Antelias: His Holiness Aram I works on securing humanitarian aid to

Press Release
Catholicosate of Cilicia
Communication and Information Department
Contact: V.Rev.Fr.Krikor Chiftjian, Communications Officer
Tel: (04) 410001, 410003
Fax: (04) 419724
E-mail: [email protected]
Web:
PO Box 70 317
Antelias-Lebanon
Armenian version:
HIS HOLINESS ARAM I WORKS ON SECURING HUMANITARIAN AID TO LEBANON
THROUGH ECUMENICAL CONNECTIONS
Gerges Saleh, the general secretary of the Middle East Council of
Churches (MECC), Dr. Samuel Kobia, the general secretary of the World
Council of Churches (WCC) as directors of ecumenical aid organizations
established contact with His Holiness Aram I during the last few days
for consultations on providing humanitarian aid to Lebanon.
The Pontiff advised to organize immediate arrangements for humanitarian
aid through special committees. He considered, however, that the
establishment of a ceasefire and security in Lebanon should be given
priority over humanitarian aid.
The Armenian Catholicos received over the last few days calls of
support through telephones and email from His Holiness Karekin II,
Catholicos of All Armenians, Archbishop Mesrob Moutafian, the Patriarch
of Constantinople, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the president of
the Protestant Federation of France and other spiritual leaders.
##
The Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia is one of the two Catholicosates
of the Armenian Orthodox Church. For detailed information about the
history and mission of the Cilician Catholicosate, you may refer
to the web page of the Catholicosate, The
Cilician Catholicosate, the administrative center of the church is
located in Antelias, Lebanon.

Antelias: The participation of the Catholicosate of Cilicia in the e

Press Release
Catholicosate of Cilicia
Communication and Information Department
Contact: V.Rev.Fr.Krikor Chiftjian, Communications Officer
Tel: (04) 410001, 410003
Fax: (04) 419724
E-mail: [email protected]
Web:
PO Box 70 317
Antelias-Lebanon
Armenian version:
THE PARTICIPATION OF THE CATHOLICOSATE OF CILICIA IN THE ECUMENICAL
DIALOGUE IN GENEVA
The World Council of Churches (WCC) organized the fourth dialogue
of Orthodox and Evangelical churches in the Ecumenical Formation
Center in Geneva on July 10-16. The dialogue’s main theme was the
human being’s Christian concept.
The Catholicosate of Cilicia delegated Bishop Anoushavan Tanielian
(Ecumenical Officer of the Eastern Prelacy of the United States)
and Nayiri Baldjian (delegate of the Armenian Church to the WCC
9th Assembly).
Bishop Anoushavan and Ms. Nayiri talked about the viewpoints of the
Armenian Church towards the creation of man and his salvation.
Mrs. Nayiri was elected a member of the committee tasked with
organizing such meetings in the future.
##
The Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia is one of the two Catholicosates
of the Armenian Orthodox Church. For detailed information about the
Ecumenical activities of the Cilician Catholicosate, you may refer
to the web page of the Catholicosate, The
Cilician Catholicosate, the administrative center of the church is
located in Antelias, Lebanon.

"It Is Good That The Secrecy Is Now Gone"

“IT IS GOOD THAT THE SECRECY IS NOW GONE”
(The exclusive interview of Zeyno Baran, Director of the Center for
Eurasian Policy, Hudson Institute, to Armenian Mediamax news agency,
July 2006)
The situation around the Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement in
recent several weeks has been developing like a “snowball”. Shortly
after the meeting of Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents in Bucharest
the OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairs issued a statement that was perceived
in the region as an “ultimatum” to the parties in the conflict. Do
you agree with such definition?
– I don’t consider the OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairs’ statement as an
“ultimatum”. It is a statement, however, that makes clear that the
co-chairs believe they have done all they can in this process. From
here on, the burden is going to be on the Armenian and the Azerbaijani
sides–if they want a solution, then they need to work with what
there is. Neither side is very happy with what is on offer, but each
side would be better off if this conflict is resolved, so the two
Presidents and the two peoples need to figure out what they want.
I think it is good that the secrecy is now gone and the people of
Armenia and Azerbaijan see clearly what is on offer. For too long
people were debating the plan based on speculations; the whole process
was in the hands of the Presidents and a small group of people around
them. Having more of the society engaged is part of the democratic
and much healthier way to go about it.
Unfortunately I still do not see how either of the Presidents will
move. There are very good reasons for both of them to accept what is
on offer, and declare it as a major success to their people. However,
I think their calculations are different and both believe it is better
to wait a bit longer and see how the situation may evolve. For example,
we still do not know what will happen with Iran; in case of increased
tension with the West, what will Iran’s policy be towards Armenia
and Azerbaijan? What will their positions be vis-a-vis Iran and the
West? How about the deteriorating relations between Washington and
Moscow, especially in areas Moscow still considers to be in its
“backyard”. I think without a clearer picture of the future of
the South Caucasus region and the dynamics that affect it, neither
president will risk making a move that may leave their country in a
worse situation than it is now.
– Can a breakthrough be anticipated at the talks if the G8 Summit
in St. Petersburg discusses the Karabakh settlement?
– Of course it would be very important for the G-8 Summit to include
Karabakh (as well as the other so-called frozen conflicts). While just
raising them at one meeting is not going to lead to any “breakthrough”
it would send a message that the G-8 community is committed to the
peaceful resolution of these conflicts. It would also be important to
underline that it is in Russia’s interest too to see these conflicts
resolved and the South Caucasus prosper.
– Speaking at “The future of democracy in the Black Sea area”
hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
European Affairs on March 8th, 2005 you expressed the opinion that
“to change the political and economic conditions on the ground and
the calculations of two sides U.S. needs to get engaged into the
Karabakh conflict settlement at the highest level.” To your mind,
can we speak about such engagement today?
– I think over the last year the US has increased its engagement,
but still not at the sufficient level. That is why we need to see
US President Bush raise Karabakh at the G-8 so he commits the US at
the highest levels. Why? Because everyone knows that in addition to
working out the issues between the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides,
there is also the Russia factor, and only the US has the ability to
work with Russia in a way to help them see that solution to Karabakh
is in their interest as well.
– You have also stated: “Azerbaijan is told by the West that it lost
Karabakh in the war and needs to give up this piece of land for
the sake of peace and prosperity and move on with its EU and NATO
integration process. This kind of talk only hardens the nationalists,
who believe that with massive oil and gas revenues starting to flow
into the budget over the next several years, they can strengthen
their military and take back their land.” What, to your mind, is
the West doing wrong and what steps should the West take? Can we
describe as nationalists the senior Azerbaijani government officials
who constantly threaten to increase the military budget and resolve
the problem in a military way?
– There is a lot of frustration in Azerbaijan and a sense that the
international community would have supported them a lot more if they
were Christian. Making compromise is always difficult and especially
in a region where such a tradition is not that prevalent. If one looks
at the facts on the ground in Azerbaijan, especially the two digit
growth rates and oil starting flow in massive quantities, it is easy
to understand that the Azerbaijani people would feel increasingly more
secure and feel that time is on their side. Then there is the rise of
nationalism which is not just an Azerbaijani phenomenon but is seen in
many of the countries, including in neighboring countries like Russia
and Turkey. The talk about the military option may be part of the
negotiating tactic, or it may reflect the sense of frustration. I am in
general opposed to people -including senior government officials–using
such language as it fuels mutual mistrust and makes compromise
even harder.
– How viable the prospect of determining Nagorno Karabakh’s status
at a referendum is?
– I do not believe there can be a referendum held in the short
term that would have international legitimacy, but there could and
probably will be one in the future. It all depends on when and under
what conditions.
– In last several years, the representatives of the U.S. Administration
have stressed that unlike other post-Soviet frozen conflicts, Russia
and the USA cooperate closely in Nagorno Karabakh. Is this conditioned
by the specific character of the Karabakh conflict or you may outline
other reasons?
– There is a major difference between Karabakh and the other frozen
conflicts–in the others, such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia
is almost a direct player. Whereas in Karabakh, it is only an indirect
player and hence it is easier for the US and Russia to cooperate.
– The opinion that the USA will henceforth connect the Nagorno Karabakh
settlement with the internal political developments in Armenia and
the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections abandon in
Armenia. How justified this
tactics will be?
– I frankly have not heard anyone mention this in the US
administration. The only thing I hear being mentioned repeatedly is
that 2006 is the “window of opportunity” to reach a solution as after
this year Armenia will start the election cycle and in that climate
it is much harder to resolve a difficult issue like Karabakh.
– Addressing the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European
Affairs last March you said that “the strength of Armenian Diaspora
limits U.S. ability
to encourage democratic change in Armenia.” You noted then that
“the U.S.
simply cannot put the same kind of pressure on President Robert
Kocharian as it was able to do with President Leonid Kuchma of
Ukraine. It is inconceivable to think that Washington would threaten
to keep senior Armenian government officials out of the U.S. in case
of falsified elections.” To your mind, will this tendency be preserved
or Washington will be ready to harden its position if the elections
in Armenia again fail to meet international standards?
– Well, I guess I do not foresee any change as the Armenian Diaspora
is still as effective as it has been and would not want the Armenian
government to come under any kind of criticism. But Armenians should be
able to join the community of democracies and all those civil society
and NGO activists, as well as those reformers in the government,
should be able to get the kind of support other pro-democracy people
in other parts of the world get from the US. There has to be a way
to come up with some sort of a constructive and effective criticism,
but I don’t have the answer as to how.
– What do you think, has Washington already defined its “allies”
at the upcoming elections in Armenia?
– No, I don’t think anyone in Washington is really thinking about
the elections at this point–those few who cover the region are all
focused on the Karabakh conflict. When it gets closer, Washington (by
that I mean the US government) will of course be mostly interested
in the pre-election process; if there will be some “more favored”
candidates, these will be people who will have a vision for Armenia
that is democratic, on its path to integrate closer with the European
and Euro-Atlantic institutions, has a clear and workable reform
agenda, etc.
– Why do U.S. efforts to normalize relations between Armenia and
Turkey turn out to be fruitless? How real is it to speak about the
possibility of normalizing Armenian-Turkish relations before the
settlement of the Karabakh conflict?
– I always had difficulty seeing how Turkey would normalize relations
with Armenia, mainly open the border, before there is some progress
on the Karabakh issue–it does not have to be fully resolved, but
there has to be sufficient progress so that the Turkish people and
the Azerbaijani people would let their leaders make such a move. Of
course there are regular flights between Turkey and Armenia, and
people-to-people exchanges and dialogues are going well. But no matter
how much pressure (or encouragement) there is from the US (and the EU),
Turks will not be able to change policy before the conditions on the
ground change. Turks are simply too close with Azeris in many ways
(ethnic, religious, culture, etc) for them to just act on their own.

Defense Minister to Think about Nominating for Presidential Election

DEFENSE MINISTER TO THINK ABOUT NOMINATING FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Panorama.am
15:03 19/07/06
Armenian Republican Party vice chairman Razmik Zohrabyan refuted rumors
that Serz Sargsyan is going to take up the post of ARP chairmanship
upon teaming up with the party. Zohrabyan said he has no such plans
but also said that Sargsyan will think about nominating himself for
presidential elections after the parliamentary elections./Panorama.am/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Are the OSCE MG co-chairs trying to provoke a war? NK press digest

Are the OSCE MG co-chairs trying to provoke a war? Nagorno Karabakh press digest
Regnum, Russia
July 19 2006
What will the freezing of the negotiating process lead to?
Golos Armenii daily believes that “if the negotiating process is
buried,” everybody will stay with what they had, i.e. Armenia with
Karabakh, while Azerbaijan without the territories its president
Ilham Aliyev swore to get back by 2008, at latest. The general
opinion is that 2007 and 2008 are hopeless – because of internal
political processes in Armenia and Azerbaijan – “while 2006 has
already halved…”
Caucasian Knot news portal reports the speaker of Nagorno-Karabakh
parliament Ashot Gulyan as saying that NK’s participation is key
prerequisite for the resumption of the Karabakh peace talks. There are
several reasons why NK should be involved in the talks: “The natural
format of the talks should be restored; Karabakh should be allowed
to defend its own interest; and, third, Karabakh’s involvement will
mean that Azerbaijan is ready for compromise.”
Nagorno Karabakh cannot take part in the talks as a conflicting
party at the current stage. The world community knows well who are
negotiators and who are conflicting parties, APA reports the head
of the Press and Information Policy Department of the Azeri Foreign
Ministry Tair Tagizade as saying in response to the statement by the
speaker of the NK parliament Ashot Gulyan. Tagizade says that after
the first stage, i.e. when the former ethnic composition of the NK
population is restored, Baku will work with both NK communities. This
is important for the problem of the NK status to be resolved in
conformity with the Constitution of Azerbaijan and also for ensuring
further development of this region.
“While now, cheap tricks like interpreting the words of Sabine Freizer
(the director of the Caucasian Project of the International Crisis
Group – REGNUM) that since the co-chairs no longer want to do anything
else on the problem, the parties should address it themselves as a
call for Nagorno Karabakh’s involvement in the process as a negotiating
party are non-constructive and meant just for internal political use,”
says Tagizade.
“I think they are directly provoking war,” Armenian ex defense
minister Vahan Shirkhanyan says about the statement of the OSCE MG
co-chairs that they are stopping intensive mediatory diplomacy. Asked
if the mediators will continue their tactics – to let the conflicting
parties solve the problem on their own if the summer respite given to
the Armenian and Azeri presidents is left unused – Shirkhanyan says:
“We’ll see that very soon. If they continue being passive after the
G8 summit, this will mean an offer for Azerbaijan and Armenia to
solve the problem the way they can.” (Aravot)
Azeri political scientist, the director of the Caucasian Crisis
Center Zardusht Alizade says that the Nagorno Karabakh conflict will
stay frozen for 10 years more. In a talk with Aravot daily (Yerevan)
Alizade says that the OSCE MG co-chairs were simply forced to state
they are freezing their mission and to disclose the details of the
talks as, particularly, the US has realized that it has exhausted
all of its ways to change the situation. The MG co-chairs decided to
pass the initiative to the two countries – to let their people decide
themselves what to do. “This is an attempt to get the problem moving.
They were simply forced to start open diplomacy. In its turn, Russia
is absolutely sure that it is pulling strings in Nagorno Karabakh
and Armenia and that the NK and Armenian leaders are under its thumb
and will make no single move without its consent. So, Russia is
cold-bloodedly watching how the US is sweating to solve the problem.”
Alizade says that the issues discussed in Paris and before were
unacceptable for either Armenia or Azerbaijan. Even more, they
generated strong resistance and nationalist and chauvinist propaganda
in both states. “This was profitable for both Aliyev and Kocharyan.
That’s why now the opposition camps in both states are slating their
presidents from equally radical positions and are ardently advocating
the deadlock situation that is leading Azerbaijan and Armenia to
tragedy.” Will the Armenian and Azeri authorities try to look for new
ways to solve the problem with no mediation by the OSCE MG and with
no interference by the MG member states? “Absolutely not. In fact,
what they have now is exactly what they wanted, what they dreamt of.
Until now the OSCE MG has been though formal but still a force that
forced them to take, at least, some steps. The co-chairs’ statement
about freezing their mediation is good for both Kocharyan and Aliyev:
now they can pass the buck on the MG and cheat their people by saying:
you see, the co-chairs have also held up their hands in capitulation –
they can’t bring us to common denominator. Then, they in Armenia will
start blaming Azerbaijan, they in Azerbaijan – Armenia, there will
be no initiative at all as both presidents are busy with something
much more important – they are robbing.” Alizade is sure that there
will be no new war: “What war are you talking about if the boss needs
frozen conflict rather than war? Escalation is absolutely unprofitable
for Russia. And Kocharyan and Aliyev have one and the same boss –
Mr. Putin. They will do just what he tells them to. Should he tell
Kocharyan to attack Azerbaijan, he will attack, should he tell Aliyev
to attack Armenia, he will do – but Putin does not want that. Russia
wants the conflict to be frozen and it is frozen.” Alizade refutes the
reports that Aliyev has changed his orientation from Russia to the
US: “Aliyev does not need that. What he needs is to fill his pocket
and if this requires giving promises to people, he is ready to give
them. Aliyev acts exactly the way your Kocharyan does?”
The Armenian and Azeri authorities have no alternative, the director
of the Center of Rights and Freedoms of Armenia Vardan Haroutyunyan
says to Aravot daily:
“They in power in Armenia and Azerbaijan regard the conflict as some
daily necessity. Here, the Armenian and Azeri authorities are very
much like each other. In both countries this conflict is the basis of
their foreign and domestic policies and everyday life and a way for
them to earn money. Neither side wants this problem to be solved:
the conflict helps them to keep power in their hands, to make big
money and to get, at least, some attention from those high and mighty,
while the proposals by the OSCE MG co-chairs and the world community
were not so much in their interests as in the interest of continuing
peace in the region. In this light, one could well expect that the
declassifying statements by Matthew Bryza (US co-chair of the OSCE
MG – REGNUM) would receive negative reaction from both sides. And
that’s exactly what is happening.”
However, the Armenian FM said that the framework agreement on Karabakh
is acceptable for Armenia and they are ready to continue the talks
on the basis of these principles. True, some NGOs said that “Bryza’s
statements smell of oil.”
The Armenian FM has been saying this for 7-8 years already. Whatever
initiative he spoke about, he said: “by the highest standards, it is
acceptable.” However, the conflict is still present, which makes future
development impossible. As regards the statements by some radically
nationalist NGOs, they are quite natural. Our Nationalists think
that the louder they shout and slate the others, the stronger they
will get. This is self-assertion rather than patriotism. One thing
is sure: rule by Nationalists is a serious ordeal for any country as
they are known for their vanity, demagogy and irresponsibility. They
authorize themselves to speak on behalf of their nation and state and
forbid the others to do anything in this sphere. Cave patriotism and
nationalism have always led to fatal consequences.” (Aravot)
New statement by the Minsk Group
Aravot daily reports the OSCE MG co-chairs to appear with a new
statement: “Taking into account recent speculation about the basic
principles for a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict
proposed to both parties by the Minsk Group Co-Chairs, it is necessary
to make the following clarification,” say the co-chairs.
“The principles are based on the redeployment of Armenian troops
from Azerbaijani territories around Nagorno Karabakh, with special
modalities for Kelbajar and Lachin districts (including a corridor
between Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh), demilitarization of those
territories, and a referendum or population vote – at a date and in
a manner to be decided through further negotiations – to determine
the final legal status of Nagorno Karabakh.”
“Certain interim arrangements for Nagorno Karabakh would allow for
interaction with providers of international assistance.”
The co-chairs stand ready to assist the parties to conclude an
agreement if the presidents indicate they are prepared to do so.
In conclusion, they say: “Although no additional meetings between the
sides under the auspices of the Co-Chairs are planned for the immediate
future, they will be ready to reengage if the parties decide to pursue
the talks with the political will that has thus far been lacking.
Zerkalo daily (Baku) says that “the double-dealing of the OSCE MG
co-chair-states” is increasingly actively pushing Azerbaijan into
solving the Karabakh problem by war. The daily reports the director of
the International Center for Strategic Studies Against International
Terrorism and Corruption “Bank-Information” Rovshan Novruzoglu as
saying that no single official document in France contains a single
sentence about the “occupation” of 20% of Azeri territory even though
this year alone the French Ambassador to Baku has made 17 official
statements that Nagorno Karabakh belongs to Azerbaijan and that the
country’s territorial integrity must be restored. The other co-chair,
the US, says in official, intelligence and diplomatic directories that
Azerbaijan has lost only 16% of its territory… Those directories
do not even say that the territories were “occupied’ by Armenia
and say that there are only 800,000 instead of 1 million Azeri
refugees. Novruzoglu says that the third OSCE MG co-chair Russia is
no better: even though the whole world knows about the mono-ethnic
policy of the Armenians, Moscow helps them to veil it. Russia has
given guarantees for creating community of Slavonic nations over ‘the
occupied Azeri lands’ and Russian community in Nagorno Karabakh. This
community was registered in 1998 by the Justice Ministry of the
so-called ‘Nagorno Karabakh Republic.’ They in Yerevan and Stepanakert
have opened ‘Houses of Slavonic Nations.’
As far as Bank-Information knows, 79 Russian soldiers and officers
serve in the armed forces of the separatists: 22 of them in the
motorized infantry division in Agderin district, 16 in the 2nd
motorized infantry brigade in the village of Garahanbeyli, 19 in the
538th regiment in the village of Agdabad. 54 Armenian soldiers and
officers serve at Gabala Radar Station under the Russian flag. Hence,
the daily concludes that the statements by Azeri government officials
and representatives of international organizations that they hope
that the OSCE MG co-chairs will help to resolve the Karabakh conflict
is just a way to drag time. In fact, the co-chairs cannot go against
the will and policy of their states. ‘So, there is only one way left
… painful, thorny but sure way…’
Azg daily believes that the co-chairs just want to see how people in
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh will react to their proposals
and later on to make those people ready to accept their settlement
scenario. We have already noted that the international pressure on
the conflicting parties will continue to grow and that the proposed
settlement principles will be imposed on them. Obviously, things are
developing exactly this way. The first serious proof is that the
G8 FMs have approved the co-chairs’ proposals and have urged the
two presidents to take a step towards peace. The daily says that
Azerbaijan may well pin all of its hopes on the oil prospects and
refuse to sign an agreement. Thereby, it will drive the conflict into
a deadlock. What shall Armenia do then? The only logical way for the
country is to attain by all means the international recognition of
Nagorno Karabakh. Azerbaijan’s unyielding defiance of the international
community is the best pretext for that. We have just to wait and
see. If Armenia and Azerbaijan fail to sign any agreement because of
irreconcilability of the other side, Armenia will have to seize this
opportunity and get the international community to recognize Nagorno
Karabakh, says the daily.
‘The last proposals by the OSCE MG co-chairs can serve as a basis
for the Karabakh peace talks,’ De Facto reports the speaker of the
NK parliament Ashot Gulyan as saying during a press-conference. He
says that ‘not all the provisions of the statement are acceptable
for the Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenian leaders.’ He says that ‘it is
early yet to speak about deployment of peacekeeping forces in the
Karabakh conflict zone.’ He agrees that peacekeepers will guarantee
peace and fulfillment of the signed agreement, but, at the same time,
he notes that the sides have been effectively keeping peace on their
own for many years already and can do it in the future too. ‘NKR is
careful about the possibility of deployment of peacekeepers in the
conflict zone,’ says NK Foreign Minister Georgy Petrossyan.
Iranian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Afshar Suleymani says that the OSCE
MG co-chair-states seek not so much to promote the conflict resolution
as to ensure their own interests. Suleymani says: ‘Those who come from
afar care for their own interests. I believe that the Nagorno Karabakh
problem has become an object of interest for certain circles, and the
role of the OSCE MG co-chairs is just to ensure their own interests
at the expense of the gist of the problem – the interest of the
Azeri people.’ In such a situation, the conflict will either be left
unresolved or be resolved upon terms imposed by the co-chair-states and
running counter to the interests of the conflicting parties. (Day.Az).
With no reliable and, more importantly, full information about the
content of the ‘framework agreement’ in hand, we can’t draw any
conclusions, says Respublika Armenia daily. Still, we are puzzled to
see that the co-chairs, who are perfectly aware that it was exactly
the Azeri president who rejected the draft agreement in Bucharest,
still persist in urging both sides to show political will, thereby,
making people in Armenia believe that they are pressuring Yerevan.
The fact that the program of the OSCE MG co-chairs has not been made
public allows the Armenian and Azeri authorities to pick up only
those components that will help them to avoid being called ‘traitors
and capitulators’ by their own people, says Aravot daily. In fact,
the Armenian and Azeri officials give quite different pictures of
what was discussed during the Kocharyan-Aliyev talks.
1. The Armenian officials report the co-chairs to suggest that the
referendum on the Nagorno-Karabakh status be held over the territory
of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region according to the
Armenian-Azeri population ratio of 1988. The Azeri officials say that
the co-chairs suggest holding the referendum over the whole territory
of Azerbaijan.
2. The Armenian officials report the co-chairs to suggest that the
Armenian troops be first withdrawn from five districts and be left
in Kelbajar and Lachin, while the Azeri officials speak about all
seven districts, including Kelbajar and Lachin.
3. The Armenians say that the co-chairs do not even mention
Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, while the Azeris say that their
proposals are based exactly on Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.
With so diametrically opposite comments, it is not very much clear
what precisely we, the public, should discuss, says Aravot. And if
in the three ‘Prague Process’ years the sides have failed to agree
on any single key point, what were they talking about, in the first
place, and why did the co-chairs say, from time to time, that the
sides had agreed on the key points and had just to coordinate 1-2
remaining ones? If the settlement program is actually the way the
Armenian authorities present it, we may as well accept it. Of course,
here too we have some former warriors who show extremist approach
by saying ‘we will give no single inch of land,’ but this approach
is obviously provoked by the authorities themselves – i.e. by their
attempts to prove what heroic efforts it takes them to overcome the
resistance of our ‘retarded society.’ (Aravot)
International Crisis Group
In an exclusive interview to APA news agency the director of the
Caucasian Project of the International Crisis Group Sabine Freizer
qualified the situation in the Karabakh peace process as very
critical. She believes that the Azerbaijani and Armenian sides were
much closer to an agreement in summer 2005 than they are today:
‘There was much optimism until the Rambouillet meeting that there
would be a peace agreement this year, that Armenian backed troops
would begin withdrawal, and Azerbaijani IDPs would begin to return
home during the second half of 2006 or in early 2007. This optimism
has disappeared. Instead the co-chairs have stated that they are
going to suspend their work.’
Commenting on the words of the co-chairs that both presidents are
responsible for the settlement of the conflict, Freizer says that the
most important text to be considered is the statement made by the
OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs at the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna
on June 22, 2006: ‘This statement provides a coherent and unified
approach to the resolution of the conflict. It is perhaps the most
open and critical statement the OSCE Minsk Group has ever made. It is
also the first time since the start of the Minsk Group facilitated
negotiations in 1994 that the co-chairs have said that they see
no point in continuing their work. I am very surprised that few in
Azerbaijan or in Armenia are commenting on this point. The Minsk Group
statement means in practice that there is no longer any internationally
facilitated negotiations format for the resolution of the NK conflict.
What does this mean? Will the two sides manage to negotiate on their
own without any third party mediation? Will another mediator appear?
If the United States, Russia and France are giving up, what other
international forces have the influence and authority to play a
negotiator role? I don’t believe that any new mediators will appear.
Rather we are entering a very dangerous phase where there will be
no peaceful negotiations between the sides. Again since 1994 this is
the first time that we are in such a situation.’
Freizer says that the critical statements by the Ministries of
Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan and Armenia prove that they are strongly
concerned for the course of the negotiating process: ‘The Armenian
side is insisting that the principles included a reference to the
Lachin corridor, and to the right to self determination of the people
of NK of their own status through a referendum. The Azerbaijani side
is stating that the principles included liberation of the occupied
territories, demilitarization of the conflict zone, and the return
of all Azerbaijani IDPs. Yet these are precisely the points that the
two sides continue to disagree on – and why they were unable to sign
a set of principles in Rambouillet and Bucharest.
The modalities of withdrawal from Lachin and Kelbajar and the
modalities of a popular vote on the status of NK were not agreed
upon by the sides. This is why the co-chairs recommended that they be
addressed later – in separate working groups. But in the meantime they
suggested that a peace-building process start with the withdrawal of
Armenia backed troops of five districts – to be followed by withdrawal
from the other two – and return of IDPs to their homes.’
Calling this a tragic process Freizer says that in 2006 there was a
chance for withdrawal to begin and return to start. ‘Now there is no
peace process. There is not even a negotiations process. Instead the
Azerbaijani side is increasingly referring to the military option. If
Azerbaijan decides to take offensive action against NK and Armenia,
how many more years will it be before this conflict is resolved? How
many more displaced persons and casualties will there be? How definite
is it that Azerbaijan will get a better deal using the military option
than what is on the table today?’
“The issue of the referendum on the status of Nagorno Karabakh is
clearly one of the most sensitive points in the package that was
being discussed. As the co-chairs state: for a withdrawal of Armenian
backed forces from the occupied territories to begin, the sides would
have to agree on the principle that a referendum will determine
final status. But the precise modalities of this referendum would
be discussed in further negotiations. Thus the key issue of debate
between the Armenian and Azerbaijani side of who would participate
in the referendum, where and when it would be held, would be decided
upon later.
Freizer says that the international community is unlikely to use any
other pressure mechanisms to encourage Armenia to withdraw from the
occupied territories. She says that at the next stage everything will
depend on the conflicting sides. If they fail to show political will
for overcoming contradictions, they should not expect international
assistance in the matter. They should not hope for international
support if they decide to solve the problem in military way, says
Frezier.

Maronites and Turkish Cypriots

Maronites and Turkish Cypriots
By Sharbel Tzotzoukis
Londra Toplum Postasý, UK
British-Turkish News Network
July 20 2006
20 Temmuz 2006, Perþembe 00:36 Yorum Yaz
Living in Southern Cyprus, Sharbel is a Maronite Cypriot who is
Webmaster for , which is an online community forum
for Cypriot Maronites. The forum, which is a source of information on
the 5000 strong community frequently, organizes events and reunions
for the community including picnics in the Troodos Mountains and
pilgrimages to Northern Cyprus.
The Maronites of Cyprus have been deeply rooted in its territories
since the 6th Century AD following massive immigration from the lands
of then Greater Syria and from what today constitutes the state of
Lebanon hence their cultural and ethnic links with Lebanon remain
very strong. Historians note that at its peak the Maronite community
of Cyprus numbered 80 villages populated by some 80,000 people.
Maronites from the Venetian period to the present day.
The reign of the Venetians (1489-1571) was particularly harsh on the
citizens of the island as adopted a Western feudal system and imposed
exorbitant taxes. But the calamity that weakened the Maronite presence
was brought on not only by the corrupt reign of the temporal rulers
and governors of Cyprus, but also by the severe treatment by both
the Greek and Latin ecclesiastical authorities.
By 1572, the Maronites resided in 33 villages and their Bishop resided
in the Monastery of Dali in the district of Karpasia. During Ottoman
rule, 14 Cypriot Maronite villages became extinct. By 1596, about
25 years after the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus, the total number of
Maronite villages had been reduced to 19.
While the Ottomans ruled, the Greeks, who had gained the upper hand
for a while, began their retaliation against the Catholics — which
mainly included the Maronites, who were the only Catholics left on
the island. The vengeance of the Greeks began with the confiscation
of the Maronite churches and was magnified by their accusation that
the Maronite clergy was conspiring for the return of Venetian rule
to Cyprus and was plotting against the Ottoman Empire.
Ottoman pressure was to convert was significant too, by 1636, the
situation had become so intolerable and those unable to resist
converted to Islam. Not all converts were Maronites, some were
Armenians and Albanians who lived in the northern mountain range and
along the north coast, particularly at Tillyria, Gambyli, Ayia Marina
Skillouras, Platani and Kornokipos. The Maronites who adopted Islam
were mainly centered in the Louroujina area and were called Linobambaki
— a composite Greek word that means men of linen and cotton.
However, the Maronites who had converted in despair did not fully
denounce their Christian faith. They retained some beliefs and rituals,
hoping to denounce their ‘conversion’ when the Ottomans left. For
example, they baptized and confirmed their children according to
Christian tradition, but administered circumcision in conformity
with Islamic practices. They also gave their children two names,
one Christian and one Muslim.
The Maronites maintained their presence and persisted in their faith,
although some succumbed due to persecution. They had their own clergy
and bishops, but effectively they were under the ecclesiastical
domination of either the Greeks or the Latin. What remained at the
time of the country’s independence from the British in 1960 were only
four villages, Kormakitis, Karpasia, Asomatos and Ayia Marina.
Our special relationship with Turkish Cypriots
Because of language considerations the Maronite Community chose to
be registered on the Greek Cypriot electoral register although their
relationship with the Turkish Cypriot community was and still is on
excellent terms. During the 1963-64 communal unrest many Maronites
assisted, helped, and hosted a number of Turkish Cypriots families
from their neighboring villages. This was something that the Turkish
Cypriots never forgot and it was repaid similarly during the events
of 1974 when the Maronites were sheltered and protected by their
Turkish Cypriot neighbours.
Before the events of 1974, the resulting division and due to the
closure of the four remaining Maronite villages, 100% of the Maronite
Community of Cyprus moved to the Southern part of the country or
emigrated abroad. Having left their ancestral villages, Maronites
were prevented from communicating with those who stayed behind while
those who relocated down south faced the dangers of assimilation into
the Greek Cypriot community.
After 32 years of closed checkpoints the numbers of the Cypriot
Maronites fell down to a two-digit figure. Cypriot Maronites welcomed
the opening of the crossing points in April 2003, which brought back
life to the streets of Kormakitis. Sadly, however positive this is,
we cannot though be as optimistic for the remaining three Maronite
villages, which remain inaccessible.
It is for this reason that all Maronites welcomed the new measures
by the new Turkish Cypriot Government regarding the rights of the
Maronites to return and to make use of their property rights. As a
direct consequence of these measures, many refugees from Kormakitis
have expressed their desire to return to their homes and properties
even before the final settlement of the Cyprus issue. The Turkish
Cypriot Government’s decision is helping the survival at least of
Kormakitis and Karpasia.
Also thanks to the Turkish Cypriot Government for the first time
in 32 years on July 23rd 2006 there will be a mass Holy Mass at the
Monastery of Prophet Elias near Ayia Marina. Simultaneously Maronites
are discussing with the Turkish Cypriot government on ways of issuing
some kind of titles to owners of newly built homes and on new measures
for removing the military character and presence from the three other
villages so that their inhabitants can move in too.
/news/8515/PageName/English
–Boundary_(ID_jdSex1 fB3D5T2+YTW4OQSg)–

www.maronite-cy.com

Editor may face new prosecution for referring to Armenian genocide

IFEX, Canada
Int’l Freedom of Expression eXpress
July 20 2006
Editor may face new prosecution for referring to Armenian genocide
Francais: Un journaliste a nouveau poursuivi pour ses propos sur le
genocide armenien
Country/Topic: Turkey
Date: 19 July 2006
Source: Reporters Without Borders (RSF)
Person(s): Hrant Dink
Target(s): journalist(s)
Type(s) of violation(s): charged
Urgency: Flash
(RSF/IFEX) – On 18 July 2006, the Istanbul public prosecutor opened a
new investigation against Hrant Dink, the managing editor of the
Armenian-language weekly “Agos”, this time for referring to the
massacre of Armenians in 1915 as “genocide.”
Dink used the term in a 14 July interview for the British news agency
Reuters about his suspended sentence of six months in prison for
“insulting Turkish identity.” He could face up to three years in
prison if convicted on the new charge.
The Turkish state still refuses to recognise that a massacre of
Armenians took place during the First World War.
For further information, contact Annabelle Arki at RSF, 5, rue
Geoffroy Marie, Paris 75009, France, tel: +33 1 44 83 84 67, fax: +33
1 45 23 11 51, e-mail: [email protected], Internet:

Americans frustrated, angry over US evacuation efforts in Lebanon

Americans frustrated, angry over US evacuation efforts in Lebanon
By VERENA DOBNIK
Newsday, NY
July 19 2006
July 19, 2006, 4:50 PM EDT
NEW YORK — Americans trying to flee Lebanon struggled on Wednesday
to find out what their government was doing to evacuate them, with
many relying on the news media for information _ only to learn that
plans were still not in place.
“We’re getting e-mails from the U.S. Embassy saying, ‘We’re working
on it,”‘ Maria Bakalian said by telephone from Beirut, where she was
trying to get her 19-year-old son out of the country and back to his
college classes in Pennsylvania. The family used the U.S. Embassy Web
site to register Sevag Bakalian for an American evacuation list. He’s
heard nothing so far.
In Manhattan, his uncle was waiting. “I think incompetence explains
the situation,” said Mirhan Bakalian. “The U.S. system is not working _
it’s ill-suited to think on its feet and move fast.”
On Wednesday, a cruise ship carrying more than 1,000 Americans sailed
out of Beirut’s port, but more than 20,000 other Americans were still
in Lebanon a week after Israeli airstrikes started.
Some wondered why they were waiting for basic information _ like
confirmation that their names were even on a list for evacuation
_ while other nations already had transported thousands of their
nationals, free of charge.
The U.S. government at first said that anyone wishing to leave would
have to sign a note pledging to reimburse the government the price of
a commercial flight from Beirut to Cyprus _ usually $150-$200. After
criticism from Congress, the State Department dropped plans to charge.
Two other young Americans visiting friends in Beirut watched the
foreigners leaving.
“They all got out _ the Turkish, the British, the Danish, the French,
the Spaniards and the Italians,” said Paola Rizzuto, 22, who was
in Beirut with her boyfriend, Rafael Greenblatt, 26, both of New
Brunswick, N.J.
U.S. Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman told The Associated Press that the
evacuation’s slow start was intended to safeguard Americans. A call
to the U.S. Embassy in Beirut was answered by a Marine who said he
could not comment.
In New York’s borough of Queens, Rizzuto’s parents waited anxiously
to hear when they could pick up their daughter at an airport here.
“I’m getting angrier and angrier. The American government seems to
have money for everything else except its citizens,” said Joseph
Rizzuto, a high school teacher in Queens who with his wife and son
waited for Paola.
He said he had called the State Department 800 number available to
answer questions about U.S. citizens in Lebanon, and although she had
registered, “they couldn’t find my daughter’s name on any evacuation
list, and had no information on her.”
Rizzuto then called the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, “and it rang and rang,
and finally the line went dead.”
In a telephone interview from Beirut, Paola Rizzuto told the AP that
after registering for evacuation with the U.S. Embassy via e-mail,
“we were supposed to receive an e-mail confirmation that we’re on
the list, that they’ve received our registration,” she said. So far,
they’ve heard nothing from American officials.
The couple was in Lebanon on a month-long visit at the American
University in Beirut, whose students were among the first to be
evacuated. Left behind were Greenblatt and Rizzuto, a graduate
of Rutgers University in New Brunswick who had attended American
University as a student.
With water pressure fading and electricity cut for hours at a time,
Rizzuto and Greenblatt have spent their days as volunteers helping
Lebanese families displaced by the airstrikes and now living in a
makeshift camp in a Beirut park.
The Bakalian family huddled in their apartment in the Zokak El-Blat
neighborhood overlooking Beirut’s port, watching CNN for any new
instructions from U.S. officials. From the ninth floor, through thick
smoke from the airstrikes, “we see the ships come in and go out,” said
Maria Bakalian, adding that the Israelis allowed “windows” of time when
the port area was safe from airstrikes and vessels could be loaded.
Bakalian, a Beirut-born Canadian citizen, said she had received
several cell phone text messages from Canadian officials offering
plans for evacuation, with costs for the trip covered all the way to
Canada. “The Canadians are keeping their citizens in the loop. The
Americans are not,” said Bakalian.
She’s staying in Beirut, along with her husband, the Rev. Nishan
Bakalian _ the Armenian Evangelical chaplain of Haigazian University
there. Until 2000, the Philadelphia native was pastor of the Armenian
Evangelical Church in Manhattan.
Their biggest concern now was “getting our son out safely,” said
Maria Bakalian.
But once that’s accomplished, the family faces another reality. “The
thought crosses my mind that if he goes, I may not see him for God
knows how long,” she said. “But I know that it all has to come to an
end at some point.”
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Armenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina Establish Relations

Armenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina Establish Relations
PanARMENIAN.Net
19.07.2006 13:48 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ During the visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina RA Foreign
Minister Vartan Oskanian met with the FM Mladen Ivanic to discuss
bilateral relations and some international problems. Remarking that
the relations between the two states are being formed the Ministers
pointed out to the importance of the development of economic ties and
formation of a legal field that would strengthen bilateral relations.
The parties also stressed the significance of agreements on investment
protection, trade and economic cooperation and non-visa entry regime
for diplomats, reported the RA MFA press office.

Nairobi: Arturs sought in Armenia for evading military service

Arturs sought in Armenia for evading military service
Story by MUGUMO MUNENE and LUCAS BARASA
Daily Nation, Kenya
July 20 2006
Publication Date: 07/20/2006
Mr Joseph Bildad Gacheru of Immigration Department studies one of
the Artur brothers passport.
The Armenian Government is looking for the two men who posed as Artur
Sargsyan and Arman Sargsyan for evading mandatory military service,
the Kiruki team was told yesterday.
The information was relayed to the Government in April through Interpol
as detectives in Nairobi, headed by Nairobi CID boss Isaiah Osugo,
tried to unravel the mystery of the Artur brothers.
“Artur Sargsyan and Arman Sargsyan are wanted by Armenian authorities
for avoiding military services according to their laws. There is no
information on their departure or arrival. How the two came to Kenya,
nobody knows,” inspector Julius Kiprotich of Kenya’s national bureau
of Interpol told the commission.
Mr Kiprotich was reading a document from Yerevan, the Armenian capital.
The information deepened the mystery of the Armenian brothers since
evidence has been tendered before the commission that the person who
identified himself in Kenya as Artur Margaryan was in fact an impostor.
According to the evidence, the actual Artur Margaryan works with
the taxation department in Yerevan and has never stepped in Kenya
or Africa.
Interpol Yerevan advised their Nairobi counterparts in April that they
had “all grounds” to believe that the men who presented themselves in
Nairobi as Artur Margaryan and Artur Sargsyan were in fact impostors.
The commission also heard that the file relating to Interalliance,
a company associated with Kensington co-director Alois Omita, had
resurfaced at the shelves in the Companies registry.
Mrs Jane Njeri, the State Counsel who heads the registry, returned to
the witness box yesterday and said that documents in the file showed
that the company had in fact changed names from Premier Global Alliance
to Interalliance International Kenya Ltd.
However, several irregularities were pointed out in the file, which
Mr Omita is expected to respond to through his lawyer Mr Gilbert
Mungu this morning.
Excerpts:
Assisting counsel Dorcas Oduor: You were to look at the contents of
the files by Interalliance. Did you get them?
Njeri: My lords, I got and I found it at the slot where it is supposed
to be.
Oduor: Was it there yesterday (Tuesday)?
Njeri: It was not when I was looking for it in the morning before I
came to the commission.
Oduor: You remember yesterday an issue was raised as to whether Premier
Global Alliance Ltd changed its name to Interalliance International
Kenya Ltd. What do you have to say?
Njeri: I have confirmed from the file that a certificate of change of
name was issued from our office on November 22, 2002. I have a copy
of the same in my file where Premier Global Alliance Ltd changed its
name to Interalliance International Kenya Ltd.
Oduor: There is a letter in your file, authoured by Mr Alois Omita
to one Anthony Macharia of K. Macharia and Company Advocates. When
is it dated?
Njeri: I have it. It is dated October 16, 2002 and is addressed to
Anthony Macharia.
The contents read; “Dear Anthony, change of name. Please refer to
our discussion on the subject matter. We would be grateful if you
would kindly change the name of our company, Premier Global Alliance
to Interalliance International Kenya. Enclosed is the certificate
of incorporation. Kindly proceed.” It is signed Yours Faithfully,
Alois Omita.
Oduor: Was it stamped in your registry?
Njeri: It was not.
Oduor: Every correspondence is supposed to be stamped?
Njeri: It is either supposed to be stamped or there should be a
receipt for payment of the fees.
Oduor: You realise that the letterhead is already using the name
Interalliance International?
Njeri: Yes.
Oduor: Has Alois Omita described his position in that company?
Njeri: From this letter, there is no description.
Oduor: Do you have a copy of a special resolution?
Njeri: I have the original special resolution to change the name from
Premier Global Alliance and it says that at an extra-ordinary meeting
of the members of the company duly convened and held at LR209/70/2
Museum Hill Nairobi on November 20, 2002, the following resolution
was passed. The name of the company is changed to Interalliance Kenya.
Oduor: The resolution is signed by who?
Njeri: The person describes himself as a director.
Oduor: Look at Form 208 in Kensington; the one signed by the advocate
Anthony Macharia.
Njeri: This is the form that is sworn by an advocate declaring that
he witnessed the formation of the company. He has signed it.
Oduor: The signature on the special resolution resembles that of
Anthony Macharia Advocate?
Njeri: It resembles.
Oduor: Is Anthony Macharia a director in Inter Alliance or Premier
Global?
Njeri: He’s not my lords.
Oduor: But he has described himself as a director?
Njeri: Yes the person signing the special resolution has described
himself as a director and this form should actually be authenticated
by a written signature of an officer of the company who should be a
director or the company secretary.
Oduor: In that letter he describes himself as a director and in
Premier Global he’s not a director?
Njeri: He’s not a director.
Oduor: Look at the letter from Omita, it’s dated October 16. Is it
referring to any special resolution?
Njeri: It refers to a discussion not a special resolution.
Oduor: And you realise that it comes before the special resolution
which is signed by Macharia.
Njeri: Yes. The letter is dated October 16 and the special resolution
is dated November 20.
Oduor: Logically the resolution should precede the letter?
Njeri: That should be the logic.
The 43rd witness, Police Inspector Julius Kiprotich, was sworn in. He
was led in evidence by assisting counsel Warui Mungai.
Mungai: For how long have you been in the police force?
Kiprotich: Seventeen years.
Mungai: How many have you served at the Interpol?
Kiprotich: I have served at the National Central Bureau for one year.
Mungai: What happened on March 22, 2006?
Kiprotich: That was the day the Officer Commanding Interpol Mary
Ngariuko, a senior assistant commissioner of police, called me to her
office and instructed me to write a message on request from the PCIO
Nairobi area Mr Osugo to Yerevan in Armenia. She gave me a letter
which had some details. I extracted information and wrote a letter
to Interpol Yerevan asking for details requested by Mr Osugo.
Mungai: I have a letter here and I would like to know whether that
is what you wrote? If it is, read it.
Kiprotich: That’s true my lords.
>>From Interpol Nairobi to Interpol Yerevan.
“We kindly request you to give us the following information to further
our investigations;
a) Whether the two are Armenian citizens;
b) Their occupation;
c) When and how they left your country for Kenya;
d) What reasons they gave for coming to Kenya.
Attached are their passports, work permits and photographs for ease
of reference. Urgently expedite.”
Mungai: Did they respond?
Kiprotich: They did, I think in April.
Mungai: What was the information?
Stolen passports, which were presented at the Kiruki commission
hearing yesterday.
Kiprotich: The information was that Artur Margaryan was born in 1973
and is the holder of passport number AF0631173 issued on October 11
2003. His first passport – number AB322223 – was issued on January
27, 1997. That he had never been to Africa including Kenya, that he
is currently in Armenia, works at taxation services in Yerevan.
Travelled twice to Sochi in Russia and once to Vurna. That he
together with Artur Sargsyan are not relatives of the Prime Minister
of Armenia. For Artur Sargsyan, he was born on May 14, 1970. On May
1, 1997, he got a passport number AB0366773. That he lost another
one number AB0366773 and applied for new one number AF0599780. That
he together with his family moved to United Arab Emirates. That
he together with his brother Arman Sargsyan are wanted by Armenian
Authorities for avoiding military services according to their laws.
That there is no information on his departure or arrival. How the
two Armenians came to Kenya, nobody knows.
Mungai: There is a letter from Armenia which is Exhibit 1(i) dated
March 18. Did you request for the information?
Kiprotich: No. The first message was drafted by senior officer on
March 15.
Mungai: Did you get to see the answer?
Kiprotich: Yes on March 18.
Mungai: Let’s first concentrate on the reply you got. Look at the
fourth paragraph.
Kiprotich: “Please be informed that we have all grounds to think
that the persons who presented themselves as Margaryan Artur in your
country is in fact another person. In this view you are requested to
make the final identification of the persons who presented themselves
with the photos we have provided.
Mungai: Do you have the photo that was presented to you?
Kiprotich: I have it.
Mungai: Did you compare with the person who presented himself as
Artur Margaryan in Kenya?
Kiprotich: No.
Meanwhile, you are kindly requested to inform us of the investigations
against them particularly whether a criminal case is instituted
against them, which body conducted the investigations, the status of
the person in subject and the details of the case. The measures for
receiving information concerning Margaryan Artur and Sargsyan Artur are
continuing and you will be informed additionally about the results.”
Mungai: Do you have the photo that was presented to you?
Kiprotich: I have it.
Mungai: Did you compare with the person who presented himself as
Artur Margaryan in Kenya?
Kiprotich: No.