OPINION – Geopolitics of memory: Why Israel turned to the Armenian question no

Anadolu Agency, Turkey
July 9 2026
Israel’s government is the most isolated in the nation’s history, facing international legal scrutiny and eroding global legitimacy. In this state, Israel is burning through its last remaining diplomatic cards to lash out against its critics.
Ramzy Baroud
09 July 2026
  • Ramzy Baroud is a journalist, author, and editor of The Palestine Chronicle.

In October 2019, the US House of Representatives voted 405-11 to adopt House Resolution 296, declaring it US policy to commemorate the “Armenian ‘Genocide’ through official recognition and remembrance” and to “reject efforts” associating the United States with its denial. Less than two years later, President Joe Biden became the first American president in decades to formally use the term “genocide” in an official presidential statement.

By then, relations between Washington and Ankara had deteriorated sharply over Türkiye’s role in Syria, its purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense system, and broader disagreements over regional security. These developments drove the congressional vote and Biden’s subsequent recognition, creating the geopolitical backdrop that finally made this supposedly “moral” position politically possible.

The contradiction became even more striking after October 2023. The same administration that had positioned itself as a moral arbiter on historical controversies became Israel’s principal military, diplomatic, and financial backer of the genocide in Gaza. Although international bodies, UN experts, human rights groups, and genocide scholars documented the reality of Israel’s extermination campaign, Washington dismissed the “genocide” characterization and continued to supply Tel Aviv with weapons and diplomatic cover. This was not merely a disagreement over legal terminology. It reflected a broader pattern in which the language of universal morality appeared remarkably flexible when applied to allies, especially Israel.

Meanwhile, the human toll continued to mount. The official figures released by Gaza’s health authorities document more than 73,000 deaths, while a widely discussed analysis published in The Lancet argued that the eventual mortality—including indirect deaths caused by hunger, disease, displacement, and the destruction of Gaza’s healthcare system—could reach 186,000 or even higher, or nearly 8% of Gaza’s population.

Gaza factor in Tel Aviv’s pivot

Against that backdrop came another extraordinary political development. On June 28, 2026, the Israeli Cabinet unanimously approved Foreign Minister Gideon Saar’s proposal to formally recognize what they term the “genocide committed against the Armenian people during the final years of the Ottoman Empire” and to firmly condemn any “denial, minimization, or distortion of historical truth,” pending final legislative approval. For decades, successive Israeli governments has deliberately avoided such language because it did not suit their strategic interests. The reasons were well known: preserving relations with Türkiye, maintaining strategic cooperation with Azerbaijan, and avoiding unnecessary regional friction.

Those calculations have now changed. Relations between Israel and Türkiye have collapsed to their lowest point in decades. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has emerged as one of Israel’s most vocal international critics over the Gaza genocide. Ankara has supported international legal initiatives against Israel, sharply curtailed bilateral relations, and increasingly positioned itself as an advocate for Palestinian rights in international forums.

On Gaza, Türkiye remains one of Israel’s strongest critics. Turkish civil society, in particular, continues to be among the most active worldwide, consistently mobilizing humanitarian aid, organizing mass protests, and supporting various international legal and grassroots initiatives designed to break the siege of Gaza and challenge Israeli actions on the global stage.

Meanwhile, Türkiye’s expanding regional influence runs directly counter to Israel’s geopolitical agenda, which remains tethered to conflict, war, and colonial expansion. In Syria, Ankara has consistently argued that long-term stability depends upon preserving the country’s territorial integrity and rebuilding state institutions, while Israel has invested in expanding its military footprint and deepening ties with secessionist groups and minorities. The two countries now view Syria through fundamentally different strategic lenses. Concerning Iran, Türkiye has repeatedly opposed military escalation and emphasized diplomacy even as Israel has advocated a far more confrontational approach. Ankara has maintained communication channels across regional divides, positioning itself as a diplomatic actor rather than a participant in military confrontation.

Why Israel fears a stable Caucasus

Perhaps most importantly, Türkiye has continued pursuing normalization with Armenia despite decades of mutual distrust. Although progress has been gradual, discussions over reopening borders, restoring transport links, expanding trade, and normalizing diplomatic relations represent one of the most significant opportunities for long-term stability in the South Caucasus. Such normalization would not simply improve bilateral relations; it could reshape regional connectivity between Europe and Asia while reducing one of the region’s oldest geopolitical fault lines.

Israel’s recent move is most likely intended to influence that process as its timing inevitably raises questions. Diplomatic decisions rarely occur in a political vacuum, particularly when they reverse decades of carefully maintained policy. Indeed, for Israel, closer Turkish-Armenian ties are entirely unacceptable. For decades, Israeli foreign policy in the South Caucasus has banked on a perpetual feud—a fractured regional landscape that Tel Aviv could actively exploit.

The Israeli strategy aligns perfectly with long-standing Israeli geopolitical doctrines, most notably encapsulated by the Yinon Plan. Authored in 1982 by Oded Yinon, then-advisor to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, this strategic blueprint argued that Israel’s regional dominance depends entirely upon the deliberate fragmentation, balkanization, and sectarian division of surrounding nations into smaller, weak, and manageable hostile enclaves.

If Türkiye succeeds in fully normalizing ties with Armenia, Israel will lose a critical building block of this regional strategy. A stable, cooperative South Caucasus deprives Tel Aviv of a geopolitical fracture line it has long weaponized to project its power, leaving its policy of sowing chaos, division, and international conflict structurally weakened.

Blurring the lines: Distraction as state policy

There is another vital dimension to Israel’s sudden pivot, and it is also related to Gaza. As the international community is forced to confront the grim reality of the Israeli genocide in Gaza, Benjamin Netanyahu and his extremist coalition government are desperate to dilute these facts. By suddenly pushing for Armenian recognition, they hope to shift global diplomatic attention, spark manufactured controversy, and weaponize historical memory to deflect attention from the genuine genocide Tel Aviv is committing today.

This cynical policy of manufacturing false historical parallels is a strategy that Israel has utilized for decades. Following every major massacre it has carried out against Palestinians, Lebanese, and other regional populations, Tel Aviv has systematically reached for historical distractions to blur the lines of contemporary accountability.

Ultimately, one cannot ignore the palpable element of desperation in this behavior. The current Israeli government is arguably the most isolated in the nation’s history, facing unprecedented international legal scrutiny and eroding global legitimacy. In this state of acute isolation, Israel is burning through its last remaining diplomatic cards to lash out against its critics. Given these stakes, Türkiye and Armenia must find their common ground directly. Neither the United States nor Israel genuinely cares about the future of the Armenian people, or about their past. These geostrategic ploys are not acts of “moral awakening”; they are calculated maneuvers designed to sow fragmentation, chaos, and perpetual regional dependency.

*Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu.

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OSCE head promises to help oust Armenian chief bishop

Malaysia Sun
July 9 2026

OSCE head promises to help oust Armenian chief bishop

RT.com

Russian pranksters Vovan and Lexus were posing during a call as Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who has mounted a massive crackdown on the Orthodox clergy

OSCE Secretary-General Feridun Sinirlioglu offered to help oust the head of the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC), in a phone call with Russian pranksters posing as Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

In recent years, Pashinyan has cracked down on the Orthodox clergy, with several senior bishops placed in custody on corruption and political interference charges. The feud between the Western-leaning prime minister and the AAC intensified after the clergy expressed support for the opposition.

In a phone call earlier this week, Russian pranksters Vovan and Lexus told Sinirlioglu, a Turkish national, that the Armenian government wants the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to help oust the AAC head, Catholicos Karekin II.

The pranksters told the OSCE secretary general that the organization’s “assistance would be the trump card and help oust the Armenian patriarch as well as change the religion” in the country, as quoted by Russian media.

Vovan and Lexus, posing as Pashinyan, specifically asked for the OSCE’s backing in case there was a backlash from the opposition.

“Alright, I will do all I can,” Sinirlioglu reportedly said in response.

Created at the height of the Cold War in 1975, the OSCE comprises 57 member states, including Russia, the US, Canada, and most European and Central Asian nations. While the organization professes to promote security and cooperation, Moscow has in recent years accused it of being hijacked by its NATO and EU members to advance Western agendas.

Last October, the Armenian authorities detained Bishop Mkrtich Proshyan, head of the Diocese of Aragatsotn and the nephew of Catholicos Karekin II. Five other clergymen were apprehended along with him.

The Armenian Investigative Committee stated at the time that the arrests had been made as part of an investigation into alleged abuse of power. Weeks earlier, Archbishop Mikael Ajapahyan was sentenced to two years in prison on charges of coup incitement – a case the AAC cleric characterized as politically motivated.

Last month, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) alleged that the EU was pressuring the Armenian government to expel the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) from the country as a prerequisite to potential EU integration.

Russia and Armenia have historically maintained close political, economic and cultural ties. However, under Pashinyan, the country has increasingly adopted a pro-Western stance. Yerevan has accused Moscow of failing to stop its neighbor Azerbaijan from reclaiming the Nagorno-Karabakh region through military force in September 2023.

Russian officials have, in turn, noted that it was Pashinyan himself who had recognized Baku’s sovereignty over the disputed territory. The Kremlin has also warned that by severing ties with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union in favor of hypothetical EU integration, Armenia would have to forgo the “concrete dividends” afforded by the single market.

The Armenian opposition has, in turn, pointed the finger squarely at Pashinyan over the defeat in the conflict with Azerbaijan.

Pashinyan’s government has responded by prosecuting a number of opposition figures and members of the clergy.

Last month, Pashinyan’s pro-EU ruling party, Civil Contract, came out on top in hotly contested parliamentary elections, securing over 49% of the vote. The opposition has petitioned the constitutional court to annul the results of the June 7 elections, citing alleged violations.

(RT.com)


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Armenia Looks to Expand Layered Air Defence via Indian Tech Following Azerbaij

Defence, India
July 9, 2026
  •  Thread starterRaj Basu

    The recent move by Azerbaijan to purchase 40 JF-17 Thunder Block III combat jets from Pakistan—an expansive agreement valued at approximately $4.6 billion—has drawn intense scrutiny throughout the South Caucasus.

    This acquisition marks a monumental departure from Baku’s historical reliance on older Soviet-era MiG-29 and Su-25 fleets.

    As these modern fighters enter service and military ties between Baku and Islamabad strengthen, experts consider this deal the most dramatic change in the regional balance of air power since the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020.

    In response, Armenia has rapidly intensified the re-evaluation of its national defence strategy.

    Moving beyond standard diplomatic objections, the Armenian government is actively upgrading its military hardware and reinforcing its anti-aircraft shields.

    Most notably, Yerevan is aggressively diversifying its security alliances, stepping away from its historic dependence on Moscow, especially as Russian military supplies have dwindled due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

    Security experts in Armenia point to the deepening military collaboration between Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Pakistan as a powerful new strategic axis that will shape the region’s future.

    While Ankara provided substantial battlefield technology during the 2020 clashes, Islamabad delivered steadfast political support.

    The recent integration of advanced Pakistani combat aircraft, showcased during recent joint military drills like the “Indus Shield Alpha” exercises, is seen as concrete proof of a solidifying three-way defence alliance.

    Procuring the JF-17 Block III grants Azerbaijan a major technological advantage. The aircraft comes equipped with state-of-the-art avionics, a highly capable Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, and integration with formidable Chinese-made PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles.

    This combination drastically improves Azerbaijan’s capacity to execute network-centric aerial warfare, beyond-visual-range combat, and highly accurate strike missions.

    Acknowledging that competing aircraft-for-aircraft against Azerbaijan would place an immense strain on its national budget, Armenia has strategically pivoted toward building a formidable, ground-based air defence grid.

    A cornerstone of this new strategy has been the rapid and unprecedented expansion of defence ties with India.

    Over a short period, India has transformed into Armenia’s premier supplier of military hardware, accounting for nearly $2 billion in defence agreements since 2020.

    These contracts include the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher systems, Swathi weapon locating radars, and the advanced Akash surface-to-air missile (SAM) network, whose deliveries commenced in 2024.

    Armenian military commanders intend to weave these Indian platforms into a multi-tiered air defence umbrella, safeguarding vital infrastructure from drones and incoming jets.

    This focus on anti-aircraft systems highlights a calculated method to neutralise an adversary’s superior combat aviation with dense surface-to-air missile coverage.

    Instead of trying to establish total control of the skies, Armenia’s goal is to make any hostile aerial incursion extremely hazardous and costly for attacking fighter pilots.

    Concurrently, attention remains on Armenia’s current fleet of Su-30SM heavy fighters.

    While these jets are currently the most potent offensive weapons in the Armenian Air Force, military commentators stress that comprehensive technological upgrades will be required soon to maintain relevance against the newly acquired assets of their neighbours.

    Within Armenian strategic circles, there is ongoing debate about partnering with New Delhi to modernise these aircraft.

    Because India operates and heavily customises its own vast fleet of Su-30MKIs, analysts believe Indian expertise in avionics, electronic warfare, and weapon integration could provide an ideal upgrade path for Armenia’s Sukhois.

    At present, however, formal agreements for such a modernisation programme have not yet been finalised.

    Zooming out, Armenia’s overall defence doctrine has experienced a fundamental shift.

    Frustrated by a lack of support from Moscow during recent territorial clashes, Yerevan is actively shedding its historical reliance on Russian security guarantees.

    To fill the void, the government has forged strong military partnerships with nations like France and India, evident in high-level visits by Indian military leadership to Yerevan in early 2026.

    Through these new alliances, Armenia is securing state-of-the-art radars, precision artillery, and robust anti-air capabilities.

    For India, this shift in Armenian policy has opened lucrative avenues for its growing defence manufacturing sector.

    Indian-built weapons are now internationally recognised as effective and dependable alternatives to traditional Russian hardware.

    This burgeoning relationship cements India’s new position as a capable global exporter of sophisticated, indigenously developed military technology, with Armenia currently standing as one of its largest single arms buyers.

    On the other side, supplying the JF-17 Block III to Azerbaijan highlights Pakistan’s rising aspirations within the international arms trade.

    Landing this massive contract is a landmark achievement for Islamabad’s aerospace sector, moving the JF-17 beyond a low-cost alternative into a strategic platform and potentially boosting its sales prospects in other regions.

    Ultimately, the changing military landscape of the South Caucasus is being dictated by more than just the delivery of new fighter jets; it is being driven by entirely new geopolitical alignments.

    As Azerbaijan solidifies its defence triangle with Turkey and Pakistan, Armenia is aggressively balancing the scales by deepening its strategic and military bonds with France and India.

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The Armenian Diaspora in the 21st Century: Communities, Institutions, Individu

Mediamax, Armenia
July 9 2026

The Armenian Diaspora in the 21st Century: Communities, Institutions, Individuals

The Diasporan Perspectives (DP) think tank is launching a call for research proposals.

 

DP commissions, publishes and disseminates new research in the social sciences focusing on the Armenian Diaspora and Armenia. Founded in 2025 by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, it also serves as a convening space for leaders, policymakers and experts. DP brings a unique diasporan perspective to Armenian national issues. Its mission is to foster cutting-edge social science research, analysis and strategic thinking that is transformative, open to the world and Armenian focused.

Society | 2025-12-06 09:00:08

Diasporan Perspectives: Opening the “treasure” and rethinking Armenia

The aim of this call for research proposals is to publish an original anthology on the contemporary Armenian Diaspora. There has been a substantial body of academic research on the topic in the last three decades, in large part due to the efforts of a handful of experts and initiatives, including case studies, historical analysis and thematic approaches.

 

Below is the announcement of the Diasporan Perspectives think tank:

 

In this call, we are interested in learning where the state of research currently stands, to generate new research, and hear as many diverse voices as possible, from different disciplinary and theoretical perspectives. The focus is on contemporary issues in and relating to the Armenian Diaspora. Disciplinary and theoretical approaches are wide open. The overarching question the initiative is seeking to answer is: where is the Armenian Diaspora heading in the 21st century?

 

The commissioned research papers, after passing peer review, will be published in an edited book or in a multivolume format.

 

We are interested in learning how research is dealing with Armenian diasporan communities and institutions, and the challenges they are facing in a rapidly changing and unstable world. While important historic Armenian communities in the Middle East are emptying because of wars and instability, migration is not only creating new challenges, but also leading to new opportunities.

 

Such changes can be studied in more detail by looking at the evolution of institutions in the Diaspora such as the church, political parties, schools, mass media, foundations, sports clubs, charity organisations, cultural associations, academic centres, etc., as well as newly emerged initiatives including professional associations, single issue mobilisation efforts and fundraising forums. Studies about individuals who make important contributions to, and have significant impact on, the Armenian Diaspora are also part of this research initiative.

 

The relationship of the Diaspora with the Armenian nation-state is another major aspect to be analysed. How did the emergence of independent Armenia influence the Diaspora? While there are several important studies on the political aspects of this relationship, other approaches such as sociological and anthropological perspectives are scarce. How did the emergence of independent Armenia, and Yerevan becoming a new “diasporan” hub, influence inter- and intra-diasporic contacts, communications and movements? How did the Diaspora’s focus on Armenia impact its resource mobilisation vis-à-vis national and local issues or needs? Did Armenian diasporan identity change due to the emergence of a sovereign nation-state?

Photo: REUTERS

The other side of the Diaspora-Armenia relationship is the policies and approaches in Yerevan pertaining to the Diaspora. How did these change, if they indeed changed? What are the views and actions of state and non-state actors in Armenia in relation to the Diaspora? How did out-migration from Armenia influence cultural production in the Diaspora, for example by the outflow of professionals, including scientists, cultural workers and athletes?

 

The topic of Armenian Diaspora and philanthropy is of particular interest to us. In the absence of a state, Armenian cultural life in the Diaspora (as well as in the homeland) has traditionally been supported by philanthropic initiatives. In the past, wealthy individuals from Persia and India pioneered such giving. Subsequently, the wealthy amiras and industrialists of Istanbul, Cairo, Baku and Tbilisi stepped up to the plate. From Mantashyan to the Melkonian brothers, from Calouste Gulbenkian to Alec Manoogian, Hrair Hovnanian, Kirk Krikorian and the Manoukian brothers funded educational, cultural and political initiatives. How are the wealthy Armenians of the Diaspora, be it in Switzerland or the Silicon Valley, engaging with Armenian (or non-Armenian) issues today? How is philanthropy changing? Are there “disrupters” in the traditional domain of community support?

 

Finally, the outmigration from the Middle East, Armenia and other former Soviet Republics is creating new diasporan communities. What is known about them? Are new types of institutions taking shape in such communities? What dynamics are at play in comparison to earlier experiences of diaspora-building? What is the relationship between the “new” and “established” communities where they coexist?

 

The current research project is provisionally planned to be built around the following structure and themes:

 

Part I: Armenian Diasporan Communities Today

 

•    Changes due to out-migration, for example in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Palestine/Israel, Greece, Egypt, etc.

•    Current developments in recently formed communities, including Russia, Poland, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Scandinavian countries, Spain, Portugal, etc.

•    Proposals may focus on specific regions or cities such as California, Rhone Valley, Tabriz, Aleppo, Beirut, Moscow, Nor Nakhichevan/Rostov-on-Don, Tbilisi, Istanbul, etc.

 

Part II: Armenian Diasporan Institutions and Organisations

 

•    Specific institutions, such as the churches, the three political parties and their satellite organisations, major foundations, organisations or initiatives – be they established or relatively new. Studies on youth and social movements, with particular emphasis on current dynamics.

•    Philanthropy and the Diaspora, especially after 1988.

•    Diasporan political activism.

•    Diasporan sub-groups: issue-based mobilisation, professional associations, specific community initiatives.

Photo: REUTERS

Part III: Armenian Diasporan Individuals and their Biographies/Activities

•    In addition to institutions, there are people of different backgrounds who invest their time, energy and funds in Armenian issues, be it at the local or pan-national levels: philanthropists, community leaders, connectors, activists, intellectuals, artists, etc. What can be learned from their experiences – be they individuals, families or small informal groups?

•    Individuals as agents of change and innovation. What impact have their activities or approaches had in the Diaspora or in Armenia?

 

Part IV: Armenian Diaspora and its Relations with External Actors

 

•    Diaspora’s relations with host-country institutions and activities (political, social, cultural, economic), including with non-Armenian diasporan communities.

•    Diaspora’s relations with countries of origin (where born, the land of ancestors, the Republic of Armenia, or an abstract notion of homeland).

•    Expectations from Armenia and its government.

•    Migration from the Diaspora to Armenia.

•    Diaspora’s relations with regional bodies, for example with inter-state institutions such as the UN, the EU and others, as well as how such institutions relate to Armenian diasporic communities.

Photo: REUTERS

Part V: Cross-Cutting Themes and Issues in the Armenian Diaspora

 

•    Women and power relations in diasporan settings.

•    In addition to specific studies on gender-related issues, we strongly encourage to incorporate gender analysis throughout the various research areas mentioned above.

•    Educational institutions and language preservation/revitalisation.

•    The political economy of the Diaspora: how is its infrastructure funded? The nature and causes of inequalities. Regional differences in economic priorities.

•    Digital spaces, social media, other communication tools and their impact on mobilisation and identity.

•    Cultural production and the arts.

•    Social issues and changing habits.

 

Society | 2020-09-07 09:17:22

The Armenian Diaspora Survey and the “components” of Armenian identity

We encourage researchers to consult the Armenian Diaspora Survey (ADS) in their research: Concurrent to this call for proposals, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, through its Diasporan Perspectives initiative, will make the data of ADS available to the public by the end of 2026.

 

Application Process

 

The deadline for abstracts is 1 September 2026. Abstracts must be sent to [email protected]. The subject line should say: “DP diaspora research project proposal.” The application package must include:

 

•    An abstract of the proposed research, maximum 400 words,

•    A brief cover note,

•    CV,

•    List of publications and/or previous research projects (if not in CV).

 

Additional Submission Requirements

 

•    Applications must be submitted in English or French.

•    Both individual and joint applications are accepted.

•    Applicants may submit one application only.

•    All application materials must be submitted in PDF format.

 

Questions and further information: [email protected].

 

The selection committee will be composed of Diasporan Perspectives staff, a Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation representative, and two external experts.

 

Authors whose academic papers are accepted will receive an honorarium of 2.000 EUR. The amount for policy papers is to be determined.

Photo: REUTERS

Key dates

 

•    Deadline for abstracts: 1 September 2026.

•    Decisions will be communicated to applicants by 15 November 2026.

•    First draft of papers to be submitted by 31 March 2027.

•    Workshop (in person and/or online) to discuss draft papers in May 2027.

•    Papers to be peer reviewed during the summer of 2027.

•    Final papers to be submitted by 31 July 2027.

•    Accepted papers will be submitted to a publisher in 2028.

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Erdoğan meets Italian PM Meloni on sidelines of NATO summit

Türkiye18:17, 8 July 2026
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Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni on the sidelines of the 36th NATO Summit.

The information was reported by the Anadolu news agency.

The meeting took place at the Presidential Complex in Ankara and was held behind closed doors.

The Turkish delegation included Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, National Defence Minister Yaşar Güler, Justice and Development Party (AK Party) Deputy Chair and Spokesperson Ömer Çelik, Head of the Presidential Communications Directorate Burhanettin Duran, Chief Presidential Adviser on Foreign Policy and Security Akif Çağatay Kılıç, and Deputy Chair of the Presidential Security and Foreign Policies Council Çağrı Erhan.

Read the article in: ArmenianRussian:

Published by Armenpress, original at 
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Erdoğan meets German Chancellor Merz on sidelines of NATO summit

Türkiye19:24, 8 July 2026
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Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met German Chancellor Friedrich Merz on the sidelines of the 36th NATO Summit.

The information was reported by the Anadolu news agency.

The meeting took place at the Presidential Complex in Ankara and was held behind closed doors.

The Turkish delegation included Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, National Defence Minister Yaşar Güler, Justice and Development Party (AK Party) Deputy Chair and Spokesperson Ömer Çelik, Head of the Presidential Communications Directorate Burhanettin Duran, and Chief Presidential Adviser on Foreign Policy and Security Akif Çağatay Kılıç.

Read the article in: ArmenianRussian:

Published by Armenpress, original at 
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Next NATO summit to be held in Albania

World19:28, 8 July 2026
Read the article in: Français Armenian:

The next NATO summit will be held in Albania, although the exact date has not yet been determined, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has said.

Speaking at a press conference following the Alliance’s summit in Ankara, Rutte said: “The next summit will certainly take place in Albania, but the date has yet to be decided.”

Earlier, Bloomberg reported that NATO leaders were considering postponing the summit in Albania, originally scheduled for 2027, in an effort to avoid possible new disagreements with the United States.

Read the article in: Français Armenian:

Published by Armenpress, original at 
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NATO to provide Ukraine with at least €70 billion in military aid next year,

World21:07, 8 July 2026
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NATO member states have pledged to provide Ukraine with at least €70 billion in military equipment, assistance and training support next year.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte made the announcement at the closing ceremony of the Alliance leaders’ summit.

He said NATO would continue supporting Ukraine while also pursuing efforts to achieve peace.

“NATO will continue its efforts to achieve peace. As Ukraine shows initiative on the battlefield, our support must also continue,” the secretary general said.

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Published by Armenpress, original at 
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Trump says U.S. to grant Ukraine license to produce Patriot missile systems

U. S.21:07, 8 July 2026
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The United States will grant Ukraine a license to manufacture Patriot missile systems.

As reported by Reuters, U.S. President Donald Trump made the announcement during a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Ankara.

“We will give you a license to produce Patriots. That way, you won’t complain that we’re not providing enough Patriots,” Trump said.

Read the article in: ArmenianRussian:

Published by Armenpress, original at 
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