in 3-4 days the Inter-State Aviation Committee will make its final
conclusion on the causes of the tragedy.
On May 3 night Airbus-320 owned by Armavia national carrier crashed
in the Black Sea 6 km away from Adler airport killing all of 113
people aboard, including 6 children and 8 crewmembers. Among them
were 26 Russian citizens, one Ukrainian and one Georgian citizen,
while the rest were Armenian citizens.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MELUNGEON COMMUNITY TO TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS
by David L. Arnett
Zaman Online, Turkey
July 5 2006
I would like to begin by expressing heartfelt greetings to all of
you from the great people of Turkey.
I am a proud American, of course, and a career Foreign Service Officer
of the United States, but I have also spent nine years of my life
in Turkey, and I know the tremendous affection that Turks feel in
their hearts for all of you. In fact, Turks are much more likely than
Americans to know about you, the Melungeons, or Meluncanlar in Turkish.
Of course, not all Melungeons trace their roots to Turkey. We come
from many ethnic backgrounds, but I promise you that the Turks embrace
you all, just on the chance that some part of your genetic makeup
may also be Turkish or perhaps traced to one of the areas that was
a part of the Ottoman Empire.
One of the most heart-warming aspects of the Turkish character and
tradition is the love of family. Another is the extraordinary sense of
hospitality. When these two are combined-family and hospitality-you
can begin to understand why Melungeons receive such a warm welcome
in Turkey. That welcome is very similar to what you will find in
Tennessee, or in my father’s home state, Kentucky, when relatives,
kinfolk, return to their homes. Nothing is too good for such
visitors. The best food is served, the best china is used, and the
host will sleep on the floor if he has to so that his guests can have
the most comfortable bed. In Turkey, the poorest villager will offer
whatever he has to a visiting stranger, particularly a foreigner,
out of a time-honored sense of hospitality and honor.
That sense of honor also still links the Turks with the Melungeons
and the people of Appalachia. As a former Army officer, I learned
to esteem the ideals of “Duty, Honor, Country.” They are still the
highest ideals in the Armed Services of both the United States and
Turkey, and I believe that they are still most alive in the general
population in this region of the country, where the Melungeons are
most prevalent. Of course, a noble sense of honor can sometimes evolve
into something destructive, such as with the blood feuds that still
existed in my grandfather’s day in Kentucky and still exist today in
some of the remote parts of eastern Turkey. The phrase in Turkish is
almost the same-“kandavasi” or a “blood matter.”
But a genuine sense of honor is to be admired, and honor and pride are
both alive and well today in Turkey. Where we have only one word for
honor, there are many such words in Turkish, and those same words are
also used for people’s names. Certainly for me, it has been an honor
to live and work in Turkey, and an honor also to be among you today.
I have served in Turkey three times, from 1983 to 1987 as the Press
Attache at the American Embassy in Ankara, the capital of Turkey;
from 1995 to 1997 as the Counselor for Public Affairs at the Embassy
in Ankara; and from 2002 to 2005 as the Consul General, or the head
of the American Consulate, in Turkey’s largest city and the former
capital of the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul.
I would like to tell you a little story, a true story, about my
introduction to Turkey and the strong connection that I have felt to
the country from the very beginning. It happened in 1983, when I first
arrived in Ankara. On my first night in the city, I stepped out on to
the balcony of my high-rise apartment and looked out at the lights of
the city twinkling within the bowl-shaped area in which it lies and
up in the surrounding hills. It was a beautiful evening, and, when I
lifted my eyes from the city lights to look at the early night sky,
I was truly surprised to see in perfect clarity the crescent moon and
a single star that lay just to the side of it. That crescent and that
star on a field of red comprise the Turkish flag, and I had thought
that they were only symbolic. But there in the sky above me lay that
same crescent moon and star together, and I had the feeling that I
was being welcomed home somehow, that the country’s flag had been
planted above me somehow as a sign of welcome and return. I never
again saw the moon and star aligned so perfectly.
I had not heard of Melungeons at that time, and I had no idea at
all that I might also trace my roots to Turkey. It was during my
second tour in Turkey, in 1995 or 1996, when I first began to hear a
fascinating legend about the crew of a Turkish ship that had found
itself on the eastern coast of the United States centuries before
and had worked its way inland and settled in the broad Appalachian
region. I have heard two versions, (1) that the ship foundered off
the coast, and (2) that the ship was captured by the British from
the Spaniards after the battle of Lepanto and brought to the New World.
In any case, I found the story interesting, but I did not focus on it,
because I thought that it had no direct bearing on me. I was pleased,
though, as an American diplomat stationed in Turkey, to learn that
Americans with possible Turkish heritage were coming to Turkey and
being very warmly received.
In 2004, in Istanbul, I was invited by the Turkish-American University
Association to attend a lecture on Melungeons, and I was fascinated to
learn that one of the families associated with the Melungeons is the
Crow family, since my father’s mother was a Crow. I then remembered
that my father’s father was rather dark-skinned with blue eyes and that
both of them came from southern Kentucky. My father was born, in fact,
within a hundred yards or so of the Tennessee border. The photographs
that I have of my grandfather show a man who could easily be Turkish.
In 2005, with that information in hand, I began to mention to my
Turkish friends that it might even be possible that I too shared in
their Turkish heritage. I mentioned this also in an early farewell
speech and said that although I could not be at all sure that I had
Turkish blood in my veins, I would definitely carry Turkey always
in my heart. The next day, the possibility that I might be partly
Turkish was carried on the front pages of the national press and
on the television news channels. Given the huge interest that had
been generated by the media, I arranged to have a DNA test conducted
through the labs in Oxford, England. To my great pleasure, the results
indicated that I share my genes on my father’s side with a full 25%
of the Turks. And that is in part why I stand before you today.
The other reason is to emphasize the very great importance of
Turkish-American relations and the role that the Melungeon community
can play in strengthening and improving those relations.
Turkey is important to the United States. Like the United States,
Turkey is a remarkable melting pot of civilizations and cultures. It
lies at the heart of nearly every regional issue of concern to the
United States. Whether one discusses current events in the Middle
East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, or Europe itself,
Turkey is an important key to both regional and world stability.
Turkey and Israel have long been the only real democracies in the
Middle East region. And Turkey’s ties to Israel are important factors
in the search for lasting peace in the region.
The United States strongly supports Turkey’s entry into the European
Union, and we view its success as a secular democracy as an essential
element in the prevention of any potential “clash of civilizations.”
Turkey is one of our strongest and most reliable NATO allies. It is
the only Muslim-majority country in NATO. We can boast of over fifty
years as NATO allies and as many years of joining hands around the
world to bring peace and security to troubled regions. We used to
say: “From Korea to Kosovo.” Now we say: “From Korea to Kabul.” Add
to that two centuries of commercial interaction and a century and a
half of educational exchange, and our countries are linked as allies,
trading partners, and friends.
The primary focus of American policy in Turkey is to support Turkey’s
efforts to achieve the ambitious economic and political goals that
the Turkish people have set for themselves. By becoming an official
candidate for membership in the European Union, Turkey has signaled
strongly that its place is in Europe. Just as important, all Turkish
citizens will benefit from an open, transparent, democratic system that
respects their individual rights and freedoms. Turks are justifiably
proud of what they have achieved over the past few years, and the
United States will continue to support the process of reform.
Inflation in Turkey is lower than it has been in a generation, and
real interest rates have declined sharply. Turkish companies are
exporting at record levels. Total annual trade between the United
States and Turkey is at a level of some 9 billion dollars.
With nearly 12,000 Turkish students enrolled in U.S. universities,
Turkey sends more students to the U.S. than any other European
country. Turkish students are currently enrolled in all fifty U.S.
states.
We are also engaged together in many places around the world to achieve
solutions to regional conflicts. Turkey’s role in Afghanistan is a
case in point. Turkey has successfully commanded the International
Security Assistance Force in Kabul twice, and participated in the
initial training of the Afghan National Army.
Turkey is an important donor for reconstruction. The inauguration
of the Kabul-Kandahar highway, built by U.S. and Turkish companies,
is a good example of our common approach.
Turkey can certainly serve as an example of a country with a large
Muslim-majority population that is also democratic and secular. We
refrain from saying that Turkey is a model, but rather an example,
because it has its own unique history and a founding father, Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk, who was one of the greatest leaders of the 20th
century. We also do not speak of our own country, the United States
of America, the oldest continuous democracy in the world, as a model
for the rest of the world, because we have our own unique history.
There is no perfect democracy, because people are not perfect. But
the genius of democracy is that it accepts that people are not perfect
and provides for peaceful change.
The U.S. and Turkey have worked together closely to address our various
interests over the Iraq issue. Turkey has legitimate regional security
concerns, and we have sought to address them. We have repeated very
often that we stand firm on maintaining the territorial integrity of
Iraq, that we are opposed to a separate Kurdish state, and that our
vision is of an Iraq where all ethnic groups, the Turkmen certainly
among them, will have their rights, representation and access to the
nation’s wealth protected.
On June 12, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell sent a message to
the City of Istanbul at the opening ceremony for our new Consulate
there. These are his words: “The United States and Turkey are great
nations. As Ataturk said, we have both been inspired by democratic
ideals, and this experience indeed deepens our friendship. Both Turks
and Americans are focused on the future, a future that will be a very
bright one for the Turkish people despite the many challenges you face
today. It will be bright for the same reason that my country’s future
is bright: because innovative people freed to use their creativity
and initiative can produce wonders.”
Hundreds of thousands of Americans visit Turkey every year. At the
Consulate General in Istanbul alone, we processed more than 65,000
visas for Turkish citizens each year, and many thousands of Americans
have made Turkey their permanent home. Turkey is a beautiful country
with spectacular tourism sites, enviable weather, great cuisine,
and people whose hospitality is known throughout the world.
We want the great and sovereign Republic of Turkey to remain
exactly what it is-a strong secular democracy that is perfecting
the democratic rights of its people and moving ever closer to full
integration with Europe.
Just as the Ottoman Empire once extended from Central Europe through
the Middle East and North Africa to the Arabian Gulf and the very
borders of South Asia, Turkey today forms a bridge between Europe and
Asia, a bridge between the ancient and modern worlds, and a bridge
between Islam and the West. It is also one of the most beautiful and
interesting countries in the world.
So, what problems could possibly exist between us? Unfortunately,
there are some. Most of them began with the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Our government believed that the Turkish Parliament would approve
the movement of our 4th Infantry Division and Turkish troops
through southern Turkey and into northern Iraq as a major part of
the battle plan. In fact, both governments expected approval, and
so did both militaries. However, on March 1, 2003, despite the yes
votes outnumbering the no votes, the small number of abstentions meant
that the motion to approve did not have the support of a majority in
the Parliament that day. In fact, Turkey did approve the dispatch of
many thousands of troops to Iraq on October 7 of that year, but that
offer was eventually declined because of the opposition of many in
Iraq itself.
The March 1 decision came as a shock and disappointment to many in
Washington. Although our relations later improved, they have not been
as close as before. Today, there are other concerns in Washington,
focusing on high-level Turkish contacts with Syria and Hamas, at a
time when unified world opposition to their activities in Lebanon
and Palestine has been sought, and there are questions about Turkish
policy in regard to Iran.
On the Turkish side, the fears that led to the rejection of the March
1 motion never materialized. There was no influx of Iraqi refugees
into Turkey. The Turkish tourism industry and the Turkish economy as
a whole have boomed since that time, although it was feared that both
would be badly damaged.
However, on July 4, 2003, an event occurred that poisoned the
relationship on the Turkish side. A small contingent of Turkish
soldiers in the northern Iraq city of Sulaimaniye was arrested by
American troops who were acting on reports that they were planning
destabilizing actions in the region. As is customary with such arrests,
they were handcuffed and bags were placed over their heads while
they were transported to American facilities. Within a day or so,
they were released, and high-level meetings were held between our
two militaries in order to discuss the incident and avoid anything
similar in the future.
That might have been the end of it, but reports were leaked to the
Turkish media, and the entire country became inflamed by what was
perceived to be a serious breach of Turkish honor. All of the polls in
Turkey continue to confirm that the institution held in the greatest
esteem by the Turkish people is the military. To dishonor the military
is to dishonor the entire nation. To this day, many Turks believe that
the Turkish uniform was dishonored that day, although their soldiers
were actually in civilian clothes.
Nevertheless, that single incident has grown in the Turkish
consciousness into a huge black mark against the United States. That
has been coupled with a widely accepted but decidedly false belief that
the United States supports the establishment of an independent Kurdish
state in northern Iraq, which might tempt Turkish Kurds to demand their
own state within the current boundaries of Turkey. That combination of
beliefs has led to several popular books and films in the last year
and a half in Turkey that have depicted the United States in very
ugly terms and undermined the friendship between our two countries.
So, yes, there are some problems. And what does that mean for the
Melungeon community, and how can we help?
There are at least two major points of convergence between Melungeons
and the Turks. The first is the search for identity and a longing to
belong to a wider community. The second, of course, is the genetic
link in many of us and a shared physical heritage. I would like to
explore both for a few minutes.
I believe it is true that nearly all of the world’s peoples are of
mixed race and ethnic heritage. One of the differences with Melungeons
is that we are well aware of that. And there is no doubt of that
really with the people of the United States and Turkey. We are a
land of immigrants, and modern Turkey is the heir of probably the
greatest empire that the world has ever seen, the Ottoman Empire,
which encompassed vast territories in Europe, the Middle East,
Africa, and Central Asia, and a great mixed population drawn from
all of those areas.
We have generally celebrated our mixed ethnic heritage in the United
States, but modern Turks have not yet done the same. Against all
odds at the end of the First World War, the great Turkish general
and statesman Ataturk, himself a man with blond hair and blue eyes
from Salonika, rallied his countrymen from the heart of the Turkish
homeland, Anatolia, and beat back the Western powers that had tried to
divide the country with the Treaty of Sevres and defeated the various
minority groups that tried to secede and establish separate countries
on what remained of Turkey. With the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923,
Ataturk and his followers achieved their hard-fought independence
and established the modern Republic of Turkey.
But it was held together by the will of Ataturk and a strong
nationalism based upon pride in being a Turk. The most famous of so
many revered statements by Ataturk is this: “How happy is the one
who says I am a Turk.” Minorities have been viewed as threats that
might fracture the unity of the new country. In addition, Ataturk
disbanded the Caliphate, or the spiritual leadership of Islam that
had been vested in the Sultan in Istanbul until 1923, and he also
outlawed various religious orders in the country, in a successful
attempt to steer Turkey toward the modern West and away from what
he considered the backward ways of the traditional Arab world. He
also championed the emancipation of women, Western dress, the Latin
alphabet instead of the Arabic, and a series of other reforms that
thrust the country into the 20th century and headlong toward the West.
And today, 83 years later, there is a national identity crisis in
Turkey that is also being played out in the political world, because
the reforms certainly changed the shape and practice of the state,
as well as the surface of Turkish life throughout the country, but
they left several unresolved questions to this day. For example, if
the country is truly secular, then why does the government regulate
religious practice and expression? In a true democracy, should the
military have the right to intervene in political affairs? Should
the country really fear the differences expressed by minority
groups as threats to national unity, or should it not embrace those
differences as they enrich the wider society? These and many other
similar questions are being debated in Turkey today as a government
with Islamist roots faces a skeptical military establishment and
resistance from the secular establishment.
As Turks struggle with their internal identity, they are also compelled
to re-examine their external or international identity.
Turks will point to the map to help people understand their strategic
situation. For example, during the Cold War, they were surrounded by
the Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Warsaw Pact-member Bulgaria and
NATO-ally but traditional rival Greece. The situation is better today,
but relations are mixed with Russia, rather tense with Armenia,
uncertain with Iran, Iraq, and Syria, and still not warm with
Greece. The current government of Turkey appears to believe that Islam
can be the unifying force that will create good relations with its
Arab and Persian neighbors, but history does not provide much support
for that view, and the Arabs have not forgotten that they were ruled
by the Turks for centuries. At the same time, whenever Turkey reaches
out to regimes considered totalitarian or terrorist or both by the
West, it risks losing the friendship of Europe and the United States.
The U.S. has long supported full Turkish membership in the
European Union and continues to do so, in the strong belief that
such membership will anchor Turkey firmly and finally in the West
and complete Ataturk’s vision of a country with a strong secular,
liberal democracy that can proudly take its place among the world’s
most modern democratic states.
The polls in Turkey used to indicate that nearly 70% of the population
supported Turkish membership in the EU, but that support has been
steadily declining as new opposition to their membership has arisen in
Europe, while some conservative forces in Turkey fear the loss of their
traditional privileges if Turkey should become a member of the EU.
At the moment then, there is both a personal and national search for
identity taking place in Turkey, and a genuine longing, I believe,
to find or to create a wider sense of community and belonging. And
isn’t that what we are doing here today as well-searching for identity
and creating a sense of community?
In their search, Turks embrace anyone with Turkish roots. With the
fall of the Soviet Union, Turkey reached out strongly and vigorously
to the Turkic people of Central Asia in the newly independent states
of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan. They expected that their ethnic connections would lead to
enormous growth in trade and an economic windfall for Turkey. Indeed,
many Turkish companies have done well in Central Asia, but the huge
windfall never materialized.
Turkey has championed the Turkmen people in northern Iraq following
the fall of Saddam, in part from a genuine sense of brotherhood, and
in part because the Turkmen provide political leverage for Turkey in
the Kurdish region of Iraq, a region that continues to haunt Turkish
policy-makers.
The Turks have even claimed kinship with Native Americans, pointing to
Turkish words in tribal languages, identical carpet designs, and other
cultural and social similarities. And here, of course, we are back with
Melungeons and the research of Brent Kennedy and many others. We do not
have to speculate, as I have heard some Turks do, about a land bridge
from Siberia and a crossing by Turkic peoples from Asia thousands of
years ago, because there is a simpler and more convincing explanation
known to all of us here-that Turks entered the country a few centuries
ago from the east, not thousands of years ago from the north.
Just as Turks have reached out to other Turkic peoples around the
world, they are indeed reaching out to you. What better way could
there be to help mend the frayed edges of Turkish-American relations
than to celebrate Turkish-Americans and welcome long lost relatives
back to the ancestral fold?
The exact number of Turkish-Americans in the United States is not
known. I have heard estimates ranging from 75,000 to 400,000. But
that is before Melungeons are taken into account. There are some 100
Turkish-American Associations that I am aware of in the United States,
and I believe that all of them would be very pleased to welcome any of
you as members. The two largest federations are the Assembly of Turkish
American Associations (ATAA) and the Federation of Turkish American
Associations, and both can be located easily through the Internet.
Most Americans, in fact, know very little about Turkey, and
that is partly because until now there have been relatively few
Turkish-Americans, as opposed to other much larger hyphenated American
ethnic groups. There are no Turkish-Americans in our Congress, for
example, although there is now a substantial Turkish caucus comprised
of Members who are well aware of the importance of Turkish-American
relations and the importance of Turkey to global peace, as well as
the peaceful integration of Islamic traditions and the modern world.
Turkish-American organizations are backing the campaign of a
Turkish-American running for Congress this fall in Maryland. I expect
that there will be many more such candidates in the future. And I
anticipate that many of you will be asked for your support in the
future in regard to Turkish-American issues and concerns as word of
the Melungeons and their numbers spreads in the American consciousness.
Regardless of your political beliefs, however, and regardless of
whether you have any ancestral connection to Turkey, I hope that
as many of you as possible will travel to that great country and
experience the homecoming that will be offered to you as soon as
you reveal that you are a Melungeon. Your very presence in Turkey
and your interest in Turkish culture, history, and tradition can do
wonders for the Turkish-American relationship.
Finally, I would like to say a few words about the genetic
connection. In many cases, it is impossible to know exactly how or
when other influences were added to our genetic makeup. In my own
case, I thought that perhaps there would be indications that I had
ancestors from the Mediterranean and even the eastern Mediterranean.
But the DNA results came back with specific mention of Turkey.
However, it is known that Turkic peoples also made their way as far
north as Finland, and there appear to be similarities between Turkish
and Finnish, particularly in sentence structure and grammar. That
might help explain why my own DNA results also mention 20% Norwegian
and a full 40% from the indigenous people of northern Scandinavia,
the Sami. Arnett is actually a Scottish name, and it seems reasonable
that the Vikings of Scandinavia brought my own bloodline to Scotland
along with the Turkish element. It is known that the Vikings visited
Istanbul, or as it was known then Constantinople or, as it was known
to the Vikings then, Miklegard. In fact, Viking mercenaries served the
Byzantine emperors of Constantinople for over two centuries. Did Turks
return with the Vikings on their ships up through the Black Sea and
the rivers of Russia back to Scandinavia? Did some Vikings establish
themselves in Turkey (Asia Minor) and return many years later? Or
am I related to that substantial part of the Turkish population that
came from Central or Eastern Europe perhaps, or another part of the
Ottoman Empire? It is probably impossible to know, and I am simply
content in the knowledge that my own mixed heritage includes a strong
connection to modern Turkey.
For those of you with Turkish genes, I recommend strongly that you
visit the modern Republic of Turkey and help solidify the important
links between our two great countries. For those fellow Melungeons
who do not have Turkish genes, I recommend that you also visit the
modern Republic of Turkey and help solidify the links between our
two great countries. Both groups will be rewarded by extraordinary
beauty, unbelievable historical riches, fascinating archaeological
discoveries, warm hospitality and friendship, unmatched cuisine,
and the knowledge that you are playing an important role in bridging
differences between cultures and religions and avoiding the threatened
“clash of civilizations.”
The contacts and the friendships that you make will be lasting,
and you personally can play an important role in strengthening and
deepening Turkish-American relations. And you will know, as I know,
that the Turks are perhaps the most warm-hearted and friendliest
people in the world.
In closing, there is a Turkish proverb that I would like to bring to
your attention. I think it speaks to us both as individuals and as
nations. I quote: “Ayrilikla olumu cekmisler, ayrilik agir gelmis.”
In English: “They weighed separation and death on the scales, and
separation was found to be heavier.”
Ladies and gentlemen, the Melungeons are together here in Kingsport.
We are bringing together the elements of our own lives and ending the
separation that has been felt in our families. I can think of no other
group that is better qualified to lead the way in helping all people
and all nations lose their sense of separation. I am very proud to
be among you. Thank you very much for your time and attention today.
June 9, 2006
This is the unabridged version of The Importance of the Melungeon
Community to Turkish-American Relations on Zaman’s Turkish web site.

“EUROPEAN TURKEY” IN THE CAUCASUS
Sergey Markedonov for RIA Novosti
RIA Novosti, Russia
July 5 2006
Few people know that Henrik H. Kroner, Secretary General of the
European Movement International, was in Yerevan, the capital of the
South Caucasian republic of Armenia, in May 2006. He visited the
Tsitsernakaberd Memorial Complex in Yerevan and laid a wreath to the
victims of the Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey in 1915.
The European Movement was created to “contribute to the establishment
of a united, federal Europe founded on the respect for basic human
rights, peace principles, democratic principles of liberty and
solidarity and citizens’ participation.”
Henrik Kroner wrote in the book of honorary guests of the Memorial
that such crimes as the Armenian genocide must not be allowed to
happen again. He wrote that the European Union’s values were in favor
of future unification.
He said in the museum that the EU was resolved to prevent a repetition
of such tragedies, and that Turkey would not be admitted to the Union
unless it assumed responsibility for its past crimes.
The process has barely begun and will last years, he said, and Ankara
will eventually have to do as requested.
Kroner’s visit to Yerevan almost coincided with a serious discussion
on criminal liability for the denial of responsibility for the genocide
against Armenians, held in the National Assembly of France.
Deeply offended, Turkey recalled its ambassador “for consultations,”
while the advocates of criminal liability for the denial of
responsibility for the genocide and the supporters of the “democratic”
principle of discussing this delicate issue rallied in the streets
of Paris.
In short, the issue of the Armenian genocide remains a European
headache. However, the issue of admitting Turkey to the EU is usually
considered from two aspects: Turkey’s ability to accept European
values, and the EU’s ability to absorb new members and spread European
values to them.
Experts are analyzing not so much the essence of integration as
the timeframe and speed with which Turkey could acquire “European
registration.”
But the European future of Turkey is not limited to the political
struggle of Brussels bureaucrats, or discussions of where Europe ends
and Asia begins. The “Europeanization” of Turkey is an acute problem
of Caucasian geopolitics, which has a direct bearing on the issue
of genocide.
Firstly, the Europeanization of Turkey is related to the painful
aspect of the “big Caucasian game”, or relations between Turkey
and the “Armenian world”, which is not limited to Armenia. Other
important parts of this “world” are the self-proclaimed republic of
Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian diaspora, which seriously influences
public opinion in Armenia and many other countries, notably the United
States, France and Russia.
These parts of the “Armenian world” are divided over the future of
Armenian-Turkish relations. During the rule of Levon Ter-Petrosyan,
the first president of Armenia (1991-1998), the Yerevan authorities
and the diaspora quarreled more than once over the recognition of
the 1915 Armenian genocide. Ter-Petrosyan was not ready to soften
his attitude to the tragedy in the name of better relations with his
country’s western neighbor.
Although Armenia’s second president, Robert Kocharyan, is pursuing a
harsher policy towards Turkey, Yerevan has withdrawn its territorial
claims against it.
But not all parts of the “Armenian world” are prepared to regard
the issue of genocide without territorial claims, restitution, or
compensation for the property lost during the 1915 tragedy.
Tigran Martirosyan, a prominent Armenian political analyst, said:
“The current demands of the Armenian people [part of the “Armenian
world”] regarding Western Armenia [modern Turkey] are based on
the international requirement on clearing up the consequences of
genocide. This norm proceeds from the statutes of international
[military] tribunals, UN General Assembly resolutions, and the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
[adopted on December 9, 1948 and enforced on January 12, 1951].”
Secondly, Turkey’s accession to the EU should outline the post-conflict
settlement in the Caucasus and the region’s development as a whole. The
decision will also bear on Russia’s presence in the South Caucasus.
Apparently, the main problem in relations between Turkey and Armenia
(and the “Armenian world”) is the recognition of the Armenian
genocide in 1915. Many people regard Turkey’s interpretation of the
1915 tragedy as a genocide (not a civil war, massacre, or deportation
of Armenians, as modern Turkish historians prefer to write about it)
as proof of Turkey’s “Europeanization”. But Turkish historians and
political experts on the Armenian problem have other arguments.
Professor Halil Berktay said: “This is a very serious issue, and it
represents a mistake on the part of Turkey, which seems unable to
make a decision on its political and legal attitude to the Ottoman
Empire. Turkey has not fully accepted the fact that it freed itself
from Ottoman rule and created a modern republic in its place. This
is a very serious contradiction. The republic is not responsible for
those events.”
“The Turkish Republic can say that it was established in 1923,
whereas the Armenian tragedy took place in 1915,” the professor said.
“The army and state institutions of the Turkish Republic are not
responsible for those events. The Turkish Republic is a new state.
>>From a legal point of view, it is not the successor to the Ottoman
government or the reformist Young Turks of the Ittihad ve Terakki
(Unity and Progress) party.”
Other Turkish researchers of Armenian-Turkish relations call for
cleansing the 1915 problem of political complications and “leaving
the issue to historians.” But many Turkish academics, officials and
politicians regard statements like the one made by Professor Berktay
as excessively liberal.
Taner Akcam, the first Turkish historian to describe the 1915 tragedy
as a genocide, is currently a professor at a U.S.university.
Turkey could make a point of “bidding farewell to its past,” using the
“liberal” historians’ idea that the republic is not a legal successor
to the previous regimes to denounce the “Ottoman past” that made the
Armenian genocide possible (the absence of legal succession has been
a key ideological precept of the Turkish Republic since the rule of
its founder, Kemal Ataturk).
Moreover, Ankara could accept the gesture of Yerevan, which has
abandoned its territorial claims to Western Armenia, now part
of Turkey. It could solve the problem by acknowledging the 1915
Armenian genocide. The point is to separate the territorial problem
(and restitution) from the request for accepting responsibility for
the Armenian genocide.
One might think that Turkey’s admission to the European Union would
make the territorial claims of the “Armenian world” history, since
the EU is categorically against territorial re-divisions even in the
name of “historical justice.”
But the situation is not that simple. The Turkey of Kemal Ataturk,
which rejects the heritage of the “anti-popular Ottoman regime,” is
mostly pursuing an old foreign and domestic policy. I am referring
to its policy regarding Cyprus, relations with Greece, Bulgaria,
Armenia and the former-Yugoslav territory, and its attitude towards
ethnic minorities (the Kurd issue).
Throughout the 20th century Turkey cleverly played on contradictions
between great powers to strengthen its position in the world. During
Kemal Ataturk’s revolution, the Turks smartly used contradictions
between Soviet Russia and the Entente. During the Cold War, they used
the left-wing threat in Greece and Cyprus to solve the Cyprus problem
in their favor.
This is why Armenia and the “Armenian world” are concerned about
the European future of Turkey, which has fully used NATO resources
disregarding the high standards of “European security.” We can also
assume that Turkey will use EU resources to advance its foreign
policy ambitions.
No country has yet been excluded from the EU. Will Turkey, if it
engages in unacceptable behavior, become the first outlaw? And if it
is, what foreign policy strategy will the authorities in Ankara adopt?
As an EU member, Turkey will use its European “privileges,” notably
the cover of “European interference,” to pursue an active policy in
the Caucasus. Acting not so much on behalf of united Europe, as in the
pursuit of its self-serving goals, Turkey will use democratic rhetoric
to try to minimize Russia’s “imperial” influence in the region.
Unlike other members of NATO and the EU, Turkey has its own national
interests in the Caucasus. Just as in 1918-1920, Azerbaijan has
become Turkey’s main partner in the South Caucasus. Turkey recognized
Azerbaijan’s independence on December 16, 1991, and helped it during
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. In 1993, it closed the border
with Armenia but, unlike in 1918-1920, stopped short of a full-scale
military intervention. In 1994, Azerbaijani President Geidar Aliyev
spoke in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey about strategic
relations. In the 1990s, Turkey acted as Azerbaijan’s agent in NATO
and other international organizations.
Military cooperation is a major part of Azerbaijani-Turkish
relations. Since 1996, Turkish military advisers have been working
in Azerbaijan, and the Azerbaijani military has been trained in Turkey.
Turkey has been energetically promoting relations with Georgia since
the early 1990s, despite such minor political differences as the
Abkhazian problem and the repatriation of Meskhetian Turks. In 1998,
the Georgian Defense Ministry and the Turkish General Staff signed a
memorandum of understanding on military cooperation, which provides
for Turkey’s assistance in the training of Georgian officers. The
two countries are also promoting transportation and communications.
Turkey may turn the Armenian genocide into an element of political
bargaining. As a strategic partner of Azerbaijan, Turkey will most
likely do this, pledging to accept responsibility for the crime of a
genocide if pressure is put on Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. It may
encourage the EU to pressure Armenia into forcing the self-proclaimed
Karabakh republic to accept abstract and far-fetched peace plans of
international structures.
On the other hand, Turkey may suggest “an exchange of confessions”
between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia. On March 26, 1998,
Azerbaijani President Geidar Aliyev issued a decree “On the
Azerbaijani Genocide.” March 31 was declared the Day of the Azerbaijani
Genocide. The decree mentioned the “dismembering” of the Azerbaijani
nation, the “re-division of historical [Azerbaijani] territory” and
the “occupation” of Azerbaijan as a result of the Golestan (1813) and
Turkmanchai (1828) peace treaties that ended two Russo-Persian wars.
The Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, Armenia and the Armenian nation
have been accused of the Azerbaijani genocide. Turkey may presumably
pledge to assume responsibility for the Armenian genocide if Armenia
accepts responsibility for the Azerbaijani genocide. If Yerevan
rejects the offer (which it will most certainly do), Turkey would
redirect the EU wrath from itself to Armenia.
In short, the Europeanization of Turkey, which may be positive to
a degree, would also create problems for Armenia and the “Armenian
world”. Turkey may devise all kinds of unacceptable conditions for
admitting responsibility for the 1915 Armenian genocide.
As for Europe, the advocates of integration, acting in accordance
with the principle of political correctness and for the noble purpose
of bringing an Asian country into the lap of European democracy,
may sacrifice the interests of Armenians, just as they sacrificed
the interests of Serbs in Croatia and Kosovo, and of Greeks in Cyprus.
Sergey Markedonov is head of the department of ethnic relations at
the Institute of Military and Political Analysis.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and
may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.

AZERBAIJAN CONSIDERS GEORGIA MOST IMPORTANT STRATEGIC PARTNER
Author: S.Agayev
TREND Information, Azerbaijan
July 5 2006
Azerbaijan has always considered and is considering Georgia its most
important strategic partner in the region and on world scale, Artur
Rasizade, the prime minister of Azerbaijan, made such a statement at
the meeting with his Georgian colleague Zurab Nogaideli, Trend reports.
According to Rasizade, the sides closely cooperate with in GUAM
(Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) and other international
organizations. “Azerbaijan has achieved high indicators in the economic
development, The gross domestic product (GDP) of the country in 2006
has increased by 40%, and in 2005 the growth was 26 %,” Rasizade told.
Rasizade told that by the end of the year, all districts in Azerbaijan
will be provided with gas. “Over the past two and a half year, 400
thousand work places have been opened and this corresponds to the
social policy of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan attaches a great importance
to the military creation because the country is in the war situation
with Armenia,” Rasizade stressed.
According to prime minister of Azerbaijan, the military budget
of the country has grown by 2,3 times as comprised to 2006. “The
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the biggest problem for Azerbaijan and the
country tries to settle the problem peacefully,” Rasizade mentioned.
Rasizade pointed out that Azerbaijan supports the territorial integrity
of Georgia and expresses its gratitude to Georgian side for supporting
the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.
The Georgian prime minister told that the trade turnover between the
two countries in 2005 was 72% and it will continue. “The construction
of SCP is the new phase in the energy cooperation between the two
countries. Kazakhstan’s joining the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is
also stabilization fact in relation with oil prices,” he emphasized.

ARMENIAN PRESIDENT OFFICIALLY WELCOMED BY IRANIAN PRESIDENT
Islamic Republic News Agency, Iran
July 5 2006
Visiting Armenian President Robert Kocharyan was officially welcomed
by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at the Presidential Office
here on Wednesday.
In the welcoming ceremony, the national anthems of the two countries
were played and the two presidents reviewed a guard of honor.
The ceremony will be followed by a private session between the two
presidents.
The first round of official talks of the two countries’ delegations
will be held this afternoon. The talks will be presided by the two
presidents.
President Kocharyan arrived here at the head of a high-ranking
politico-economic delegation for a two-day official visit this morning.
On hand to welcome the Armenian president and his entourage upon
their arrival at Mehrabad International Airport here was Iranian
Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki.
Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian, Minister of Energy Armen
Movsisyan and Deputy Foreign Minister Armen Kirakosian are accompanying
the president in this visit.
The Armenian president, during his two-day stay here, is scheduled
to hold separate meetings with senior Iranian officials including
Foreign Minister Mottaki.

93 SCHOOLCHILDREN AWARDED WITH GOLDEN MEDALS
Panorama.am
18:15 05/07/06
93 medal winners at the secondary schools of republic were honorably
handed over their medals at the National Academy of Sciences today. The
medal winners were awarded by the NAS academicians on the day of
Constitution.
“The presence of NAS chairmanship and this presentation under the
walls of NAS is a means to reward the schoolchildren for their work,”
Levon Lazarian, minister of education and science said.
NAS Chairman Radik MARTIROSYAN was amazed. He had never seen NAS hall
so full of people who can link their future to science.
30 among 93 medal winners are from Yerevan, including 10 from private
schools.
The founder of Ohanyan school Suren Ohanyan said that the level of
education at private schools is high. “A schoolchild pays tuition
fee and receives quality education. There are no bribes here,” he said.
Republican Party member Sukias Avetisyan’s daughter, Ruzanna Avetisyan,
was also among the medal winners.
There are also children of school heads and teachers among the winners.
However, there are no privileges granted to such children during the
examinations at higher educational establishments. This procedure is
effective for the second year now.

ARMENIAN STANCE PROMPTS HIGHER AZERI MILITARY SPENDING: PM
Assa-Irada, Azerbaijan
July 6 2006
Baku, July 5, AssA-Irada
Azerbaijan is committed to a negotiated settlement to the Upper
(Nagorno) Garabagh conflict, but Armenia’s non-constructive stance
hampers these efforts and necessitates increasing military expenses,
Prime Minister Artur Rasizada has said.
“We have set out a goal to bring Azerbaijan’s military spending to the
overall budget of Armenia next year. We have to do this, as Armenia
continues to occupy our territories,” Rasizada said in a meeting with
his Georgian counterpart Zurab Nogaideli in Baku on Wednesday.
The two premiers expressed gratitude on behalf of their countries for
mutual support for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and Georgia.
Discussions also centered on expanding economic cooperation, full
commissioning of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export pipeline exporting
oil to world markets and energy issues in general.

GARABAGH MEDIATORS ‘AWAITING DECISIONS OF PRESIDENTS’
Assa-Irada, Azerbaijan
July 6 2006
Baku, July 5, AssA-Irada
The OSCE mediators brokering settlement to the Armenia-Azerbaijan
conflict over Upper (Nagorno) Garabagh are awaiting decisions from
Presidents Ilham Aliyev and Robert Kocharian that would move forward
the peace process and are required to reach a ‘framework agreement”,
the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and the new co-chair of
the OSCE Minsk Group (MG), Matthew Bryza, has said.
“The document has emerged as a result of a lengthy process.
Certainly, I cannot impose it on either side, but it brings us closer
to reaching a solution to the conflict. Without the presidents’
decisions or advice, we cannot move forward. That’s why we are
currently at this stage,” Bryza told the Armenian media.
He said the decision to disclose the core principles of peace talks
had been made prior to his recent statement that caused a great deal
of debate.
Bryza told Radio Liberty earlier that the mediators submitted a
framework accord to the conflicting sides.
“I did not make the decision to disclose the principles on the
negotiating table. It was made prior to my appointment to the post,”
Bryza said. He emphasized that the statement did not aim to put
pressure on Armenia.
“I hope that my friends both in and outside the Armenian government
will put an end to speculations. My responsibility is actually to
explain the decisions made by the three co-chairs [from the United
States, Russia and France] prior to my appointment.”
With regard to a possibility of a change of power in Armenia prompted
by the disclosure of the gist of talks, Bryza said: “I don’t believe
an agreement would lead to a political crisis in any country.”

AZERI, ARMENIAN LEADERS’ TALKS NOT ON G8 SUMMIT AGENDA – US MEDIATOR
Assa-Irada, Azerbaijan
July 6 2006
Baku, July 5, AssA-Irada
The US co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group (MG) has played down reports
suggesting that Presidents Ilham Aliyev and Robert Kocharian are
expected to table settlement to the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict
over Upper (Nagorno) Garabagh during the upcoming G8 summit in
St. Petersburg.
“I am unaware of such a meeting. This was not discussed at the June
22 meeting [of the co-chairs] in Vienna,” Matthew Bryza told an
Armenian newspaper.
“We have made no proposals to that end. We suggested that the
presidents take a time-out to discuss the framework agreement. But
holding a presidential meeting would be good,” Bryza said. He added
that Russia to host the meeting should invite the two leaders to hold
the discussions.
The intermediaries’ earlier statement that there is a framework deal on
the negotiating table has caused a great deal of debate. Azeri Deputy
Foreign Minister Araz Azimov said such a document is not on agenda.